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AB3rrRACT 
In this thesis a:n analysis is made of the relationship 
between the families which until recently controlled most of 
South Africa's sugarmills, and their sugarmill employees. The 
relationship is approached by way of a study of the culture of 
the sugarmill; by way, that is, of looking at the ideological 
and material connotations of the sugarmilling labour process as 
they manifested themselves i~ the sugar villages of South 
Africa. It is the principal concern of the study to 
demonstrate how the dynastic sugarmilling families, who are 
presented as a sugarocracy, impinged upon the culture of the 
sugarmill. 
By perceiving the culture of the sugarmill as evolving out 
of the sugarmilling labour process, a materialist 
interpretation of historical evidence is indicated as a method 
for analysing sugarocratic domination. This method is applied 
to empirical evidence derived primarily through literary 
research. A further methodological consideration is displayed 
in the emphasis given to causal relationships between 
sugarocratic influences upon the labour process and workers' 
responses to that process. :J3ecause of the centrality accorded 
to the labour process points of reference are readily found in 
studies of sugarmilling in other milieux. Thus each chapter of 
the thesis is introduced with relevant material on sugarmilling 
in regions where it has generally been subjected to more social 
analysis than has been the South African case. 
Arranged in three parts, the analysis begins with an account 
of the ascent of the . sugarocracy since the turn of the 
twentieth century, and of the establishment and development of 
sugarocratic ideology and politics. In the second part, 
attention is focused on the sugarmill, with chapters devoted to 
sugar technology and the technical division of labour, the 
racial di vision of labour, and work-place control, 
respectively. The final part is given to an examination of 
life in the sugar village, and to the question of how, by means 
of accommodation and resistance, workers coped with the 
conditions under which they worked and lived. 
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Twenty years have elapsed since Manuel Moreno Fraginals 
first had his El Ingenio published. Now available also in 
English, the book is unsurpassed as a beacon for students of 
the social and economic history of the sugarmill. The author's 
intimate acquaintance with the world of sugar-making enabled 
him to infuse his book with a ·richness that seldom comes of 
literary research alone; this was a singular strength of his 
work. When I began my own research into sugar history, I was 
inspired by a deep affinity I have with the world of sugar-
making. Al though I could not resort to memories of sugarmill 
work, I could nevertheless approach-my research with a sense of 
familiarity. Having spent my first seventeen years in a sugar 
village, and being descended from three generations of 
forebears who worked in sugarmills in Mauritius, India, and 
Natal, I was hardly alien to my field of interest. If my 
thesis has any strengths they mey be attributed to the 
influence which my past experience has on my understanding of 
sugar history. I fear though that the pragmatism and 
compromises entailed in thesis writing have prevented me from 
doing full justice to that experience and understanding. 
Indeed, I regard this thesis as an intermediate study, coming 
between the articles in which I committed myself to print 
(probably prematurely), and a full-blown social history which 
encompasses detailed oral histories and greater experiential 
insight than I have so far been able to muster. 
Apart from my sense of indebtedness to my mother and my 
father, I am thankful for the assistance which I have received 
from a number of people during the preparation of this thesis. 
The task of curbing me when I struck out from the disciplinary 
straight-and-narrow was performed by Ken Jubber; Peter 
Richardson read and commented on a draft of the thesis; Charles 
van Onselen helped to purge Chapter 8 of its least acceptable 
content; I enjoyed the co-operation and comµmy of Daniel North 
Coombes at various stages; Jonathan Crush led me to certain 
uncatalogued archival material; Debbie Budlender lent her 
technical expertise; Ramela Bhaga typed the tables; and 
numerous librarians and many people in the sugar industry f!JiVe 
of their time and knowledge. I thank them all. Catherine 
accompanied me through the proof-reading doldrums, and she, 
Emma, and Zo~ not only collaborated inestimably in other w83s, 
they also provided me with a clear rationale for pressing on 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the course of human history, vast numbers of people and lands of 
considerable extent have been bound up in the cultivation and milling of 
sugarcane 'in order to produce sugar for human consumption. For 
centuries sugar production spread on.the expar,iding frontiers of European 
colonial empires, 1 a growth associated with the dual phenomena of 
plantations and slavery. With Africa's "human haemorrhage"2 and the 
enslavement ·of people on other continents too, millions of lives were 
devoured by plantations, if not en route to the sugar colonies. 
Although in some sug;:u'-producing regions indentured labourers replaced 
' 
slaves, both groups of bonded workers were succeeded by wage-labourers. 
The historical transition from slave to wage-labourer took place more or 
less concurrently with the transition in the sphere of plantation owner-
ship and control. These transitions reflected the industrialisation of 
the sugar plantation. Plantation owners had formerly been essentially 
agriculturalists. They were succeeded by those who - by virtue of 
ownership of sugarmills which were centralised, capitalised, 
technologically sophisticated, and dependent on free labour - were 
essentially industrialists. Hence the distinction, in simple terms, 
between a plantocracy and a sug;:u'ocracy. 
It is generally known that the domination of regional plantocracies over 
the lives of working people in the old plantation colonies was typically 
effected by means of a despotism which private property in slaves and 
other means of production made possible. Amongst the monumental works 
S.M.Greenfield, "Plantations, Sugar Cane and Slavery". In Roots and 
Branches: Current Directions in Slave Studies, edited by M.Craton. 
Toronto: Pergamon, 1979. 
2 R.Dumont, False Start in Africa. London: Andre Deutsch, 1966, p.36. 
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of Eugene Genovese there is one entitled ~he World the Slaveholders 
Made.3 It is a title which conveys the enormity of the influence of 
English American planters over every aspect of the lives of generatioiis 
of plantation slaves. Equally evocative of the distinctive social 
totality, or "world", centred on the omnipotent plantation owner w~s 
Gilberto Freyre's reference to the bagaceira in sixteenth to nineteenth 
century Portuguese America. The wqrd denotes a storage place for 
' 
ba~asse, the residue sugarcane fibre expelled from the sugarmill. It 
also came to mean "the general ,life and atmosphere of the sugar 
plantation" in Brazil. 4 Both Genovese and Fr~yre were concerned with 
the day to day social life of coloni~ American plantations. In this 
respect they were in communion with innumerable other writers with an 
J 
interest in the-social life of Europe's tropical colonies in America, 
the Caribbean islands, and the Mascarenes - the regions where sugar 
. I 
production historically stood out as the most pervasive economic 
activity. Around the colonial sugarmill there existed, according to 
this literature, a "world" or a bagaceira; a specific cultural milieu. 
Against the backdrop of· global sugar history, the South African case is 
somewhat special. The local sugar industry is comparatively recent in 
origin, and slaves were never used. Although a plantocracy was created 
in South Africa's former colony of Natal in the absence of slavery, it 
was rapidly overwhelmed by a su~ocracy. The SU&U" villages which were 
established on this sugarocracy's properties had all the outward 
appearances which characteri.sed the old plantation colonies. The 
question arises: what, historically, has been the role of the local 
su~ocracy in shaping the culture of the South African su~mill? It 
3 E.D.Genovese, The World the Slaveholders Made. New York: Vintage 
Books, 1971. 
4 G.Freyre, The Masters and the Slaves. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1946, 
p.xxiii. 
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is this question that this thesis sets out to answer. 
Conceptual Methods 
There exists voluminous literature on colonial plantation (or sugar-
producing) societies, and there are many precedents to this thesis 
insofar as it is a social analysis of culture in a sugarmilling milieu. 
These precedents have generally been cast in the mould of 
anthropological "community studies", and they were usually informed by a 
functionalist theory of society.5 The only sociological treatise which 
has been written on the South African sugar industry to date, American 
sociologist Pierre van den Berghe's Caneville,6 belongs to this 
tradition. Although van den Berghe questioned the authority of Parsons 
on certain issues, his study of Tongaat (thinly disguised as 
"Caneville") bore a strong resemblance to contemporaneous "community 
studies". Van den Berghe couched his analysis in accordance with the 
tenets of soc~ology's dominant paradigm of the 1960s; leaning more, 
within that context, towards a cultural pluralist than a Parsonian 
structural functionalist position. Whereas Caneville represents an a-
historical analysis of Tongaat, this thesis rests upon an historical 
understanding of the sugarmilling "community''. In another fundamental 
departure from Caneville, that "community" and its culture are 
approached here from a materialist perspective. 
What is implied by a materialist approach is that analysis is rooted in 
5 See S.W.Mintz,"Caiiamelar: The Subculture of a Rural Sugar Plantation 
Proletariat". In The People of Puerto Rico, edited by J .H.Steward. 
Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1956; C.Jayawardena, Conflict 
and Solidarity in a Guianese Plantation. London: Athlone Press, 1963; 
and M.M.Horowitz, Morne-Paysan. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 
1967. 
6 P.L.van den Berghe, Caneville: The Social Structure of a South 
African '!ovn. Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1964. 
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"an empirical examination of the concrete processes of social life which 
~e the sine qua non of human existence".7 The fundamental processes 
in question are the formation and conflict of social classes according 
to different relationships to.property in the means of production. How 
this approach differs from the idealism embodied in Caneville has been 
clarified by F.Johnstone in his historical materialist study of racial 
domination in the South African gold mining industry.8 The crux of the 
distinction, simply put, is that whereas culture is accorded centrality 
in idealist explanations,/it does not enjoy primacy over the social 
relations of production in materialist analyses of the patterns and 
processes of social life. In the words. of Patrick Joyce, "whatever 
mediates the social relations of one class with another grows out of the 
soil of the means of production and is not imposed from without as 
'superstructure' ". 9 
The treatment of culture in this thesis has been inspired by the 
pioneering theoretical endeavours of the Centre for Contemporary 
Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham. The Centre's Richard 
Johnson, drawing on the work of Antonio Gramsci, has defined culture as 
the common sense or way of life of a particular class, 
group or social category, the complex of ideologies that 
are actually adopted as moral preferences or principles 
of life.10 ' 
In other words, culture may be understood as the ensemble of collective 
responses to conditions of human existence. It encompasses forms.of 
7 A.Giddens, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1971 , p.22. 
8 F.A.Johnstone, Class, Race and Gold. London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1976, pp.8-1 O. 
9 P.Joyce, Work, Society and Politics: The Culture of the Factory in 
later Victorian England. Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980, p.xvii. 
10 R.Johnson, "Three Problematics: Elements of a Theory of Working-Class 
Culture". In Working Class CUlture: Studies in History and Theory, 
edited by J .Clarke et a1. London: Hutchinson, 1979, p.234.. See also 
S.Hall, "Cultural Studies: Two Paradigms". In Culture, Ideology and 
Social Process, edited by T.Bennett et al. London: Batsford and Open 
University, 1981. 
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consci~usness and social practices, as well as material artefacts that 
are utilised in accordance with those . subjec~i ve ways of interpreting 
and responding to objective conditions. It follows that cultural items 
may exist in many forms: there are those which are consciously forged, 
and others which are taken for granted; there is quotidian culture - the 
everyday "way of life"; there are national cultures; and there are work-
place cultures. 
The concern here is with a work-place culture and, more specifically, 
with the influence of employers on that culture. This thesis is 
premised upon the view that the sugarmilling labour process and its 
immediate human agents (sugarII,lill owners and employees) constitute the 
culture of the sugarmill; that it is these agents whose material 
interests have been reflected and s-erved by that culture. Advancing 
from this premise, historical descriptions of the sugarmilling labour 
process in different regions, were widely combed in pursuit of suitable 
conceptual touch.:.stones and comp:trative points of reference. The work 
that was considered most worthy of emulation was Moreno Fraginals' 
dialectical analysis of the Cuban SUg;lr industry.11 An exemplary work, 
' Moreno Fraginals' analysis provided an astute exposition of Cuban 
sugarmillers' class rule, in particular their domination over 
sugarmilling techniques and personnel. It was from his work that the 
term "sugarocracy" was adopted; a major qualification being that whereas 
he used the term with reference to slave-owning sugarmillers, here it 
denotes owners of industrialised su€;irmills. Thus a sugarocracy is here 
defined as a regional group of sugarmill-owners, whose sugarmills are 
staffed by free personnel - free in the sense of being neither owners of 
means of production nor owned themselves as chattels; and whose economic 
11 M.Moreno Fraginals, The ~mill: The Socioeconomic Complex of ~ 
in Cuba. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976. 
' 
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interest it is to expand their capital in sugar by constantly developing 
.the means of sugar production. More than that, a sugarocracy is 
presented as a group of dynastic families which is subsumed in 
capitalist society under a social class, namely a bourgeoisie. 
This bourgeoisie, of which a sugarocracy forms pa.rt, is distinguishable 
from other classes firstly by the criterion of ownership of the means of 
productiol'.l, and secondly by its use of labour as a commodity which is 
hired from the ranks of the proletariat for the express purpos.e of 
amassing capital. Classes of owners and workers - the bourgeoisie and 
the proletariat - are thus initially identified in terms of their 
respective relationships to the means of production. But witpout 
historical analysis and an inquiry into the culture and consciousness of 
the_ classes'' constituent members, there is little to be inferred from 
this analytic, or objective, classification about the way in which these 
and other classes are formed, how they interact, and how they are 
transformed. 
At the heart of the culture of the sugarmill lies the sugarmilling 
labour process. It is by this process that sugarmillers and sugarmill 
.workers are drawn into a relationship which is ultimately based on 
(conflicting) material interests. It is the labour process which 
sustains the economic and.materially-based relationship around which a 
distinctive work-place culture evolves. According to Palloix, the 
labour process is that 
by which raw materials or other inputs are transformed 
into products having a use value. This process is a 
combination of three elements: human activity, or 
labour, which is set to work as labour power· the 
objects (raw materials, unfinished products etcJ upon 
which labour acts; and the means (means in general, 
usually in the form of tools Dr even more complex 
machinery) by which labour acts.1~ 
7 
The first element of the labour process, as defined above, is here taken 
to include recruitment, the division of labour, and control; and the 
third, viz. the means, is taken to include technology and occupational 
know-how. Thus the labour process refers in general to conditions 
surrounding the presence of human labour at a particular point of 
production. 
It is a fundamental characteristic of capitalism that human labour is 
exploited in the interests of capital accumulation. The labour process 
under capitalism involves not only the transformation of raw materials 
into products having a use value, but also the realisation of the 
exchange value of those products on the market. The difference between 
the exchange value of commodities (their market price) and the value of 
labour-power (the cost of reproducing labour-power) constitutes surplus 
value (or the value imbued in that commodity by labour). Capital 
accumulation is, then, effected by owners of capital through the 
appropriation of surplus value. It follows that the capitalist process 
of production embraces the labour process and the production of surplus 
value as a unity. 13 
The su§9.rmilling labour process under capitalism typically implies that 
the relationship, between owners and employees, which arises from the 
conditions of production and the consequences of the realisation and 
appropriation of surplus value, is more than a work-place relationship. 
12 C.Palloix, "The Labour Process: From Fordism to Neo-Fordism". In The 
Labour Process and Class Strategies. London:CSE, 1976, p.46. Quoted 
by C.Scott, "The Labour Process, Class Conflict ·and Poli tics in the 
Peruvian Sugar Industry", Development and Change 10: 1 ( 1979), pp. 57-
89. This is of course an elaboration of Marx's "elementary factors 
of the labour-process": K.Marx,Capital.Vol.1. London:Lawrence & 
·Wishart, 1954, p.174. 
13 Ibid., pp.181-192. 
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This is because the domain of the sugarocrat (as owner and employer) 
usually extends beyond the site of production to the limits of a broader 
milieu. The milieu in question is geographically and socially delimited 
in the form of an agro-industrial complex - "an enterprise in which a· 
sugarmill, other associated industrial plant and a cane plantation are 
under common ownership" .14 
I 
It is within this broader milieu that the 
culture of the sugarmill comes into existence. It is· in that 
geographical and social context that suglrmill personnel work and live; 
it is in that milieu that they subjectively and collectively face the 
economic and extra-economic practices of their employers. 
In short, the culture of the sugarmill (its "interactional reality") 15 
is regarded as the ideas and practices which manifest themselves as 
responses to, and conditioning factors of, the sugarmilling labour 
process. This definition implies furthermore that the culture of the 
sugarmill is a dialectical process by which the relations of production, 
as much as the physical conditions of production, are translated into 
subjective meanings, relationships, and action. It is the task of this 
thesis to analyse the impress of the suglrocracy upon the substance and 
dynamic of the culture of the South African sugarmill; a task which 
involves laying bare the influence of the SU€fll"Ocracy on the experiences 
of its employees. 16 
14 Scott, "Peruvian Sugar Industry". 
15 The term has been used, with reference to the culture of the South 
African gold mine, by D.Moodie, "Mine Culture and Miners' Identity on 
the South· African Gold Mines". In Town and Countryside in the 
Transvaal: Capitalist Penetration and Popular Response, edited by 
B.Bozzoli. Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1983, p.178. 
16 The implied relationship between experience and culture is 
substantiated in B.Bozzoli, "History, Experience and Culture". In 
Tovn and Countryside, op cit. 
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Research Methods 
The empirical content of this thesis was derived principally by means of 
"desk research" - at many desks and in many places. Unlike the, 
Caribbean, where colonial sugarmillers were keen to conduct research in 
order that they might have a good understanding of their historical · 
subordinates, 17 Natal's sugarmillers evidently never held such 
aspirations. Moreover, there are ho accounts which might parallel 
Dunn's Sugar and Slaves: The Rise of the Planter Class in the English · 
West Indies, 1624 - 1713, 18 and Ragatz' The Fall of the Planter Class in 
· tbe British Caribbean, 1763 - 1a33,19 nor is there a South African 
equivalent of Craton's detailed study of Worthy Park which spans three 
centuries of life on a Jamaican sugar plantation.20 The most obvious 
remedy to this historiographical dearth would be to begin an analysis of 
South African sugar companies' records. Certain technical data aside, 
these records either do not exist or they are not generally available 
for scrutiny. So the researcher with an interest in the social fabric 
of sugarmilling in South Africa is turned in the direction of particular 
primary and secondary sources. 
The chief sources that were tapped for primqry material during the 
preparation of this thesis were the State Archives' Transvaal and, to a 
much lesser extent, Natal depats; the Killie Campbell Library in Durban; 
the South African Sugar Journal, published monthly since it was 
introduced almost 70 years ago in 1917; the Sugar Year Book, published 
17 See P.D.Fraser, "Africa and the Caribbean", African Affairs 81 (July, 
1982), pp.425-432. . 
18 R.S.Dunn, Sugar and Slaves: The Rise of the Planter Class in the 
English West Indies, 1624-1713. Chapel Hill: University of Carolina 
Press, 1972. 
19 L.J.Ragatz, The Fall of the Planter Class in the British Caribbean, 
1763-1833. 1928. Reprint. New York: Octagon Books, 1971. 
20 M.Craton, Searching for the Invisible Man: Slaves and Plantation Life 
in Jamaica. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978. 
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annually since 1931; and the Proceedings of the South African Sugar 
Technologists' Association, which date back to 1927. ' Also tapped in the 
search for primary data were cc;>lonial Blue Books, reports of 
governmental Commissions of Inquiry, records of parliamentary debates, 
and other published and unpublished official documents. 
Archival material broadens the myopic perspective on sugarmill 
employees, black workers in particular, that publications emanating from 
within the sugar industry provide~ However, the inaccessibility of 
certain company records and of holdings of certain libraries within the 
industry means that the full potential of empirical evidence has not 
been exhausted in this attempt to reconstruct the history of sugarmill 
culture in South Africa. 21 Any social analysis of sugarmilling in South 
Africa will, under these circumstances, fall short of the depths and 
precision attained in the Caribbean studies or by contemporary 
researchers who have gained access to sugar company records in 
independent Mo~bique. 22 
On the question of secondary materials, historical and analytical 
studies of the South African sugar industry are few in number and there 
exists virtually no written history of sugarmill operatives. Regarding 
21 While researchers are known to be received with every courtesy by the 
sugar companies - some companies are effusively hospitable to the 
outsider - comµmy records such as minutes of directors' meetings and 
managers' correspondence are not generally accessible. Communications 
I have had with academics in South Africa and abroad confirm my 
belief that Tongaat's Amanzimnyama archives and the South African 
Sugar Association's library do not afford entry to social 
researchers. I have certainly been unsuccessful in trying to gain 
access to these sources. There are encouraging signs that senior 
officials in the sugar industry may in future adopt a less 
restrictive policy towards researchers. 
22 Most notably J.Head, "Sena Sugar Estates and Migrant Labour". In 
Mozambique: Proceedings of a Seminar held at the Centre of African 
Studies, University of Edinburgh. Edinburgh: Centre of African 
Studi_es, 1979; and L.Vail and L.White, Capitalism and Colonialism in 
Mozambique. London: Heinemann, 1981. · 
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the works written this century, the major pieces germane to this thesis 
were two biographies and a review of the sugar industry until 1926, 
compiled by R.F.Osborn;23 a biographical histocy of the Tongaat empire 
written by a former general manager of Tongaat Sugar Comp:u13;24 van den 
Berghe's Caneville; a doctoral thesis on the economics of sugar cane 
production in South Africa;25 and two journal articles, one co-authored 
and the other independently penned by Peter Richardson. 26 These last-
mentioned journal articles and the forementioned thesis offered 
important contextual material, but little by way of detail on the 
culture of the sugarmill. Osborn's books, Watson's history of Tongaat, 
and other smaller biographical texts, fall into the same genre as the 
eulogistic books on the sugarmiller Hornung of Mo~bique,27 and on the 
Tates and Lyles of Britain.28 
Osborn's books, his Valiant Harvest in particular, are readily available 
in most South African libraries. Valiant Harvest was generously 
distributed by the South African Sugar Association to various libraries 
and senior sugar industry personnel, with the University of Cape Town 
being the recipient of four copies. By contrast, Caneville, the first 
published sociological writing on the local industry, is not freely 
23 R.F.Osborn, Valiant Harvest: The Follllding of' the South African ~ 
Industry 1848-1926. Durban: SASA, 1964; C.G.: A Great liatalian: A 
Biography of Sir Charles George Smith, KCMG, KSJ, JP. Durban: 
C.G.Smi th, 1966; and This Man of Purpose: A Biography of Sir James 
Liege Hulett KtB, JP. Edited by J.Hulett. Umhlali: W.H.Hulett, 1973. 
24 R.G.T.Watson, Tongaa.ti: An African Experiment. London: Hutchinson, 
1960. 
25 H.I.Behrmann, "A Study of the Economics of Sugar Cane Production in 
Natal". PhD thesis, University of Natal, 1959. 
26 A.Graves and P.Richardson, "Plantations in the Political Economy of 
Colonial Sugar Production: Natal and Queensland, 1860-1914", Journal 
of Southern African Studies 6:2(1900), pp.214-229; and P.Richardson, 
"The Natal Sugar Industry, 1849-1905: An Interpretative Essay", 
Journal of African History 23:4(1982), pp.515-527. 
27 B.M.Collin,J.P.Bornung:A Family Portrait.Kent:Orpington Press, 1972. 
28 G.Fairrie, The ~ Refining Families of Great Britain. London: Tate 
& Lyle, 1951; and A.Hugill, Sugar and all that ••• A History of Tate & 
Lyle. London: Gentry Books, 1978. 
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available to the reader in South Africa. After a fruitless search in 
Cape Town for a copy of Canevi1:1e, which I had read as an undergraduate 
student, the search was extended through the inter-library loan service. 
Initially this search drew a blank, but eventually a pre-publication 
t 
draft of the book was procured, seemingly the only version of Caneville 
available for public readership in the country. Only after personal 
\ 
communication with its author was a copy of the published version 
obtained.29 
Of all the publications so far referred· to, only Caneville had anything 
directly to sey about sugarmill workers, but not very much at that. The 
absence of detailed social studies of sugarmill work (to say nothing of 
culture) in South Africa, is exacerbated by the difficulty of 
disaggregating information about sugarmill workers when there has been 
no differentiation made in the available literature between field 
workers and sugarmill workers. This latter problem was presented by 
primary documents as much as by secondary commentaries, and it was most 
acute in the case of material on indentured Indian workers. 
Only a limited amount of ethnographic research has been incorporated 
into the thesis. My ethnographic investigation was conducted principally 
amongst Mauritian workers and their descendants in the sugarmills about 
whom little has been otherwise recorded.30 Although the thesis is in 
many respects a social history of sugarmilling, a vast field of oral , 
history remains to be investigated before a full-blown social history 
can indeed be written. The. most obvious topic deserving future 
ethnographic (and documentary) research is the sugarmill compound. A 
29 The assistance of Pierre van den Berghe is gratefully acknowledged. 
30 D.Lincoln, ''Mauritian Settlers in South Africa: The Case of Sugarmill 
Artisans", South. African Geographical Journal 66:2(1984), pp.133-151. 
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study of the compound as an institution,31 and of compound life, would 
constitute an extensive project in itself. Such a project would be an 
appropriate starting point for a detailed analysis of how sugarocratic 
rule was actually experienced by individuals and by different categories 
of employees. 
Approaching the South African Suga.rmill 
Working towards the stated objectives of the thesis, within the context 
of the methods and resources described above, did not involve a clear-
cut and linear programme. There were instances where choices had to be 
made and where circumspection had to be exercised in the presentation of 
empirical evidence. These warrant brief attention. As far as the 
selection of material for inclusion in the thesis was concerned, 
information about the agricultural side of the industry was drawn into 
the text only where it was considered directly relevant. Circumspection 
had to be exercised in dealing with personal details. Information 
gleaned during interviews was treated confidentially, and the anonymity 
of interviewees who spoke as individuals rather than as officials 
protected. Certain published material had also to be made impersonal. 
These precautions was especially necessary when dealing with Mauritian 
settlers and their descendants; firstly because some of them have 
suffered the indignities of prejudicial racial classification; and 
secondly because privileged knowledge was required to identify them in 
sources like voters' rolls and sugar
1
industry directories and documents. 
Apart from these deliberate limitations, and. given the scarcity of 
31 Given that the sugar industry's Indian workers have always, during 
and since the indentures period, been housed with their families, 
the comi:ound has played a particularly complex role as an "essential 
institution" of labour exploitation. See J .Rex, "The Compound, the 
Reserve and the Urban Location; the Essential Institutions of South 
African Labour Exploitation", South African Labour Bulletin 
1 : 4 ( 1 97 4), pp.4-17. _/ 
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existing analytical coverage of the local sugar industry, it was 
considered essential that as much empirical detail be drawn into the 
thesis as possible. 
It would be presumptuous to suggest that this thesis fills all the 
lacunae in the existing body of analytical work on the South African 
sugar industry. Indeed, even in its limited objective of providing an 
analysis of one dimension of the culture of the South African sugarmill, 
namely the sugarocratic impress, the thesis leaves certain qu-estions 
unanswered. I have been at pains in the foregoing pages to spell out 
the difficulties and frustrations encountered in trying to accumulate 
the documentary material upon which I have relied more heavily than 
alternative sources. The "gaps" and "loose ends" in the narrative 
testify to this problem. There are undoubtedly aspects of my approach 
to the subject which will also be regarded as shortcomings. 
Nevertheless the thesis does shed some light on previously unresearched 
terrain, and in so doing facilitates (and possibly invites) further 
study of the sugarocracy and its influence on the way of life of 
generations of sugarmill workers. 
To approach the culture of the sugarmill in terms of the influence 
exerted thereupon by the sugarocracy demands at the outset a clear 
exposition of the constitution and culture of the sugarocracy itself. 
Chapters One, Two, and Three attend to this task; the first being 
concerned with the sugFtrocracy's ascent, the second with its economic 
circumstances, and the third with the quotidian, ideological, and 
p:>litical facets of its culture. .Therea:fter, a detailed analysis of the 
production process is made in three chapters which are devoted to social 
relationships within the sugarmill itself. In the following two 
15 
chapters attention is 'given to the social life of sugarmill personnel; 
Chapter Seven looking at the sugar village and th~1 way in which the 
sugarocracy directly affected or sought to affect village life, and 
Chapter Eight looking at the history of sugarmill workers' responses to 
the sugarmilling labour process during the period of sugarocratic 
control. In the Conclusion, generalisations are made about the most 
important aspects of the sugarocratic impress. These final 
generalisations adhere to the periodisation adopted in the foregoing 
chapters; the first period during the sugarocratic era having been from 






THE ASCENT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN SUGAROCRACY 
Globally, .the history of sugarocratic ascendancy has followed a similar 
pattern. While agronomic and climatic factors confine sugarcane fields 
between the tropical and sub-tropical latitudes, economic and biological 
, imi::eratives necessitate the milling of sugarcane within close proximity 
to its source. Cane sugar production was until the end of the 
'nineteenth century usually dominated by colonist plantation owners. 
With the abolition of slavery and the subsumption'of plantation systems 
under a capitalist mode of production, the fundamental relations between 
owners' and labourers were altered. The planter-miller unity was 
dissolved, and whereas previously every planter ruled over a plantation 
and each crushed his own cane using labour-intensive milling plant, the 
post-emancipation sugarmiller was forced to rationalise his use of 
labour and to constantly revise the technique of milling. The 
industrialisation of sugarmilling in this manner represented a first 
phase in the historical restructuring of sugar capital. It was this 
phase in the later half of the nineteenth century which heralded the 
rise of the sugarocrat. The next, slightly less distinct, phase in 
capital restructuring lasted roughly until World War II, and it was 
characterised by the absorption of estates and/or sugarmills by the 
larger sugarmilling companies which had arisen during the previous 
period of centralisation. This could be said to have been the age of 
the sugarocrat, the period of individual or family bourgeois control 
over sugarmills. The most recent phase, since World War II, is 
characterised by the domination of regional sugar industries by 
corporations, and by the appearance of agribusinesses.1 
See R.Burbach and P.Flynn, Agribusiness in the Americas. New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1980, p.12. 
· I 
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In this chapter the rise of the Natal sugarocracy is examined. After 
tracing the course followed by sugarocrats in their ascent in other 
regions, the historical development of the Natal sugarocracy is 
described. This is done mainly by paying close attention to the 
individual biographies of the relevant people. What emerges from the 
biographical material is a general idea of the first-generation 
sugarocrats' route to their particular class position, and an idea also 
of how sugarocratic lineages developed, and who the sugarocracy's 
consorts were. 
Sugarocrats Ascendant 
World-wide, the second half of the nineteenth century was a momentous 
period in the history of cane-sugarmill ownership. Existing 
sugarmillers had to contend with the repercussions of the abolition of 
slavery; they were also presented with important new technical 
possibilities within their sugarmills. Of even greater consequence was 
the restructuring of sugar capital insofar as it was, on the one hand, 
responsive to these changed circumstances, and, on the other hand, 
associated with the entry of new capital into sugar production. The 
social changes brought about by the abolition of slavery in the old 
sugar colonies (and the growth of sugar capital), were implicitly 
related to the physical transformation of sugar production. The latter 
change involved the integration of new sugar technology in centralised 
sugarmills. In Natal, where sugar production began during this very 
period, the ascent of sugarocrats was conditioned more or less directly 
by this process of change which their foreign sugarmilling competitors 
were then experiencing. 
When the plantation (or ''Labat") system of the old sugar colonies in the 
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western hemisphere was transformed during the nineteenth century, there 
were according to Galloway three main types of response to its 
disruption.2 Firstly, some countries, such as S~ Domingue, Jamaica, 
Martinique, and Guadeloupe, faced a prolonged decline in sugar 
production. In these regions plantations occupied only part of the 
cultivable land and thus former slaves had an alternative to plantation 
work as a livelihood. Martinique and Guadeloupe countered the resultant 
labour shortfall by importing indentured workers, but other sugar 
economies continued declining, some irreversibly, due to effective 
labour shortages exacerbated by inadequate sugarmill centralisation. A 
.second group of countries, including Barbados, S~ Kitts, and Antigua, 
experienced an easy passage out of the plantation system. Although the 
transition in these countries was smooth, by virtue of the ubiquity of 
plantations, the fact that sugarmill centralisation was retarded meant 
that immediate prosperity was hampered. The· third case in Galloway's 
typology of responses to the disruption of the plantation system was 
witnessed in British Guiana, Puerto Rico, and Cuba, where sugar 
production exµmded. In these countries the labour question presented 
less severe problems for owners, financial support for centralisation 
was at hand, and markets were assured. In British Guiana, the initial 
outflow of former slaves from the plantations was redressed by the 
imp:>rtation of indentured workers, while good soil fertility together 
with the large rmmber of debt-free plantations attracted capital to the 
sugar industry. In Puerto Rico and in Cuba, exµmsion was stimulated by 
the coll~pse of the S~ Domingue sugar indristry and the lifting of trade 
restrictions by Spain. In both of these countries slavery had been 
abolished relatively late (1873 in Puerto Rico and 1880 in Cuba) and 
2 J.H.Galloway, "The Sugar Industry of Pernambuco during the Nineteenth 
Century",Annals,Association of American Geographers 58:2(1968), 
pp.285-303. 
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there were large free populations, as a result of which abolition had a 
minimally disruptive effect. Cuban owners were furthermore able to 
import cheap labour from Yucatan and China, and later also from Jamaica 
and Haiti (formerly S~ Domingue). Of crucial significance for Cuba and 
Puerto Rico was the rapid centralisation of sugarmilling, permitted by 
access to North American capital and its market at the end of the 
nineteenth century.3 In addition to these three main types of response 
to the disruption of the plantation system, a locally peculiar response 
was identified in Pernambuco, in north-eastern Brazil. The Pernambuco 
case was similar in many respects to the third type of response except 
that no foreign ~abour was introduced nor was there access to North 
America. Instead of expanding then, the Pernambuco sugar industry 
continued functioning at the pace at which it had been worked under 
slavery. 
What Galloway's typology suggests is that the successful transition to 
industrial capitalist sugar production in the late nineteenth,century 
depended on four inter-related factors; namely, fresh capital inflows, 
susta~ned supplies of cheap indentured labour or wage labour, 
centralised sugarmills, and reliable markets. These factors were 
equally critic~ in regions where sugar production was started during 
the nineteenth century. Hawaii had its first "permanent plantation" and 
' 
3 Although Puerto Rico's suegar industry had indeed expm.ded during the 
first half of the nineteenth century, it had stagnated towards the 
end of the century and its contribution to the value of the country's 
exports had been eclipsed by income from coffee exports. The sugar 
industry only regained its prominence after the collapse of the 
coffee producers in the late 1890s, and expanded in the wake of the 
American occupation in 1898 (See L.W.Bergad, Coffee and the Grorlh of 
Agrarian Capitalism in Nineteenth-Century Puerto Rico. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1983). Sidney Mintz, Worker in the Cane: 
A Puerto Rican Life History. New York: W.W.Norton, 1974, p.25, has 
gone so far as to suggest that emancipation contributed to the 
deterioration of the sugar industry. Puerto Rico does not therefore 
sit too comfortably in the place assigned to it in Galloway's 
typology. 
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sugarmill established in 1835 after ·a mercantile trading company had 
reached an agreement with the King and the Governor of Kauai over the 
conditions whereby land would be leased and labour supplied. 4 Thus 
began a new plantation system which was to flourish with a subsequent 
influx of foreign workers and American capital, and with the support of 
an American market. In Mo~bique, where sugarmilling began at the very 
end of the century, it was European capital and technology which turned 
to the sugarmillers' advantage the quasi-feudal prazo system of land 
tenure and labour exploitation.5 In that Portuguese colony contractual 
grants of vast tracts of land included the right to extract the labour 
of its inhabitants in the cane fields and sugarmills, and the Portuguese 
state offered the market protection necessary to assure the industry's 
progress. 
Capital, cheap labour, centralised sugar mills, and protected markets 
were clearly the component parts of the machinery which had to be 
assembled and maintained by aspirant sugarmillers in the nineteenth 
century if they were to succeed in the face of foreign competition. 
The Prelude to the Suga.rocratic Era in Natal: 1850-1905 
The Natal sugar industry's early growth in the 1850s and 60s was marked 
by speculative investment in comµtrati vely small sugar estates. Once on 
its- feet the sugar industry was not inevitably destined to a dependence 
on a plantation system for, as Richardson has pointed out, there were 
two other historically proven alternatives which might have suited 
4 R.Takaki,"'An Entering Wedge':The Origins of the Sugar Plantation and 
a Multi-Ethnic Working Class in Hawaii",Labor History 23:1 (1982), 
pp.32-46. 
5 D.Lincoln,"Capi tal and the Milling of Sugar in Mo9ambique before 
1942",Perspectives in Economic History 1 (1982),pp.30-42; and L.Vail 
and L.Whi te,Capi talism and Colonialism in Mozambique. 
London:Heinemann,1980. 
22 
Natal.6 On the one hand milling might have been done in independent 
central sugarmills, while on the other hand peasant production might 
have formed the source of sugarcane for the sugarmills. These 
possibilities were discounted by inadequate transport infrastructure, by 
the lack of state guarantees for capital, and by low levels of capital 
and credit avai.labili ty, inter alia. These constraints placed the Natal 
sugar industry on a particular route, and in combination with the 
effects of the depression of 1865 - 1869, they led to a veritable 
revolution in patterns of sugar estate ownership in the decade 1864 -
1874. The concentration of ownership during that period, with the 
strong participation of merchant capitalists (in the absence of banks 
frightened off by previous losses in the industry), forged the Natal 
industry's financial and ownership structures into a likeness of those 
which characterised the older sug:u- plantations of the West Indies. The 
effects of this development were modified by the uneven growth of the 
sugar industry until 1905. Between 1878 and 1885, and again between 
18~ and 1895, the price of sugar had fallen on the domestic and export 
markets, and the proportion of Natal's contribution to British colonial 
sugar production had contracted between 1 f!75 and 1904. , 
. Only the larger and most heavily capitalised sugar producers did not 
buckle under these economic pressures, and from the 1880s the small 
plantations wen.t into a decline. Those who had the capital and other 
resources necessary to undertake technological change and intensify 
labour exploitation, and who could withstand the effects of market 
depression, were the ones to emerge by 1905 as "new" agents of 
,production. These were the first "millers-cum-planters". 
b P.Richardson,"The Natal Sugar Industry, 1849-1905: An Interpretative 
. Essay',Journal of African History 23:4(1982),pp.515-527. 
--. 
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What factors shaped the early history of the millers-cum-planters? 
Capital and labour supplies were undoubtedly the most significant. 
E.Morewood, the first to mill sugar mechanically in Natal, had observed 
in 1853 that "To make Natal go ahead with giant strides, it only 
requires to be proved to capitalists at home ••• that sugar can be 
produced here by free labour, cheaper than in Cuba or the Brazils by 
slave labour". 7 A decade later however, the onset of the depression 
and declining sugµ.r prices signalled the beginning of a crisis for early 
sugarmillers. For those who had access to credit or to private funds, 
technological change and the concentration of estate ownership offered a 
means of surviving and ultimately taking advantage of these conditions. 
But, like Morewood, most pioneer sugu-millers had entered the industry 
with limited, if not negligible, funds at their disposal. An aggravating 
factor for the small and under-capitalised sugarmiller was the 
increasing scarcity value of land as its availablity outside the 
Reserves diminished.8 If these factors had not, by 1874, removed small 
plantation owners from competition with owners of amalgamated estates 
and highly capitalised sugarmills, then declining sugar prices and 
returns on capital did so. The two periods of falling prices - 1878 to 
1885 and 1890 to 1895 - followed a period during which capital returns 
had dropped sharply. In 1859 the owner of a 7CAJ acre plantation, 
turning out 100 tons of sugar a year and paying 6% interest on his 
borrowed capital, could have expected an annual net profit of 14%;9 in 
( 
1876, seven years after the end of the depression of the late 1860s, an 
7 E.Morewood,letter to The Natal Mercury 18 January 1853, quoted by 
A.F.Hattersley,The Natalians:Further Annals of 
Natal.Pietermari tzburg: Shuter & Shooter, 1940,p.91. 
8 Richardson, "Natal Sugar Industry"; and H.Slater, "Land, Labour and 
Capital in Natal: The Natal I.and and Colonisation Comµmy 1860-1948", 
Journal of African History 16:2 ( 1975), pp.257-283. The twin factors 
of under-capitalisation and certain millers' ineptitude have been 
noted by R.F.Osborn, Valiant Harvest: The Founding o:f the South 
African ~ Industry 1848-1926. Durban: SASA, 1964, passim. 
9 Handbook to South A:frica.London:S.W.Silver, 1876,p.414. 
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owner who had borrowed £20000 at 8% interest to establish his 
plantation, could have expected an 8% net profit.10 Capital alone was 
not the salvation of the sugarmillers who weathered these pressing 
conditions. The key to their success lay in their ability .to maintain 
at sufficiently_ low levels ·their single greatest item of current 
expenditure, namely their wage bills.11 The labour question was dealt 
with by the inception of the Indian indenture system, which meant 
drawing upon India for a resource which Natal's sugarmillers could not 
exploit locally at a sustained level and magnitude acceptable to 
themselves. It is against this background that the miller-cum-planter 
made his appearance. 
According to Richardson, 12 there were three outstanding attributes of 
the unit of production controlled by the miller~cum-planter: firstly, it 
represented an enlarged estate and milling capacity; secondly, it 
displayed an increasingly corporate structure as company ownership 
replaced individual ownership; and thirdly, it implied the creation of 
an increasingly monopolistic structure of ownership over the industry as 
a whole. Though Natal's sugar industry had come to be dominated by such 
units of production, when Zululand was opened up to white settlement in 
1905 the colonial state prevented the spread of miller-cum-planter units 
into the territory. The outcome of the Zululand settlement scheme as 
far as sugarmilling was concerned, was the first appearance in South 
Africa of central sugarmills which were supplied entireJy by non-
millers. Thus the Tugela river came to represent a regional boundary 
separating two forms of miller/planter relations. In spite of this 
departure from the patterns of control then obtaining, the first four 
sugarmills to be built in Zululand were owned by already established 
10 lbid.,pp.415-416. 
11 Richardson, "Natal Sugar Industry". 
12 Ibid. 
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Natal sugarmillers. By 1905 then, the body of millers-cum-planters had 
emerged victorious from a struggle waged principally against structural 
factors. It was a struggle which obviously differed from that engaged 
in by other, older sugarmillers elsewhere who had had to respond to the 
abolition of slavery, yet both had very similar outcomes in terms of 
social relations. And it was only secondarily an internecine planter 
struggle which had yielded the millers-cum-planters who were to remain 
at the helm of Natal's Sugar industry until the 1980s. 
The Natal Sugarocra.ts and their Consorts: 1905-1962 
It has been shown how the sugarmillers of Natal responded to local 
constraints and market inf1.uences, to the plantation system and to its 
dissolution. The question to be asked now is: who were Natal's first 
sugarocrats, and how did they achieve their status? Brief biographical 
notes follow on the first generation of sugarmillers who had emerged 
triumphant from the transition out of the plantation system and into 
miller-cum-planter proquction, and on those who entered the colonial 
sugar industry directly as millers-cum-planters without having 
' 
experienced the transition as active participants. The names of the 
people in question are Saunders, Campbell, Reynolds, Crookes, Pearce, 
Armstrong, Hulett, and Smith. 
Saunders 13 The first of the settlers in Natal to establish a -
sugarmilling venture that would be controlled by successive generations 
\ 
of heirs was James Saunders, who was horn in Mauritius in 1818. His 
father had gone to the-island with the British invasionary force in 
13 Biographical note condensed from E.Saunders,"Katherine Saunders:The 
Story of Her Life and Times". In Flower Paintings of Katherine 
Saunders. Tongaat:The Tongaat Group, 1979; and R.G.T.Watson,Tongaa.ti: 
An African Experiment. London:Hutchinson, 1960. 
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181 O, and there he entered a partnership to create the firm Wiehe et 
Saunders. In 1823 the family was transferred to London, where James 
Saunders received his schooling. For fifteen months in 1832 and 1833 he 
\ 
was a pupil at Char~erhouse, of which school an uncle of his was 
headmaster. In 1837 he returned to Mauritius and worked there on 
several su~ estates, gaining experience that would be of relevance to 
him in Natal. While in Mauritius he made the acquaintance of two men 
who were later to become his partners in a land' speculation' company 
operating in Natal. Saunders again left Mauritius for Europe in 1850, 
and there he worked as a railway engineer._ He was employed by the Great 
Western Railway, of which company another uncle of his was first 
secretary and general manager, and he was involved with various projects 
including the construction of the Thames tunnel. In 1854 he travelled 
to Natal as a holder of one-eighth of the shares in the Natal Company 
which had been formed by Saunders and his associates. One member of the 
syndicate was a Crown grantee of Tongaati Estate which, together with 
its small sugarmill, became part of the Natal Company's property. 
/ 
Saunders took charge of the estate, operating it for the syndi_cate until 
it was dissolved in 1860, and on his own account thereafter. Saunders 
installed a steam-powered sugarmill in 1861 and later relocated the 
plant when he purchased more productive lands. By periodically 
improving the sugarmill and expanding his land-holdings he had control 
of a large estate by the time of his death in 1892, when his youngest 
son Edward succeeded him as proprietor. 
Campbeu 14 William Campbell, born in 1821, began his working years on a 
Scottish railway. His father had· by that time been dishonestly 
dispossessed of the farm which might have kept William' on the land. In 
14 Biographical note condensed from E.Campbell,The Life o:f Sam Campbell. 
Privately piblished, 1933; and N.Herd,Killie's Af'rica:The Achievements 
o:f Dr.Killie Campbell. Pietermaritzburg: Blue Crane Books, 1982. 
/ 
27 
his late twenties, although already in the relatively well~paid position 
of line foreman, Campbell was taken in by the allure of Byrne's 
settlement scheme. He sailed for Natal with his family in 1850, but 
once there he did not immediately take occupation of the freehold land 
which the Byrne scheme qualified him for. Instead he bought a plot of 
land in Durban. In Durban he accepted a contract to build the harbour's 
north pier, a task for which his experience in Scotland had prepared 
him. Only in 1857 did he turn to agriculture when he bought 738 acres 
of abandonded land north of Durban. On this farm, which he named Muckle 
Neuk, Campbell experimented successfully with sugarcane and proceeded to 
borrow money from the Glasgow and Natal Sugar Company against collateral 
of land, buildings, machinery and crops. This loan enabled him to 
import a sugarmill of sufficient capacity to place him amongst the 
leading contemporary sugfll'millers. His successes were cut short by his 
accidental death in 1865, when the Muckle Neuk estate passed into the 
hands of his eldest son, William. 
Reynolds 15 The brothers Thomas and Lewis Reynolds disembarked in Durban 
in November 1850 as Natal Company of London settlers. They first rented 
land on the Umhlali river where in 1852 they began growing sugarcane. 
In 1856 they were given the management of a farm, Oaklands, with Thomas 
in charge of the ox-powered sugarmill and Lewis overseeing the field 
work. Thomas travelled to Mauritius in 1860 to buy a second-hand 
sugarmill for Oaklands farm, and three years later he purchased the farm 
itself and an adjacent estate. He sub-divided the latter estate and 
sold the land to farmers who would be suppliers of cane to his 
sugarmill. Iri 1860 Lewis had left Oaklands to become the manager of 
Canonby estate, which he later bought in partnership with G.Wirsing. 
15 Biographical note condensed from Osborn, Valiant Harvest; and South 
African National Society,"The Reynolds of Sezela", 1981. 
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This partnership dissolved when Canonby was declared insolvent in 1869, 
but Lewis steyed on the estate as manager until 1874, when he bought at 
an auction the Umzinto Sugar Company. After Lewis' death in 1875, 
Thomas took over the Umzinto Sugar Comp:my and assigned two of his own 
sons, Frank and Charles, to its operation. Another son of his, Arthur, 
had been given the responsibility of running the Glendale Sugar Estate 
which Thomas had acquired in the early 1870s. In 1880 the Oaklands 
~rm ill was moved to Glendale Sugar F.state and the fallowing year the 
Oaklands farm was sold. When Thomas~ Reynolds died in 1885 his 
sugarmilling interests were concentrated in the'Umzinto Sugar Comp:m.y, 
on the south coast, and Glendale Sugar Estates, north of Durban. 
Crookes16 Samuel Crookes arrived in Durban in 1860, having come from 
Yorkshire with his brother Charles. Charles Crookes walked to 
Pietermari tzburg to seek work there and Samuel remained in Durban where 
he became apprenticed to a wagon builder. In 1865 Samuel Crookes began 
working on Maryland estate as a wagon builder. Eight years later,in 
1873, he bought the 600 acre Ellingham estate and on 100 acres he 
planted sugarcane. After erecting a small sugarmill, which began 
crushing in 1877, he was joined on the estate by his youngest brother 
Leonard who had recently survived a shipwreck on Robben Island. In 1880 
Samuel returned to Maryland estate and made his home on Cypress Hill, 
after having bought the estate from its former owners, his brothers-in-
law. Subsequently, in 1883, he bought another farm and its sugarmill, 
and integrated the machinery with that at Maryland. After the death of 
his wife in 1886, Crookes left Natal for the interior to become first a 
diamond- and then a gold-prospector, while his elder son George managed 
his estates. By 1894 he had returned to Natal and bought Renishaw 
16 Biographical note condensed from Osborn,Val.iant Harvest;·and SASJ 
44: 10(1960) ,pp.851-853,and 58:8( 1974) ,pp.420-421. 
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estate from a brother-in-law. Once again he moved his milling plant to 
concentrate it all at Renishaw. In 1895 he took his sons George, Fred 
and Charles into partnership, and they assumed control over the 
sug;:u-mill and estates when Samuel Crookes died in 1906. 
Pearce 17 William Pearce was born in 1855 in Durban, where his father 
was stationed with the imi:erial 45th Regiment. His parents later ran "a 
little roadside establishment" in southern Natai.18 When his father 
died in 1864, leaving a wife and six children, William was placed in the 
care of a local family. He stayed with that family until the age of 
fourteen. In 1871 he became apprenticed in the wagon building and 
blacksmith trade, and he followed his apprenticeship with an attempt at 
gold prospecting at Pilgrims Rest. Within a year he had left the gold 
fields and turned his hand to timber felling. When the second Anglo--
Zulu war was fought in 1879 William Pearce saw action with the Alexander 
Mounted Rifles, a regiment which he had joined at the age of fourteen. 
After the war he practiced as an artisan for a brief period until in 
188'.) he was advised, on medical grounds, to change his occupation. For 
a time he was a transport rider and then an arrowroot farmer. The 
declining market for arrowroot forced him to abandon this crop and he 
planted his first sugarcane in 1887. In 1889 he acquired a sugarmill 
which he first used to crush cane in 1890. His success as a sugarmiller 
led to the formation of Illovo Sugar Estates. The compmy was floated 
in 1906 with th'ree directors: William Pearce, the managing director, 
C.G.Smith, and Edward Saunders. In 1908 two additions were made to the 
the board of directors in the persons of George and Fred Crookes. 
Pearce was elected chairman of the board in 1934 and he also became a 
17 Biographical note condensed from Illovo Digest(December,1965),pp.5-7, 
and (May,1966),pp.5-8; Osborn,Valiant Harvest; and South African 
Sugar Year Book (1939-40),pp.215-216. 
18 Illovo Digest (December,1965),p.5. 
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director of C.G.Smi th and Company and Gledhow Sugar Estates. By the 
time of his death in 1939 his heirs had their interests intertwined with 
the fortunes of the Crookes', the Reynolds', and C.G.Smi th. 
Armstrong19 George Armstrong was born in Australia in 1855 and at the 
age of five he was taken by his parents to Natal, where they settled on 
/ 
a farm near Verulam. After being schooled in the district, Armstrong 
served a four-year apprenticeship and then in 1 ff'/6 he left for Kimberley 
where he found work with Atlas General Engineering Works •. Six months 
later he entered a partnership to manufacture diamond washing machinery. 
During 1007 and 1 ffi8 he was on active military service with the British 
forces, returning then t~ a partnership as a digger in the diamond 
fields, and later becoming the manager of a diamond comJElly. ,Although 
there are references to misfortune and loss after this time, by 1892 he 
was in a position to sell his interests in Kimberley "for·a considerable 
sum".20 He now left the diamond fields, where he had bec~me a close 
associate of Rhodes', to embark on sugar production. He first made an 
unfruitful bid jor the Blackburn sugar estate on the Natal north coast, 
but succeeded the same year, 1892, in buying the Verulam Central Sugar 
Factory with two of his brothers, W.G.Armstrong and James Armstrong. A 
year later he and James sold their shares to their brother and George 
left for America, to return shortly after the end of the AnglcrBoer war. 
In 1910 he, his elder son Athol, and Sir Thomas Hyslop obtained a 
concession to grow sugarcane in Zululand and they formed the Umhlatuzi 
' 
Valley Sugar Company which would supply Hulett's Felixton sugarmill. 
The following year, 1911, the same three partners secured a milling 
concession in Zululand, and under the title Zululand Sugar Milling 
19 Biographical note condensed from Osborn,Valiant Harvest; SASJ 
18:2(1934),pp.71-75; and South African Sugar Year Book and General 
· Directory (1930),p.96. 
20 South African Sugar Year Book and General Directory (1930),p.93. 
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Company they constructed a sugarmill near Empangeni. Later, in 1917, 
Armstrong and his associates also purchased the Emoyeni Co-operative 
Sugar Company from the koningkramer brothers, who had been milling their 
own cane since 1910. This estate was re-sold in 1921 to.Delville 
Estates, a Hulett subsidiary. Then in 1929 Zululand Sugar Millers and. 
Planters was formed to take over the Zululand Sugar Milling Compmy and 
75CJJ acres of former.Reserve land. This land was subdivided and offered 
I 
to.farmers who would have pro-rata shares in the new company, on 
condition that none would hold in excess of 800 acres. Eight hundred 
acres were also set aside and profits therefrom would form the basis for 
an employee pension scheme. Proceeds from another 5CJJ acres would be 
held in trust to maintain the Emµmgeni hospital until it was taken over 
by the state; thereafter the revenue would go to church, educational, or 
charitable institutions in the Lower Umfolozi district. At the fime of 
' 
his dea~h in 1934 George Armstrong was still active as the managing 
director of this large and locally pervasive sugar concern. 
Hulett21 James Liege Hulett, persuaded by the combined effects of the 
Crimean war and unemployment in Britain, sailed to Natal in 1857 to take 
up the offer of a job as assistant to a Durban chemist, a friend of his 
father's. Hulett embarked with £30 (which an uncle had lent him), of 
which £20 would pay his fare. Soon after his arrival in Natal he 
secured a lease over land at· Mount Moreland, where he built a house for 
himself and his parents and family who then also emigrated from Britain. 
After eighteen months of cultivating arrowroot he was appointed as 
manager of Driefontein, a cotton farm, where he again built a house, 
this time with the assistance of Alf Townsend's father. The farm was 
unsuccessful but by borrowing money Hulett was able to meet its owner's 
21 Biographical note condensed from R.F.Osborn,This Man of Purpose: A 
Biography of Sir James Liege Hulett. Edited by J .Hulett. 
Umhlali :W.H.Hulett, 1973; and SASJ 41: 1 (1957 ), pp.475-479. . 
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terms of sale. It was at Driefontein that Hulett began trading with 
Zululand, where there was a market for the, mealies and sweet potatoes 
which grew on his farm. When he took out a lease on a further 600 acres 
of land, calling the farm Kearsney, he extended his trading interests -
"As there was a big kaffir location in the neighbourhood, I opened a 
store and at one time had a fairly flourishing business".22 On the 
proceeds of Driefontein and in a short-lived partnership with his 
father-in-law, Hulett bought Kearsney and additional land north of the 
Umvoti river. In 1892 he was in a position to put into operation with 
£50000 capital a tea compmy under the style of J.L.Hu.lett and Sons Ltd. 
His success as a tea grower, packer, and distributor enabled him in 
1901, at the age of 64, to make his debut in the sugar industry. He 
acquired 3000 acres of land, named it Tinley Manor, and had his first 
sugar mill built on it. Then in 1906 a second sugar mill was ·built at 
Darnall to crush the excess cane cut on his estates. The latter 
sugarmill was also supplied by growers who had 99-year leasehold on 
their respective portions of the farm De Jager's Kraal, which Hulett had 
bought for that purpose. In the interim Hulett had moved his 
headquarters (in 1903) from Kearsney to Durban. From there he stood 
poised to spread his empire by successfully tendering in 1905 for the 
· erection of two concession sugarmills in Zululand. The first of these 
was ·opened in Amatikulu in 1908 and the other in Felixton in 1911. When 
he died in 1928 Hulett left to his heirs controlling interests in five 
sugarmills, a, refinery in Durban, and vast sugar estates, inter al.ia. 
Smi th23 Charles George Smith was born in England in 1858 and in 1861 
was taken to Natal where his mother's uncle, Henry Leuchars, had a 
22 Osborn, Man of Purpose. p.24. . 
23 Biographical note condensed from Osborn,Valiant Harvest; and R.F. 
Osborn, C.G.: A Great Batalian: A Biography of Sir Charles George 
Smith. Durban:C.G.Smi th, 1966. 
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coffee plantation. His father, intent on independently seeking 
opportunities in Natal, left the family, and young C.G.Smith returned to 
London with his mother in 1868. At the age of twelve he ran awey from 
home to work in the City. For two years he worked by day and attended 
night schools. In 1873, at the age of fi_fteen, he made his way back to 
Natal where his first job was as a store assistant. Smith's father was 
by then a' bookkeeper for W.B.Lyle, who gave Charles employment in his 
store where Richard Addison was also working. Lyle later sent C.G.Smith 
to manage Kirkly Vale estate and there the latter met Frank Reynolds, 
with whom he would in due course become closely associated. Following an 
altercation with Lyle, Smith left his employ and went to work as an 
auctioneer for Beningfield. His work with Beningfield was interrupted 
when he fought as a trooper during the Anglo-Zulu war, and then in 1888 
he and a fellow employee left their employer to start their own 
auctioneering business. In 1893 Smith withdrew from the partnership and 
practiced as an independent auctioneer and trader. He built up his 
business by buying a ship to ply the coastal route, and by forming the 
South African Supply and Cold Storage Compmy. In 1897 he floated, with 
Frank Reynolds, the Elandslaagte Coal Mining Company, and then further 
expanded his mining interests to become the largest shareholder and 
chairman of Cambrian Colliery. In 1904 Smith and his associates 
J.C.Meydon, Charles and Frank Reynolds, A.Hepburn, and E.Acutt acquired 
Umzinkulu Sugar Estates from a company iri which the Campbells had been 
directors. During the same year,. 1904, Smith formed C.G.Smi th & 
Company. In 1919 Smith's company bought Umzinkulu Sugar Estates and 
renamed it Umzinkulu Sugar Compmy. In the interim Smith had been party 
to the formation of Illovo Sugar Estates, which in 1914 bought a 
plantation in Mo9ambique and renamed it Beira-Illovo Sugar Estates. 
Smith was chairman of the board of this subsidiary until 1917, when he 
took it over in his own name. He held the compmy in Mo~bique until 
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1920, when he sold it to a Portuguese company. While his venture in 
Mo~bique was in progress Smith had also been active in Natal. In 1916 
he formed the Chaka's Kraal Sugar Company with Frank Reynolds, 
G.J.Crookes, S.F.Crookes, J.J.Crooks, and William Pearce. The same 
group bought Gledhow Sugar Estates from Friend Addison in 1920, and in 
1928 C.G.Smith gained possession of La Mercy Sugar Estates. Three years 
later the La Mercy sugarmill was sold to Tongaat, and in 1934 the 
Gledhow-Chaka's Kraal Sugar Company was formed to take over Gledhow 
Sugar Estates and Chaka's Kraal Sugar Company, and to amalgamate them 
with two estates already owned by C.G.Smith and Compmy. Meanwhile in 
1927 Smith had established Smiths Coasters as a private company. 
C.G.Smi th died in 1941 without descendants. 
In addition to the people listed above as first-generation Natal 
sugarocrats (whose biographies are summarised in Figure 1 ), there were a 
few other nineteenth century sugarmillers whose families remained within 
the ambit of the sugarocracy until well into the twentieth century, but 
were displaced from the sphere of sugarmill ownership and control by 
World War II. There were nineteen sugarmills which operated outside the 
control of the sugarocracy at the turn of the twentieth century, four of 
which had ceased crushing or were sold before World War I, and another 
eight of which had been closed or sold to the sugarocracy by 1922. Of 
the remaining seven, three remained under the control of pioneering 
families until the late 1920s or beyond. These three families, the 
Platts, the Kirkmans, and the Hawksworths, have their histories briefly 
described below, together with that of the Addisons who, despite having 
sold their sugarmill before 1920, remained closely associated with the 
sugarocracy thereaf'ter. The final four sugarmills to be accounted for 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































shown after the following biographical notes that these four sugarmills 
were the only ones to change hands during the twentieth century without 
going to the above-mentioned sugarocrats or their descendants. 
Platt24 The brothers Sydney and Lawrence Platt reached Natal 
separately, within a year of each other. In 1849 Sydney started farming 
beans on the Isipingo Flat. He then, in 1852, turned to sugarcane 
growing and acquired a sugarmill for his estate, but later left the 
colony for North America. Lawrence Platt, who had departed from 
Yorkshire, "where he occupied a good position", 25 with 200 gold 
sovereigns, also took up land and began bean cultivation on the Isipingo 
Flat in 1850. Like his brother he too turned his attention to sugarcane 
in 1852, and bought his first sugarmill in 1854. When Lawrence Platt 
died in 1886 his son Alfred, who was married to the daughter of nearby 
Reunion sugarmill's owner, took over the prosperous and expanded 
Prospecton Sugar Estate. Upon Alfred's retirement, the management and 
control of Prospecton was assumed by his son Cecil. Alfred Platt died 
in 1938, and seven years later, in 1945, by which date the Platt family 
had amassed extensive property on the Isipingo Flat, Tongaat bought 
Prospecton Sugar Estate. The Platts' sugarocratic connection was cut 
when Cecil Platt died in 1950. 
Kirkman26 The Kirkman family's interests in sug;3.I'milling began when 
John Kirkman arrived in Natal from Lancashire in 1868 at the age of 
twenty two. His first sugarmill was a small second-hand one, which he 
replaced with a new one in 1874. After World War I Kirkman enlarged his 
24 Biographical note condensed from Osborn, Valiant Harvest; SASJ 
17:10(1933),pp.525-5311, and 26:11 (1942),pp.557; and South African 
Sugar Year Book (1949;50),pp.174-175. 
25 SASJ 17:10(1933),p525. 
26 Bio~aphical note condensed from Osborn, Valiant Harvest; and SASJ 
6:9 ( 1922) ,p.659. 
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estate's milling capacity by buying the suga.rmill on Reunion estate when 
the lands were sold to Illovo. Kirkman was party to the formation in 
1917 of the Uba Printing Company and he was its board of directors' 
first chairman. By the time of his death in 1922 he had formed 
J.Kirkman and Sons, and his son J.P.Kirkman succeeded him as principal 
thereof. The Kirkman's sugarmill was bought by Reynolds Brothers in 
1928 and moved to Entumeni. 
Havksvorth27 Four Hawksworth brothers landed in Natal in 1868 and began 
working a mixed farm of 400 acres; 100 acres had been granted to the 
brothers, 100 acres had been obtained in the .name of their father, and 
200 acres they had bought. In the mid-1870s they started growing 
sugarcane, and although their father had lost most of the fortune he had 
made as a Scottish iron and steel manufacturer, he made them a present 
of a new sugarmill in 1875. E.W.Hawksworth left his three brothers in 
1877 to farm independently at Beneva, and they continued sugarmilling 
until 1895, when they sold out to A.A.Smith for £2500. Meanwhile 
E.W.Hawksworth had resumed sugarmilling on his own account after his 
cattle herd had been struck by lung-sickness in the period 1880 - 1882. 
' 
Using second-hand machinery he built his first sugarmill in 1883 and 
then in 1908 opened a new sugflrmill. He extended his land-holdings to 
almost 2000 acres and leased 40 acres of land in the Ifafa Mission 
Reserve. His sugarmill was supplied by his own cane as well as that 
from three white and some sixty African growers. After }}is death in 
1923, E. W.Hawksworth and Sons remained in that family's control until 
1930, when Reynolds Brothers acquired the company's property. 
27 Biographical ·note condensed from Osborn, Valiant Harvest; and SASJ 
7:3(1923),p.209. 
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Addison28 After disembarking in Natal in 1848, Dr H.W.Addison practiced 
medicine in Pietermaritzburg, but by 1862 he had a small sug8rmill on a 
farm ~ed Addington after his home in Kent. When he resumed medical 
practice in 1868 as district surgeon for the county of Durban (he 
founded Addington hospital there), his farm was left in the care of his 
son Friend Addison. The farm deteriorated during the young Addison's 
absence while fighting in the Anglo-Zulu War, but an unexpected legacy 
enabled him to erect a new sugarmill and buy another estate. At some 
time during the 1880s his brother Walter took charge of the cane fields, 
and in 1911 the brothers formed a private company in which name a new 
and larger sugarmill was commissioned in 1912. In 1919 the C.G.Smith 
group bought the Addisons' su~mill and 12000 acres of their land. The 
new owners operated their acquisition under the title Addison Bros. 
until 1934, when it was amalgamated with Chaka's Kraal Estate. 
) 
While these last four £amilies were being effectively pushed into 
positions which were peripheral to the sugarocracy as such, there were 
transactions taking place between other owners, whose sugarmills 
represented some of the obstacles to the complete conquest of the sugar 
industry by the strongest sugarocrats. 
Nev Guelderland sugarmill29 One of thes~ was the sugarmill at New 
Guelderland which T.C.Colenbrander had started in 1862, eight years 
after his arrival in Natal from Java. Colenbrander's property included 
a large sugarmill; and possibly the largest sugar estate of the time, 
when he was declared insolvent in 1870. The Glasgow and Natal Sugar 
Company, which had purchased Colenbrander's property for £5750, was also 
forced by insolvency to sell in 1880. By 1882 the proprietors of the 
28 Bio~aphical note condensed from Osborn, Valiant Harvest; and SASJ 
9:8( 1925) ,p.549, and 56:7 ( 1972) ,p.315. 
29 Osborn, Valiant Harvest.; Natal Mercury ZI .6.1961 .. 
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sugarmill were Ash, Colenbrander's son-in-law, and George Stewart, the 
sugarmill's engineer. Stewart's family was in control of the New 
Guelderland Sugar Factory at the time of his death in 1949. The 
SU€fll'mill was then closed and moved to Chirundu, in Southern Rhodesia, 
in 1951. 
Chick's sugarmiu30 Another case in point was Chick's sugarmill which 
be8an crushing in 1864 under the ownership and control of John Chick, 
who had settled in Natal in 1850. By 1870 the sugarmill was under the 
management of his two sons, and af'ter the death of the second of these 
sons in 1905, the latter's widow and sons ran the sugarmill until 1926. 
Their land was sold in 1926 and their 'Sugarmill was bought by John 
Shire, who was to begin sugarmilling on his own account in Zululand. In 
1957 the Shire family departed from the sugfll'milling sphere when their 
sugarmill was closed and once again relocated by its new owners, Ubombo 
Ranches of Swaziland. 
Umvoti sugarmil131 The third case was that of the Umvoti sugarmill 
which was erected by the Colonial Government in 1861, at a cost of 
cfE818~ to operate as a central sugflrmill in the Groutville Reserve. The 
sugarmill was initially supplied by African growers who received half of 
the proceeds of sugar sales, the balance of the revenue going to the 
government. · The early history of the Umvoti sugarmill was marked by 
planters' protests, inefficiency caused by poor mechanical plant layout, 
and by resultant unprofitability. Eventually in 1900 it was sold by the 
government for £1CX)(). Although it had crushed for much longer than any 
other sugarmill which had been supplied solely by African growers, the 
Umvoti sugar mill was a symbol to white sugarmillers of the perceived 
30 Os born, Valiant .Harvest; and SASJ 41 : 7 ( 1957), and. 35: 1( 1951 ) , p.63. 
31 Osborn, Valiant Harvest. 
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ineptitude of Africans in the conduct of sugar industry affairs: 
W.A.Campbell once recounted a conversation which had taken place between 
his father and one Colenbrander who 
was called in to help them through their troubles and 
for some time ran the Mill and a committee comprised 
entirely of natives representing native owners! ••• on 
many occasions when the Mill ran smoothly for a few 
hours without a stoppage, the native committee would 
come down from their kraals in a body and instruct him · 
to cease crushing as they, in their opinion, considered 
the Mill required a rest. In their primitive minds, 
they considered that as oxen needed rest, so would 
machinery require rest. Orders were then issued to the 
'Tombis to immediately fetch large quantities of beer to 
the Mill; the committee would then sit round, together 
with the Mill hands who were on duty ~2 the time, an~ would partake liberally of the beverage. 
'' 
In 1916 the Umvoti sugarmill passed into the hands of the Umvoti Central 
Sugarmilling Company, and then in 1919 it was taken over by the 
Mauritian-owned Melville Sugar Compmy. 
Glendale sugarmi1133 Finally there was the case of the Glendale 
sugarmill which had been erected in 1880 by Arthur Reynolds. Glendale 
was sold to G.Nicholson in 1890, and he in turn sold it in 1920 to· the 
Paruk family. This last sale represented the first (and only) 
successful penetration of an Indian family into the ranks of Natal's 
sugarmill owners • 
. ' 
More than providing biographical information, the foregoing pen-sketches 
serve to illustrate the continual process of centralisation which 
characterised the ascent of the Natal sugarocracy. It is seen how ~ few 
families controlled all but a small number of sugarmills by World War I. 
What is especially noteworthy about these sugarmillers is that they 
were, by and large, "self-made" capitalists. While one or two of the 
sugarocrats-to-be had arrived in Natal with independent means, their 
32 .Opening Address, Proceedings, SASTA 13(1939). 
33 Osborn, Valiant Harvest. 
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ascent w~ more generally dependent upon personally accumulated capital, 
and they were accountable principally to colonial labour power for their 
status. 
Sugarocratic dynasties evolved from the combined practices of family 
company formation and inheritance. It was principally under the aegis 
of capital accumulated in the names of Armstrong, Campbell, Crookes, 
Hulett, Pearce, Reynolds, Saunders, and Smith, that the sugarmilling 
com]llllies of lasting significance had already come to dominate the local 
industry before World War I; it was the second and subsequent 
generations of heirs to seven of the first-generation millers (that is, 
excluding C.G.Smi th) by whom the sugarocracy was reproduced as a 
distinctive grouping ~n both the economic and political senses. By 
acretion of capital in sugarmilling, largely without threat of external 
contenders for ownership, and by internal coalescence, rather than 
dismemberment, the sugarocracy remained intact until 1962. Then high-
pitched internecine struggle put asunder the SU€fll'OCracy as the Hulett 
empire was usurped by other sugarocrats. Therefore, although_it brought 
further coalescence, 1962 also heralded the break-up of the Natal 
sugarocracy. The following descriptions take the story of sugarocratic 
inheritance up to the eve of the 1962 clash. 
Saunders34 Of James Saunders' male offspring (for sugarocratic 
daughters, while they might be heiresses, were excluded from sugar 
business), the oldest son Charles was by training and inclination 
destined for a senior post in the colonial administration, rather than 
34 Biographical notes condensed from Osborn,Valiant Harvest.; 
A.Hugill,Sugar and all that ••• A History of Tate & Lyle. London: 
Gentry Books, 1978; Watson,Tongaati.; R.G.T.Watson,"'The Old Order':A 
Tribute to Douglas Saunders",Condenser 5:1 (1963),pp.14-18; South 
African Sugar Year Book (1939-40),pp.193-195; and Financial Mail 
29.1.1982,pp.431-432. 
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in the family company; the second son, Walter, after working for a time 
at Tongflat also joined the colonial service; and only the youngest son, 
:Edward, bound himself to the sugar industry. Thus in 1882, ten years 
before his death, James Saunders named Edward the heir to his compll'ly. 
By self-tuition and experience :Eliward Saunders became a knowledgeable 
sugar mill manager, and in some lean years for sugar producers he also 
broadened his experience by transport riding and trading. After the 
death of his father in 1892 Edward was left in sole charge of Tongaat, 
but, for want of finance he was unable to expand his sugarmill 
immediately. In 1894 he entered into a partnership with W.J.Mirrlees, 
the son of the senior partner in the Glasgow sugar machinery 
manufacturing company, Mirrlees, Watson and Yaryan. Tongaat Sugar 
Company was formed by Saunders and Mirrlees, with the latter's 
contribution being an inve~tment of £15CX)(). Still short of capital with 
which to expand according to Saunders' project·, the partners borrowed 
£.61311 from Marshall Campbell and David Don in 1895, by mortgaging over 
5000 acres of land and pledging their new sugarmilling machinery as 
security. (It was in these formative years of the Tongflat empire, until 
1897, that Robert Armstrong was contracted to transport the company's 
sugar to Durban by wagon.) In quest of yet further funds, Saunders went 
to Britain in 1899, the year in which Mirrlees retired, and floated 
Tongaat Sugar Company as a limited liability company in Li verpo91. 
Saunders and Frank Reynolds were appointed as joint managing directors 
of the comapany, although it was mainly Saunders who performed an 
executive role. Despite the preponderance of Natal shareholders over 
British shareholders (11 :2), it was only in 1918, after the advent of 
double taxation, that Tongaat was incorporated in South Africa. Under 
Edward Saunders the Tongflat empire grew by the absorption of other farms 
and sugar companies. An unsuccessful attempt to acquire the property 
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of the Addison brothers, which went to the C.G.Smi th group, was offset 
by the purchase of the Umhloti Valley Mill and Tutate Compmy in 1922. 
That company's sugarmill was moved to Maidstone to complement the 
existing Tongaat sugarmill nearby. In 1927 the two sugarmills were 
amalgamated on the Maidstone site. 
By this time Edward Saunders' son Douglas was also involved with the 
affairs of the company. Douglas Saunders had spent his vacations from 
the University of Natal, where he was a science student, as an estate 
overseer with Tongaat Sugar Company. He had then gained a diploma in 
agriculture from Cambridge University, before doing an extensive tour, 
in 1925, of the sugar industries of Hawaii, Cuba, and the United States 
of America. In 1926 he was made assistant general manager of Tongaat, 
and there followed an appointment to the company's board of directors. 
In 1934, five years before his death, Edward Saunders handed over 
control of Tongaat to Douglas, who became managing director in 1939 and 
chairman iin 1941. Under Douglas' direction the compmy continued on its 
expansionary path. In 1944 the Platts' sugarmill and estates were 
acquired, and in 1946 the Armstrong's Central Factory was exchanged for 
IB40000 in Tongaat shares. 
From 1955 ,Douglas' son C.J.Saunders began taking over-control of 
Tongaat, with the chairmanship passing from father to son in 1963. 
C.J.Saunders, a graduate in science from the University of Cape Town and 
of economics and agricultural science from Oxford University, began 
working for Tongaat after g:tining a year of practical experience at Tate 
& Lyle's refinery in Plaistow, England. Early in his career with 
Tongaat he was despatched on an international tour of research which led 
to important innovations within the company's operations. In 
particular, the entire transport infrastructure was revised and road 
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vehicles were substituted for rail weys as means· of conveying cane and 
sug;ar; and the sug;armill was put into seven-dey operation without the 
conventional Sundey close-down. C.J.Saunders was also later attributed 
with having inspired Tongaat's diversification outside sugar. No less 
significant was the influence he had over the course of events by which 
the structure of sugar capital was transformed in 1962. 
C8JI!-pben35 In spite of William Campbell's success in Natal, the early 
history of the Campbell family's participation in sugarmilling contained 
episodes of misfortune, and their sugarocratic status was only really 
assured some thirty years after William Campbell's death in 1865. 
Initially it had been Campbell's eldest son, also William, who had 
controlled his legacy, Muckle Neuk, with the assistance of his younger 
son Marshall. About ten years later Marshall left his brother and went 
to the farm Aberfoyle, which he had ~ought for himself. In 1877 William 
Campbell sold Muckle Neuk and Marshall was subsequently dispossessed o~ 
Aberfoyle af'ter having stood, and lost, as guarantor for his brother-in-
law. Marshall was taken on as a manager, first of Groom and Hill's 
estate, and later of Umzinto lodge Estate. When the latter estate was 
declared insolvent in 1880, Marshall moved yet again to Cornubia Estate, 
which he had secured by means of a bank loan. In 1882 Cornubia was 
absorbed into the Natal Central Sugar Company, of which Marshall 
CamJ:bell was made a director. This represented the first step towards 
regaining a place in the Natal sugarocracy for the Campbell family, but 
there still ley ahead a sequence of events by which their status was to 
be confirmed. 
The Natal Central Sugar Comp:my's life had begun with the assistance and 
35 Biographical notes condensed from Herd, Killie's Africa.; Osborn, 
Valiant Harvest.; South African Sugar Year Book (1930), pp.70-71; and 
KCM 32753, Marshall Camfbell. 
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involvement of the Oriental Banking Corporation. In 1876 the Mount 
:Edgecombe estate belonging to Smerdon had been bought by a Mauritian, 
whose idea it was to start a central sugarmill there by inducing the 
Oriental Banking Corporation to transfer to Natal a redundant Mauritian 
suga.rmill. This plan was given effect in 1878 by the newly-formed Natal 
Central Sugar Company. Marshall Campbell and David Don, a former 
. 
Oriental Bank manager, bought the company from the bank after it went 
into liquidation in 1890. Campbell proceeded to float Natal Estates 
Limited in London during 1895, in order to take over the Natal Central 
Sugar Compmy and to buy adja.Cent estates. Now the Campbell family was 
fully restored to its sugarocratic standing. 
Marshall's son W.A.Campbell joined the headquarters staff of Natal· 
Estates in 1900 at the age of twenty. When in 1902 the company bought 
the Prospect Hal~ Estate, which had its own sugfll"mill, W.A.Campbell was 
made manager thereof. In 1906 the young Campbell was made junior 
managing director of Natal Estates. Marshall Campbell died in 1917 and 
his son succeeded him at the head of the company. W.A.Campbell's son 
Urban also joined in the management of Natal Estates, and the Campbell 
family maintained control thereof until 1962. 
Reynolds36 Following· the death of Thomas Reynolds in 1885_, his sons 
lent themselves with some vigour to the continued task of expansion. In _ 
1890 Arthur Reynolds sold Glendale, but at about the same time Reynolds 
Bros. Ltd. was incorporated in England with a capital of £100000 and 
with the brothers Frank and Charles Reynolds on its board of directors. 
It was to Frank in particular that the development of the Reynolds' 
empire could be attributed, and it is of some interest to note that an 
36 Biographical notes condensed from Osborn, Valiant Harvest.; ''Reynolds 
of Sezela"; SASJ 41:8(1957), pp.637-645; and South African Sugar Year 
Book and General Directory { 1930), pp.31-43. · 
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uncle of his, a weal thy English tanner, frequently gave him financial 
backing. In 1907 Reynolds Bros. was re-incorporated in Natal with a 
capital of £150000. In 1913, the year following the Reynolds Bros. 
take-over of Bazley Bros., the company embarked on a programme of 
intensive expansion •. Its capital was again restructured, and now George 
Crookes became joint managing director with Frank Reynolds. During. the 
next year construction began on Reynolds Bros.' new Sezela sugarmill, 
and thereafter the compmy's estates were continually enlarged. Amongst 
the Reynolds Bros. acquisitions were the property of J.Kirkman and Sons, 
bought in 1928, and E.W.Hawksworth 'and Sons' estates, bought in 1930. 
While the company was growing to comparatively enormous proportions, the 
Reynolds family's controlling interests were being gradually thinned as 
C.G.Smi th, the Crookes' and the Reynolds' joined forces as sugarmillers. 
When Frank Reynolds died in 1930, his position as chairman and managing 
director of Reynolds Bros. was assumed by G.J.Crookes, and although his 
immediate heirs still held a large stake in the company, they had no 
executive part to pley. 
' 
Crookes37 The joint Reynolds-Smith-Crookes ventures produced an 
· intricate web of control over a large part of Natal's sugar industry, 
'-
with the Crookes dynasty emerging ultimately at the forefront. The 
brothers G.J., S.F., and J.J.Crookes were all involved in the running of 
the company established by their father, and they contributed to the 
direction of the other sugar companies which they controlled in. 
conjunction with the Reynolds' and C.G.Smith. In addition to their 
being directors on the boards of Crookes Bros. Ltd., Reynolds Bros. 
Ltd., C.G.Smi th and Co. Ltd., and Gledhow-Chaka's Kraal Sugar Co. Ltd., 
G.J.Crookes was on the board of Umzinkulu Sugar Co. Ltd. and he was 
37 Biographical notes condensed from SASJ 20:1 (1936), pp.25-32, 
32:6(1948), p.373~ 43:2(1959), p.125, 50:3(1966), p.293, 54: 10(1970), 
p.673, 57:3(1973;, p.113, and 58:8(1974), pp.420-421. 
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chairman and managing director of Reynolds Bros. until his death in 
1948; and J.J.Crookes was chairman of Crookes Bros. Descendants of 
these three Crookes brothers followed their forebears .into these) 
compmies as directors and senior managers. F.N.N.Crookes began in the 
Renishaw sugarmill in 1923 as a laboratory assistant and left ,seventeen 
years later after having become first the chief chemist and then factory 
manager. After some years as a cattle farmer he resumed his links with 
S1l.&3l'milling in 1951 when he was appointed to the Crookes Bros. board of 
directors. In 1955 he joined the Gledhow-Chaka's Kraal directorate and 
.was chairman of that board between 1963 and 1966. In 1966 V.J.S.Crookes 
retired as general manager of Crookes Bros 1., and the same year 
T.C.B.Crookes became the com:p311y's managing director while G.D.D.Crookes 
was made general manager of Umzinkulu Sugar Co. The two last-mentioned 
Crookes' al.so became directors of other companies within the Smith 
group. Meanwhile many of G.J.Crookes' directorships had been taken over 
by his son G. V.Crookes, who was the most senior of the Crookes lineage 
in sugarmilling until his death in 1970. He had been, with C.J.Saunders 
and W.A.Campbell, a prime mover in the take-over of Hulett's. 
Pearce38 When William Pearce died in 1939, his three sons were already 
in prominent positions of~control over Illovo Sugar Estates. 
B.J.W.Pearce received his training in sugar technology at Louisiana 
State University before joining Illovo as manager. In 1922 he took the 
position of general manager of Gledhow-Chaka's Kraal Sugar Co., and he 
held that post and the chairmanship of Illovo's board at the time of his 
death in 1949. R.L.Pearce was appointed to Illovo's board of directors 
in 1934 and he remained there as managing director until his death in 
1952. B.E.D.Pearce, who had al.so studied sugar technology at Louisiana 
38 Biographical. notes condensed from Proceedings, SASTA 21 (1947), p.vi; 
SASJ 36:4(1952), p.247, 56:5(1972), p.193, South African Sugar Year 
Book (1939-40), pp.215-216, (1948-49), p.247, and (1951-52), p.121. 
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State University, and who had visited the sugar industries of the United 
States, Fiji, Cuba, and Australia, began at Illovo in 1923 as factory 
> 
manager. In 1934 he went onto Illovo's board of directors, and he was 
joint managing director thereof when he died in 1952. A third 
generation of the Pearce family maintained dynastic continuity in the 
person of O.W.M.Pearce, t:P,e son of B.J.W.Pearce. He followed his 
training at Illovo with studies at Louisiana State University, and then 
joined the staff of the SASA Experiment Station. A few months after his 
return to Natal he went back to Illovo as its assistant manager. In 
1952 he became the company's general manager, and in 1956 he was 
appointed Illovo's managing director. 
Armstrong39 When George and James Armstrong sold their shares in 
Verulam Central Sugar Factory to their elder brother W.G.Armstrong, he 
formed a private compmy, Central Factory (Pty) Ltd., which he ran with 
the assistance of a fourth brother. Robert Armstrong had begun working 
in a general store in Verulam before joining his brothers on the 
Kimberley diamond fields. When W.G.Armstrong died in 1925, it was 
Robert who succeeded him as managing director of Central Factory. He 
was in turn succeeded after his death in 1942 by his son R.S.Armstrong. 
Four years later, in 1946, Central Factory was bought by Tongaat, and 
R.S.Armstrong was taken onto the Tongaat board of directors. It was he, 
R.S.Armstrong, who was the first chairman of Hulett's af'ter its take-
over. 
Hulett40 Written into the articles of J.L.Hulett and Sons at its 
formation in 1892 was the clause that 
39 Biographical notes condensed from Osborn, Valiant Harvest.; SASJ 
54: 12 ( 1970), p. 791 ; and South African Sugar Year Book ( 1941-42), 
p.214. 
40 Biographical notes condensed from Osborn, Man of Purpose.; SASJ 
51:1(1967), p.73, 56;5(1972), p.197, and 58:11(1974), p.573. 
the founder should be Chairman and Managing Director for 
the term of his life, if so long willing to act, at a 
salary of One Hundred Pounds per month, and shall be 
emJX)wered to substitute any other Director as Managing 
Director in his place. Albert Saxe Liege Hulett and 
William Arthur Hulett
4
fhall be two of the first 
Directors of the Company. 
49 
And so it was that the Hulett dynasty began its life, first with 
interests in tea and later in sugar. A.S.L.Hulett, the eldest son of 
the company's founder, duly took over the position in the company 
va~ated by his deceased father. He was initially assisted by his 
younger brother Horace, who had formerly been the compmy's secretary 
and who was later to become the managing director of Hulsar. Although 
A.S.L.Hulett's eldest son became a director of Sir J.L.Hulett and Sons, 
it was a younger son Guy who succeeded him in office. Another Hulett to 
have a seat on the compmy's board was Jack, son of Horace. Jack Hulett 
had started working on the family's tea estates, and later went to 
Ceylon to study tea production in that country. This training was 
followed by an appointment as general manger of the Kearsney tea 
estates. Ten years thereafter he was made general manager of Hulett's 
Natal sugarmills, and in 1956 he joined the company's directorate as an 
alternate director. He was the only member of the Hulett family to 
retain a place on the Hulett board after the take-over which had ensued 
from actions taken by his cousin, "the brilliant, dynamic but difficult 
Guy Hulett", 42 who had also been instrumental in effecting the company's 
vast exi:ansion during the 1950s. 
An impression is created above of the dynastic pattern which developed 
during the ascent of the sugarocratic families. It would be a 
distortion of historical fact to present the individuals encountered 
) 
above as the sole agents of sugarocratic empire-building, for there were 
41 Osborn, Man of Purpose. p.66. . 
42 Financial Mail 19.2.1965, Special Supplement, p.9. 
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numerous peripheral sugarocrats, company directors and others who were 
instrumental in the process. 
The directorates of the compl?lies forming the sugarocrats' empires did 
always, and in progressively greater magnitude, include persons from 
outside the. immediate sugarocratic family network (see Appendix 1 ). 
There is admittedly little that can be said about the personal influence 
of individual directors in the absence of detailed information about 
their respective shareholdings and their standing on company boards, and 
without being privy to board decision-making~ Certain generalisations 
mEzy" nevertheless be made on the basis of what information is available, 
and these cast light on the implications of the appointment of directors-
from outside the ranks of the sugarocracy. 
Firstly, attention IDB¥ be drawn to the directorships held by members of 
Natal's colonial filite on the earliest boards of the pre-eminent sugar 
companies. For example, Natal Estates had at different times 
S.F.Beningfield, G.C.Cato, R.Vause, Sir D.Currie, J.W.Leuchars, and 
G.Payne as directors; Umzinkulu had, also at different times, 
J.W.Leuchars, J.C.Maydon, A.Hepburn, and E.Acutt; and Chaka's Kraal had 
in its earlier years Governor B.C.C.Pine as a director. These people, 
who stood in the forefront of colonial Natal's urban fili te, commanded 
considerable economic strength and wielded influence in local and 
colonial government. It can be deduced that however small their input 
might have been in the conduct of sugar company affairs, their 
association with colonial sugarmillers represented an alliance which 
served to em}ilasise the parallels between the objectives of government 
policy and company employment practices. 
Secondly, the initial registration of some of Natal's sugar compl?lies in 
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Britain and the raising of capital in Britain led to the presence of 
British residents on sugar company boards. The most notable of these 
overseas connections was made in 1929 when Sir L.Lyle, principal of 
England's vast Tate & Lyle sugar corporation, was appointed to the 
Hulett's board. The connection was maintained in the person of his son, 
who succeeded him as a director of Hulett's. The existence of such 
links pointed to another inestimable but implicitly important influence 
/ 
upon sugarmilling affairs in Natal. 
Finally, there is the changing comp:>sition of directorates to be noted. 
Besides a reduction in the proportion of overseas directors in the wake 
of company re-registration in South Africa (to avoid double taxation) 
and local capital growth, growing investment diversification af'ter World 
War II was followed by th~ progressive influx on those boards of 
administrative and technical managers from the various branches of 
company operations. That is not however necessarily to say that a 
managerial revolution was in progress. As departures were made in the 
p:>st-World War II comp:mies from the traditional ommission of comp:my 
employees from company boards, parent companies were simultaneously 
created above existing sugar comp:mies. A related development was the 
increase in the number of interlocking directorships, with individual 
(usually sugarocratic) directors gaining seats on more than one sugar 
company board (See Appendix 1 ). 
If it is accepted "that comp:my chairmen and managing directors are the 
most potent members of a directorate, then it follows that the 
sugarocracy did not lessen its grip on company control by admitting 
professional managers to its boards. These professional managers had to 
be seen as lieutenants of the sugarocracy rather than as contenders for 
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company control. Undoubtedly the most significant amongst this category 
of pre-1962 directors was Hulett's W.E.R.F.dwards.43 :Ed,wards was born in 
Antigua in 1880 and he joined Hulett's in 1911 after a few years as a· 
bank employee in Antigua, London and Port Elizabeth. When Hulsar (the 
origins of which are discussed in the following chapter) was floated in 
1926 he was its first c~airman, and he subsequently became Hulett's 
managing director. He was a central figure in pre-1927 negotiations 
between planters and millers, especially those which culminated in the 
1926 Fahey Conference Agreement. :Edwards also represented the local 
sugar industry as official delegate to the 1932 Ottawa Conference, which 
I 
produced an agreement whereby South African sugar would be imported by 
Canada at the prevailing British preferential rate for an initial period 
of five years. He was also an unofficial adviser to the South African 
state delegation to the 1937 International Sugar Conference• , 
A consort of a different nature ~as the director who was neither foreign 
nor a professional manager. A case in point was L.C.Grice,44 who at the 
time of his death in 1959 was chairman of the ZSM & P board and a 
director of Hulsar. He was a senior partner in Shepstone & Wiley, a 
firm of attorneys which he had joined in 1905. Besides his involvement 
with sugar compmies, he was also chairm~ of James Brown Ltd. and Felt 
& Textiles South Africa Ltd., and director on the boards of over 30 
other compmies including Barclays Bank. There were few directors who, 
like Grice, were local people without roots in the sugar industry, and 
who had reached such stature in the sugar company boardroom before 1962. 
lt might readily be concluded from the foregoing that the entire Natal 
sugarocracy and its consorts within the industry made up a coterie of 
-43 Biographical note condensed from SASJ 32:4(1948), p.235. 
44 Biographical note condensed from SASJ 43:8(1959), p.715. 
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sorts. This is dispelled in the following chapter which demonstrates 
that contending factions have always existed within the sugp.rocracy, and 
that its history is marked by campaigns in pursuit of sectional 
interests. 
Summary 
The opening decades of the twentieth century saw the emergence of a 
local sugarocracy composed of a few families from petit-bourgeois 
origins in Victorian Britain. As the more powerful of these 
sugarmilling families succeeded in their endeavour to constantly expllld 
their capital in the means of sugar production, so were smaller 
sugarmillers gradually eliminated from the sphere of sugarmilling. Thus 
during its ascent as a bloc, the sugarocracy was continually 
contracting; a process of atomisation which approached a climactic end 
in the early 1960s. 
Natal's "sugarocratic era" spanned six decades. Millers-cum-planters 
had begun emerging towards the end of the nineteenth centu~y and 
individual members of certain sugarocratic families to-day still wield 
power in the sugar industry, but (as the following chapter shows in 
greater detail) it was between 1905 and 1962 that there was a 
sugarocracy per se in Natal. Eight family names accounted for the core 
of the suga.rocracy; viz., Armstrong, CamrX:>ell, Crookes, Hulett, Pearce, 
Saunders, Smith, and Reynolds. A number of other families occupied 
peripheral positions in the world of sugarmilling, and a small group of 
company employees and directors completed the picture of sugar capital's 




THE SUGAROCRACY AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SUGAR PRODUCTION 
In charting the course followed by individual sugarocrats in thei-r 
ascent, the previous chapter offered some indication of the economic 
factors which most immediately accounted for the way in which the 
plantation owner was eclipsed by the miller-cum-planter. Those insights 
into the circumstances surrounding the emergence of the Natal 
sugarocracy provide a prelude to a deeper examination of the history of 
the sugarocracy as a regional group of sugarmillers faced by local 
marketing constraints and stiff foreign com:i;etition. 
It is necessary to undertake this deeper examination in order to 
appreciate the extent to which sugarmillers were influenced by 
international economic and political, to say nothing of environmental, 
forces. The way in which the sugarocracy responded to these forces 
ultimately, if not alW8¥S immediately, had a bearing On its employment 
practices. Furthermore, by situating the Natal sugarocracy in its 
global context, similarities (and differences) betwE?en forms of 
sugarocratic control over workers in Natal and those exercised in other 
sugar-producing regions will be better understood. 
There are four issues which receive particular attention in this 
chapter: firstly, competition and co-operation within the Natal 
sugarocracy; secondly, the sugarocracy's changing relationship with 
cane-growers; thirdly, the way in which local and international climatic 
and .marketing conditions influenced sugarocratic practices; and 
fourthly, the events which led to the demise ~f the sugarocracy. The 
analysis begins with a brief historical outline of Natal's place in the 
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international sugar market. This outline serves as a skeletal structure 
to be fleshed out in the remainder of the chapter, where the main 
features of the political economy of sugar production in Natal since 
1905 are dealt with chronologically, in four sections. 
Natal and the International Sugar Market 
Alt.hough Natal's sugar industry was founded during a remarkably 
favourable period for sugar sales, 1. the international situation was 
about to be transformed to the disadvantage of the colony's planters. 
It is generally argued that the downward trend in world sugar prices 
between the mid-1880s and World War I reflected the expansion of 
subsidised European beet sugar production and the disposal of beet sugar 
in protected markets. This, as has recently been pointed out,2 was not 
the sole reason for declining prices. What is generally overlooked is 
that the production of cane increased more rapidly during the period of · 
declining prices than it had previously been doing. These two factors 
implied the same thing for sugar-producers; namely, competition. 
That Mauritius was, during the late 1800s, supplying sugar cheaply to 
the Cape Colony (where Natal annually disposed of approximately half of 
its sugar), meant .that Natal's planters had to endure stiff competition 
in one of their most likely markets. Although both Deerr and Richardson 
have seen links between the mineral revolution on the South African 
highveld and the eXf0llSion of. regional trading in Natal sugars,3 it is 
B.Albert and A.Graves, "Introduction". In Crisis and Change in the 
International Sugar Economy 1860-1914. Norwich and Edinburgh: I~ 
Press , 1 984. 
2 Ibid. 
3 N.Deerr, The History of Sugar. 2 vols. London: Chapman & Hall, 1949, 
pp.191-192; and P.Richardson, "The Natal Sugar Industry, 1849-1905: 
An Interpretative Essay", Journal of African History 23:4(1982), 
pp.515-527. 
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not absolutely clear from available evidence that Natal did indeed enjoy 
an immediate reprise. What is certain is that the Customs Convention 
signed in 1903, after the 1899-1902 Anglo-Boer War, brought a measure of 
security to Natal's planters by giving their product preference in the 
South African territories over Mauritian and other overseas sugars. If 
the 1903 Customs Convention had given strength to the arm of Natal's 
sugarmillers, they nevertheless later had to. contend with the 1909 
amendments to the 1901 Modus Vivendi between Mo9ambique and the 
Transvaal; one of the new provisions being that Mo~bique could export 
commodities, including sugar, to ·the Transvaal duty-free. To be assured 
of survival in the remainder of the pre-World War I period, they had to 
participate in the contem:µ:>rary revolution in sugar technology.4 
Throughout World War I Natal planters were prohibited from exporting 
sugar, but there followed a recompense within.a ~ew years of the 
resumption of exports irt 1919: with war damage having severely upset the . 
beet sugar industries of Europe, world sugar prices rose to record 
levels by 1920 (as the South African economy was entering a 2-3 year 
recessionary period), and in 1923 the Mo9ambique Convention was 
terminated. However the initial euphoria of Natal's, and the world's, 
cane sugarmillers during the immediate post-war years was soon to give 
way to despair. By 1925 European beet-producers had recovered, while a 
number of cane-producing regions had expanded their output to take 
advantage of the post-war situation. Natal faced the resultant crisis 
of overproduction with a particularly large crop to dispose of. Prices 
on the free market ·dropped precipitously, and import competition on the 
4 Unless otherwise stated, the following sketch has been based on 
H.I.Behrmann, "A Study of the Economics of Sugar-Cane Production in 
Natal". PhD thesis, University of Natal; 1959; Report of the 
Commission of Inquiry into the Sugar Industry of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1970; and SASJ, passim. 
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South African market led the state to augment duties on foreign sugar. 
This was a foretaste of what the Great Depression was to bring. 
When in 1930 world sugar prices plummeted again, Natal's sugarmillers 
were hard-hit. Since 1924 there had been a massive increase in the area 
under cane in Natal, and now its sugarmillers had to struggle against 
depressed export earnings as well as a malaria epidemic in their labour 
catchment area along the east coast. Moreover, in 1930 Cuba began 
"dumping" low-priced white sugar on the South African market. By 
raising the import duty in 1930 and again in 1932, after relatively low-
priced American sugar entered the South African market, the' South 
African state extended a measure of relief to Natal's sugar-producers. 
Matters were not made any easier for sugarmillers by the drop in 
, domestic consumption during the depression. The first opportunity for 
Natal's sugarmillers to find cause for optimism came when, as a member 
of the 1933 Ottawa Imperial Economic Conference, South Africa secured a 
position on the Canadian market at a preferential tariff. Then, with 
the conclusion of the first International Sugar Agreement (ISA) in 1937, 
its signatories, including South Africa, established a firmer basis for 
guaranteeing access to the world market at determined prices by means of 
a quota system. 
The end of World War II marked the beginning of the rapid expansion of 
the Natal sugar industry, and when South Africa became signatory to the 
1951 Commonwealth Sugar Agreement (CSA) it did so as a relatively large 
producer. The CSA provided its predominantly colonial signatories with 
a protected market position and subsidised prices, and it fuelled the 
growth of local sugar industries in southern Africa (see Appendix 2). 
J 
The terms of the CSA were incorporated in the second ISA, concluded in 
1953. 
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These post-war international agreements amongst sugar-producers and 
their chief consumers in the European and North American metropoles were 
not the panacea for all the problems faced by the sugarmilling 
signatories. Since World War II, London sugar brokers C.Czarnikow have 
pointed out,5 world sugar prices have followed a six- and seven-year 
1 cyclical pattern. The first post-war boom came in 1956, when fears of 
stock depletion, in tandem with the Suez crisis, led to a doubling of 
the world sugar price. When a new ISA was signed in the wake of this 
boom, in 1958, South Africa again had its CSA terms embodied therein. 
However, when in 1961 South Africa became a Republic its international . 
standing changed; its status as a CSA signatory was withdrawn and 
replaced by a bilateral agreement with Britain. South Africa's 
subsequent search for alternative foreign outlets led to Japan and, 
following its embargo on Cuban commodities, the United States. The Ba;v 
of Pigs crisis, which provoked this American action towards Cuba, had 
far-reaching effects in the world sugar market in the early part of 
1962: the existing ISA was suspended, and the sugar price went into a 
severe depression. A relatively rapid recovery had been made by the end 
of 1962, and then by the end of 1963, after Cuba's sugar crop had 
suffered hurricane devastation, the sugar price had been pushed to 
record levels. 
South Africa responded to the events Surrounding the 1962/63 boom by 
removing restrictions on cane growing. The resultant expansion involved 
Natal's sugarmillers in a 4-year period of massive capital ex:p3nditure. 
However by 1965 the tide had turned again, largely as a result of Cuba's 
recovery, and the sugar price went into a decline as buyers took 
advantage of the over-stocked market. 
5 lfatal Rercury 8. 7. 1 985. 
59 
The fotll'th post-war price boom occurred in 1969, the year in which the 
fourth ISA came into effect and re-introduced the structures of control 
which had been absent since the 1962 suspension. When attempts to 
negotiate a new ISA in 1973· failed, producers were poised to take 
unfettered advantage of the 1974 price boom. Participants on the world 
market were able to command prices which were in excess of fifty times 
.greater than those which had prevailed during the 1965/66 slump. The 
fact that South African su§3.I'millers were selling SU§3l' on the domestic 
market a~ less than production costs paled into insignificance against 
the background of huge export earnings.6 
In 1976 overproduction again set the world sugar price on a downward 
slide, which continued until 1978. But- now, a century after sugar beet 
had posed a serious threat to cane sugar, the price cycle embodied a new 
influence. This new threat is constituted by viable .alternative 
sweetners. 
Millers-cum-Planters, the Refinery Question, 
and Growers' Protests: 19:)5-1914 
Given the narrow coastal region within which their capital was staked, 
the relatively brief period of settler colonialism that lay behind them, 
and the size of the settler population, it goes without saying that the 
early sugarocrats related one to another on a personal plane. If co-
operative economic and political ventures were fostered by personal 
acquiantance, competition and conflict amongst sugarocrats were 
nevertheless prevalent. Superficially it was the Crookes', the 
Reynolds', and C.G.Smi th who dominated sugarmilling on the coast to the 
south of Durban, while the Huletts and the Saunders' were the primary 
6 Daily News 23.10.1974. 
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north coast sugarmillers. Al though the regional grouping::J were not of 
themselves the sources of 'friction, some of the more imµ>rtant moments 
in the history of the sugarocracy arose out of collaborative or 
competetive efforts to exploit or break down certain regional 
advantages. 
Zululand had been annexed to Natal in 1897, but pressure from 
sugarmillers, amongst others, to allow Natal capital to spread into the 
territory was resisted for some years by the Colonial Government. When 
Zululand was opened to settler colonists, the young sugarocracy was 
presented with an opportunity to comP3te, by _tender, for the erection of 
a central sugarmill there. This was to be a central sugarmill in the 
pure sense of the term, with its owner prevented from also owning the 
lands that -would supply it with cane. The sugarmiller would be 
contractually bound to crush cane planted by land concessionaires, who 
would be bound under the government's scheme -to cultivate cane and 
supply it to the sugarmill. 
Tenders were first invited by the Colonial Government in mid-1904, but 
as J.L.Hulett was the only one to respond before the dead-line, the 
government re-advertised. A tender was attracted from Friend Addison 
this time. Although the Select Committee appointed to assess the 
tenders favoured Addison's, neither his nor Hulett's were acceptable 
because they embodied certain financial expectations of the government. 
In mid-1905 the government extended another invitation for tenders. 
Three offers were forthcoming: one from Hulett, one from E.Saunders, 
c.P.Reynolds, and C.G.Smi th, and the third from an Un-named party. In 
August 1905 it was confirmed that Hulett had been successful, and he set 
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about the establishment of the Amatikulu sugarmill.7 
It is not· clear why other sugarmillers had not initially shown the same 
enthusiasm as Hulett, but the recent depression may have been an 
influential factor. When the final tenders were submitted, the one from 
Saunders, Reynolds, and Smith reflected the links that existed' between 
the three sugarocrats; an association with formidable potential which 
was never realised. It is of speculative interest to ponder the absence 
of Marshall Campbell from this latter group, given the bonds that 
existed between the Campbells and the Saunders' •
1 
It has been claimed 
that Campbell was himself intent on making a bid for the Amatikulu 
concession, but that en route to Pietermaritzburg the train, which also 
' carried Hulett with his tender, was delayed and Campbell was unable to 
submit his tender on time. Hulett had apparently alighted from the 
' train, made off across the veld, and managed to hire a horse and cart 
which took him to Pietermari tzburg timeously.8 The final contest for 
the first Zululand concession sugarmill had.demonstrated the capacity 
which sugarocrats had to form coalitions, as much as it showed them to 
be com:p3titive; it was an event which foreshadowed later negotiations 
involving sugarocrats in various coalitions. There were certain 
groupings which endured, but each multi-µu-ty negotiation or conflict 
within the sugarocracy seemed to bring out a fresh coalition, as in the 
case of refining arrangements. 
Whereas uneven quality had previously characterised the ~ produced 
by the various sugarmills of Natal, 1910 saw the origins of wider 
uniformity as co-operative refining was first introduced by some of the 
7 For details on the Zululand concessions see NLA, Sessional Paper, 4, 
1906; Natal Government Gazette 27.6.1905; 'Umfolozi 1923-1973"; TAD, 
K39, Vol.5, SC34; and SASJ 33:3(1949), pp.157-161. 
8 N.Herd, Killie's Africa: The Achievements of Dr. Killie Campbell. 
Pietermaritzburg: Blue Crane Books, 1982, p.36. 
~·· 
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sugar companies. Natal Estates, Tonga:at, and Hulett's were the major 
investors and sugar suppliers behind the scheme which brought into being 
the South African Sugar Refinery Ltd.. The newly-formed company had its 
refinery at South Coast Junction, and its first managing director was 
1!11ward Saunders. This development enabled the participants to achieve 
greater rationalisation in the areas of production and marketing. ·. 
If three of the largest sugarmillers were now enjoying the benefits of 
po-operative refining, they and the sugarocracy as a whole had not 
resolved their differences with suppliers. They were reticent, 
secretive, and calculating in dealings with their cane suppliers, 
notwithstanding joint interests. Until the mid-1930s cane was paid for 
by weight rather than sucrose quantity; a system which had nourished 
antipathy between grower and miller since the appearance of the first 
centralised sugarmills in Natal~ Indeed, as early as 1885 independent 
growers had voiced their concern about the secretive wa;y in which the 
millers-cum-planters functioned.9 · Information about levels of sugar 
recovery was concealed, and the miller-cunrplanter kept an upper hand 
in cane pricing. There was no knowing what the quality of cane was, how 
one supplier's crop compared with another's, how one sugarmill's level 
of efficiency compared with that of another, and whether any 
improvements in sugar recovery were being effected. Because 
sugarmillers justified payment by weight on the grounds that only one 
cane variety was grown in Natal, 10 while also keeping details about 
their operations and revenue out of the public eye, growers had well-
founded suspicions that they were being disadvantageously paid and 
misled. 
9 W.Y.CamJi>ell, The Natal Sugar Industry. Durban: P.Davis & Sons, 1885, 
p.57. 
10 G.Heaton Nicholls, South Africa in My Time. London: Allen & Unwin, 
1961, p.101. 
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New light was cast upon growers' suspicions when some of them in 
Zululand litigated, following proved irregularities by concession 
sugarmills.11 The ehsuing Beaumont Award, made in favour of the growers 
in 1912, might be said to have been the harbinger of greater re~arity 
in miller/grower relations on the whole. Seen from Osborn's 
perspective, after 1910 "the sugar industry, with conscious effort, 
started to put its house in order ••• nudged along by two commissions of 
enquiry ••• [and] the development of enquiring minds and fearless self-
analysis".12 A closer examination of the -affairs of the inter-war 
period reveals that self-interest would have been a more apt diagnosis 
than the "self-analysis" found by Osborn. 
The Sugarocracy Figh.ts through the Inter-War Period: 1914-late 1930s 
Since the beginning of World War I domestic sugar prices had been fixed 
and sugar exports were prohibited, and for some years there had been no 
British imperial preference for colonial sugars. It was in this context 
that Natal sugarmillers joined ranks with other industrialists to 
I ' 
advance protectionism by lobbying through the newly-formed British 
Empire Producers' Organisation (BEPO) and, as the next chapter shows, 
the Federated Chamber of Industries (FCI). Some sugarmillers were at 
11 R.F.Osborn, Valiant Harvest: The Founding of the South African ~ 
Industry 1848-1926. Durban: SASA, 1964, p.102. There would be 
further court decisions in favour of concession growers, such as the 
1919 award to plaintiff in van der Plank vs. Hulett's: SASJ 
3: 10 ( 1 91 9), p. 94 7. 
12 Osborn, Valiant Harvest. pp.101-102. 
64 
the same time motivated to buy into the Mo98Jllbique sugar industry.13 
The 1918 Cost of Living Commission indicated that respite was on its Wa:f' 
when it concluded that the sugar industry should be allowed to resume 
exporting. However, rather than sitting back in expectation of 
favourable market conditions, sugarmillers sustained their collective 
commitment to the work of the organisations which they had helped to 
launch, namely BEPO, FCI, and the South African Sugar Association 
(SASA). Although the FCI constituted an im:rortant lobbying institution, 
its direct involvement in the economics and politics of sugar production 
and distribution was neglible as compared to that of BEPO and, 
naturally, SASA. Broadly conceived by E.Saunders as a propaganda agency 
for imperial producers and founded in London in 1916, BEPO was to 
represent an important vehicle for advancing the cause of Natal's sugar 
exporters in particular. In 1918 South Africa's sugarmillers pledged 
'--
their material support for BEPO over the following three years, 14 and 
both Saunders and W.E.R.Edwards served terms as BEPO executives.15 On 
13 In 1914 Illovo Sugar Estates acquired the Beira Sugar Estates in 
Mo9ambique, and in 1917 C.G.Smith took it (now the Beira-Illovo 
Sugar Estates)over in his own name. Smith disposed of his Mo~bique 
interests in 1920 (R.F.Osborn, C.G.: A Great Jlatalian: A Biography of 
Sir Charles George Smith. Durban: C.G.Smi th, 1966; and D.Lincoln, 
"Capital and the Milling of Sugar in Mo9ambique before 1942", 
Perspectives in Economic History 1 ( 1 982), pp.30-42). At the same 
time, and until the late 1920s, other Natalians, namely Gen.Arnott, 
G.Crookes, W.F.Curry, R.Murray, and C.Platt, were the directors of 
African Agricultural Estates, another sugarmilling company in 
Mo~bique (SASJ 6:3(1922), pp.181-183). The comµmy was floated in 
1910 and registered in Natal. In 1915 the South African government 
was approached indirectly to support the com:µuiy's bid to raise more 
capital in Britain (TAD, MNW 295, MM 2487715, Secretary African 
Agricultural Estates to Mackenzie, 1915). The comµmy would seem to 
have been sold in 1927 to a Mauritian syndicate (SASJ 11:4(1927), 
p.227). Whether or not Natal sugarmillers were involved in the 
Inhambane Sugar Estates, registered in Johannesburg in 1903 (TAD, LD 
374, AG 1237 /03, Registration of Articles of Association), is 
unknown. Of related interest was the move made in 1927 when 
G.S.Armstrong led a syndicate including C.Platt and Gen.W;ylie that 
was investing in Southern Rhodesia (SASJ 11 :12(1927), p.TI5J. 
14 SASJ 2:3(1918) p.1072. 
15 SASJ 15: 3 ( 1931 L P· 155. 
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the London end, Sir Humphrey Leggett was the Natal sugar industry's 
permanent representative on the BEPO Council. 
The most important organisation to ,emerge at this crucial historical 
moment was SASA, which was formed in 1919 as a combined millers' and 
growers' association.1 6 It in fact represented the victory of 
sugarmillers in bringing the two parties together to jointly resist 
state interference in the sugar industry while simultaneously promoting 
the cause of protectionism in the face of a deteriorating world sugar 
market. It very soon became obvious that SASA provided nothing mor~ 
than a fragile unity based on compromise and pragmatism. Growers were 
from the start reluctant partners with misgivings about, inter al.ia, the 
envisaged tripartite structure of SASA to accommodate sugar 
agents/brokers as well as themselves and millers.17 The close 
af'filations between sugarmillers and their distributors had for decades 
been a major bone of contention for growers. In the event, the agent 
David Fowler was ~lected SASA's first chairman, 18 and E.Saunders, who 
had been the prime mover behind its formation, SASA's first president. 
The elaborate institutional structure erected by the sugarocracy during 
and immediately after the critical World War I period, was to become 
fully mobilised in an attempt to take full advantage of the conditions 
which the 1918 Cost of Living Commission had anticipated. During 1919, 
the exp::>rt of surplus sugar was again allowed, under licence; a joint 
miller/ grower deputation to Cape Town resulted in the government raising 
the domestic price of sugf3r; and the BEPO campiign to have the im~rial 
16 On the stormy inception of SASA see Duminy, ''Natal Sugar Interest", 
and A.Hammond et al South African Cane Grovers' Association: The 
First 50 Years. Durban: SACGA, 1972. 
17 See discussion in SASJ 3:5(1919), p.319. 
18 Although Fowler did belong to the syndicate which owned the La Mercy 
sugar company between 1920 and ~931, his primary interest was in 
sugar marketing. 
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preference for colonial sugars renewed also achieved a degree of 
success.·Then in August 1919, with world sugar prices having risen 
threefold in the previous three months, another deputation met Smuts in 
Durban over the price at which sugar was being sold on the domestic 
market (the demands of which had to be satisfied before sugarmillers 
co.uld export). Yet another miller/grower deputation travelled to 
Pretoria in September. When the Cabinet responded by increasing the 
domestic sugar price again, the palliative measure fell short of sugar 
producers' requests, and it came with no guarantees. This has been seen 
as the impetus for E.Saunders to stand for election to parliament in 
1920.19 The strengthened sugar lobby (with Saunders and Heaton Nicholls 
of Umfolozi in the House of Assembly and F.Reynolds in the Senate), and 
_another sugar deputation to Cape Town, won for sugar producers two 
further price increases in 1920.20 
Still frustrated by the price ceilings, and perturbed by the possible 
imminent renewal of the Mo9ambique Convention, which would allow 
Mo~bique to continue exporting duty-free sugar to the Transvaal, sugar 
industry representatives again went to Cape Town in April 1921, but to 
no avail. Not surprisingly, after two price reductions were announced 
later in that year, the Prime Minister was visited by a sugar industry 
deputation. The upshot of this. last meeting was the government's 
decision to appoint a Commission of Inquiry into the sugar industry.21 
Although after World War I the Union Government under the South Africa 
Party generally provided a protective dispensation for agricultural and 
manufacturing interests, policies which directly favoured sugu-millers 
19 A.H.Duminy, "The 'Natal Sugar Interest' and the Smuts Government, 
191 9-1924", unpublished m imeo. 
20 Ibid. 
21 See Behrmann, ''Economics of Cane Production", pp.32-69. 
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did not necessarily accommodate their supplying growers. Evidence given 
before the 1922 Sugar Inquiry Commission left little doubt as to the 
difficulties that lay ahead of growers, who were intent on achieving a 
more equitable share of the proceeds from sugar sales.22 One witness 
supplied evidence to the Commission showing accounting and distribution 
inconsistencies on the part of Hulett's. (Interestingly, the letter 
submitted as evidence was withheld from SASA.)23 Certain of the 
evidence and data- submitted to the Commission by Hulett's were, at the 
express behest of the company, kept from the eyes of growers.24 Crookes 
Bros., who had no contracts with growers, revealed that they had as 
their basis of cane payment 12/- per ton when their sugar realised £15 
per ton, less excise duty. Otherwise they had only a skeletal return to 
submit to the Commission, on the grounds that they had never undertaken 
costing nor kept separate accounts for fields and sugarmill, and they 
had no chemists' figures available. 25 
The Crookes Bros.' return, and data furnished by Natal Estates and 
Tonga.at, respectively, have provided an insight into the nature of the 
prevailing variation and variability in miller/grower trade. This is 
illustrated in Table 1. (The mutual interdependence of concession 
growers and millers was at some remove from the situation which 
prevailed south of the Tugela, and besides showing the various, and 
fluctuating, prices paid to growers, the tabulated data are indicative 
of the differences in status that existed between concession growers in 
Zululand and growers supplying these three particular sugarmills.) 
22 It is notable that Hulett's and their cane suppliers in Zululand were 
frequently locked in battle during the inter-war period. Growers 
found Hulett's to be imµIBsive when negotiation was attempted. See 
TAD, K39, Vol.5, Memorandum from Ginginhlovu and Mtunzini Planters' 
Association to members, 24.8.1918. 
23 TAD, K39, Vol.5, W.White to Sugar Commission Secretary, 28.2.1922. 
24 TAD, K39, Vol.5, Sugar Commission Chairman to Hulett's, 22.2.1922. 
25 TAD, K39, Vol.5, Crookes Bros. to Sugar Comnission, 23.2.1922. 
TABLE 1: GROWERS' CANE SUPPLIES TO THREE NATAL SUGAR COMPANIES, 
1912-1920 
GROWERS' CANES AS PAID TO GROWERS 
A PROPORTION OF TOTAL (SHILLINGS PER TON) 
CRUSHED (PERCENTAGES) 
Natal Crookes Natal Crookes 
Estates Tongaat Bros Estates Tongaat Bros 
1912/13 13,38 20,88 40,27 12/3 12/9 11/11 
1913/14 11,63 24,26 36,65 12/6 12/5 12/7 
1914/15 12,07 27,02 48,56 13/6 13/11 14/6 
1915/16 14,41 31, 71 46,69 14/10 15/2114 14/9 
1916/17 13,37 36,29 48,88 15/9 16/5314 15/9 
1917/18 14, 18 39,58 46, 12 19/7 1 s1113la 19/2 
1918/19 30,20 53,45 45,99 17/4314 11/5112 17/9 
1919/20 26,45 45,56 45,20 22/9114 19/111~ 20/6 
1920/21 24,00 53,33 36/- 34/-
Source: TAD, K39, Vol 5, Company Submissions to Sugar Inquiry 
Commission, 1922. 
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The findings of the 1922 Commission were hardly prejudicial to 
sugarmillers, but some of its more imJX>rtant recommendations indicated 
that the miller/grower status quo would duly be revised. It was 
recommended, inter alia, that cane in future be paid for according to 
sucrose content and quality, and not by weight; that the Zululand 
concession agreements be immediately revised, and their period of 
operation reduced from 25 to 5 years; and that planters should have 
access to ·information about the performance of sugarmills.26 
After the Sugar Inquiry Commission, cane growers generally remained 
sceptical of sugarmillers. With the world sugs.r market still buoyant in 
the early 1920s huge profits were being reaped in the sugar industry,27 
26 See Behrmann, "Economics of Cane Production", p.33. 
27 An un-named company, _possibly Hulett's, rose from a 2C!/o loss to a 32% 
profit between 1921/2 and 1922/3, to a 125% profit the following 
season (Board of Trade and Industries, Report N~ 66, Report on the 
Sugar Industry, 1926 ). 
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but because no changes to their situation had come of the 1922 
Commission, growers remained convinced that millers were taking an 
unjusttfiably large slice of those profits. The African Sugar and 
Cotton Planter articulated growers' views thus: "We want more light 
thrown in the dark places, a more efficient policy of administration, 
and the discontinuance of the system of family-p:trty cabals".28 
When the world sugar crisis struck in 1925, South Africa had produced a 
particularly large crop and sugar producers turned immediately to the 
government for assistance. The Board of ·Trade and Industries 
investigation which was consequently undertaken, led to the 
recommendation being made that the duty on imported sugar be raised as a 
protective measure, subject to certain conditions. One of these 
conditions was that the miller I grower agreements be revised to effect 
~ment for cane according to its sucrose content; this was in pursuance 
' of recommendations already made by the 1922 Commission, which had not 
yet been adopted.29. The duly instituted conference of millers and 
growers, under the chairmanship of Fahey (who belonged to the Labour 
Party and was chairman of the Board of Trade and Industries), produced 
the Fahey Agreement on cane pricing according to its sucrose content, 
and attendant legislation in the form of the 1926 Sugar Prices Act. 
The ink had barely dried on the Fahey Conference Agreement before the 
sug;3.I'millers began expanding their own crop sizes on an unprecedented 
scale; They also began an immediate revision of refining arrangements. 
Watson has revealed part of the background to the events which led to 
the liquidation of the South rAfrican Sugar Refinery' after a brief life 
28 African ~ and Cotton Planter 1 ( 1925) , ;g· 11 • 
29 Board of Trade and Industries, Re,port N. 66, Report on the Sugar 
Industry, 1926. 
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of fifteen years.30 Although he had been on the Tongaat board of 
directors since 1902, C.G.Smith had not participated in the co-operative 
-refinery movement during 191 O. His subsequent resignation from the 
Tongaat board followed a dispute which he had instigated by questioning 
the methods of management employed by the refinery's directors. The 
difference between Smith and the co-operative refiners had thus 
foreclosed the possibility of industry-wide rationalisa~ion. 
Then Natal Estates had effectively reversed its commitment to the co-
operative refinery by taking the decision to introduce to its sugarmill 
the double carbonatation refining process. This move by Natal Estates 
apparently incited Hulett's, under the hand of W.E.R.E:lwards, to build a 
new central refinery a few hundred metres awey from the existing ~uth 
African Sugar Refinery plant. The older refining company was 
consequently liquidated, and in 1927 a new company, Hulett's South 
African Refineries Ltd. (Hulsar), began operations as co-operative 
refiners and distributors. Hulsar, which served a number of the north 
coast sugarmills, had as its main shareholders Sir J.L.Hulett and Sons, 
Tongaat, and ZSM & P. Meanwhile a suchar process refinery was installed 
at Illovo in 1927, and all the south coast sugarmills steyed outside the 
Hulsar scheme. 
Al though the settlement of the refinery question in the above fashion 
may have reflected their inability to achieve consensus over the 
techniques and management of refining, sugarmillers were quite prepared 
to combine forces and rationalise the system of selling their exported 
sugar in London. Until 1927 sugarmillers had effected the distribution 
of sugar exported to Britain through various agents and brokers (Table 
30 R.G.T.Watson, Tonga.a.ti: An African Experi.aent. London: Hutchinson, 
1960, p.132. 
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2 reflects the situation as it was in the early 1920s), and the only 
unifying factor was the presence in London of their collective 
representative, Sir Humphrey Leggett, who~ould proudly announce to them 
that 
in addition to their [BEPO's] sugar committee, on which 
I sit, they have appointed a very strong new committee, 
frankly styled "The Propaganda Committee" ••• They have 
paid me the compliment of making me Chairman of this 
Committee, and I shall of course, do my best iu
1
that 
capacity for the interests of South African sugar.) 
The Smith group depended upon the agency founded by C.G.Smith before he 
\ 
became a sugarmiller, while Hulett's had of ~ate performed their own 
distribution, and A.A.Smith and David Fowler & Co. were two other 
important agencies. The last-named company had become a leading export 
agency, selling Natal sugars through the London brokers E.D. & F.Man or, 
less frequently, Czarnikow. At the end of the 1927/28 season, the first 
during which Hulsar functioned, its chairman, Edwards, communicated to 
C.G.Smi th and Co. his satisfaction with their chosen selling agents in 
London, and his concern that C.G.Smi th should also deal through African 
Agency Ltd. so as to avoid mutually detrimental dealings. The following 
season saw C.G.Smi th and Co. following the advice received from 
F.dwards.32 
The new system worked as follows: after the determination of export 
quotas by the Crop Disposal Committee of the Natal Sugar Millers' 
Association (NSMA), Hulsar, and C.G.Smi th and Co. would jointly agree 
upon their respective shares of the export sugar cargo and organise its 
shipment to Britain. African Agencies then acted as intermediary 
between the two South African concerns.and British refiners and brokers. 
This arrangement involved Hulsar working as agent under agreement with 
31 SASJ 10:11 (1926); pp.758-759. 
32 KC, F633 SOU, South African Sugar Association, "Private and 
Confidential Statements and Correspondence of E.Saunders and 
W .E.R.Ed wards", August 1934. 
TABLE 2: QUANTITY OF SUGAR HANDLED BY AGENCIES, 1919/20-1921/22 
(SHOWN AS PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL PRODUCTION) 
1919/20 1920/21 1921/22 
David Fowler & Co 52,51 52,97 48,75 





c G Smith & Co 27,97 24,47 28,55 
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Source: TAD, K39, Vol 5, Submission to Sugar Inquiry Commission, 1922. 
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Hulett's, Tongaat, Natal Estates, ZSM & P, Melville, Prospecton, Central 
Factory, and Umfolozi Co-op.. C.G.Smi th was the agency for Reynolds 
Bros., Crookes Bros_., Chaka's Kraal, Illovo, Gledhow, and Umzinkulu.33 
Thus by World War II the handling of Natal's sugar exJX)rts had undergone 
extensive revision, stemming largely out of the Rulsar initiative. 
If they had reached agreement amongst themselyes on the marketing-of 
sugar expo~ts, the sugarocrats had still'to contend with the problem of 
protesting growers, many of whom had not been placated by the terms of 
the Fahey Agreement. As revolutionary as it had been in the Natal 
context, the Fahey Agreement did not eliminate the discord between the 
two parties, and an unconditional rapprochement was far from being 
reached. From the outset there was abundant prejudice, shown in the 
refusal of sixteen growers to sign the agreement.34 No less mollifying 
were breaches of the agreement. It was shown that as -a result of the 
averaging of statistics by Hulett's Felixton chemists in 1928, growers 
had incurred losses, and for these and the costs of arbitration they 
were compensated in 1930.35 Given that at least two further cases were 
brought against Hulett's,36 and, more significantly, that the South 
African Cane Growers' Association (SACGA) split from SASA, 1930 was a 
particularly turbulent year. Such turbulence in the sugar industry was 
undoubtedly related to the fact that the Fahey Agreement favoured 
millers-cum-planters. 
The miller/grower relationship was further complicated by the difference 
in status between concession growers and non-concession growers. The 
negotiating strength of the latter growers was surely undermined by the 
33 Ibid. 
34 Board of Trade and Industries, Report N<? 194, The Sugar Industry: 
Working of SU€fil" Conference .Agreement and Future Orgpnization, 1935. 
35 SASJ 14: 5 ( 1930) , p. 303 • 
36 SASJ 14:2(1930), p.85, and 14:10(1930), p.667. 
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particular conditions facing each "mill group", by their proportionately 
minor status as suppliers, and not infrequently by close family ties 
with sugarmillers. These differences had provided much of the rationale 
for the existence of two major growers' organisations, the Zululand 
Planters' Union (ZPU) and the Natal Planters' Union (NPU). There is 
little known about the nature of relations between south coast growers 
and the millers constituting the Smith group. On the north coast, 
between Durban and the Tugela river, the sorts of stresses that typified 
miller/grower relations in Zululand were ameliorated, if not contained, 
by social connections of long standing. The imp:>rtance of sugarocrats' 
intermingling with north coast growers was demonstrated in the events 
surrounding and following the Fahey Agreement. Even if things did not 
always follow the sugarocrats' line, their intermingling with north 
coast growers appears to have reduced dissent amongst these suppliers in 
the wake of the Fahey Agreement. 
A number of growers' associations were formed in the two or three years 
following the Fahey Agreement. One of these, the Tinley Manor Planters' 
Association, was dominated by members of the Armstrong and Hulett 
families.37 In the Tongaat district sugarocratic families were 
numerically less prominent within the planting community, but hardly 
less influential. During October 1926 the growers supplying Tongaat 
. Sugar Co. had met at the company office to have E.Saunders explain to 
them the Fahey Agreement. These growers then formed an association and 
elected a committee which decided to employ their own chemist, who was 
instructed to have nothing to do with the head technologist of the South 
African Sugar Planters' Union (SASPU); they thereby remained outside the 
SASPU ambit. The Tongaat Sugar Planters' Association subsequently 
refused to join SASPU's successor, the SACGA, but were later convinced 
37 SASJ 62: 9(1978)' p.441. 
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to do so by other growers following a formal proposal seconded dy 
D.Saunders. In 1931 the association was renamed Tongaat and Central 
Factory Planters' Association.38 Such amalgamation came as a result of 
centralisation of ownership and production in the industry, and it was 
of so~e concern to the SACGA that in the early 1930s many growers were 
selling up, and that- millers were ready buyers for their farms.39 Thus 
was the Inanda Planters' Association rendered defunct when Natal Estates 
and Tongaat respectively bought a number of large sugar farms.40 
l 
North of the Tugela th~ situation was quite different. In Zululand, 
Amatikulu and ,Pelixton were large concession sugarmills, both owned by 
Hulett's and both supplied solely by concession growers. Delville and 
ZSM were not concession sugarmills, and Umfolozi was (since 1923) a 
growers' co-operative sugarmill. The Ginginhlovu and Mtunzini Planters' 
Association, representing Amatikulu's suppliers, was consistently 
frustrated in Its attempts to persuade Hulett's to adapt concession 
agreements and make them more mutually acceptable. These endeavours 
were spearheaded by the association's president, C.B.Hill, a vociferous 
cam:ra.igner for growers' interests who 118.d in the broader political arena 
been a staunch and active supporter of Gen. Botha's.41 Felixton's 
growers had F.Piccione as a stalwart defendant of their interests; he 
considered millers to have treated concession growers as "a lot of 
indentured Indians'i.42 . Outstanding amongst Zululand growers in their 
struggle against millers was G.Heaton Nicholls of Umfolozi. 
A thorn in the flesh of the sugarocracy, Heaton Nicholls worked 
relentlessly to improve the position of Zululand growers and in so doing 
38 SASJ 61 : 7 ( 1 977 ) , pp. 34 9-351 • 
39 SASJ 15:2(1931)t pp.103-115, and 15:10(1931), p~630. 
40 SASJ 16:10(1932), pp.557-561. 
41 SASJ 3:2(1919), p.135. 
42 SASJ 1:2(1917), pp.131-134. 
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he became a champion of growers' interests in general. ~is role as 
growers' protagonist is suitably described in an excerpt from a speech 
of his: 
They [the Zululand concession agreements] stood in the 
way of efficiency. To accomplish this it was necessary 
to organize all planters to enlist the aid of 
Government. That meant organizing the planters south of 
the Tugela, where the Government agreements did not 
apply ••• There was in existence at Umhlali an Association 
' called the Victoria County Farmers' Association; which 
was a very mixed bag. At my first meeting I was faced 
by the principal miller of the district who told the 
members that I was a socialist and some-what out of 
bounds in Umhlali; but it was not long before Umhlali 
formed the strongest centre in Natal. I travelled down 
the South Coast and stirred up considerable interest. 
The result was the formation of the Natal Planters' 
Union, with Townsend as its first President, from which 
it was a short step to affiliate Zululand and Natal into 
the South African Planters' Union - now the Cane 
Growers' Association. As its first President, I was in 
a position to speak, through the Executive, on behalf of 
all sugar planters to the Government. T~3 objective was 
the revision of the Zululand agreements. 
The sugarocracy could not have found a more astute opponent. Heaton 
Nicholls had a background in British colonial administration, having 
served as a district commissioner in Northern Rhodesia and magistrate in 
British New Guinea, and he was destined for high office. In the interim 
he carried the growers' torch, after first having openly parted company 
with the sugarocracy in 1921.44 His twin concerns were to obtain 
government intervention on behalf of growers, and to have the Zululand 
agreements revised. There can be little doubt as to his having played a 
direct part in bringing about through articles in the media, through 
parliament, through his submission to the 1922 Commission,45 and through 
43 "Opening Address", Proceedings, SASTA 22 (1948). See also Heaton 
Nicholls, South Africa. which provides details of his political 
career. 
44 TAD, K39, Vol.3, Heaton Nicholls to Sugar Commission Chairman, 
20.4.1922. 
45 Duminy, "Natal Sugar Interest". 
-----------------------------------
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sugar producers' organisations, the breakdown of sugarocratic hegemony 
in the miller/grower relationship in the mid-1930s. 
Shortly before the expiry of the terms of the Fahey Agreement, another 
investigation was made by the Board of Trade and Industries, and its 
report formed the basis for a new agreement, the terms of which were 
laid out in the 1936 Sugar Act. While its autonomy from the state was 
preserved, the sugar industry was compelled to adopt a new formula for 
cane pricing - the "marginal formula" - which made provision for costs 
of production by growers and millers respectively. The Act also laid 
the basis for the introduction of quotas and the establishment of a 
Sugar Industry Central Board. Growers would henceforth be awarded 
quotas according to which they would supply specified quantities of cane 
to specific sugarmills. The Central Board, upon which millers and 
growers would have equal representation, was designed to administer the 
quota system, to operate a cane testing service at all sugarmills, and 
generally to watch over the miller/grower relationshi~. 
It was thus not until 1936 that stability, if not accord, was reached 
between sugarmillers and independent growers, and SASA was reconstituted 
as a millers' and growers' association. Brief bursts of united action 
before that time were overshadowed by planters' intolerance of a 
situation which investigation after investigation had shown to be based 
on a questionable cane-payment system. Growers' discontent had been 
aggravated by the absence of any form of accountability by sugarmillers; 
over and above the inequitable returns on cane paid for by weight, the 
method bred disincentives for growers, and there was no way of their 
knowing if cane was being processed under conditions of optimal 
efficiency. Sugarmillers had obviously taken no steps to dispell the 
view that they had been acting conspiratorially; that was their 
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prerogative so long as they enjoyed supremacy in the sugar industry. 
When the initiatiye had been taken by sugarmillers to form a united 
front with growers, it had to be seen as one that was implicitly founded 
on a division between production aspects and distribution aspects: 
sugar millers sought co-operation if it could lead to mercantile 
. 
protection, but they were extremely defensive about production details, 
to the extent of even denying one another access to information about 
production. 
Centralisation and Consolidation of Sugp.rmi.11 Ownership: late 1930s-1962 , 
The coalescence of sugarmillers' interests in refining and marketing 
sugar had stimulated collective sugarocratic ventures, but there 
\ 
continued unabated ,attempts by respective sugarocrats to expand their 
capital in the means of SUg;:u' production. They eliminated peripheral 
sugarmillers in this pursuit, their expansionist ambitions took them 
beyond South Africa's borders, and they ine~itably pitted themselves one 
against the other. An examination of the ensuing centralisation and 
consolidation of sugarmill ownership completes the picture of the 
sugarocra.cy ascendant. 
The 1936 Sugar Act had been intended, inter alia, to restrict the 
country's sugar output by means of a quota system. The terms of the 
Sugar Act were reinforced by the 1937 ISA, which also embodied a quota 
system. The implementation of the restrictions was not unproblematic 
and, with the strong demand for Commonwealth sugars during the War, 
I 
there was good reason for amendments to be made to the Act during 1939. 
Further negotiation in 1943 ~tween producers and the state .led to the 
inception of the system whereby cane delivered at the sugarmill was 
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weighed on the basis of its sucrose content for the purposes of quota 
determination. 
By 1946 the situation of the sugarmillers had captured the specia~ 
attention of certain Senators and state officials. Although the state's 
interest centred primarily on the question of settling more people on · 
agricultural land (and to this end the Ministry of Lands was advancing 
the idea of developing a new sugar-producing region at Pongola), strong 
opinions were voiced against the sugarocracy during Senate debates on 
the matter. As one Senator put it: 
The sugar industry of Natal is one which has been 
inimical to'the welfare of the people of South Africa, 
because not only ••• has it brought into that industry 
people whom we are having a good deal of trouble with -
and it will be never-ending now - b'45 they will have 
also ••• held this country up to ransom. . 
Citing a.former Wage Board chairman, he went on to make the condemnatory 
claim that if every employee in the sugar industry was paid a monthly 
pension of £25 and sugar was imported rather than produced by South 
Africa, it would constitute less of a burden to the country's economy 
than existing subsidies did.47 
Nevertheless, when in 1947 the state instituted measures to raise South 
Africa's food output, the sugar industry was given the green light to 
expand. The area of land under sugar cane had remained static during 
the War, but now quota regulations were amended and greater output 
encouraged.48 
It was against this background that the post-war centralisation of sugar 
capital began to intensify. In 1952 Reynolds Bros.' Esperanza sugarmill 
46 Senate Debates, 4.4.1946, cols.962-966 
47 Ibid. 
48 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Sugar Industry of the 
Replblic of South Africa, 1970. 
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was relocated to Pongola, in the new sugarcane-growing region in the 
eastern Transvaal, where it began production in 1954. The take-.over of 
ZSM & P by Hulett's in 1957, had also gained for Hulett's the lion's 
share of Hulsar. It was also during 1957 that the first thrust wa8 made 
by the Natal sugarocracy into foreign regions without existing sugar 
industries. This expansion took place in a buoyant sugar market some 
few years after the CSA ·had provided for quotas to be given to 
Commonwealth producers. Under the lead of Guy Hulett, Hulett's had in 
1957 bought the Triangle sugarmill and estates in Southern Rhqdesia. 
Its attempt to establish a sugarmilling comµmy in Tanganyika that year 
was thwarted by the refusal of that country's government to commit 
itself to the building of necessary railways, and Nguru Estates in 
Tanganyika, which Hulett's had bought in anticipation, were subsequently 
sold.49 Guy Hulett then turned his attention to Swaziland, immediately 
beginning negotiations with the Commonweal th Development Corporation 
(CDC). In 1958 the negotiations bore fruit in the form of Mhlume 
(Swaziland) Sugar Co., a joint venture between Hulett's and CDC which 
milled its.first crop in 1960.50 
Sug;g.rmillers suffered a temµ>rary set-back when world sugar prices fell 
sharply during the 1960-61 season. The severity of the price slump and 
growing concern with their own vulnerability in such circumstances 
prompted the larger sugar companies to embark on a programme of capital 
diversification.51 The spawning of subsidiaries had hardly begun when, 
just as the international sugar economy entered its next boom period, 
the parent comp:mies became embroiled in a complex series of tactics and 
, counter-tactics at the end of which the almost complete monopolisation 
49 Hulett's Annual General Meeting Reports, in SASJ 39: 10(1955), 
40:10(1956), 41:10(1957), and 42:10(1958). 
50 See Appendix 2. · 
51 See for example South African~ Year Book (1963-64), pp.65-67. 
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of sugarmilling had been achieved. Osborn has chronicled the events in 
close detail and his work provides the source for the following summary 
of events.52 
The background to the restructuring of sugar capital in 1962 could be 
traced to Natal Estates' attempts to effect the rationalisation of its 
( 
milling and refining operations. Large quantities of cane destined for 
the Natal Estates' sugarmill at Mount Edgecombe had for a number of 
years been cut in fields which fell into Hulett's catchment areas. The 
I 
economic irrationality of its cane supply system indicated the 
desirability of entering into a co-operative agreement with either 
Hulett's or Tongaat. Any negotiation would be complicated by the fact 
that Natal Estates had invested R 1,5 million to improve its refining 
plant to a standard which would permit the production of sugar of equal 
quality to that produced by Hulsar. Natal Estates had also dismi.ssed 
Hulsar as its selling agent in favour of C.G.Smi th & Co.. This 
critical situation was brought to a head in mid-October 1962 when Guy 
Hulett, Hulett's chairman, notified his Natal Estates counterpart that 
Hulett's was to make an offer for the purchase of all Natal Estates 
shares. The Natal Estates directorate turned immediately to the Tongaat 
board for consultation. A meeting was called, and on the same day that 
it took place an indication came from G.V.Crookes that the Smith Group 
would stand behind Tongaat in whatever action that comP3J!Y saw fit to 
initiate. As a consequence of Tongaat's reaction to this supportive 
move, a consortium of Tongaat and the Smith Group was established to 
negotiate the future of Natal Estates. Although the consortium made a 
counter-bid for the Natal Estates shares, they were beaten by Guy Hulett 
who announced in late October that he had secured for his company a 
52 Osborn, Great Natalian.. pp.108-112. 
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_ controlling interest in Natal Estates. An hour after Hulett's 
announcement, G.V.Crookes, D.Saunders, and a financial adviser visited 
him to inform him that the Smi th-Tongaat consortium was to make an offer 
for Sir J.L.Hulett & Sons shares. By early in November the consortium 
had reached its objective by acquiring 51 % of Hulett's equity. 
Following share exchanges within the Smith Group, the consortium was 
co~stituted early in 1963 as S & T Investments (Pty) Ltd., with two-
. . 
thirds control vested in the Smith Group and one third in Tongaat. Guy 
Hulett's resignation from Hulett's board as a consequence of this 
sequence of events symbolised an imJ;X>rtant stage in the history of the 
sugarocracy's ascendancy. 
A lesser known aspect of the 1962 take-over was the role played therein 
by finance capital. As the Financial Mail saw it, the counter-bid for 
Hulett's "had the hall-mark of a daring manoeuvre conceived in the 
fertile brain of Johannesburg financiers, -not of Natal sugar growers".53 
Although the evidence would sue?Eest that this was an underestimation of 
the sugarocracy's prowess, it is clear that the take-over was contingent 
upon the backing of "Johannesburg financiers". The S & T consortium 
received 'the support of Anglo-American's merchant bank, United 
Acceptances Ltd., while Old Mutual and Sanlam are said to have stood 
behind Hulett's (notwithstanding the links between United Acceptances 
and Old Mutual). 
This was not the first time that non-sugfll' capital had ma.de inroads into 
the local sugar industry, but the tempo of that involvement was to take 
on new proportions after 1962. At the end of the 1962 take-over the 
major sugar companies were internally structured as shown in Figure 2. 
53 Financial Mail 16.11.1962, p.818. 
FIGURE 2: AFTERMATH OF SUGAR COMPANY TAKE-OVERS IN 1962 
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Source: Financial Mail (Special Supplement) 19.2.65, p 78. 
Corporate Intrusions into the Sugar Industry after 1962 
Internal restructuring was also being effected elsewhere, and Gledhow-
Chaka's Kraal Sugar Co., which had closed its Chaka's Kraal sugarmill in 
1961, was reconstituted as the Gledhow Sugar Co. in 1964. During 1964 
Illovo acquired Doornkop. The major shareholder in Doornkop had until 
then been General Mining and Finance, which now offered to advise Illovo 
on the financial aspects of their new acquisi tion.54 Illovo's 
Noodsberg Sugar Company was also formed in 1964 to operate the new 
sugarmill that it was to build at Jaagbaan, in the Natal midlands. In 
1966 another new sugarmill was opened in the midlands at Dalton, under 
the ownership and control of the Union Co-operative Bark and Sugar Co., 
and the Malelane sugarmill in the Transvaal lowveld came into 
54 Financial Mail 26.3.1964, p.683. 
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production. The Malelane sugarmill was owned by Transvaalse 
Suikerkorporasie, in which initially Volkskas had a 60% stake and 
General Mining and Finance the balance; later Volkskas took over the-
entire comµmy. The Jaagbaan, Dalton, and Malelane Sllgll"mills, as well 
as the reconstructed Pongola sugarmill were established in new sugarcane 
growing regions. Thus while centralisation of ownership was in 
progress, by 1970 the number of sugarmills in South Africa had increased 
to twenty, three more than there had been in 1950.55 
In 1970 Tate & Lyle, the British-based multi-national sugar corporation 
acquired a 49,25% share of Illovo Sugar Estates. Then 'in 1975, through 
a merger with Reynolds Bros. (which owned Umzinkulu Sugar Co. by then, 
and which had bought Gledhow Sugar Co. and the Crookes Bros.' 
\ 
sugarmill), c.-G.Smi th came to control seven sugarmills. One of these 
sugarmills, at Doornkop, was simultaneously sold to Hulett's, which 
closed it down, being interested only in the milling rights invpl ved. 
C.G.Smi th' s Renishaw sugar mill was closed in 1976_, and in 1977 the· 
company bought the controlling share in Illovo formerly held by Tate & 
J.ule. In 1978 the Melville sugarmill (pr~viously owned by the Mauritian 
company of Stafford Meyer, which had relinquished control to S.A.Board 
Mills, which was bought in turn by Anglo-American in 1974) was bought 
jointly by Tonga.at and C.G.Sm.i th and closed, with cane diverted to two 
of their sugarmills. This left seventeen sugarmills in operation in the 
late 1970s.- Six of these were controlled by C.G.Smith, five by Hulett's, 
one by Tongaat, and C.G.Smi th and Tongaat were jointly in -control of 
·Hulett's. 
55 This process of centralisation has been outlined elsewhere. See 
D.Lincoln, "South African Sugar Mill Labour during the 1970s", South 
African Labour Bulletin 6:6(1981 ), pp.37-48. 
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Late in 1979 a new corporate intrusion was made into the sugar industry, 
when Barlow Rand found it opportune to wrest some control thereof. 
Following complex negotiations and share trading, Barlow Rand acquired a 
controlling interest in C.G.Smith in 1980, and the dealings left Angler 
American in ultimate control of Hulett's and Tongaat. An AnglcrAmerican 
front c.ompany subsequently bought a large block of sugar farms which 
constituted a~ proportion of the Umfolozi ccroperative sugarmill's 
cane source. The situation prevailing at the end of 1.980 is shown in 
Figure 3. The latest developments of note occurred in 1982 when 
Hulett's and Tongaat ~ere brought together as one company, under the 
title of Tongaat-Hulett's, and C.G.Smith bought into Monitor Sugar 
Company in Michigan, u.s.A •• 56 The dramatic struggle within the 
sugarocracy had some time since reached its pinnacle, and the sugar 
industry was now almost completely enveloped by mining, industrial, and 
financial corporations. 
Summary 
The broad contours of the political economy of sugar production during 
Natal's sugarocratic era have been followed through three periods. It 
was the opening up of Zululand to sugar-producers in 1905 which 
signalled the beginning of the first of these periods. Between 1905 and 
1914 the sugarocraby consolidated itself as a group of industrialists, 
most notably with respect to refining arrangements. 
Between 1914 and the late 1930s the sugarocracy endured what was 
arguably its most crucial period. During the war years the sugarocracy 
turned its hand to institutional means of pursuing protectionist 
ambitions, and once the war-time constraints on domestic prices and 
56 Smithlink (April, 1982). 
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FIGURE 3: OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OF SUGAR MILLS IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1980 
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exports had been lifted it succeeded in drawing growers into a new 
organisation, SASA, in order to tackle domestic marketing policies as a 
united front. This unity was built on the shaky foundation of long-
standing growers' antipathy and suspicion. This antagonism was not 
resolved by the 1926 Fahey Conference Agreement which generally favoured 
the sugarinillers. During the decade between the signing of the Fahey 
Agreement and the promulgation of the 1936 Sugar Act the sugarmillers 
faced a continuing barrage of criticism from growers and, in the early 
1930s, a major depression of the international sugar economy. The terms 
~ 
of the 1936 Act did much to resolve miller/grower quarrels, as well as 
establishing a quota system to control the marketing of sugar. Further 
control was introduced in the context of the 1937 ISA, and thus by the 
outbreak of World War II the sugarocracy was subjected to a boay of 
local and international regulations. 
The final period during the sugarocratic era spanned World War II and 
the post-war years until 1962. Three major issues characterised this 
period: a significantly large growth in sugar production; a greater 
dependence of the sugarocracy on international sugar agreements; and an 
intensified centralisation of sugarmill ownership. Sugar production 
began expanding in response to the war-time demand from both the 
rapidly growing domestic market and Britain. Although they had to 
supply the home market at relatively low prices fixed by the state, 
South Africa's sugarmillers had a secure position in the world sugar 
economy by virtue of their standing as Commonweal th producers._South 
Africa's departure from the British Commonweal th in 1961 necessitated a 
revision of exporting arrangements. No sooner had this necessity been 
attended to than the world sugar price slumped to its lowest ebb since 
the last War. Hard-hit, South Africa's sugarmillers began to diversify 
their investments as a precaution for the future. Then, with the 
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massive revival of the export market in progress, the sugarocracy fought 
its internecine, struggle for supremacy at the end of 1962. 
Sugarocrats had not of course engaged in struggles with growers, with 
foreign producers, and between themselves as purely economic agents. 
Their struggles involved them in a range of political practices, some of 
which went beyond the ambit of their direct relationships with the 
government and with growers. This wider terrain, constituted as the 
sugarocracy's culture, is surveyed in the following chapter. 
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CHAP.rER THREE 
THE CULTURE OF THE SUGAROCRACY 
With few exceptions, the first sugarocrats h~d their roots in fin de 
siecle Victorian Britain. Anticipating colonial prosperity, they 
travelled to Natal alone or with their families. They came from petit-
bourgeois backgrounds and, fired with entrepreneurial spirit, they 
gradually consolidated their grip over Natal's burgeoning sugar 
industry. It was especially in its reproduction that the sugarocracy 
took on the mantle of a fully-fledged stratum of the South African 
bourgeoisie. Not only was an economic legacy passed on to later 
generations of the sugarocracy, but also particular political interests 
and an exclusive way of life that implied quite specific ideological 
concerns. A distinctive culture was thus set in motion, with traditions 
to be upheld by successive generations in the sugarocratic genealogy. 
There are many difficulties encountered when attempting to adduce the 
ideological basis of any given group's actions, no less so with regard 
to the sugarocracy. Therefore if a "sugarmillers' consciousness" is to 
be referred to and if the ideological underp~nnings of the employment 
practices which are discussed la~er are to be exposed, then the full 
' . 
spectrum of sugarocratic culture must be subjected to scrutiny. The 
task is undertaken in thi.s chapter under four headings. In the first 
section the Natal sugarocracy is situated in its wider context; the 
domestic and community.life of the sugarocracy is then dealt with; 
. thirdly the sugarocracy's ideology, its intellectual pursuits, and its 
mobilisation of a sugarocratic image are discussed; and finally the 
sugarocracy's work in the institutionalised political sphere is 
considered. Emphasis is placed on the pre-World War II period, before 
sugp.r comp:my bureaucratization and the atomisation of the sugarocracy 
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began gathering momentum. 
Conceptualising the Culture of a Suga.rocracy 
The existence of dynastic sugarmilling families within societies 
dominated by a capitalist mode of production has not given rise to the 
sort of planter culture about which generalisation is both possible and 
feasible. A .European colony's slave-owning planters can readily be 
referr d to as having consti t':lted a regional plantocracy with a 
dist·nctive culture. The plantation colony's incipient bourgeoisie was 
gene 1\y formed of merchants and planters, and the distinctive culture 
of the latter related to ownership of slaves, land, and the technical 
means of colonial production. By contrast, there is hardly a case to be 
made for regarding "sugarocratic culture" as anything but a transient 
and regionally isolated phenomenon. Even where sugarmilling families 
resisted the erosion of their dynastic control for prolonged periods 
under capitalism, they have constituted a small and diminishing 
comronent of bourgeois society. 
All this is to say that whereas planter culture may have once been an 
identifiable and general mode of quotidian existence and class rule, 
"sugarocratic culture" is a term of dubious analytical worth. There is 
therefore more than semantics at issue when analysis proceeds with 
reference to the culture o'f a sugarocracy instead of to sugarocratic 
culture. 
An image has been created, in the relevant literature, of colonial 
plantocracies imbued with hedonism, and given to ostentation and excess; 
of a planter culture which encomp:issed violence and oppression as well 
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as Christianity, racism as well as sexual exploitation of slaves. This 
contradiction-fraught culture was ascribed to planters of various crops, 
including sugar, and it was synonymous with colonial ruling class 
culture. 1 Moreover, national or colonial interests were equi val.ent to 
or strongly representative of planters' interests. In the age of the 
sugarocrats, it was only where they continued to exist in (agrarian) 
moncrcultural, usually island, economies· that their culture was at once 
the culture of the ruling class. Elsewhere sugarocrats were a 
constituent element of a burgeoning bourgeoisie with complex ideological 
and institutional concerns. Nevertheless, bourgeois sugarinillers had 
specific economic and thus political interests. In colonial situations 
such as Natal, Queensland, or Mo9ambique, they had a peculiar social 
identity and wey of life which was resonant of metropolitan bourgeois 
culture, but which was not immediately subsumed under colonial bourgeois 
culture. 
When sugarocracies appeared in previously planter-dominated societies, 
there was a great deal of common ground between their respective weys of 
life: the mansions in which they lived had more servants than occupants; 
their daily activities often precluded any direct involvement with the 
work of their employees; they upheld the old religious and social 
institutions; and they surrounded themselves with the ideas and 
artefacts of ruling class existence. There were also great differences 
between the culture of colonial planters and that of sugarocrats; these 
differences being historically far more significant than the 
similarities. Apart from the implications of owner/worker relations 
~ having supplanted planter/ slave relations, sug,arocrats were on the one 
hand locked into an interdependent relationship with growers, and on the 
See for example the controversial W.J.Cash, The Mind of the South. 
New York: Alfred A.Knopf, 1941. 
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other hand they had to relate-to other elements of the bourgeoisie. 
These relationships demanded then the erection of an ideological and 
institutional superstructure which was quite removed from that of the 
former plantation colonies. And the more developed the bourgeois state, 
the more specific were the ideological and institutional channels which 
sugarocrats had of necessity to follow. 
Those aspects of their culture which were exclusive to the Natal 
sugarocracy were defined by their original social status as settlers in 
J 
a young British colony and by their economic status as millers-cum-
planters. Their culture reflected the consequences of both the 
confrontation between these structural factors and the ideology of 
settler sugarocrats, and the way in which the sugarmillers' 
·consciousness developed beyond that initial stage. 
The Domestic and Community Life of the South African Sugarocracy 
British settler culture has had two characteristics which, inasmuch as 
they cut across the bounds of class, gave added emphasis to the 
fundamental schism between coloniser and colonised. But these two 
characteristics - the use of black domestic workers and social cohesion 
amongst settlers - have varied quantitatively and qualitatively amongst 
classes within settler society. Although perhaps not given to the 
excesses of their counterparts of yore across the Atlantic Ocean, the 
Natal sugarocrats exhibited a far from ascetic appreciation of their 
wealth and power. Their quotidian culture was furthermore indicative of 
a high degree of familiarity and identification which sugarocrats had 
with traditions peculiar to the group. Such a shared body of values 
pertaining to work, education, patriotism, religion, and leisure 
consolidated their economic cohesion and underlined the material 
I 
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distance from their employees which their wealth afforded them. It is 
instructive to begin an exploration of this culture on the su~ocratic 
hearth. 
Amongst the more conspicuous trappings of ~ocratic existence were 
the mansions built and furnished on the lines of the aristocratic 
British "family seat". On the north end of Durban's Berea ,ridge was 
erected J.L.Hulett's Manor House in 1904; on the south end of the Berea 
was the sligtltly less imp:>sing Manor House which belonged to C.G.Smith 
since 1912; and between the two Muckleneuk, first occupied by the 
Campbells in 1914. The Campbells' former residence, Mount Edgecombe 
House, and the Saunders' country seat Amanzimnyama, both of them to the 
north of Durban, counterposed the Reynolds' Lynton Hall and the Crookes' 
The Cedars on the Natal south coast. Then there were the other rural 
' 
homes such as the Pearces' Eden, the Hawksworths' Beneva, and Hulett's 
original Kearsney House which 
was a well made and designed mansion with large, 
arti-stically furnished reception rooms and 22 ·bed-
rooms ••• 
There was a big staff of Indian servants supervised by 
Michael, the butler, who ~ad acted in a similar capacity 
to Lord Roberts in India. 
And we have been invited also to 
Picture the homes of these four sons [of J.L.Hulett], 
each built on lavish and artistic lines in a perfect 
rural setting. Over the years their surroundings had 
matured and mellowed with continuous cul ti vat ion. The 
families had increased and in each household a gracious 
standard of living was ~he keynote. This was the 
standard set by Sir Liege.'5 
Architectural styles and furnishings were transposed from bourgeois 
Britain, and even in naming their homes the sugarocrats were determined 
to bring to Africa the accoutrements of a class to which they had not 
2 R.F.Osborn, This Man of Purpose: A Biography of Sir James Liege 
Hulett. Edited by J.Hulett. Umhlali: W.H.Hulett, 1973, p.37. 
3 Ibid., p.42. ' 
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strictly belonged in their country of origin. 
In keeping with the image which they were intended to convey, some of 
the houses became depositories of artworks collected locally and abroad. 
Certain of the houses were placed at the disposal of Seuth African prime 
ministers or English royalty. The most notable of these was one which 
F.Reynolds built at Umdoni Park for the express purpose of donating it 
to Louis Botha for use as a holiday residence by himself and his 
successors in office. Receptions for visiting dignitaries cemented 
links with those in political powe·r and with prominent artists and 
writers. These receptions were impressive even by the standards of 
Natal's bourgeoisie, on a scale extending to the heights reached when 
Louis Botha, the newly appointed Prime Minister, was 
entertained [by Hulett] at Manor House. On this 
occasion the Durban Light Infantry supplied the music 
for more than a thousand guests. Frock coats and top 
hats, long frocks, high waists, British Officers in red 
mess-jackets; all interspersed with white turbaned 
Indian servants scurrying to and fro; the tinkle of ice 
in long glasses combined to g\adden a scene not 
for gotten in Dur ban for many a day. '-
How the occupants of the grand sugarocratic houses spent their time when 
at home and not entertaining was consistent with their bourgeois 
, 
standing. For example, Amanzimnyama's first sugarocratic matriarch, the 
wife of J.R.Saunders 
held family prayers in the vernaci.D.ars for her domestics 
and workers, painted in water-colours and corresponded 
with the botanical authorities at Kew concerning the 
specim5ns (chiefly orchids) brought to her from the 
forest. 
A later matriarch of Amanzimnyama has been remembered in the 1920s to 
have often been seen "driving past in her shiny victoria carriage with 
4 Ibid., p.93. 
5 R. G. T. Watson, "The Tongaati", Condenser 2: 3 ( 1954), pp. 12-20. 
I 
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Moonsammy in his white livery and red pugaree on the box";6 she was, 
according to another recollection, conspicuous for 
the two matched greys, the gleaming harness and ••• her 
party dress, her long gloves and her parasol ••• Sometimes 
she would call on Moonsammy to stop the carriage while 
she exchanged a word or two with a byst1711der, be he 
manager, fitter or humble Indian mill hand. 
Subsequent generations of sugf3.I'ocratic women immersed themselves when at 
home in gf3.I'dening, hand-work, writing and culinary crafts, often with an 
eye to charitable causes and the annual exhibitions Of the women's 
organisations to which they belonged as founders or members. An 
entourage of black domestic servants lent assistance and helped to 
project a genteel facade on the home front; whether uniformly attired 
and discreet in the house or working outdoors as g;a.rdeners and drivers, 
it was these, usually adult, ''boys and girls" whose toil gave cause for 
employers' pride in their homes and gardens. The more profound the 
loyalty or deference of servants, and the longer their periods of 
service, the closer they came to being paternalistically considered as 
"part of the family''. 
From their home bases,. sugarocratic families ventured on sporting or 
vacational outings. Roy Campbell, the renowned poet and author, has 
) 
committed to perpetuity his memory of holidays spent by his family at 
their Peace Cottage near Umhlanga Rocks (another home in which Botha was 
received for holidays).8 . In later years William Campbell paid periodic 
visits, once with a British royal party, to his private game reserve 
Mala Mala in the eastern Transvaal.9 C.G.Smi th went as far afield as 
Britain, F,gypt, Madagascar, and Mo9filllbique to pursue his interests in 
6 Condenser 5:5(1967), p. 7. 
7 Ibid. 
8 R.Campbell, Light on a Dark Horse. 
9 SASJ 14:8(1930), p.525. 
London: Hollis & Carter, 1951. 
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hunting and fishing.10 Sea excursions to Cape Town, East Africa or 
Europe were undertaken by the older generation of sugarocrats, and 
George Armstrong gained a reputation for his trips to East Africa and 
Europe in the early days of passenger flight. The daughter of Frank 
Reynolds was in the late 1920s an aviatrix with her own aeroplane, 11 and 
another amateur pilot, W.H..Hulett, won the Governor General's air race 
in 1937. 12 The horse racing community in Natal has also counted in its 
numbers people such as C.G.Smith and C.J.Saunders. 
Their competence at replicating the houses and life-styles of the 
British bourgeoisie was matched by the sugg.rocracy's ability to promote 
religious and educational institutions in Natal. The first-generation 
sugarocrats were stalwart protestants - Anglicans and Methodists. And 
if their houses were a reflection of the sugarocracy's achievement of, 
and keenness to display, the status they had as an adjunct to the 
British bourgeoisie, their accomplishments in the sphere of schooling 
were no less impressive. Sugarocratic ideology and behaviour were 
vividly seen to be causally related where their involvement with church 
and school was concerned. 
William CamJ:bell, "a rigid Calvinist", had in his youth contemplated the 
prospect of doing missionary work in Africa.13 When eventually he did 
come to Africa it was not as a missionary, although his proselytizing 
fervour was not obviously dampened. In Durban he had been party to the 
establishment of a Mechanics' Institute during 1853;14 bringing to the 
colony a young men's centre for part-time study - "colonists of better 
10 R.F.Osborn, C.G.: A Great Natalian: A Biography of Sir Charles George 
Smith. Durban: C.G.Smi th, 1966, p.87. 
11 SASJ 13:9(1929), p.619. 
12 SASJ 20:7(1937), p.393. 
13 N.Herd, Killie's Africa: The Achievements of Dr. Killie Campbell. 
Pietermaritzburg: Blue Crane Books, 1982, p.3. 
14Ibid., p.10. . 
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financial standing were doubtful of the propriety of patronizing the 
insti tute11 15 - much like those he had in his own youth attended in 
Glasgow. Campbell also assisted in the establishment of the Verulam 
Library and Literary Institute in 1858. 16 This institute was one of a 
number of organisations founded in early Verulam, at the heart of the 
north coast community of Wesleyan settlers which included Polkinghornes, 
Starrs, and, of course, Huletts.17 Another local organisation was the 
Sunday ~chool. Association, which embodied the collaborative efforts of 
Verulam's Anglicans and Methodists.18 On the south coast, one of 
Natal's earliest Anglican parishes was formed in the community 
comprising residents of Umzinto Sugar Company and related estates.19 
Here on the south coast, the Reynolds' were Anglicans and amongst the 
Crookes' were some very devout Methodists. 
When the "hereticism" of Bishop Colenso became an issue of public 
concern, colonial sugarocrats became embroiled in the melee which 
culminated in the bifurcation of the Anglican Church into the Church of 
England in-South Africa and the Church of the Province of South 
Africa.20 Although Marshall Campbell's views on the future of Africans · 
in South Africa were said to be similar to those held by Colenso, 
Cam}bell was offended by Colenso's radical approach to his religion.21 
The Saunders' - "reactionary products of mid-century Anglicanism"22 -
15 A.F.Hattersley, Portrait of a Colony. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1940, p.102. 
16 See M.Park, "The History of Early Verulam, 1850-1860", Archives Year 
Book for South African History 2(1953), pp.241-306. 
17 See R.E.Ralls, "Early Immigration 'Schemes in Natal, 1846-1853", 
Master's dissertation, University of Natal, 1934. 
18 See Park, "Early Verulam". 
19 B.B.Burnett, Anglicans in Natal. Durban: Churchwardens, St.Paul's, 
1955(?), p.87. 
20 Ibid., passim. 
21 Herd, Killie's Africa. p.14. 
22 R.G.T.Watson, Tonga.a.ti: An African Experinent. London: Hutchinson, 
1960, p. 74. 
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were equaily intolerant of Colenso's style, and J.R.Saunders had once 
gone so far as to suggest that Colenso was responsible for inciting 
Africans to take up arms against the settlers in 1879.23 
'\ 
J.L.Hulett had an abiding interest in and influence upon church affairs 
and education in Natal. His father had established a small school in 
the colony, and he himself had been an active member of the Verulam 
Sunday School Association in the 1850s and 60s. He later offered 
Kearsney House to the Methodist church so that Kearsney College could be 
founded there in 1921. In the early 1930s the school wa.S moved to 
Botha's Hill, where part of the grounds had been made available by 
. . 
G.J.Crookes. J.J.Crookes donated one of the houses, which was named 
after the Crookes' home town in Yorkshire, and another house was named 
after the Hulett home in Kent. 24 
The metropolitan and sugarocratic connections were just as pronounced at 
Hilton College, an Anglican school which since 1903 h'ad been owned by 
Hilton College Ltd., of which Marshall Cam:rtell was one of the largest 
shareholders. Strongly influenced by England's Rugby School and 
proclaimed "the cradle of. school rugby in Natal", 25 Hilton College was 
heavily supported by the Campbells, Crookes', Saunders', Reynolds', 
G.S.Armstrong, C.G.Smith, C.G.Smith & Co., and Natal Estates. Hence the 
William Campbell and the Crookes blocks of the school, and its Edward 
Saunders Sanatorium.26 W.E.R.Edwards, Hulett's managing director and 
guest on Hilton's 1938 speech day, might just as well have been 
23 Natal Mercury 3.4.1879. J.R.Saunders also contributed an article on 
church affairs in Natal to the English Churchman in 1890. 
24 Osborn, Man of Purpose; J.F.Reese, The Birth and Development of 
Kearsney College. :Eshowe: Zululand Times, 1975; and SASJ 20: 11 (1937), 
p.651. 
25 A.F.Hattersley, Hilton Portrait. Pietermaritzburg: Shuter & Shooter, 
1945, p.51. 
26 N.Nuttall, Lift up Your Hearts. Durban: Hiltonian Society, 1971. 
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referring to Kearsney College when he expressed his confidence that 
"whilst you are at Hilton, with its traditions of manliness and sporting 
spirit, the foundation for the future is being laid".27 
The future of every young sugarocrat may not have been determined by his 
schooling, but that experience certainly buttressed his class position. 
The schools established by sugarocrats or chosen for their sons' 
education were colleges for the progeny of Natal's elite: private, 
expensive, protestant, boys' boarding schools, originally intended to 
imbue their pupils with the social and ideological attributes of the 
British bourgeoisie, and the tenets of that class's morality. 
The domestic, religious, and educational institutions given birth to by 
the sugarocrats were complemented by their conjugal relations to endow 
them still further with bourgeois status. While dynastic lineages were 
established through inheritance, marriage partners furnished ties 
amongst the respective sugarocratic families and between sugarocrats and 
other members of the bourgeoisie; there was little ambiguity about their 
class position reflected in their choice of marriage partners. To go 
beyond such a generalisation from a basis of names appearing on family 
"trees" is undoubtedly hazardous, yet when looked at in conjunction with 
information about sugar companies' directorates these family trees do 
invite some commentary. Three such trees have been constructed and 
depicted in Figures 4, 5, and 6. The only marriages shown are those of 
immediate relevance to the study, and which have received publicity 
through generally available media. In this they af'f ord merely a partial 
exposure to the links of consanguinity within the sugarocracy. Another 
Z7 SASJ 21:11(1938), p.625. While providing a useful context within 
which to situate the efforts of sugarocrats to foster fili te schools 
in Natal, Randall had little to contribute on Kearsney College in 
particular (P.Randall, Little England on the :Veld: The English 








FIGURE 4: SUGAROCRATIC fAMILY TIES - HULETTS 
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Notes: 1 Colonial Minister of Agriculture 
2 Director of Tongaat Sugar Co 
3 See Gillatta listed in Appendix 1, and mentioned in Figure 6 
4 Head of A A Smith, sugar agents, and director of ZSH 
5 Reynolds Bros employee ~ 
6 SACGA President 
7 Secretary and subsequently director of ZS~ & P 
Sources: R r Osborn, This Man of Purpose: A Biography of Sir ~ames Liege Hulett. Edited by J Hulett. Umhlali: 




FIGURE 5: SUGAROCRATIC FAMILY TIES - CAMPBELLS/ARMSTRONGS 
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FIGURE 6: SUGARDCRATIC fAMILY TIES - CROOKES' 
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2 Director of CG Smith (see Appendix 1) 
3 South ·African representative of A & W Smith, Glasgow sugar machinery manufacturers 
4 Probably a C G Smith employee 
5 See Gillatts listed in Appendix 1 
6 General manager and director of Pongola 
Sources: South African sugar Journal passim; Who's Who of Southern Africa. Johannesburg: Combined Publishers, 
1970. 
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qualification that needs to be made about the figures is that they show 
relationships over several generations without specifying the actual 
times when the linkages were made. 
In Figure 4 it is seen that the Huletts and the Crookes' were within 
three generations widely spread, by virtue of their relatively large 
families. In the case of the Huletts, many marriages are seen to have 
taken place within the north coast planting community, including the old 
Wesleyan settler families of Polkinghorne and Starr. Similarly, the 
Crookes' had strong bonds with planters, and in their case with company-
related individuals too. Although ties between the Crookes' and 
Hawksworths are not fully confirmed by the diagrams, they are suggested. 
The familial bonds between the Armstrongs and the Campbells are more 
obvious. 
The totality of family connections indicated in the figures provides an 
idea of how closely-knit the community of settler sugarmillers was, and 
how as the group of sugarmillers became more concentrated, planters 
descendant from the earliest sugarmillers, as well as certain senior 
compmy personnel, were still closely associated. Thus, when W.!LHulett 
and J.M.Jex were married, A.Townsend was one who formally made a 
toast;28 when Lewis, the son of F.Reynolds, was married, it was 
W.E.R.Edwards who "gave away the bride11 ; 29 and C.J.Saunders of Tongaat 
married the daughter of a Natal Estates director, H~R.Butcher.30 Not 
too much more can be read into these observations as to how marriage 
might have had a bearing on economic relations within the sugarocracy. 
Similarly, little can ·be safely said about such relationships within the 
28 SASJ 15:5(1931 ), p.311. 
29 SASJ 14: 4 ( 1 930 ) ' p. 231 • 
30 Who's Who of Southern Africa. Johannesburg: Combined Publishers, 
1970. 
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~rocracy as that which had C.G.Smi th become O.Pearce's godfather.31 
' 
Deduction must remain in abeyance on these issues, but that is not to 
say that the significance of marriage is being discounted. 
The seeds of sugarocratic culture were thus sown through religious and 
educatioruil institutions and through marriage. The culture was nurtured 
in bourgeois homes and in bourgeois leisure-time activities. It was 
more than a domestic way of life that was in formation, but also a wider 
sugarocratic culture enveloped by bourgeois ideology. In the political 
sphere of that culture, as is shown later in this chapter, the parties 
supported by their fathers found ready recruits amongst second- and 
third-generation sugarocrats. And when parliamentary.politics were 
overshadowed by war-time Realpolitik, soldiering traditions were created 
within the sugarocracy. Many of Natal's colonial sugarmillers fought 
under arms in the Anglo-Zulu wars, and some during the rebellion of 
1906. For example, W.Pearce fought in the 1879 Anglo-Zulu Wai:. and in 
1906 was commander of Durban County;32 Friend Addison became colonel and 
officer commanding of Umvoti Mounted Rifles, in which regiment he had 
done battle in 1879;33 W.G.Armstrong fought in the Anglo-Zulu War with 
the Victoria Mounted Rifles;34 R.A.Armstrong was a captain_ in the Natal 
Mounted Rifles during the 1906 uprising,35 as was W.A.Campbell;36 and 
F.Reynolds served as an officer with the Alexander Mounted Rifles.37 
There were other members of the sugarocracy who might be mentioned in 
I 
this context. The two world wars exacted a heavy toll, given the size 
of the sugarocracy. A son of E.Saunders' ,38 members of the Armstrong 
31Smithlink1:8(1978), pp.14-16. 
32 South African~ Year Book (1939-40), pp.-215-216. 
33 SASJ 9: 8 ( 1 925 ) , p. 54 9. ' 
34 SASJ 9:2(1925), p.109. ' 
35 South African ~ Year Book ( 1""941-42) , p. 214. 
36 SASJ 42:7(1958)~ p.567. ' 
37 SASJ"14:10(1930J, p.681. 
38 SASJ 2:4(1918), p.1167. 
------------------------------------------------~ 
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family,39 and H.E.Hawksworth lost their lives.40 Apart from war-time 
action, usually with officer rank, some sugarocrats supported Natal 
regiments by other means, and well into the post-colonial period. 
C.G.Smith had paid bounties to Royal Durban Light Infantry recruits 
during World War I,41 and W.A.Campbell, who had once been a Royal Durban 
Light Infantry recruiter, was an honorary colonel of the Natal Mounted 
Rifles.42 
On another front sugarocrats were often remembered for their 
philanthropy. 4 3 In 1939 G.J .Crookes donated a hospital to the province 
of Natal;44. E.Saunders' "generosity was steal thy - few knew of his 
benefactions11 ,45 and R.Armstrong's "generosity was always cloaked by 
anonymity11 .46 Their gestures of philanthropy were frequently tangible 
shows of patriotism. C.G.Smith supplied the Imperial Government with 
horses worth half a million pounds for military purposes,47 and he and 
G.J .Crookes together donated 1000 tons of sugar to the Royal Navy in 
1940. 48 Such largesse did not go unnoticed in London. F.Reynolds was 
knighted in 1915 for his philanthropy, his donation of the Umdoni Park 
house to the Prime Minister, and his contributions to Michaelhouse, 
another of Natal's exclusive schools. 49 In 1923 C.G.Smi th was also 
knighted, so that not forgetting J.L.Hulett, knighted in 1902, and 
Marshall Cambell, knighted in 1916, the sugarocracy, small as it was, 
39 SASJ 2:5(1918), p.1189. 
40 SASJ 2:4(1918), p.1169. 
41 Osborn, Great liata.lian. p.97. 
42 SASJ 42:7(1958)' p.567. 
43 See-for example on C.G.Smith in Smithlink 1:4(1977), p.11. 
44 SASJ 23:12(1939), p.667. 
45 South African SU€fll" Year Book ( 1939-40) , pp. 193-195. 
46 South African~ Year :Book (1941-42), p.214. 
47 SASJ 7:1(1923)~ p.16. 
48 SASJ 24: 1 ( 1940)' p. 7. 
49 South African. National Society, "The Reynolds of Sezela", 1981. On 
Micha.elhouse, a school founded "especially for the upper and middle 
classes", see A.M.Barrett, Michaelhouse 1896-1968. Pietermaritzburg: 
Michaelhouse Old Boys' Club, 1969. 
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could boast four lmights in its midst. 
The knighting of Natal sugarocrats gave symbolic affirmation of the 
connections between their quotidian culture and that of the British 
bourgeoisie which they so closely emulated. This was the way of life 
that .could be held up as an example of the rewards due to those "who 
worked through the years to bring civilization to a barbarous 
country".50 
Ideology, Intellect and I~e 
Being settlers and colonists, the early sugarocrats drew upon an 
ideology which had its roots in Victorian Britain and which was further 
inspired by conditions in Natal; the ruling ·class ideas of imperial 
Britain were put into ac_tion by these colonial sugarmillers in their 
combined efforts to foster a social and political climate amenable to 
their own economic ends. The specific aspects. of su~rocrats' ideology 
which most vividly influenced the development of colonial social 
relations were those which related to the workings of British 
imperialism and to the creation and control of a colonial workforce. In 
other words sugarocrats' ideology was, in colonial Natal, at the very 
heart of bourgeois state and class formation. 
Those ideological currents which could be said to have flowed through 
the consciousness of all suga.rocrats, which orginated from the common 
backgrounds of individual sugarocrats, and which became manifest in 
their common practices, are posited as the substance of "sugarocratic 
consciousness". Racism loomed largely as an element of that 
50 J.Hulett (Mrs W.H.Hulett), ''Umhlali - A Century of Progress", Women's 
Institute, no date, p.36. 
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consciousness, pervading sugarocratic culture, politics, and employment 
practices. Yet the existence of racism within sugarocratic 
consciousness was neither inevitable nor calculated; it was created 
under particular conditions and used in a particular manner. The 
origins of sugarocrats' racism can be traced to the sugarocracy's 
beginnings during the economic and political ferment of early settler 
colonialism in Natal. 
With reference to the British settler community in nineteenth century 
Natal, the historian Hattersley wrote that 
It was impossible to di vi de people into owners of 
property and the common herd; for land was so cheap that 
the humblest emigrant could afford to be proprietor of 
his own house or farm. Landowning was scarcely a mark 
of privelege, and business, especially finance and 
banking, wrs coming to replace it as the symbol of 
authority.?. 
Such a remark took for granted settler status as a symbol of authority 
in itself, for while "the common herd" may have carried no "symbol of 
authority-" when facing financiers and bankers, whites in general assumed 
authority over blacks. Settlers collectively viewed the partly 
conquered people, whom they claimed to have colonised, as social aliens, 
as a barbarous, pagan, subject "race". Therefore the latter system of 
authority which cross-cut the incipient classes in settler society was 
based as much on the settlers' theory of colonialism as it was on 
economic criteria. 
When Africans put up fierce resistance, their ultimately unsuccessful 
attempt to repulse the colonists only hardened settler resolve to remain 
collective, if class-divided, overlords. And as the dynamic of capital 
accumulation gained momentum in the colony, it did so in typical 
colonial fashion, with the colonised.pressed into the service of the 
51 Hattersley, Portrait of a Colony. pp.76-77. 
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settlers. A blend of settler racism and laissez faire economic tenets 
of bourgeois ideology went a long way towards furnishing the rationale 
for recruiting, coercing, and super-exploiting black workers on a large 
scale: society was construed as being divided into lower and higher 
"races", with an attendant hierarchy of rights and privileges; the need 
was expressed for subject "races" to have inculcated in them a hitherto 
negligible ethic of industry and work; employers were regarded as having 
the inalienable right to determine wages and to unilaterally define the 
rules and sanctions governing virtually every facet of a worker's 
existence; and black workers were super-exploited in that their wages 
were inadequate to maintain themselves and their families without 
-
recourse to agricultural production in the Reserves. When suga.rmillers 
surfaced as large-scale employers at the economic pinnacle of colonial 
society, their ideology embraced just such an elaboration of settler 
racism. 
Because it was a social construct without objective or scientific 
grounds, racism manifested itself with a degree of personal nuance, if 
not ambiguity. It is later shown that T.Reynolds was not disposed to 
the political dis-enfranchisement of blacks and to notions of racial 
hierarchy in the same way as his sugarmilling associates, yet his 
employment practices earned him more public,approbrium than any 
contem p::>rary sugar miller. Of course the conditions faced by Reynolds' 
workers were no different from those condoned on the properties of other 
sugarmillers. Nevertheless it has been written of the older William 
Campbell that he followed an "enlightened labour policy ••• preferring 
kinder and more intelligent methods of attaining a satisfactory labour 
output11 ,52 and until 1874 no Indian was employed by the Campbells.53 In 
52 Herd , Killie' s Africa. p. 13. 
53 Ibid. 
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another respect, outside the employer/employee relationship, the 
Campbells certainly did attract acclaim for their relations with 
Africans. Marshall Campbell was "advisor" to a local Zulu clan, and 
·John Dube once wrote of him that "It was he who brought me before the 
eyes of the authorities. It was he by his gifts and advice that I was 
able to carry on" .54 Campbell and Dube were said to have collaborated 
in an attempt to keep local Africans out of the fray during the 1906 
rebellion,55 and refugees were given sanctuary at (but improbably in) 
Mount F.dgecombe House.56 Marshall Campbell had shown the same regard 
for Africans as had his father, but he had been forced out of necessity 
to use the Indian indenture system which both he and his father had been 
so critical of. His was a lone voice when it came to defending free 
Indian workers against the notorious £3 licence, but he was equally keen 
to see Indians repatriated rather than being allowed to stey in Natal.57 
Instances of respectful intercourse and paternalistic benevolence 
notwithstanding, the sugarocrats' ideology either blinded them to, or 
justified in their own minds, the decidedly oppressive ramifications of 
treating employees according to "racial" appearances. The manner in 
which they articulated their racism is seen with reference to the play 
of imJ:Brialist ideals in the making of sugarocratic consciousness. 
Imperial connections had some obvious connotations not least· of which 
54 KC, MS CAM 1.04, Folder 12, Dube to Cam:PJell, 24.9.1936. 
55 Herd, Killie's Africa. p.190. 
56 Ibid., p.37; and "Mount Edgecombe Area Annals", Womens' Institute, 
1964. 
57 Senate Debates, 1914, pp.424-425 and 498. Gandhi praised Campbell, 
for the stand he had taken in the Senate, in a number of public 
statements. See for example M.Gandhi, The Collected Works of Mahatma 
Gandhi. Delhi: Government of India, 1964, vol.XII, pp.433 and 465-
470. 
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was the promise of military security for settlers in the,face of the 
newly conquered but far from servile black populace. There were also 
sources of capital and mercantilist guarantees which, over and above 
emotional bonds, indebted the Natal sugarocracy to its country of 
origin. But, for all its acts of submission to metropolitan crown and 
flag, the nascent sugarocracy had left the fold of the British peti t-
bourgeoisie and it had an autonomous struggle to wage as a colonial 
bourgeoisie: it had to engage itself in the formation and workings of a 
bourgeois state; it had to pursue the objective of creating and then 
maintaining in servility a supply of cheap labour, without interference 
from Downing Street; it had to be assured of the political support of 
white settlers; and it had eventually to arrive at some compromise in 
its relationships with the ruling settlers in adjacent co~onies. How 
ideology was woven into these pursuits, and how a sugarocratic 
consciousness began to develop during their execution, majy be discovered 
by tracing the performances of sugarocrats in public office. 
The colonial sugarocrats maintained a strong allegiance to Britain, 
which long after Union was still referred to by some as "home", and 
their emotional and political expressions were often flavoured by 
imperialist jingoism. As Rhodes lay on his deathbed in 1902, 
G.S.Armstrong eulogised that 
I have known the right honourable gentleman for nearly 
20 years, and I am proud to say that he is a Britisher 
and Imparialist of the first water. He is the greatest 
statesman that South Africa has ever seen. He i~the 
greatest Empire-maker that the world has ever seen. 
That Armstrong's expressed views on British imperialism and its agents 
seemed to border on idolat~ry should not be seen to be out of line with 
the general sentiments of the sugarocracy towards crown and empire. It 
was Armstrong also who, on the eve of the unification of the South 
58 NLA Debates, Vol.31, 29<>-291, 1.4.1902. 
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African colonies, captured most clearly the sugarocracy's understanding 
of the implication of having a colonial ruling class whose ideological 
and material commitments were forged under the shadow of a metropolitan 
bourgeoisie: although he spoke as "a Britisher and an Im~rialist", he 
argued that 
If there is one thing_ that ought to be left in the hand 
of [Union Parliamentj it is the Native question ••• once 
for all we shall have no interference from Downing 
Street ••• 
I trust that this [Draft South Africa] Act will pass the 
House, and that we will become a nation equal to none . 
under the British flag.59 
And the sugarocrac:v, stood firmly opposed, if not to Union, th.en to any 
development that might ultimately result in the lowering of the British· 
flag in Natal. 
Subjects of real embourgeoisement though they were, colonial suga.rocrats 
did not alweys see themselves in that light. As they contemplated the 
unification of their colony with the three colonies abutting it, some 
voiced their misgivings about the nature of class alliances that might 
eventuate. From G.S.Armstrong came the warning that "capitalists" were 
not to be t·rusted, and that these people in the Transvaal were friendly 
with "the Dutch".ro In the terminology of Armstrong and his colleagues, 
"the Dutch" and British settlers stood apart as two distinct "races", 
while mine-owners were "capitalists" and sugarocrats were "farmers". 
Thus it was with some prescience that J.Kirkman projected the 
unlikelihood of "racial division" and "I rather.think it will be a 
division on the great lines of country interests, merchants' interests, 
and magnates' interests". 61 Even if some may already have seen 
themselves as industrialists and capitalists by the time of Union, the 
59 NIA Debates, Vol.47, 42-65, 1.4.1909. 
60 Ibid. 
61 NIA Dehltes, Vol.47, 78-88, 5.4.1909. 
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colonial sugarocrats had shown themselves to have had a definite pre-
occupation with "country interests", which had direct ideological 
implications. _ They had pressed in colonial Natal's Legislative Assembly 
(NLA) for the taxation of absentee landowners, which led to the 
introduction of a tax ll1 1903 that caused those affected to dispose of 
over 20CX)() acres of land in Victoria co~ty alone;62 they urged closer 
settlement;63 and Hulett had been an especially forceful proponent of 
leasehold rather than fr~ehold settlement, particularly with respect to 
Zululand where he argued leasehold would obviate land speculation and 
unproductive settlement.64 Apart from the ideological platform erected 
in their stand for "country interests" against rentier capital, the 
colonial sugarocracy was at one with Transvaal's mine-owners when it 
came to putting ideology to work in the formation and control of a 
labour supply. The racial di vision of labour in Natal, to which the 
sugarocracy was party, had its origins in the structural conditions of 
the time, but its sustenance was, as is explained in Chapter 5, also 
mediated by racist ideology. 
While sugarocrats contributed to the formation of a colonial working 
class comprising whites and blacks, they nevertheless espoused the felt 
need for segregating the colonial populace. The sugarocracy's 
contribution to segregation took various forms, of which residential 
segregation on their own properties was but one of the most superficial. 
They also advocated and claimed to practice preferential treatment for 
white artisans and clerical workers, and in the colonial Legislative 
Assembly they lent support to statutory segregation. In 1904, for 
example, a motion put before the NLA by G.Armstrong was agreed to, which 
62 NIA Debates, Vol.48, 292-306, 3.11.1909. 
63 NLA. Debates, Vol.24, 8-11, 1.7.1903. 
64 NLA Debates, Vo1.37, 523-536, 12.7.1904; Vol.42, 81-92, 2.7.1907; 
Vol.48, 162, 26.10.1909. 
113 
would lead to the seg,regation of Natal's rail way passengers. Similar 
motions had previously come to nothing, but now Armstrong was ~guing 
that "the matter is so important, even to the Native and the Asiatics 
themselves", and his successful case rested on such observations as 
this: 
I think it is a most painful sight to see European women 
and children travelling with Indians, and also Natives 
at times. Only the other day a friend of mine told me 
that a Chinaman ca.Ille down on the Main Line travelling in 
the same carriage as a lady and a number of white 
children. I think that is a standing disgrace to a 
colony such as ours. I consider, Sir, that we have a 
right, as the ruling people of this country, to keep ,our 
position, and to see ~at this intermixing is not 
allowed on the Railways. 
Though they may all have found "intermixing" objectionable, colonial 
sugarocrats were not unanimous in their disposition towards Africans and 
Indians in other respects. While they could not concur on the exact 
means and intensity with which to maintain blacks in subordination, the 
colonial sugarocrats appear to have shared a tacit acknowledgement of 
the humanness of bl~ks. As J .R.Saunders himself pronounced, 
I think that the road to the Zulu War was paved with 
good intentions •.• playing with the Zulus as if we were 
dealing with rights as between two civilized nations. 
Rights between barbarians must be dealt with with full 
justice, but with a paternal care which is necessary in 
dealing with such people. If w'661ad acted fairly the 
War-would never have taken place. 
And two years later he added that "It is because I like the Zulus, with 
all their faults, that I seek to exJX)se the evils which surround us";67 
then with further qualification, "The Zulus are fine jovial grown-up 
children". 68 J .L.Hulett had used stronger language in writing that 
Nothing less than the complete annhilation of the Zulu 
power (i.e. as a power) will satisfy the requirements of 
65 NIA Debates, Vol.37, 232-235, 21.6.1904. 
66 NLA Debates, Vol.1, 529-532, 3.2.1880. 
67 J .R.Saunders, "Natal in its Relation to South Africa", Proceedings, 
Royal Colonial Institute 13 ( 1881-82), pp.103-145. 
68 Ibid. . 
the Colony; when that is. crushed, without the 
possibility of again rising, we mey mould ~d shape the 
incongruous mass of barbarism in our midst. . 
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And from Marshall Campbell came the claim in 1911 that "the native who 
is Christianised and educated, and is not simply a clothed native, is 
far 1:11ore useful than a raw kafir". 70 Colonial sugarocrats as a group 
thus construed their domination of blacks as a rational consequence of 
their self-ordained rights and duties as cultural superiors and 
political rulers. They were nevertheless divided over the precise manner 
in which racism should be practiced and they differed in their 
appreciation of the level at which discourse between whites and blacks 
was considered to be appropriate. 
The colonial sugarocracy' s opinions on the ques.tion of the 
enfranchisement of blacks were formed in consonance with the ideological 
communion achieved amongst them with regard to the morality of racist 
paternalism. Although the sugarocrats were comparatively silent in the 
Legislative Assembly when the issue was under discussion, J.R.Saunders 
had in 188) voiced his support for the dis-enfranchisement of Indians, 
whom he thought would be "made the catspaw of agitators and others who 
will lead them into mischief". 71 It was T.Reynolds who had stood out as 
an exception when in 1882 he pleaded that "The sooner we cast away 
suspicions regarding the natives, the sooner we let them feel they have 
a part in the legislature of the country, the sooner we shall arive at a 
better understanding about them11.72 Though the' stance taken .by Reynolds 
was ambiguous, the colonial sugarocracy at large clearly recognised, 
with self interest, the need to exclude blacks from the colonial 
electorate. It was equally plain that control would not be assured by 
69 Natal Mercury 8.5.1879. 
70 Argµs 14.9.1911. Copy filed in KC, P 4291. 
71 NLA Debates, Vol.1, 622-623, 24.2.1880. Hulett too had opposed the 
franchise for Indians (NLA Debates, Vol.24, 166-178, 6.5.1896). 
72 NIA Debates, Vol. 5, 479-481, 27. 7 .1882. 
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this tactic alone. 
With typical candour J.L.Hulett had written to his Victoria County 
supporters in 1879 that 
The whole past of native legislation has been 
barbarous ••• [ we have to] ••• see that the natives are 
dealt with upon a basis of civilisation, which cannot be 
done under the tribal system. Increase the wants of the 
people; foster their industry, and give them a direct 
interest in the land - you make them loyal. Their 
present loyalty is not real, only a sham - fear onlf3 
their loyalty is 'at present to barbarism and kafirdom. 
By supplanting ''barbarism" with loyalty, by taking up cultural matters 
which encompassed marriages,74 medicine,75 and modes of dress,76 by 
attempting to break down the tribal economy, and by other measures, did 
/ 
the sugarocracy seek to effect control over the recalcitrant Zulus and 
the resilient Indians of colonial Natal. 
In order for the sugarocracy's civilising mission to produce the desired 
climate for control it meant that the Reserves could not be seen as an 
end in themselves, nor could Zululand be allowed to remain untouched by 
the Natal administration. In 1880 J.R.Saunders argued for the exchange 
of Reserve for Crown lands with the express purpose of deepening the 
di visions amongst Africans in Natal, 77 and he also proposed the 
installation of a Colonial Resident in Zululand whose presence should be 
financed by a levy on the territory's inhabitants: "you will never make 
the Zulus realize that anyone is placed over them, unless you make them 
pay tribute through their chiefs".78 Saunders continued his ca.mµdgn in 
1882 to bring Zululand "under the supremacy of British authority, 
73 Natal Mercury 23 • 5. 1879. 
74 NIA IDlebates, Vol.40, 13-14, 8.5.1906. 
75 NIA Debates, Vol.28, 340-341, 27 .6.1899. 
76 NIA Debates, Vol.1, 149-152, 4.12.1879. 
T7 NLA Debates, Vol.2, 364-366, 14.12.1880. 
78 RIA Debates, Vol.1, 529-532, 3. 2.1880. 
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exercised through the agency of white Magistrates". 79 These were 
matters which also occupied Hulett, who held the view that "if we want 
to have a public benefit, something that will be the commencement of a 
system of better control over the Natives, then we must put ourselves to 
a slight amount of inconvenience"80 (that the registration of Africans 
would entail). Hulett was no less concerned with the control of 
Africans within the Mission Reserves. He considered it to have been a 
"fatal mistake" for the Colonial Government to have allowed African 
freehold settlement in an Umvoti Reserve, for the Africans in question 
then leased their land to Indians for large rents 'and "in consequence 
are not developing their own intelligence to the extent that they 
should" . 81 
Evidently colonial sugarocrats did not always act in concert as 
employers and as politicians, but this did not imply the absence of a · 
modicum of fundamental ideological unity. Even if they were divided 
over whether or not Africans were "barbarous", they were not ln 
disagreement over the question of white supremacy in the colony. Thus 
although there may for example have been some objective significance 
attached to the Africanist Killie Campbell's insistence that her father 
Marshall Campbell was not cast in the mould of a typical 11Sugar 
Baron", 82 there could be no gainsaying his ideological conformity with. 
his sugarocratic contemporaries on the question of black/white 
relations. As the writer of Marshall Campbell's obituary in the Natal 
Mercury worded it, "Whilst a strong upholder 0f the white man's 
supremacy in South Africa, he enjoyed in a unique degree the confidence 
79 NIA Del::ates, Vol.5, 262, 27.7.1882. 
00 NIA Del::ates, Vol. 27, 678, 1898. 
81 NIA Del::ates, Vol.24, 32-38, 2. 7.1903. 
82 Herd, Killie's Africa. p.52. 
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of our native and Asiatic populations". 83 Personal idiosyncracies 
notwithstanding then, racism and imperialism were the cement of the 
suga.rocracy's ideology. 
The sugarocracy's ideology did not simply unfold in the course of time. 
It was also actively impelled by intellectuals within the sugarocracy, 
and its adherents and advocates had their idelogical (and class) 
position defined in a number of written works. By considering now three 
specific issues - the intellectual pursuits of certain sugarocrats, the 
creation and projection of a sugarocratic image, and the development of 
suga.rocratic historiography - it is shown how the ideological le~y of 
the colonial sugarocracy remained embedded in the collective 
"suga.rmillers' consciousness", and how it was put to practical use. 
From the early stages of its history the sugarocracy could be said to 
have had a fertile intellectual source within its own ranks. It is 
particularly with members of the Saunders lineage in mind that this 
point is made. J.R.Saunders, attributed as the progenitor of the Indian 
indenture system in Natal, was like many other sugarocrats a politician; 
he also wrote letters to the colonial press, and in 1882 addressed the 
Royal Colonial Institute in his capacity as a fellow thereof. This 
speech of his in I.Dndon concerned the relationship between Natal and the 
rest of South Africa, and he argued against uniting the British and Boer 
territories in South Africa.84 Interestingly W.Campbell also addressed 
the Royal Colonial Institute in the same year, his subject being postal 
comml.IDication between Britain and India and Australia.85 
83 Natal Mercury 21.4.1917. 
84 Saunders, "Natal in Relation to South Africa". 
85 W.Campbell, "Postal Communication with the East; India in Six and 
Australia in Sixteen Days", Proceedings, Royal Colonial Institute 
14 ( 1882-83), pp.223-246. 
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J .R.Saunders' intellectual mien was clearly based on an engagement with 
some of -the central issues of state formation and ruling class 
ideological ferment in ~eneral, and in this regard his son :Etlward was no 
less of an intellectual figure. Ed ward Saunders played a leadership 
role in the formation and running of the NSMA, of SASA, and of BEPO; he 
also held office i~ the FCI and_ he once represented his constituency in 
the Union Parliament. 
Saunders' involvement with BEPO was crowned by his book A Self-
Supporting Empire, which was published in London at the end of World War 
r.86 There he gave support to the plea his father had made for a 
greater awareness in England of the "history and potentialities of the 
Empire".87 _ His professed mission in this regard was to provide a blue- ~ 
print for a "self-supporting empire" maintained by research, planning, 
and imperial protectionism. Some .of the measures which he advocated 
were the establishment of joint industrial councils and the greater 
application of science to agriculture in order to "set the labourer free 
from the treadmill that exhausts the body and dulls the intelligence.',88 
These devices would, he claimed, contribute to "the true solution for 
the Capital and Labour difficulty [which] is to give every workman the 
opportunity of becoming a capitalist".89 Turning to South Africa, he 
cautioned that 
the white population must .be safeguarded from the 
tendency to degeneration which shows itself in a labour 
market ~bable to be flooded with masses of coloured 
workers. : 
And as for African workers, he considered that 
everything depends upon utilising them not only in a 
86 E.Saunders, A Self-supporting :Empire. London: Nisbet, 1918. 
87 Ibid., p. 9. 
88 Ibid.' p.47. 
89 Ibid.' p.68. 
90 Ibid.' p.180. 
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manner beneficial to themselves but so as to preveuf 
them becoming serious competitors with the white race.~ 
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There in a nutshell were the contradictions of which the sugarocracy was 
always aware it had to resolve both practically and ideologically: 
fostering a protected and progressive industrial environment while 
simultaneously preventing the de-colonisation, in body and in mind, of 
black workers. 
The intellectual endeavours of the sugarocracy in the period before 
World War II were, it is suggested, of a "holistic" bent in that they 
were carried on as appeals to an imperial bourgeois audience at large, 
with seldom any overt consideration for their personal empires. This 
did not of course detract from the imµ:>rtance of those efforts for local 
and company affairs, but it did represent a wider scope in the 
application of intellect from that of subsequent sugarocrats. After 
World War II, company and general sugar industry business were more 
decidedly at the forefront of intellectual pre-occupation, although 
questions of state and polity were never neglected. This may be 
illustrated by reference to the image which the sugarocracy formed of 
itself to be beholden by others. 
It would appear that the image consciously projected by the sugarocracy 
was initially an expression, to themselves as much as it was to others, 
of the sugarocracy' s ascent to the ranks of the bourgeoisie. Because 
they saw bourgeois rule in cultural terms as much as in economic or 
power terms, they also saw themselves as being rationally aestined to 
provide leadership as well as being objectively dependent on control 
over workers. Black workers in particular had to be presented with an 
image of the sugarocracy that would command respect and loyalty; they 
91 Ibid. , p. 142. 
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had to be convinced that sugarocratic control, justified by ownership, 
cultural superiority, and masterly status, was the rightful role of the 
sugarocracy. The paternal side of the early sugarocratic image was ,, 
linked to a sense of being on a civilising mission, and it rested on 
axiomatic ideas in sugarocratic consciousness about the child-like 
mentality of blacks. Where this image, and invective, led to nought, 
discipline was enforced by coercive measures which were nevertheless 
consonant with the notion of cultural superiority and with bourgeois 
\ 
expectations of worker submission. As Genovese argued, such heavy 
handed paternalism was a compromise between a demand for servility and a 
recognition of the humanness of workers (albeit simply a recognition of 
. their capacity for resistance and rebellion).92 
After the termination of the Indian indenture system, and even more so 
since the late 1930s, the sugarocracy seemed concerned to shed the 
coercive aspect of its image. As is shown in Chapter 7 their paternalism 
became more sophisticated as they tried to replace coercion with 
benevolence, and quiescence among workers was increasingly sought 
through "community building" - improved housing, sponsored and organised 
recreation, support for religious activities, and so on. 
There was a certain amount of ambiguity surrounding this shift taken by 
the sugarocracy ·in its image-building. What is clear is that the 
attempt to bring benevolence into the image projected by the sugarocracy 
did not imply an abandonment of racism, an filitist notion of power and 
rule, and metropolitan -bourgeois culture, as guiding ideological 
principles. - The ambiguity arises when consideration is given to the 
links which appeared, at the time of the shift, between the sugarocracy 
92 E.D.Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll. New York: Pantheon Books, 1972, 
plSSim. 
121 
and the short-lived journal The Industries of South Africa. On the one 
hand the journal, published in Durban, might have had the appearance of 
a forum for progressive ideas: it carried interviews with G.B.Shaw after 
his visit to South Africa;93 a paper by the liberal historian Edgar 
Brookes offered "Some Clear Thinking on the Native Question"; 94 
A.Geo.Champion wrote to its editor "Mey God give you many more days to 
express the truth"; 95 it had a correspondent in the USSR who contributed 
glowing articles on such topics as the position of women in that 
country; and it frequently dealt with the Natal sugar industry. On the 
other hand the journal was banned from Natal schools by the province's 
Superintendant of Education, and its editorial policy was blatantly to 
, 
fap. the flames of fascism: 
We think that the only hope of salvation that South 
Africa has lies in the bringing about in this country of 
an Industrial Fascism under a Dictator.
96 
This is what 
every true South African should work for. 
Was the regular advertising in the journal of Sir J.L.Hulett & Sons Ltd, 
Natal Estates Ltd, and C.G.Smi th & Co Ltd of any significance? More 
germane to this discussion, did the sugarocracy intend to project an 
image of an affinity with fascism? Was the frontpiece photograph, in 
the first edition of the South African S~ Year Book in 1930, of 
W.E.R.Edwards, the Hulett empire's strongest general ever, beneath the 
caption "The Mussolini of the Natal Sugar Industry'', something of a clue 
in this respect? The sugarocracy's practices during the inter-war years 
(detailed in the following chapters) provides an affirmative answer to 
these questions, and certainly D.Saunders was said not to have shied 
away from the appelation of fascist.97 
93 The Industries of South Africa (September and October, 1935 ). 
94 Ibid., (December 1935), pp.33-35. r 
95 Ibid., (July 1936), p. 21. 
96 Ibid., (August 1933), p.23. 
97 P.L.van den Berghe, Caneville: The Social Structure of a South 
African !ovn. Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1964, p.66. 
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Until the 1930s then, the projected image of bourgeois and "master" had 
been attended by a paternalism which encompassed expectations of 
"servants"; it was a paternalism which had the sugarocrats dispensing 
negative sanctions freely, without ever laying any store by positive 
sanctions. Although the change was neither rapid nor evenly manifested 
within the sugarocarcy, the image began to shed its more despotic 
aspects from the late 1930s. This transformation of the sugarocrats' 
image was first witnessed in Tongaat in the wake of D;Saunders' 
assumption of control in 1934, and at a time when the wide-spread slums 
in the district had deteriorated to appalling levels. Other 
sugarmillers did not immediately follow suit when Saunders began his 
humanitarian drive to give Tongaat a face-lift. 
Because such a change of attitude, or of the image projected, needed to 
be backed by monetary expenditure, sugarmillers may have postponed it 
(had they at the time considered it worthy of undertaking). Apart from 
the difficulties imposed by World War II, sugarmillers had to bear in 
mind the implications of the statutory eight-hour working day and the 
prospect of Industrial Council wage determinations. Under these 
circumstances sugarocrats generally still followed the hard-line they 
had· taken as "masters". It was only from the late 1940s that the 
example set by Tongaat was seen to begin spreading through the sugar 
belt, and the sugarocracy maintained an overt interest in improving 
their employees' material conditions through the buoyant and profitable 
1950s. 
By the late 1960s the image of sugarocrats as benevolent em players had 
undergone further, but subtle, changes. Paternalism persisted, while 
cultural pluralism was projected as the chosen alternative to racism as 
a principle of management in the sugarmills and villages. Whereas the 
123 
early sugarocrats had initially created an image of themselves to affirm 
their embourgeoisement, they had later turned to creating an image of 
themselves which was conducive to the imperatives of production. The 
image of the sugarocracy had thus been assigned a place in production 
relations per se, and it was nurtured via sugarocratic historiography. 
Early sugarocrats had left their impression on .. Natal's cultural 
landscape in a variety of ways, some consciously contrived and others 
not. For eXa.mple, KwaMashu - "the place of Marshall" - is named af'ter 
Marshall Campbell. Another artefact attributable to him and to 
E.Saunders is rickshaw transport in Durban, which they initiated by 
importing a consignment of the vehicles from Japan.98 Apart from 
legacies such as these, sugarocratic families have consciously 
endeavoured to uphold the image projected by their forebears. This they 
acc?mplished by means of biographies, usually written with the 
assistance of other parties close to the sugarocracy. 
In the first place there was the work of R.F.Osborn, who might be said 
to have been the sugarocracy' s official. biographer and historian. His 
Valiant Harvest, published in 1964 by SASA, was widely distributed to 
libraries, senior sugar company employees, and elsewhere. Valiant 
Harvest was intended to have a sequel, but the draft of "Sweet Concord" 
never went to print because of Osborn's death.99 Both texts had very. 
little to say of sugarmill operatives employed by "the men who have 
established and developed the Sugar Industry'1• 100 · 
Two other books written by Osborn were the biographies C.G.; A Great 
~Herd, Killie's Africa. p.Z/. 
g<J The SASA library holds the manuscript of Osborn's Sweet Concord. 
100"Forevord", in Osborn, Valiant Harvest. 
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Batalian. A Biography of Sir Charles George Smith KCMG, .KSJ, JP, and 
This Man of Purpose, A Biography of Sir James Liege Hulett KtB, JP. As 
the titles suggest, these books conveyed faithfully the images which the 
respective sugarocrats had themselves successfully projected; now by 
virtue of the not disinterested publishers, the images were placed on 
record for the edification of later generations. The latter biography 
was based in part on a text compiled in 1957 by J.M.Hulett to 
commemorate the centenary of Hulett's arrival in Natal; this text had in 
turn been based on Eric Rosenthal's unpublished manuscript biography of 
Hulett. J .M.Hulett later also had a hand in 'editing This Man of 
Purpose, which was published by her husband. In 1982 another Hulett 
descendant, Kearsney principal H.E.Hopkins, abridged This Man of Purpose 
into "The South African Connection of the Hulett Family", the 
publication of which was sponsored by the Hulett family and the Hulett 
Corporation to commemorate the 125th anniversary of J.L.Hulett's arrival 
0 ' 
in Natal. Whereas C.G.Smith had no direct descendants and his biography 
was posthumously published by C.G.Smi th & Co., J.L.Hulett's image was 
guarded by his descendants by means of the written and re-written word. 
Indeed, the Hulett biography itself acquired a history with the air of a 
saga about it. 
Another printed e'difice to the sugarocracy was Flower Paintings of 
Kather.ine Saunders, published by the Tongaat Group in 1979 to 
commemorate its 60th year as a public comJlll1Y in South Africa. Between 
the covers of the lavish volume were printed a 90-page biography of 
James Renault and Katherine Saunders, penned by their great grandson, 
the brother of Tongaat's chairman; and reproductions of K.Saunders' 
flower paintings. This book was announced in its preface, written by 
C.J.Saunders, as "a tribute to the pioneers of all races and creeds, who 
in one way or another helped to establish Tongaat and to build our 
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country". The preface also included a proclamation of the oft-repeated . 
"Tongaat philosophy". 
The "Tongaat philosophy" was a particularly powerful ideological device 
which made' explicit liriks between the sugarocratic image, paternalism, 
and comp.my policy. It was most completely detailed by R.G.T.Watson in 
his Tongaati: An African Experiment, which was at once a biographical 
treatise on the Saunders family and a manifesto and rationalisation of 
company philosophy. Watson's book, more fully and explicitly than 
f 
others, was what sugarocratic historiography was all about: the 
portrayal of sugarocrats in majestic profile; the parading of their 
ideology as the font of rationality, objectivity, and progress; and· the 
justification for sugarocratic claims to authority. 
Clearly the partisan biography was an imp::>rtant means of establishing a 
sugarocratic "tradition". Of greater import for the maintenance of that 
tradition have been the SASJ and the magazines published by the various 
sugar companies. The SASJ was, during its early years, the official 
organ of the South African Sugar Planters' Union. It was in the SASJ 
that the opinion was expressed in 1930 that certain sugarocrats had not 
paid their dues: 
Sir Frank Reynolds, who departed from the Sugar World at 
the end of September, left about a quarter of a million 
sterling, made entirely out of the Sugar Industry; yet 
not a penny has he left to benefit the industry to which 
he owed so much. In this he merely emulates his 
predecessors, Sifofiege Hulett, Sir Marshall Campbell 
and a few others. · 
The SASJ had previously not always been favourably disposed to the 
sugarocracy, and until the late 1930s its editors remained closely 
~igned with growers in their disputes with the millers. After World 
101 SASJ 14: 10(1930), p. 665. 
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War II the journal contributed to the maintenance of the sugarocratic 
image by showering praise in obituaries, historical articles, and 
contemporary reports. 
The relevant house journals are Hulett's Nevs(incorporating 
KvaHulett's), Hulett's Review, Tongaat's The Condenser a.rid ltkosiBomvu, 
The Illovo Digest, and Smithlink. If the books put out by the 
sugarocracy were not intended for sugarmill employees, then these. 
journals were. Besides conveying com~ policy and heralding com~ 
growth, most, and particularly The Condenser, have portrayed company 
founders in an aura of heroism. Lest the image were to fade, the 
portrayal has served to remind employees thereof. And that image has 
been central, if a reading of the journals is anything to go by, to the 
cause of promoting (in the case of NkosiBomvu by its very name and by 
regular quizzes) amongst employees ~ sense of community and 
identification with sugar companies, even if today they operate under 
the umbrella of Anglo-American and Barlow Rand. 
When, as in the following chapters, the implications of sugarocratic 
domination are examined more closely, it becomes clear that su~ocratic 
ideology and its portrayal via sugarocratic historiography served to 
distort and conceal aspects of reality. In particular, the reality of 
class embattlement and workers' experiences under the sugarocratic yoke 
were concealed by the pens of the sugarocracy's historians and 
intellectuals. Though such concealment may sometimes have been nothing 
more than unconscious "silences" or a symptom of cultural myopia, at 
other times, but especially after World War II, it became as intentional 




A convenient means of discussing systematically the sugarocracy's 
involvement in political institutions is to look at the animation of the 
"sugarmillers' consciousness" from two perspectives: the sugarocracy's 
dealings with sugarcane growers; and the sugarocracy's approach to 
relations with the state. The finer details of miller/ grower politics 
have been analysed in the previous chapter, and the following discussion 
concentrates ·on the political life of the sugarocracy outside the 
sugarmilling environment per se. Although the sugarocracy's endeavours 
in political institutions are being approached here in terms of "state 
politics" and."sugar politics", it is quite apparent that the 
distinction relates only to the different agencies concerned. 
Natal's sugarocrats had stood as a powerful lobby in the Colonial 
Government, and within the post-colonial party-political sphere the 
sugarocracy was consistently supportive of the South Africa Party (SAP) 
and its successor the United Party. Six of the eight most prominent 
' 
sugarocratic families had members elected to office in colonial 
government, amongst other sugarmillers: T.Reynolds and his son Frank 
represented Alexander County at different times; J.L.Hulett once beat 
E.Saunders at a general election, and he was successfully returned when 
he shared an anti-Responsible Government platform with T.Groom and 
W .Campbell in the 1892 general election; 102 and· G.S.Armstrong, 
J.Saunders, M.Campbell, and C.G.Smith all held seats in the Colonial 
Parliament. After Union ·these sugarocrats cast their lot with the SAP. 
Moreover F.Reynolds and G.S.Armstrong were elected SAP Members of 
Parliament within a few years of Union, and C.G.Smith, who replaced 
Reynolds as Senator in 1921, was the
1
Natal leader of the Party until his 
1043ee Herd, Killie's Africa. p.26. 
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resignation in 1930, when he was made life president of the SAP. Both 
J.L.Hulett, who had been colonial Minister of Native Affairs and later 
the Speaker of the House, and M.Campbell served as Union Senators, and 
W.Pearce was Durban County's Member on the Provincial Council. Apart 
from this direct involvement of sugarocrats in the affairs of state, 
G.Hulett was made a Union Senator· in 1917; J.L.Hulett's son in law, 
W .Clayton, ~ecame a Senator after having twice been colonial Minister of 
Agriculture, and having represented Zululand as SAP Member of ' 
Parliament; and F.Reynolds' son, Lewis, was honorary assistant private 
secretary to General Smuts before filling the seat for Natal Coast as 
SAP Member.of Parliament. The only departures from the obvious 
political leaning within the sugarocracy were seen in the · ineffectual 
attempts made in 1929 by G.Hulett and W~Campbell to rally support in 
Natal for the National Party.103 
During the colonial period the political work of sugarocrats revolved 
around larger issues of state formation as much as around their day-to-
day concerns as employers, millers, and planters. If this was apparent 
from their postures in the Natal Legislative Assembly, it was even more 
evident in their involvement with the Indian Immigration· Trust Board. 
They had always been represented on the Board, but since the turn of the 
twentieth century they predominated,104 being thus effectively in a 
position to determine the parameters within which they could oper~te as 
employers of Indian workers. Their strength in this respect was 
bolstered by the successes of individual and collective campaigns to 
secure themselves as millers-cum-planters: the campaigns for the 
103SASJ 13:8(1929), p.469, and 13:12(1929), p.815. 
104By 1907 E.G.Saunders was chairman of the Indian Immigration Trust 
Board, and J.L.Hulett, C.P.Reynolds, and A.Platt were amongst the six 
other members of the Board. The following year also saw C.G.Smi th 
and E.W.Hawksworth on the board. See also Chapter 5, Note 39. 
-- ----------------------------~ 
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extension of the Indian indenture system, for mercantile protection, for 
rail way construction and an exp:mded customs union, for the taxation and 
control of Africans, and for the settlement of Zululand by whites, were 
all pursued in search of a guaranteed future for millers-cum-planters in 
face of forei@l competition and local constraints. 
The intensity with which certain sugarmillers had engaged themselves as 
politicians in colonial Natal had almost inevitably assured them piaces 
in the early Union Senate. It is remarkable that the only su~miller 
to stand for and be elected to parliament after Union, who had not been 
a member of the Colonial Parliament, was E.Saunders. Post-colonial 
sugarocrats were seemingly inclined to divorce the pursuit of their 
economic objectives from that of their political objectives, 
concentrating their energies on the former. When they dealt with the 
state now it was through direct deputations, and, their general attitude 
was one of resisting any form of state interference. 
After Union the sugarocracy by and large fell within the ranks of the 
SAP, by which allegiance they hoped to maintain Natal as a relatively 
autonomous dominion province, while expecting also a protective 
\ \ 
dispensation for the industry. Their approach to involvement with the 
state reflected their position of having two hats to wear, that of the 
agriculturalist and that of the manufacturer. This inherent ambiguity 
was seen in the way in which af'ter Union SU§:U'millers related to Botha 
as "a man of the land", and to Smuts as the proponent of their wider 
political aspirations; it was more vividly evident from the changing 
relationship they had with planters when the indu5try as a whole dealt 
r 
with the state. 
If in the period before the late 1930s sugarmillers had (as the previous 
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chapter shows) related to growers from an obsessively defensive 
position, they had done so with the state too. Like exemplary 
exponents of laissez faire economics, they had resisted any form of 
state intervention, while growers had worked in the opposite direction. 
The organisations behind which they had stood, and the work of those· 
organisations, . bore testimony to the search for sug;:u-ocratic autonomy. 
Through BEPO they had sought to secure imperial preference for their 
products, without working through the state, and they had hoped to keep 
miller/grower relations confined to .SASA, in which they participated as 
members of what was undoubtedly the strongest party, the NSMA. In the 
background to these organisational activities, the sugarocrats had also 
mobilised around an ideological campilgn to advance their interests as 
industrialists. This campaigp, which linked their concern for autonomy 
with their protectionist ideals, was manifested in their affiliation to 
an offshoot of BEPO, namely the South African Federated Chamber of 
Industries (FCI). 
The nature and extent of the sug;9.I'Ocracy's immersion in the politics of 
( 
protectionism appears not to have been fully appreciated by social 
historians. Within the context of her analysis of the ideology and 
ideologues of manufacturing in South Africa before state protection was 
firmly secured, when the Labour-National Party Pact came to power in 
1924, Bozzoli mentioned J.L.Hulett but ignored E.Saunders.105 While 
there is no question as to Hulett's imp:>rtance as an ideologue, and even 
as a protectionist, when the articulation of "manufacturing i,deology" 
was institutionalised with the creation of the FCI in 1917, Saunders' 
contribution overshadowed anything that the 80 year old Hulett did or 
105B.Bozzoli, "The Origins, Development and Ideology of Local 
Manufacturing in South Africa", Journal of Southern African Studies 
1 : 2 ( 1 975 ) , pp. 194-214. 
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might have done in this sphere. 
Saunders has been acknowledged for making the original proposal by which 
the idea of a federated chamber of industrialists was defined,1C6 and he 
served two terms as the FCI's president, first in 1919/20 and again in 
1933/34.107 Saunders' mission was unambiguous: to unite manufacturing, 
agriculture, and labour in "an industrial Parliament, capable of putting 
united propositions to the Government which would be impossible to turn 
down!" .1 OS . Sugarmillers in general were party to this cause and the 
NSMA had three representatives on the FCI's Executive Council until 
1936. 109 
'--.. 
This direct form of participation by sugar producers in the·FCI was 
altered in 1937, from which time SASA instead of NSMA nominated three 
' 
representatives as executive councillors. Al though this still meant 
that sugarocrats such as W.A.Campbell and G.V~Crookes maintained a 
presence in the FCI, the attendance of sugar industry representatives at 
the Federation's annual conventions began to decline after 1939. Formal 
SASA representation was not made after 1950, except for the two terms 
served by C.J .Saunders in the early 1960s. Flagging interest in 
bureaucratic or executive involvement in the FCI coincided with an 
improvement in the export market and rising domestic demand for sugar. 
The extremely volatile history of sugar politics in the pre-World War II 
period was followed by the relative calm of the post-war period. The 
only policy-related sugar institutions remaining after the War were SASA 
and its constituents, SACGA and SASMA. In the post-war climate of 
106FCI Viewpoint (50-year Commemorative Issue) 1:6(1967), p.30. 
107SASJ 19:1 (1934), p.15. 
108FCI Viewpoint (50-year Commemorative Issue) 1:6(1967), p.30. 
109This and the following details on sugarmillers' involvement in the 
FCI have been drawn from Annual Reports, SAFCI. 
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sugarmillers' prosperity little was publicly seen or heard of the 
rapidly thinning sugarocracy in the party political sphere, and only 
C.J.Saunders came to the surface in political life. An interview with 
Saunders reported by the Financial Mail in June 1982, had it that he 
claimed to have "no ~tomach for poli tics11• 110 Saunders was nevertheless 
at the time Natal chairman of the Urban Foundation, a member of the 
Buthelezi Commission, and a member of both the Prime Minister's Economic 
Advisory Council and his Defence Council.111 No less significant was 
the political role played by Saunders, in the company of other members 
of the old sugf:!.rocratic families, on the eve of the referendum for South 
Africa's white electorate over the question of the proposed new 
constitution. By the time of the referendum, on 2nd November 1983, 
Saunders had sought and received wide publicity in the media for his 
propagation of a vote in favour of the new constitution. 
Summary 
As self-made capitalists, the first sugarocrats in Natal set in motion a 
distinctive culture. In every sense - from the quotidian way of 
SUgf:!.rocratic life to the politics and consciousness of the SUgfil"Ocracy -
their culture was bourgeois yet sectarian, dynamic yet conservative. 
They saw themselves and applied themselves as ideologues; they affirmed 
their real embourgeoisement by projecting an appropriate image; and 
their intense patriotism did not stop at the threshold of military. 
action. 
Changes in aspects of the culture of the sugarocracy mirrored the 
110Financial Mail 29.1.1982, pp.431-432. 
111 Ibid. See also D.Lincoln, "State, Capital and the Reserve 
Consolidation Issue in South Africa", Tijdschrift voor Economische en 
Sociale Geografie 73:4(1982), pp.229-236. · 
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structural changes outlined in Chapter 2. From an early stage in the 
I 
sugarocratic era their perceived obligation to intervene personally in 
the processes of state formation and social reproduction became less 
' 
pressing than it had been towards the end of the nineteenth century. 
Despite an underlying commitment to the rationalisation of bourgeois 
power and rule, the sugarocrats' main concern moved away from the 
politics of bourgeois rule, and closer to the source of their economic 
strength, the sugarmills. The sugarocrats' overt· concern. for the 
politics of the work-place became all the more evident when the severe 
I 
production and distribution crises of the inter~war period sapped their, 
political energies. An important aspect of this shift was the move from 
creating a bourgeois image, to mobilising that image. After World War 
II the sugarocracy rema~ned pr~occupied with bourgeois control at the 
level of the state as well as the work-place, but now it was seen to 
have adjusted its social theory from one predisposed towards a rapacious 
racism, to another which was ostensibly given to meritocratic ideals. 
This insight into the culture of the sugarocracy prepares the way for a 
study of the sugarocracy's employment practices; it provides clues aboµt 
the range of expectations sugarocrats might have had of their employees, 
and about the manner in which they might have responded if those 




SUGAR TECHNOLOGY AND THE TECHNICAL DIVISION OF SUGARMILL LABOUR 
It is within the sugarmill that a sugarocracy lays first claims to 
authority over its employees. It is here that a sugarocracy exerts an 
influence over the way in which a contingent of appropriately equipped 
operatives is assembled and set to work with the appliances and 
machinery of the sugarmill to produce sugar and profits. Neither the_ 
division of labour nor the technology at the disposal of operatives can 
remain stagnant under a capitalist mode of production: the workforce 
undergoes re-division and technology is constantly revised in order to 
optimise the conditions which favour the highest possible return to 
owners in an ever changing economic context. However, the particular 
division of labour at any one time imposes certain limits on 
technological change, and various technologies in their turn impose 
constraints on the division of labour in the sugarmill. There is thus a 
mutual interdependence between the changing configuration of the 
workforce and changing technology; both changes being related the form 
taken by bourgeois intervention in that dynamic relationship. 
In this chapter the sugarmilling labour process in Natal is approached 
via a general historical account of sugar technology and the division of 
sugarmill labour. The Natal case is then treated chronologically, with 
emphasis given to the technical division of sugarmill labour, technical 
training, and- technological change respectively. 
Sugar Technology and the Di y~sion of Su@=lrmill Labour 
The process of sugarmaking involves several basic operations: crushing 
the sugarcane; clarifying the juice thus obtained; evaporating water 
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from the juice by boiling; crystallisation; and "purging" the molasses 
adhering to the sugar crystals. Until the introduction of steam mills 
these operations were undertaken, often simultaneously, either solely by 
humans or by various combinations of human and an~mal, water, or wind 
power.1 Whatever the source of motive power in these early sugarmills 
though, human manual labour of a most arduous nature was always 
implied. 2 
Historically speaking, sugarmill industrialisation could only be 
achieved by first transforming the workforce from slaves to wage-
labourers. That is to say, technological changes alone could not 
progressively raise the productivity and profitability of slave-operated 
sugarmills. Representing as they did a form of capital, all slaves were 
required to be productively occupied at all times in order to reduce 
planters' expenses to as close as possible to the fixed cost of 
maintaining and controlling his slaves.3 This imperative; the 
difficulty of regimenting skilled slaves due to the incompatibility 
An arbitrary set of data show the degree of variation in sugarmill 
prime movers during the eighteenth century: 
Animal Water Wind 
Jamaica 1768 369 235 44 
Tobago 1775 52 9 23 
Mauritius 1776 1 1 1 
Data on Jamaica and Tobago from L.J.Ragatz, The Fall of the Planter 
Class in the British Caribbean, 1763-1833. 1928. Reprint. New York: 
Octagon Books, 1971; and on Mauritius from R.Lamusse, "The Economic 
Development of the Mauritius Sugar Industry", Revue Agricole et 
Sucriere de l'ile Maurice 43:1 (1964), pp.22-38. 
2 For a brief but informative essay on pre-industrial sugarmills, which 
deals with sugar technology and the di vision of labour, see 
W.Barrett, "Caribbean Sugar-Production Standards in the Seventeenth 
and Eighteenth Centuries". In Merchants and Scholars edited by 
J.Parker. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1965. 
3 This imperative has been termed ''Genovese's rule" by R.V.Anderson and 
R.E.Gallman, "Slaves as Fixed Capital: Slave Labor and Southern 
Economic Development", Journal of American History 64:1 (1977), pp.24-
46. It has been observed in sugar production by E. V.Goveia, Slave 
Society in the British Leeward Islands at the end of the Eighteenth 
Century. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1980, pp.126-129. 
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between bondage and the autonomy acquired by artisans;4 the related 
issues of educating slaves and entrusting to them an entire sugfll'mill 
containing sophisticated machinery - these factors, either jointly or 
severally, militated against technological change in sugarmills where 
there was a preponderance of slaves.5 For the late eighteenth century 
Cuban sugarmiller, as an example, this condition was a virtually 
insurmountable obstacle; he was 
A castrated, im!X)tent semi-bourgeois, with merchandise 
and market like the revolutionary bourgeois who 
intellectually inspired him, but self-contradictorily 
forc~d %1-m to chain himself to the past in order to 
survive. 
As committed as he was to reaping the profits attainable on the world 
sugar market, this "semi-bourgeois" Cuban sugarmiller had to contend 
with a sugar output ceiling which hovered at 1,15 tons of sugar per 
slave per season from the end of the sixteenth to early in the 
nineteenth century.7 
That slavery was a stumbling block with respect to technological change 
, 
seems clear, although purely technical constraints did exist,8 for 
example in the widespread use until the early nineteenth century of 
vertical rollers made of wood. These mills set limits which could only 
be broken by the use of horizontal iron mills of greater mass and with 
greater crushing surf aces. Then there were the open copper vessels for 
evaporation which required manual labour to stir and to clear scum from 
their boiling contents; they too placed a constraint on sugar recovery. 
4 Goveia, Slave Society. p.131. 
5 M.Moreno Fraginals, The Sugarmill: The Socioeconomic Complex of~ 
in Cuba. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976, passim., but 
especially p.112 where he wrote of machinery being "too complicated" 
for slaves. 
6 Fraginals, Suga.rm.ill. p. 18. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Of course the availability of capital was also a critical factor, as 
emphasised by S.W.Mintz, "Labor' and Sugar in Puerto Rico and in 
-Jamaica 18C0-1850", and E.V.Goveia, "Comment", Comparative Studies in 
Society and History 1 ( 1958-59), pp.273-283. 
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Significant change in sugar technology came in the mid-nineteenth 
century principally via the use of steam and the application of 
principles of thermodynamics and kinetics.9 It was steam p:>wer which 
drove enlarged horizontal mills, and in the sugar house (or boiling 
house) the previously used copper kettles were replaced by two steam-
related appliances, the multiple effect evaporator and the vacuum pan. 
These innovations were developed and operated on the principle of 
boiling syrup below 1 oo0c by reducing pressure over the syrup. Boiling 
under vacuum prevented the formation of caramel, it enabled a finer 
grain to be produced, and it made for dramatically improved final 
recovery. Multiple effect evaporators and vacuum pans (operated 
separately from the evaporators to boil away remaining moisture and to 
promote crystallisation) doubled production immediately in the 
sugarmills into which they were introduced· in the mid-eighteen 
hundreds.10 During the late eighteen hundreds a further advance was 
made with the introduction of centrifug;ll machines. The "massecui te1111 
leaving the last vacuum pan could now be subjected to high-speed 
rotation in finely perforated metal baskets, whereby the separation of 
molasses from crystallised sugar could be completed. 
The above developments notwithstanding, sugar yields per sugar canes 
crushed had not been markedly increased. What had been achieved was an 
9 Except where otherwise specified, technical descriptions of 
sugarmills operating between the mid-1800s and World War II have been 
drawn from N.Deerr, The History of Sugar. 2 vols. London: Chapman & 
Hall, 1949; Fraginals, Sugarmill.; and G.A.North Coombes, The 
Evolution of Sugar-Cane Culture in Mauritius. Port Louis: General 
Printing & Stationery, 1937. 
10 In Mauritius the average output per sugarmill more than trebled 
during the two deacdes 1843-1863, after vacuum pans and evaporators 
were introduced on a wide scale (North Coombes, Evolution). Multiple-
effect evaporators were introduced with the effect of fuel- and 
labour-saving, and the average working day was shortened 
(A.H.Adamson, Sugar vi thout Slaves. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1972, p.187). 
11 Literally '~cooked mass" . 
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increase in sucrose recovery from the available juice; it required the 
arrangement of a series of mills in tandem to raise the amount of juice 
extracted from sugarcane. . This innovation of the late nineteenth 
century, and the introduction a few decades later of shredders and 
lmives to the mill house, made a significant impact on sugar recovery. 
By the time these foregoing developments had had their effect in the 
. 
sugarmill, a rrumber of critical qualitative changes to the sugarmill's 
workforce had taken place. In the first place there was the replacement 
I 
of slaves by wage-labourers. Another crucial transformation was the 
elimination of the sugar master, for 
Until then production had depended on the technical 
expertise of the sugarmaster, but the very word 
"sugarmaster" betrays its feudal origins. These masters 
had operated within the limits of traditional functions 
known as "mysteries", which only professionally 
experienced initiates could penetrate. Large-scale 
production required that the veil that concealed his own 
proces~ 2of production from a man's eyes should be torn away ••• 
in those regions affected by the presence of these masters, who were 
"the despair of mill owners11.13 Their place was taken by scientifically 
trained sugar chemists. And in response to the installation of vacuum 
pans there surfaced the pan-boiler whose skills were, ironically, 
acquired by sensory experience. 
Quantitatively, the immediate needs for unskilled manual labour tended 
to grow as each increase in the volume and tempo of production was 
effected.14 So the sugarm.ill, which once had a small troop of people 
12 Fraginals, Su§mnill. p.61. 
13 Ibid. 
14 This general growth was not even. Australian sugarmills were never 
as labour-intensive as other colonial sugarmills, and sugarmills in 
Mo~bique employed twice as many labourers as Zululand sugarmills in 
the early twentieth century (SASJ 1 :1 (1917), pp.299-309, and 
1 :2(1917),pp.135-139). See also F.Maxwell, Modern Milling of Sugar 
Cane. London: Norman Rodger, 1932, p.309. 
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working the mills and supervising the crushing and processing 
procedures, now had a workforce which included manual labourers and 
their overseers, skilled artisans and their foremen, pan-boilers, as 
well as sugar chemists. 
This brings the historical sketch to shortly before.World War II, when a 
relatively large sugarmill producing sugar for direct consumption would 
typically have functioned as follows:15 the entire sugarmill is 
accommodated in a single building complex comprising the cane house 
where sugarcane is unloaded; the cane carrier house protecting the cane 
carrier; the mill house; the boiler house (and if bagasse is used as 
fuel, a bagasse store house); the sulphur and liming house·; the 
clarification house; the filter-press house; the evaporator house; the 
vacuum pan or boiling house (which is distinct from the boiler house); 
the centrifugal and crystalliser house; the sugar dryer and store house; 
and the power house. The arrangement of such a sugarmill is depicted in 
Figure 7, which shows an elevated pan floor beneath which are situated 
the centrifu@3.ls. 
Sugarcane arriving at the sugarmill is crushed and the juice flows from 
beneath the mills, along a sloping gutter, and into a strainer where 
trash ("cush-cush") is removed. The juice then passes through measuring 
or weighing equipment in order to record accurately the amount of 
sucrose about to be processed. Lime is now introduced to the juice as a 
reagent, and sulphur is used as a bleaching and coagulating agent. 16 
15 This description is taken from L.A.Tromp, Machinery and Equipment o:f 
the Cane Sugar Factory. London: Norman Rodger, 1936, passim. Only the 
most im!X)rtant stages in the process are outlined and no reference is 
made to condensing equipment, boilers, the various ty_pes of pumps 
used, the various carriers and elevators, the scales, imbibation 
equipment, or the intricacies of pan-boiling such as the re-
introduction of run-off from first boilings. 
16 Deerr, History. p.578 has details on the use of sulphuring and 
liming. 
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FIGURE 7: 1000-TON SUGARMILL, BRITISH DOMINIONS, c 1935 
(Reproduced from L A Tromp, Machinery and 
Equipment of the Cane Sugar Factory. London: 
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After the juice and lime-milk mixture has been heated in juice heaters 
to about 100°c, it goes into defecators and/ or settling tanks where 
insoluble impurities are partly eliminated. Sulphitation or 
carbonatation processes are then used to further clarify the juice.17 
Thereafter the juice enters filters containing various filtering media. 
The last stage of filtration is completed by using animal or vegetable 
char. Now the juice is pumped first into the evaporators, where sucrose 
is concentrated by a continuous process, and then, as syrup, into the 
vacuum pans where the sucrose is crystallised in discontinuous batches. 
17 The relative costs (including wages) of these two processes were 
calculated. by H.C.P.Geerligs, Practical Vhite Sugar Manufacture. 
London: Norman Rodger, 1915, Chapter 6. 
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The contents of a vacuum pan are boiled under reduced· pressure until 
they reach a critical degree of concentration. The pan is then 
"grained" or "seeded" by the introduction of some form of seed crystal. 
These crystals absorb sucrose and their size thus increases. Once full 
of concentrated sucrose crystals the pan is ready to be emptied. By 
means of a "strike" the "massecui te" is discharged from the pan into 
open crystallisers where cooling is hastened by mechanical stirring. 
This cooling promotes the growth of crystals and ensures higher sugar 
recovery. Therea£ter the massecuite passes into the centrifugals, and 
following that the sugar crystals are purged of any remaining molasses. 
Finally the sugar is dried and then packed. 
Technological refinements have proceeded apace since World War II, with 
attendant changes in occupational categories: the craft of sugar-
boiling, for one, has over the last two decades been practically 
dispensed with, following automation in the sugarmills of the world's 
leading sugar producing countries. But the most distinctive feature of 
the post-War sugarmill is not so much automation as the scientific 
research that precedes technological change. This latter development 
has had a far-reaching effect on the division of labour. in sugarmilling 
as well as on modes of control. 
Although many technological advances are based on the cumulative ideas 
of anonymous sugarmilling personnel, many of the earlier inventions were 
made by individuals who were immortalised in the annals of sugar making. 
So, for example, Charles Howard is attributed with the invention of the 
vacuum pan in 1813,18 and Norberto Rillieux invented -the evaporator in 
18 Deerr, History. p.559. 
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1840.19 Rewards for innovat~ons were paid by milling bodies and 
occasionally by other agencies: the chemist Dutrone was reported to have 
been paid 600) li vres by the French government in 1792 for his improved 
method of purification;20 and there is documentation of commissioning 
and rewards in the British Caribbean colonies.21 Research and 
I 
development have since been taken under the mantle of the larger 
national and mutinational corporations, notably Tate and Lyle,22 or 
they proceed at research institutions which have been established in 
most leading sugar producing countries. Research results are 
disseminated in a number of specialist journa'.ls and at local or 
international conferences - a far cry from the disparate investigations 
of yesteryear and the arcane practices of the sugarmaster. An entirely 
new field of work has thereby been appended to sugarmilling, adding a 
corps of permanent scientists to the total sugarmaking workforce, and 
modifying once again the division of laboUI'.23 
Furthermore, the division between technical experts and manual labourers 
means very often a division between settlers or expatriates on the one 
hand, and the local populace on the other. Because racism has reigned 
19 Rillieux had a tragic history in that he, "A free man of 
color ••• revolutionized sugar production in Louisiana by his work on 
sugar machinery" (E.D.Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll. New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1972, p.390), yet he was forced into exile in Paris 
"when the slights to which his African ancestry exposed him 
determined" (Deerr, History. p.566). 
20 S.T.McCloy, French Inventions of the Eighteenth Century. Lexington: 
University of Kentucky Press, 1952, p.80. 
21 Ragatz, Fall of the Planter Class. p.62 ff. 
22 See G.L.Beckford, "The Economics of Agricultural Resource Use and 
Development in Plantation Economies", Social and Economic Stuaies 
18: 4 ( 1 969), pp. 321-34 7; and L. Turner, Multinational Companies and 
the Third World. London: Allen Lane, 1973, passim. 
23 It is of incidental interest to note current research into small-
scale processes accessible to and manageable by relatively unskilled 
groups of owner-operatives. See for example D.J.C.Forsyth, 
"Ap:r;>ropriate Technology in Sugar Manufacturing", World Development 
5:3\1977), pp.189-202; and G.B.Hagelberg, "Appropriate Technology in 
Sugar Manufacturing - A Rebuttal", World Development 7:4(1979), 
pp.893-899. 
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prominently in the ruling class ideologies of sugar-producing countries, 
these divisions have been accentuated in methods of exploitation and 
control. To some extent these divisions are also indicative of the 
relative :superiority of some sugar-producing countries in the fields of 
training and research; that is, sugar experts from countries which are 
most advanced in these fields are found in the upper echelons of 
sugarmill staffs in many so-called Third World countries. In these 
latter countries, where the means and feasibility of autonomously 
creating a training and research infrastructure are sometimes non-
existant, a condition of dependency is fostered such that in the 
perhaps extreme case of the Nzoia sugarmill in Kenya, a huge deficit in 
the 1978/79 season was attributed to "abnormally'' high salaries paid to 
expatriate technical personne1.24 
From Plantation to Industrialised Sugarmilling in Natal: 1850-1905 
Colonial Natal's first sugarmill, that established by Morewood, ·was in 
February 1852 a simple affair incorporating a small hand-operated mill 
and an iron pot for boiling less than fifteen litres of juice at a 
time.25 The crushing mill, which had been imported to Natal in 1851, 
was kept in motion by four African workers.26 The juice issuing from 
the mill was collected in buckets which were then emptied into a cast-
iron pot standing over an open fire. The syrup in the pot was manually 
stirred and cleared of scum as it evaporated and converted into sugar. 
During 1852 the mill's driving gear was altered to permit the 
substitution of animal power for human effort,27 and the sugarmill was 
24 Africa Economic Digest 1 :6(1980), p.12. 
25 W.C.Holden, History o:f the Colony o:f lfatal.. London: Alexander Heylin, 
1855' p.300. 
26 R.F.Osborn,Valiant Harvest: The Founding o:f the South African Sugar 
Industry 1848-1926. Dur ban: SASA, 1 964, p. 1 9. 
27 KC, M 32741, Marshall Campbell. 
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further improved by the installation of three iron boilers, inter 
alia.28 A contemp:::>rary description had it that 
the sugar manufacturing house was a respectable 
building, substantially built, and covered with 
galvanized iron ••• 
at the back of which four Kafirs are seen turning the 
crushing-mill, each being at the end of a long arm, to 
which it is designed to attach a creature with four legs 
instead of two, when the works are more complete. One 
man also appears putting the canes into the rollers, and 
a boy is taking them out after they have been pressed. 
From these rollers a spout is placed, through which the 
saccharine flows into a vessel inside the house, and is 
thence taken to the boilers, where, after having passed 
through its various processes, it is placed in the 
coolers, the molasses are 2?Jn off, and a beautiful 
crystal sugar remains behind. 
By 1859 there were 16 oxen being used, a pair at a time, to turn the 
three rollers from which juice "flows along zinc gutters in a thick 
puddly stream into the boiling house" .:JJ The techniques em ployed in a 
slightly modified contemporary sugarmill, that of William Jo;Yner, were 
more fully described thus: 
The crushing machine was drawn by cattle-power. The 
juice was run off into an iron tank and then into pans 
(5 in all) and the fire made under all of the pans and 
in the smallest pan the syrup boiled until the proper 
consistency for sugar. The syrup was skipped from one 
pan to another. When the smallest pan of syrup boiled 
to the proper consistency it was put into lead trenches 
and then put into boxes with holes and these were 
drained over the treacle tank. Now the other pans of 
syrup were skipped in the first small pan and boiled. 
The boys were kept busy skipping over the syrup and 
removing the scum while boiling and throwing it away. 
They used what they called "a brush". A piece of wood 
shaped like an oar with a-l:ong pole handle and that used 
tq help to skip the syrup from one pan to another. The 
flow of syrup had to be supervised as the pans could 
only take a small quantity at a time. As one pan was 
emptied, more syrup was allowed to flow in. The scum 
was removed with a tool made like a very large spoon 
with holes in it. The wet sugar was allowed to drain 
out until it was a beautiful yellow sugar. It was dug 
out with spades and spread out to dry until ready to 
28 Holden,Colony of Natal, pp.298--299. 
29 Ibid., pp.290 and 297. 
30 A.F.Hattersley, The Natalians: Further Annals of Natal. 
Pietermaritzburg: Shuter & Shooter, 1940, p.81. 
bag. There were two bags needed, the outer and inner 
bags. The outer bag was made from a flay rush plaited 
together and was called a "Vacuum bag''. [ :> J The inner 
bag was like a coarse hessian and was called a "Gunny 
bag''. The two bags were put together and the sugar was 
put into the gunny bag and sewn up and then the vacuum 
bag was sewn up. These were loa~ed on to an ox-wagon 
and sent to an agent .•• in Durban.) 
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Disregarding the few wateI'- and tread-mills, which in any event lapsed 
quickly into obsolescence and eventual disuse, sugg.rmills erected during 
the 1850s and 60s reflected the confidence and ambitions of their 
owners. Each planter millep. his own cane and al though built so soon 
after Morewood's simple sugarmill, theirs were technologically far 
superior to his prototype. For instance, in 1855 steam-driven 
centrifugals had been installed at the Springfield Sugar Estate,33 and 
in 1856 a complete steam mill was imµ::>rted into the colony.34 . Besides 
the appearance of steam engines and centrifugals, juice clarifiers, 
Wetzel evaporators, and other novelties were also introduced by Natal's 
sugarmillers during the 1850s and '60s. 
According to an estimate made by Babbs in 1856, a sugarmill containing 
a steam engine, three batteries, and six centrifugals, would have been 
appropriate for a 200 acre plantation. In order to prepare the land for 
sugarcane cultivation on this estate, a manager, 6 white ploughmen, 6 
black "drivers" (or foremen), 6 black span leaders, 6 black pugglers (to 
clear the ploughs), arid 24 additional black workers were deemed to be 
( 
required. During the first cutting season a sub-manager would be taken 
on, and thereafter he and the manager togetner would administer the 
31 This should undoubtedly read ''Vacoa bag", referring as it does to the 
type of cane bBB. which originated in Mauritius. 
32 SASJ 30:12(1946), p.635. 
33 Osborn, Valiant Harvest. p.52. According to A.Coqui, Practical 
Remarks on the Colony o:f Batal. London: Effingham Wilson, 1857, p.19, 
these centrifugals reduced the time taken to make sugar from 3 weeks 
to 24 hours. 
34 SASJ 32:2(1948), pp.73-79. 
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entire estate.35 While this was a conjectural estimate, Babbs' former 
estate actually had in 1866 the personnel employed at the wage rates 
shown in Figure 8. Plainly skill divisions were few in the plantation 
sugarmill. The most significant material di visions were that between 
African and Indian workers, and that between the manager and his 
assistant, on the one hand, and seasonal employees on the other. 





138 INDIAN WORKERS 
plus RATIONS 
50 AFRICAN WORKERS 
plus R~TIONS 
ANNUAL WAGES 









Source: Trustees Report on the State of Insolvent Estates ••• , 
Durban, 1866. 
A particular pattern was evident in the spatial deployment of the 
workforce in the larger sugarmills. Morewood's sugarmill had been an 
indoor/outdoor establishment, yet on a simple enough scale to be easily 
supervised by a single person. Later sugarmills had their various 
operations partitioned off from one another or separately housed. Hence 
Robinson's interest with three of the sugarmil1s which he visited in 
1870: 
The millhouse [of Mrs Isabelle] is one of the very few 
in Natal where one can see the whole operation of cane-
crushing and sugar-making carried on under one roof. M 
Collard [the manager] has pulled down all partitions, 
35 Coqui, Practical Remarks. pp.38 ff. 
and standing in front of the, engine - a beautiful 
machine by the way - the eye takes in at a glance 
battei:.~, coolers, wetzels, centrifugals, and drying 
house."° 
148 
William Campbell's sugarmill was also then under one roof,37 and 
similarly at Canonby 
The mill-house is a model of orderly arrangement, the 
whole process being carried on under one open roof. In 
a corner on a raised galle~tands the vacuum pan, the 
first erected in the colony. 
The positioning of the above-mentioned vacuum pan on a raised gallery 
was the first step taken towards the vertical expansion of the 
sugarmill. Subsequently evaporators and centrifugals were also elevated 
and the boiling house was situated on a platform above the level of the 
mills. Full advantage of gravity could thus be taken to convey 
massecuite and sugar in the final stages of processing. This vertical 
expmsion also meant that the'workforce was deployed in such a wey as to 
necessitate a more elaborate system of supervision than that which was 
to be found in the smaller sugarmills. 
The 1 ITTOs were characterised by extensive experimentation. During that 
decade a rrumber of su.g3.rmills were for example fitted with "concreters", 
which enabled them to turn out a compacted substance containing all the 
molasses usually expelled from sugar. Another case of unsuccessful 
experimentation·in the 1870s was the use by some of the smaller millers 
of imµ:>rted Samson or Croncher mills and evaporators.39 The futility of 
these ventures notwithstanding, the techniques of suga.rmilling were in 
general greatly improved during the decade, principally by virtue of 
vacuum pan technology. In 1870 there were three sugarmills fitted with 
36 J.R.Robinson, Notes on Natal: An Old Colonist's Book for Nev 
Settlers. Durban: Robinson & Vause, 1872, p.13. 
37 Ibid., p.57. 
38 Ibid., p. 1 07. 
39 Osborn, Valiant Harvest. ~im. 
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these, and by 1873 vacuum pans were to be found in 12 Natal 
sugarmills.40 
While.many of the small su~mills did not have the technical attributes 
referred to above, the larger ones had crushing capacities way in excess 
of cane available on respective plantations. Various other factors, not 
least of which were certain millers' ineptitude or 
undercapitalisation,41 contributed to make the largest ones the nucleus 
of a centralised sugarmilling system. It was not a coincidence then 
that 1878, the year in which the first successful centralised SUg3.rmill 
began crushing at Mount Edgecombe, also marked the peak in the number of 
sugarmills in Natal. The construction of the Mount Edgecombe su~mill 
signalled a turning point then in both miller/planter relations and in 
technological advance. It represented the beginning of the transition 
from plantation to industrial sugarmilling. 
However, as well disposed as they may in general have been to mak:lng 
alterations to their plant, there is at least one report that not all 
sugarmillers in Natal had the scientific acumen and inclination needed 
to optimise the use of this plant or to initiate significant changes 
themselves: from responses to a questionnaire administered in 1885 the 
conclusion had been drawn that 
The Natal sug3.r planter appears heretofore to have been, 
on the whole, a plodding mortal not aspiring to exact 
methods, to fractional figures or too many scientific 
tests, he has been content as a rule to put in his cane 
much as his neighbours did, he treated his cane crop 
with as much science as he devoted to his sweet potato 
crop; he hauled his cane crop and crushed it by methods 
more or less primitive and expensive, and as a whole the 
small miller and the grower is not4~uch in advance of what he was some 10 or 15 years ago. 
40 SASJ 1:2(1917), p.CJ7, 1:10(1918), p.733. 
41 See Osborn, Valiant l!3farvest. passim. 
42 W.Y.Campbell, The Natal Sugar Industry. Durban: P.Davis & Sons, 1885, 
p. 11 • 
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What needs to be taken into account, when confronted by such ambiguity 
over the question of the nineteenth century sugarmiller's status as 
innovator, is that while individual plantation owners may well have been 
"pre-scientific" in their approach to technology, the owners of .the 
larger sugarmills certainly kept up with the momentum of change in 
global sugar technology by bringing to Natal whatever machinery was 
currently available abroad. Put another way, technological change had 
occurred in Natal's larger plantation sugarmills, but it owed more to 
exogenous influences than it did to inspiration or sound technical 
I 
knowledge amongst colonial sugarmillers. 
Apart from the ambiguous status of the sugarmiller in the realm of 
scientific research and application, there was also little change being 
effected in the organisation of the sugarmill's workforce to suggest 
that the plantation system was on the wane. Two outstanding features of 
the plantation were its system of labour organisation - labour intensive 
work performed by f!J3IlgS of unskilled workers - and its almost unitary 
workforce - sugarmill and field workers interchangeable and a very small 
minority of skilled employees tied to the sugarmill exclusively. The 
former feature had its origins in a system of exploiting unfree labour 
under coercive surveillance, and the latter mirrored the fact that 
despite an incipient dualism towards the end of the nineteenth century, 
between fields and sugarmill, the plantation was organised around 
labour-using rather than labour-saving principles. What technological 
change did occur in the plantati.on sugarmill could be reduced to two 
essentials - the replacement of men by mechanical motive power, and the 
stepped-up output and quality of sugar by means of wetzels, vacuum pans, 
and centrifugals - but neither was necessarily intended to nor had the 
result of pruning the workforce. Indeed, although its organisational 
1 51 
principles continued to reflect the operation of a plantation system, a 
number of additional occupational divisions had arisen in the sugarmi11 
by the mid-1880s. Since these new divisions were to be seen primarily 
amongst managerial and skilled personnel they related to white rather 
than black employees. In 1885 the complement of white personnel on a 
Natal sugar plantation, and their wage bill, were typically made up as 
shown in Figure 9. 
rICURE 9: WAGES or WHITE SUGAR PLANTATION STArr IN COLONIAL 
NATAL, 1885 
MANAGER £200-600 pa plus house; one or two 
horses, stabling and 
feed; at least one black 
servant 
SUB-MANAGER £10-20 pm plus the above perquisites 
OVERSEER £8-12 p111 plus some but not 
necessarily all of the 
above perquisites 
MILL MANAGER £10·15 pm plus some but not 
necessarily all of the 
above perquisites 
ENGINEER £10-15 pm plus some but not 
necessarily all of the 
above perquisites 
SUGAR BOILER £10-20 pm plus some but not 
necessarily all of the 
above perquisites 
Source: W Y Cafll>bell 0 'l'he Na~al SUgat Industry. Durban: 
P Davis & Sons, 1085, Appendik IX. 
The transition from the plantation to the centralised sugarmill was, in 
the first instance, reflected in technology rather than in work 
relations. In other words, the newly emerging division of labour in the 
late nineteenth century sugarmill rested on the organisational 
-principles of the plantation but at the same time embraced categories of 
work and modes of supervision born of the industrialisation process. 
This observation is borne out by a document pertaining to the first 
successful centralised sugarmill at Mount Edgecombe. The manuscript is 
reproduced verbatim, from the original by a Mauritian manager, in Figure 
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rIGURE 10: MOUNT EDGECOMBE SUGARMILL 'S PRODUCTION COSTS, c 1900 
Estimation approximatively of Coast price for One Ton of Sugar Manufactured at Mt Edgecombe Mill 
This expenses calculated by 26 days of work per month 








250 Coolies at 1/ " 
JO 1/6 II 
20 • 21 " 
about 
" 
rood for Hagass mules and keep in good order the Hagass Carts 
Unforseen at £20 per month 
Making 10 Tons sugar per day Expenses beilllJ £2).8.9. Shall 
be for one Ton say £2,4.0. 
At this amount I added for repairs machineries £2000.0.0 
£ 
£ 








12 10 0 
2 5 0 
2 0 0 
1Z 0 
n o 
23 e 9 
upon a Crop of Tons 2000. Say for one Ton£1, or per day for 10 Tons 10 0 O 
Say £JJ,10.0. Coast price for 10 Tons of Sugar 
Now: Crushing ten Tons the share for the Mill will 
or 4 Tons at £14 the Ton say •••••••• £ 56. o.o 
Expenses for 10 Tons as over •••••••• £ 33.10.0 
Profit for the Mill per day 
Manufacturing 10 Tons £ 22.10.0 
I will obser(?) you that this amount of £2000,0.0 for 
repairs the machineries & is very high. 
Nows As Saccharine Estate belong to the same Cpy than 
Mt Edgecombe the price of ten Tons of Sugar at £14. 
equal. 
Expenses for manufacturing 10 Tons £ 3J 10 ti 
Cutting & loading for 10 Tons the man at /1 a day 14 5 0 
Carting for 10 Tons. 14 Carts at 10/. 4 days 2B 0 0 
Int(?) Manager & asst. " " 2 12 0 
Net profit for the Company by ten tons of Sugar 
from Saccharine Estate Sugar Cannes. 
I believe, if my figures are correct that the Cpy 
has a profit to continue to crush Saccharine 
Estate Cannes, as bad she are. 
Yours obediently 
(signed) Henry Ouboisee 
Source: KCH, '2762, Sir f·1arshnll Campbell. 
t JJ 8 9 
£ 140 0 0 
78 7 0 
£ 61 1J 0 
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10. Especially noteworthy were the divisions between skilled workers 
(all Mauritians) and undifferentiated Indian workers - a legacy of the 
plantation; and the separation of field accounts from those of the 
sugarmill, and the discrepancy between sugflrmill and field wages - both 
signs of industrialisation in progress. 
The Centralised Sugarmill in the Making: 1905-1914 
The beginnings of centralised sugarmilling in Mount Edgecombe implied a 
large outlay on mechanical and processing plant. By the early 1890s, 
most sugarmills had phased out open batteries and Wetzel evaporators and 
already employed double crushing and vacuum pans,43 but Mount Edgecombe 
embodied even grander devices, notably its 6-roller mill, the first in 
Natal. As Table 3 shows with r~f erence to· Tongaat, another early 
sugarmill to install a 6-roller mill, the consequences of enlarged 
milling capacity were impressive. What the investment of capital in 
centralised sugarmills had initially brought about was a gulf between 
the small, technologically circumscribed plantation SUgflrmill and the 
large, technologically progressive sugarmill. In the former, the limits 
to technological change were mainly functions of capital for by ~11 
accounts their owners had been enthusiastic innovators where new 
machinery was concerned. 44 
Within the larger sugflrmills the division of labour was quite consistent 
with that outlined by Maxwen.45 A process complementary and related to 
43 SASJ 1:2(1917), p.97. 
44 See P.Richardson, "The Natal Sugar Industry, 1849-1905: An 
Interpretative Essay'', Journal of African History 23:4(1982), pp.515-
527. 
45 F.Maxwell, :Economic Aspects of Cane ~ Production. London: Norman 
Rodger, 1927, Chapter 11, outlined the division of sugarmill labour 
in selected regions, the Hawaiian model being similar to the Natal 
case. 
TABLE J: EffECT or ENLARGED MILLS ON SUGAR RECOVERY 
AT TONGAAT SUGAR CO, EARLY 1900s 
AVERAGE 
MILLING PLANT CANE TO SUGAR 
1899-1905 6 rollers 15,30 
-1907 9 rollers 13, 15 
-1909 11 rollers 10,06 
-1921 16 rollers 9,77 
Source: TAD, K39, Vol 5, Company Submission to Sugar 
Inquiry Commission, 1922. 
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the division of central sugarmill labour was that whereby the regimen of 
work was being changed, mainly with a view to raising productivity 
without incurring the costs of improved technology or increased wages. 
By the early years of the twentieth century some of the larger 
sugarmills were worked in two shifts in order to crush continuously 
around the clock during the cane-cutting season. In some cases extra 
men were added to mill feeder, boiler and centrifugal gangs to 
facilitate shift work by allowing always one out of every ten labourers 
to be at rest.46 At Mount Edgecombe, for example, before the 
introduction of twelve-hour shifts in 1908, the working day of sugarmill 
personnel began at about 3 a.m. and ended at about 7 or 8 p.m •• 47 And 
until about 191 O, there were general attempts being made by sugarmillers 
to lengthen the working day of unskilled and semi-skilled workers.48 
46 Protector of Inmigrants, Report for 1900. 
47 SASJ 10:12(1926), p.785. 
48 M.Tayal, "Indian Indentured Labour in Natal, 1890-1911 ", Indian 
Economic and Social History Review 14:4(1977), pp.519-547. 
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An apt entrhe into the centralised industrial sugarmill, and the 
peculiarities of its occupational hierarchy, is available in the form of 
a diary kept during the construction of one of these at Sezela. 49 The 
diarist, E.Camden Smith, was responsible for construction which began on 
the eve of World War I. Once the sugarmill was functioning he was to be 
Sezela's chief engineer. In the initial stages, eighty Africans and 
thirty Indians dug foundations and laid concrete, while six white 
artisans applied their skills to other immediate objectives, including 
the erection of brick cottages which would eventually be their own 
accommodation. The di vision of labour by skin colour/ skills p~esented 
no qualitative change from the plantation arrangement, nor did the 
location of the white workers' cottages on a hill overlooking the black 
workers' barracks which were adjacent to the low-lying site of the 
sugarmill. In addition to residential separation, and also in keeping 
with the plantation system, whites and blacks received differential 
forms of payment such that all Africans, irrespective of expertise or 
productivity, were paid 35/- a month, while whites were paid according 
to their respective trades ranging from 10 /- per dey for the handyman to 
18/- per d.ey for the bricklayer. 
By exercising close supervision, the diarist was able within a few days 
of the beginning of cement-laying to achieve some economy in the use of 
labour. His initial success in terms of raising productivity must have 
been offset though as a result of subsequent altercations with workers. 
Exactly a month after the first shovels of sand had been dug he 
encountered 
5.6.1914 Trouble with [African] gangs at breakfast 
time. Want Saturdays off. Palaver. Agreed to do weekly 
task of 75 barrels [of cement, presumably] to each gpng. 
Lungele. Blacksmith did a bunk at dinner time ••• 
In afternoon, one carpenter was taken off foundation 
49 E.Camden Smith, "Diary of Construction ISEZELA May 1914 - May 191611• 
work & put on to finish native barracks, lack of 
accomodation[~~c] having been one of main causae belli 
this morning. 
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It is not clear when or under what circumstances the workers left the 
site, but within three weeks of this confrontation the African workforce 
had been halved, and the diary read 
26.6.1914 Labour supply short:- 40 men (i.e. 4 gangs) 
concreting (all of whom clear out when their daily task 
is finished at about 1.0 P.M.); 18 at stonebreaker; 6 
bringing; sand; 6 or so odd jobbers; about 12 unloading 
cement.:n 
Demands on the white workers had by this time also increased and both 
carpenters daily worked overtime. These labour difficulties were 
conveyed to Crookes, and a few days later an extra gang of Indian 
workers was taken on, only to strike (with about six Africans) and be 
dismissed within the week. 
His necessary pre-occupation with labour gave way from about this time 
to a greater concern with the minutae of mechanical plant installation, 
and here we take leave of the diarist. Once the sugarmill was 
functioning, it obviously did so with a qualitatively different and much 
expanded workforce. :But the rules of stratification remained unchanged. 
Topped by the engineer himself, the personnel pyramid had a broad base 
comprising unskilled black workers and an intermediate layer of white 
artisans. Newly inserted into the hierarchy were the process staff -
pan-boilers, chemists, and overseers. The occupational hierarchy aside, 
the engineer here personified the transformation from the plantation to 
the centralised sugarmill - in him was vested complete authority over 
sugarmill erection and operation, over technology and operatives. 




the relative importance attached to milling over processing. Engineers 
dominated within the sugar mill's occupational hierarchy, and all the 
more so because improved sugar recovery was still generally a 
consequence of increased milling efficiency rather than contingent on 
chemical control. 
Responding to Global Crises: 1914-late 1930s 
World War I disrupted the supplies of mechanical plant and chemicals to 
Natal,52 and in any event expenditure was generally circumscribed by the 
war-time restrictions on sugar sales. When the restrictions were lifted 
in 1919, most sugarmillers gave vigorous attention to technological 
change.53 
The more important technological changes were made at the extraction 
stage of the production process. Most sugarmills had their mills 
adapted to cope with the Uba variety of cane. Uba, valued for its 
resilient qualities in face of local climate and crop pests, was far 
more fibrous and of smaller diameter than other varieties.54 This 
necessitated special grooving in mill rollers as well as elaborate 
arrangements of milling tandems, usually to incorporate at least one 
single or double crusher before the mills themselves. Largely because 
oi the ubiquitous cultivation of Uba then, milling tanderhs commonly 
included one or two sets of knives before the crushers, and sometimes 
shredders between the crushers and the mills. In the largest sug,armills 
this combination of knives, crushers, shredders, and milling train was 
52 Osborn, Valiant Harvest. p.107. 
53 R.F.Osborn, "Sweet Concord", unpublished ms. 
54 A.McMartin, "The Early Days of the Natal Sugar Industry, with Special 
Reference to the Introduction of Varieties", Proceedings, SASTA 
22(1948), pp.83-89; and G.S.Moberly, "The Replacement of Uba by New 
Variety Canes from 1936 to 1944", Proceedings, SASTA 19(1945), pp.29-
34. 
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duplicated so as to have two tandems operating simultaneously. The use 
of two tandems, which gave the advantage of reduced breakdown or 
overhaul time, was later taken up in other large sugarmills. Within a 
milling tandem there was thus a range of mechanical devices and 
attendant workers to be maintained and controlled. 
While the exµinsion entailed in making these changes went on beneath a 
single roof, the sugarmill retained its compartmentalised structure of 
sequential "houses" and allied workshops as reco;rded by Tromp.55 
However, whereas in 1870 the absence of partitions had meant that the 
entire sugarmill was conveniently placed under the purview of the owner 
or manager, each "house" or workshop now had its own foreman or 
overseer. In other words the arrangement of the various sugarmilling 
departments was paralleled by a spatially organised system of 
surveillance over machinery and personnel; a system for which the 
engineers were ultimately responsible. 
The role of the engineers as custodians of machinery and its operatives 
was still based on labour-using rather than labour-saving principles. 
Although by the time the sugar industry began to respond to the lifting 
of war-time restrictions in 1919 most sugarmills were worked in three 8-
hour shifts instead of the earlier two of 12 hours each,56 this did not 
mean that the intensity of labour-use was declining - it implied in some 
cases a renewed attempt to lengthen the working day in that a worker had 
to work every second shift. Despite the tempo of new investment in 
mechanical plant, manual work was still regarded as an important 
component of the production process. Thus, for example, the view was 
still held in some quarters that 
55 Tromp, Machinery and :Equipnent. 
56 SASJ 3:4(1919), p.239. 
the old, if expensive method of hand feeding is 
undoubtedly the best. By hand feeding may be secured 
that even... supply of cane which makes for regular 
crushing. ~if 
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As far as the training of workers for more skilled positions was 
concerned the approach taken by sugarmillers was quite consistent with 
the image they had gained for themselves, during the colonial period, of 
' being ready spenders on new plant, but inept exponents of scientific 
principles. There had certainly been no place for skill training in the 
indentures period, nor were _migrant workers ever considered worthy" -of 
expenditure in this respect. As the em_ployers saw it, 
the practice of natives returning to their homes after 
only four months of continuous labour makes it difficult 
to impart useful training to ~em and to depend on them 
as a source of labour supply.' 
Nevertheless some few - invariably Indian - workers had learnt skills in 
the nineteenth century sugarmills which stood them in good stead after 
the expiry of their indentures. These exceptions apart, the Board of 
Trade and Industries had in 1926 detected a generally "inefficient" use 
of labour by sugarmillers, and related it to the way in which "the 
executive minds of the industry have not entirely thrown off a certain 
bias in favour of low-paid labour and a consequent tolerance of its 
shortcomings". The Board also recommended that more apprentices be 
taken on, especially "sugar men11.59 Two decades later another Board of 
Trade and Industries Report made reference to the lack of training 
facilities in the sugar industry for operating personnel and exeeutive 
staff, and an unfavourable reliance on Mauritius and :Wuisiana in this 
regard. 60 In the interim, the conditions of the Fahey Agreement had 
57 R.F.Hutcheson, "The Milling of Uba Cane in Natal", SASJ 10:3(1926), 
pp. 165-171. 
58 KCM, 32759, Sir Marshall Campbell, File 10, Natal Sugar Association 
(Private). 




created the need for trained planters' chemists. 
The 1926 Fahey Agreement gave rise to the need for some fifty cane-
testers and laboratory assistants. This the sugarmillers did not 
initially see as their problem - in fact, whether they realised it or 
not at the time, they stood to benefit from the source of technologists 
that the planters' cane-testing service would provide. What was at the 
time of growing concern to sugarmillers was chemical control; although 
not yet universally applied, it was by the time of the world sugar 
crisis in the mid-1920s generally recognised for· its important 
contribution to improved final recovery. Thus when the demand was 
created for planters' chemists, sugarmillers took the opportunity to 
collaborate to a very limited extent in the establishment of common 
training facilities for sugar house apprentices and cane-testers, the 
limitation being that they were reluctant to make any expenditures 
towards the scheme. 61 
The basis for the planters' cane-testing service was laid by the Moberly 
Report of 1927, which recommended a hierarchy of personnel comprising 
supervising chemists earning £25 per month, testers earning £12 or more 
per month, and "young reliable Indians" as laboratory assistants earning 
£4 per month plus rations.62 A four-year course was inaugurated in 1928 . 
to provide theoretical training for sugar hous~ personnel and cane-
testers during the annual off-crop. The SACGA employed two lecturers to 
give the course at the Technical College in Durban, and 45 students were 
registered, 12 from the milling com_p3Ilies and 33 SACGA employees.63 The 
students who joined the scheme, and those that succeeded them in the 
61 See for example A.Hammond et al South African Cane Growers' 
Association: The First 50 Years. Durban: SACGA, 1977, p.82. 
62 SASJ 11:3(1927), pp.147-149. 
63 Proceedi.ng;3, SASTA 2 ( 1928), p. 7 4. 
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following years, were not certificated on completion of their course of 
studies,· but they were encouraged to write the sugar technology 
examinations of the City and Guilds of London Technical Institute. 
Whatever their degree of success in their theoretical education (very 
few ever passed the London examinations) the candidates were seasonal 
employees who received either half of their normal wages or no pay at 
all during the off-crop. Their few prospects for promotion offered no 
consolation. 
Moreover, when promotion came it did not necessarily imply a bright 
future. As a chemist lamented in 1927 
the life is a hard one with plenty of work and very 
little comfort or society at most sugar factories. 
Twelve hour days - or even six hours on duty and six 
hours off of strenuous monotonous work seven days a week 
is the rule, and the climate often far from heal thy or 
bracing, and the moderate pay' for all exupt the more 
responsible posts, is no great recom:p3nse. 
Nevertheless, the sugarmills were obviously relatively more appealing 
c 
for qualified cane-testers than work in the growers' c'ane-testing 
service. By 1930 already 22 men had left the cane-testing service for 
the sugarmills.65 Despite this flow of qualified testers into the 
sugarmills, the deterents to prospective sugar house personnel loomed 
large and in 1935 the president of SASTA niade the suggestion that "The 
industry itself will have to train such men, first catching them young" 
and then also providing work for them during the off-crop.66 
The significance of the sugarmillers' concern with the recruitment of 
sugar house personnel was that the question of chemical control and 
64 H.H.Dodds, "The Sugar Manufacturing Industry: General Review from the 
Standpoint of a Chemist", SASJ 11 :1 (1927), pp.43-49. 
65 ''Report of Committee on Training of Sugar House Apprentices", 
Proceedi.n&3, SASTA 4 ( 1 930) , pp. 1 08-11 0. 
66 "President's Address", Proceedings, SAS'rA 7(1935). 
162 
contingent improvements in sugar -recovery had taken on similar 
importance to expanded milling capacity. Having re-assessed their 
priori ties in this way, and having then also weathered the depression 
during the early 1930s, sugarmillers were poised to review their 
thinking on the utilisation of labour. 
While the new-born imperative of chemical control necessitated an 
increase in the number of laboratory and sugar house personnel under the 
supervision of chemists and factory overseers, respectively, 
possibilities for marginally reducing the number of workers employed in 
the mill house were presenting themselves. Control over prime movers , 
could be taken from the hands of individual drivers to become 
increasingly centralised and electrically operated. A case in point was 
the Mount Edgecombe sugarmill where electrically driven mills were first 
put to use in the early 1930s.67 This made possible centralised control 
of. the milling train, and a single operator was thus able to start up or 
stop the entire milling tandem. The need for labour to oil the mill 
engine was at the same time almost eliminated. 68 
The spur towards a systematic policy of labour-saving in the sugarmills 
was provided by anticipated legislation for an 8-hour day which, as the 
president of SASTA noted in his 1937 address, would make it necessary to 
reduce labour costs. 69 
67 Natal Mercury 15. 6. 1932. 
68 J.B.M.Godfrey~ ''Electrical Activities of Natal Estates", Proceedings, 
SASTA 8(1934J, pp.103-128. 
69 "President's Address", Proceeding3, SASTA 12(1937). 
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The Sugarmill during the War and the Post-War Period of Expansion: 
late 1930~ 1962 
For the period until 1940 there is only fragmentary material available 
on the di vision of sugarmill labour, some samples of which have been 
displayed above. An obstacle to generalisation from such data is the 
lack of uniformity among sugarmills: each comp:my had its own approach 
to management, and not all owners were equally forthright when it came 
to divulging information about comp:my operations.70 Furthermore, the 
quantitative aspect of the division, in terms of the numbers of 
employees in the various categories, remained obscured. The year 1940 
did not herald a new dispensation as far as the publicity of company 
information went; rather, it was workers who had to be attributed with 
precipitating an outpouring of relevant information. 
The two years leading up to the time in 1942 when the first Wage 
Determination was made for the sugar industry represented a vital stage 
in the history of the sugar industry. In November 1940 the Natal Sugar 
Industry Employees' Union (NSIEU) appealed to the Department of labour's 
Wage' Board to conduct an investigation into the wages and conditions of 
employment of sugarmill workers. The Wage Board responded positively 
and immediately to the plea. Employers and the NSIEU alike were 
canvassed for recommendations regarding wages and occupational 
descriptions, giving the Union the opportunity to press for higher 
wages, especially for assistant pan-boilers (who in smaller sugarmills 
70 The Board of Trade and Industries, Report N~ 66, Report on the Sugar 
Industry~ 1926, observed how experimental information was "jealously 
withheld". Another illustration of this secrecy was the practice of 
not revealing the names of sugarmills in any technical reports. The 




reported directly to factory overseers or managers), platen hands, motor 
vehicle drivers, head sirdars and indunas, and unskilled workers. The 
employers' requests ran counter to those made by the NSIEU. 
The sugarmillers were clearly intent -0n having the 1942 Wage 
Determination embody occupational categories and qualifying clauses that 
would depress wage minima as far as possible and, hold as many workers as 
pos~ible close to the absolute minimum. One aspect of this ambition was 
seen in the attempt that was made to have all workers north of the 
Tugela river paid less than others; an attempt, that is, to exploit 
labour according to its regional abundance or scarcity, and level of 
vulnerability. Umfolozi wa8 satisfied by being the only company 
permitted to pay lower wages than elsewhere on the grounds (identified 
by the sugarmill) that they used uneducated labourers with a low 
standard of living in a region where Indian workers, being malaria 
intolerant, could not be expected to work. Although the Wage Board 
entrenched the divisive connotations of the regional location of the 
sugarmill in this way, no sugarmillers were suqcessful when they 
attempted also to obtain permission to pay lower wages during the annual 
off-crop. 71 
Off-crop employment was a particularly contentious issue as various 
categories of skilled as well as unskilled sugarmill employees were 
affected by the seasonal nature of their work. The most valuable 
employees in the eyes of their employers, might have been paid during 
the off-crop to do maintenance work, but others were put on half pay or 
they went unpaid during that time. Indian sugarmill workers were 
sometimes given field work to do during the off-crop, and in the case of 
71 House of Assembly, Annexure N~ 60, 1943. 
ZSM & P, 
The Indians have shown a special aptitude for the work 
of malaria control, which, moreover, fully and 
profitably occupies· their time during the off-season. 
Indian employees often become very skilled at laboratory 
work, but the fact that in the past inter-crop 
employment of an unskilled nature could only be found 
for them has obscured and detracted from their value as 
employees. The important sanitary work of malaria 
control offers a welcome solution to this problem.72 
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The differential levels of security engendered by this practice were 
generally eliminated when the Wage Board ruled against the practice. 
Nevertheless African workers remained in the persisent situation of 
insecurity characterising all migrant African wage labour throughout 
South Africa. 
One area which was virtuallly neglected in the course of the Wage 
Board's inquiry and subsequent negotiations was the discriminatory 
sexual di vision of sugarmill labour. Nothing was done about white women 
employed as clerks in the sugarmill office, who were consistently lesser 
paid than their male counterparts, nor about Indian women, who were more 
severely discriminated against in their capacity as manual workers. 
·· Indian women had in some cases around the turn of the century been used 
as conveyors~. carrying bagasse to the boilers.73 They were subsequently 
employed to do less arduous manual work, most commonly the mending, 
cleaning and bundling of sacks, for which their wages were now 
institutionalised as the lowest 'of all workers with the exception of 
juvenile males. 
The negotiations were followed by an objection stage, without input from 
the NSIEU, before culminating in the 1942 Wage Determination.74 In the 
72 W.Buchanan, "Inter-Crop Malaria Control by the Laboratory Staff at 
Empangeni", SASJ 26:6(1942), p.307. 
73 Illovo Digest (March, 1973), p.22. 
74 House of Assembly, Annexure N? 16, 1943. 
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interim, the NSIEU achieved a victory, hard-won in September 1941, which 
led to the award by Illovo, Tongaat, Huletts, Crookes Bros., Natal 
Estates, Gledhow-Chaka's Kraal, and Hulsar, of a minimum 10/- per month 
wage for adult male labourers and 5/- per month for women and youths.75 
As far as the analysis of the division of sugarmill labour is concerned, 
the Wage Board gathered some imp::>rtant, formerly withheld, information 
from the twenty three sugarmills investigated on the eve of the Wage 
Determination. This information, shown in Table 4, exposed for the 
first time the quantitative features of the sugarmills' workforce. 
The Wage Determination had very direct consequences for the technical 
division of sugarmill labour. Mount Edgecombe's chief engineer had no 
doubt that 
the question of labour-saving devices [was] passing 
through the minds of many factf6Y executive staffs, 
especially the engineering staff. 
As an example he made the prophetic observation that 
In many instances in this country, milling tandems have 
from three to four steam engine-driven mills, and in all 
instances each engine is operated by an engine driver. 
By central control al~these engines could be operated 
-by one or two drivers. 
Labour-saving now stood at the forefront of owners' and managers' 
thinking about technological change. The internal re-arrangement of the 
sugarmill emerged as a high priority in this regard. It was not 
something which could be effected either easily or cheaply, but its - ,-
potential was vast: in one instance where machinery was re-arranged 
during the 1940s, the resultant labour-saving was of the order of 90 
75 Daily News, 12.9.1941; Natal Mercury, 12.9.1941. 




TABLE 4: DIVISION or SUGARl-IILL LABOUR BY RACE, GENDER AND AGE: ND\'Ef.1BER 1940 
WHITES AFRIC4NS INDIANS COLOUREDS A11erage Monthly Gross 
\'I age (including 
Males Females Males Females Males Females Males Females TOTALS rations and ouarters) 
A J A J A J A J A J A J A J A J WHITES OTHERS 
Foreman 189 3 1 193 £. 40.11.2 £. 26. o.o 
Assistant foreman 8 8 37. 4. 7 
Chemist 40 40 37. 8.5 
Assistant Chemist 20 3 2 1 26 25.14.0 12. o.o 
Bench Chemist 1 1 8. 0.0 8. o.o 
Artisan 345 56 51 63 4 16 1 536 28. 1.8 7. 3.9 
Executi11e Staff 17 17 73. 8.10 
Clerical 57 2 16 2 77 
cfl:9.14.6 
~ 12.13.11 
Storeman 5 3 8 26. 0.0 5.18.4 
Compound Manager 4 4 39. 5.0 
Pan Boiler 45 5 1 23 8 82 26. 9.4 10.10.0 
Crane Dri11er 21 21 23.13.4 4.11. 7 
factory Clerk 1 1 47 44 3 96 11. o.o 5. 6.11 
locomotive Driver 60 60 27. 1.6 
Handyman 18 8 21 3 50 22. 7.2 6.10.3 
Printing hand 1 1 4. 8.11 
Motor Driver 1 7 23 1 32 25. o.o 5. 0.11 
Head Sirdar 4 4 7. 9.11 
Boiler Attendant 17 1 1 18 25. 9.6 12.10.0 
Cube Maker 2 2 22.15.0 
Grade I e11"4>loyee 14 64 336 4 418 24.12.1 4. 7.11 
Grade II ef1'4>loyee 1 1445 20 14 1237 95 7 2 809 20. o.o 3. 7.4 
Labourer: Male A 14863 hJ84 6 247 3. 4.6 
Male J 146 219 365 2.11;3 
female J 48 51 1.19.8 
956 6 660 3 519 31 11 166 -
Source: House of Assembly, Annexure No 16, 1943. 
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workers.78 Other changes were less dramatic in their immediate effect, 
but jointly they had im!X)rtant consequences for numerous positions in 
the occupational hierarchy. 
Regarding technological change at the extraction stage first, World War 
II had interfered with endeavours to modernise the mills ~y interrupting 
the supply of imported machinery, 79 but after the War, and especially 
since the 1950s, many mills were renovated. Mills which had crushed for 
decades were replaced,tn and turbine mill drives made their appearance 
in the mid-1950s. 81 
The problem of keeping the milling tandem supplied with cane, and that 
of automating the milling operations, were tackled by engineers with 
growing effecti vi ty particularly since the early 1960s.82 Automatic 
cane carriers had first appeared in the 1950s,83 and at Darnall, for 
example, where it was considered necessary by engineers to automate the 
feeding of cane knives, so long as a few instrumental oddments were at 
hand, the cane knife feeding operator became dispensable. That is, 
With the aid of a few relays, second-hand spares from 
the centrifugal machines and a Hagan boiler control 
unit, a device was engineere~to perform the duty of the 
cane knife feeding operator. 
For these ever resourceful engineers, 
78 ''Labour-Saving Devices (Factory)" (Committee Report), Proceedin__gs, 
, SASTA 21 (1947), pp.75-79. 
79 Board of Trade and Industries, Report N? 298, The South African Sugar 
Industry, 194 7. 
80 At Darnall, for example, the two tandems of 2-roller crushers and 4 
mills which had been installed in 1905 were replaced in 1950 by one 
· tandem (J .B.Grant, "The New Darnall Milling Plant", Proceedings, 
SASTA 29(1955), pp.33-37). 
81 G.W.Hedgecock, "Natal's First Turbine Mill Drive", Proceedings, SASTA 
28(1954), pp.41-45. 
82 See M.Matic, "Sugar Manufacture in South Africa", SASJ 58:5(1974), 
pp.235-241. 
83 J.R.Gunn, "Automatic Cane Carriers", Proceedings, SASTA 32(1958), 
pp.68-71. 
84 D.J.L.Hulett, "Miniµiisation of the Human Element in Milling", 
Proceedings, SASTA 34 ( 1960), pp. 57-62. 
The remaining problem of the feeding of the tandem lay 
in the diligent loading of the auxiliary cane carrier 
and this has been solved ~emporarily by employing a mo§e 
intelligent type of Indian to supervise the cane yard. ? 
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By these changes and the introduction of a ''killer plate" to control the 
flow of cane into the cane knives, it was possible to eliminate 18 
workers, or "six uni ts of labour on each shift, namely - two top roll 
boys, three engine drivers and one cane carrier driver".86 
Automatic control of mill engines, when first achieved at Umfolozi in 
the 1961 /62 season, implied the reduction in the number of workers at 
the milling tandem from six to two per shift, a saving that is of twelve 
workers' wages.ffl Apparently aware of both the link between automation 
and unemployment, and the number of years it would take for the 
financial benefits of labour-saving to be felt, Umfolozi' s chief 
engineer announced the innovation with the following qualification: 
No matter how well trained the operators may be, they 
are only human and their thoughts and actions are not 
tuned to their tasks every second of every hour of their 
shift; they have lapses and it is during this period 
that things usually gp wrong. Their job is a monotonous· 
one, eyes fixed on an ammeter or revolution counter or 
some other instrument and their hand on a wheel which is 
turned back and forth for eight hours. 
It is said that the requirements of good milling is a 
steady supply of cane into the mill with no 
interruptions. It is the operator's task to see that 
these interruptions do not occur, and if this onerous 
job could be takeggout of his hands then a great deal 
has been achieved. 
At the clarification stage, the combination of sulphitation and plate 
and frame filtration which had been in general use since the mid-1920s 
underwent change:89 from the early 1940s plates and frames were 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid. 
'OT G.G.Ashe, "Automatic Milling Control", Proceedings, SASTA 36(1962), 
pp.65-68. 
ffi Ibid. 
89 ''President's Address", Proceedings, S~A 50(1976). 
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eliminated, and then sulphitation too was replaced so that between 1953 
and 1967 all the sugarmills had installed in them a new method of 
defecation by labour-saving rotary filters.90 And on the pan floor, by 
1950 coil type vacuum pans had been replaced in Natal by calandria 
pans, 91 al though the technique of pan-boiling had not changed as such. 
Technological change and the general trend towards automation in the 
sugarmill created new demands for artisan$, while the position of sugar 
house personnel ~as modified. On the question of artisanal training in 
the sugarmills, it is noted that in 1948, the establishment within the 
ambit of the Department of Labour of the Apprenticeship Committee for 
the Sugar Manufacturing and Refining Industry formalised existing 
practices and introduced a measure of statutory control over conditions 
of apprenticeship. Initially apprenticeships could be served in the 
following trades: blacksmith; bricklayer and plasterer; carpenter; 
coppersmith; electrician; fitter and turner; motor mechanic; moulder; 
sheet metal worker; and welder.92 In 1954 boilermaker was added to the 
list and coppersmith, plumber, and sheetmetal. worker deleted.93 Further 
additions were made in 1960: the trades of diesel fitter; fitter ·and 
machiner; instrument mechanician; and turner and machiner.94 Thus the 
trade of fitter and turner, excised from the list in 1960, was. 
fragmented into two substantive areas of specialisation. 
Changes in the range of trades for which training and employment could 
be provided in the sugarmills reflected the direction of technological. 
change on the one hand and, less obviously, the changing status of 
90 ''President's Address", Proceedings, SASTA 52(1978). 
91 C.G.M.Perk, "Coil and Calandria Vacuum Pans", Proceedings, SASTA 
26 ( 1952)' pp.48-53. 
92 Government Gazette, 16.1.1948, 30.9.1949, and 28.4.1950. 
93 Govermnent Gazette, 15.10.1954, and 31.12.1954. 
94 Government Gazette, 9.9.1960. 
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certain artisans on the other. Some t.rades, such as those of the 
blacksmith, bricklayer, carpenter, moulder, or welder, and particularly 
those excised in 1954, offered little prospect for promotion beyond the 
rank of artisan. Artisans in those categories would generally have 
remained for their entire working lives in their respective departments. 
By contrast electricians could attain some seniority in the occupational 
hierarchy by becoming chief electrician. Before World War II the ,fitter 
and turner had the even greater prospect of possibly rising to the 
position of chief engineer. Sugarmill artisans entering the industry 
after the War were doing so in a climate of diminishing possibilities 
for promotion above artisanal rank, al though they did not share equal 
I 
occupational status which wage schedules alone might have led one to 
believe - foremen and supervisory artisans were implicitly drawn from 
certain, machinery-related trades, usually fitting and turning. 
When quantitative aspects of artisanal training in the suga.rmills are 
investigated, a picture of qualitative weakn~ss emerges. The number of 
operative contracts of apprenticeship in the sugar industry had 
increased from 57 in 1950 to slightly more or less than 100 in the late 
1950s.95 Few of these apprentices ever submitted themselves for trade 
tests, and fewer still passed the tests. 
On the question of training for laboratory and sugar house personnel, 
the difficulties which employers had experienced in the inter-war period 
led them to review the practice of recruiting whites only as trainees. 
It was observed by the South African Sugar Technologists' Assoc~ation 
(SASTA) president in 1946 that process and laboratory personnel in the 
sugarmills were unqualified for work in any other industry.96 There 
95 Annual Reports, De~nt of Labour. 
96 "President's Address", Proceedings, SASTA 20 ( 1946) •. 
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appeared, in addition to the seasonal nature of the work and its limited 
career opportunities, another dimension to what was considered to be the 
problem of attracting satisfactory candidates for laboratory and sugar 
house work. By the early 1950s the sugarmillers' demand for trainees, 
who were implicitly white, had dropped considerably. By the same time 
some sugarmill laboratories were staffed by Indians. It is not clear 
exactly to what extent the cheaper Indian workers precipitated the 
diminished demand for white trainees by the sugar comp:mies, nor for 
that matter to what extent the supply of white trainees WflS staunched by 
the knowledge that Indians were being employed as laboratory staff. It 
is in any event clear that the presence of Indian workers in the 
laboratories was at the time regarded to be a reason for a reluctance by 
whites to undergo training.97 Thus racial considerations - the 
relatively greater exploitability of Indian workers by employers and the 
avoidance by whites of work done by Indians - affected the demand for 
and supply of white trainees. 
On the grounds that the quality of trainees forthcoming was 
unsatisfactory, SASTA eventually recommended to SASA that the 
technologists' course be discontinued. The proposal was accepted by 
SASA and the course was suspended in 1953.98 Past experience led SASTA 
to advise that consideration be given to re-starting the course only if 
candidates could be assured of improved conditions of work, salaries, 
and promotional prospects. When in 1959 the course was re-introduced, 
it was designed to train milling company employees as factory overseers -
and to equip them for eventual promotion to the position of chief 
chemist or process manager, and to enable graduates to take up work 
97 Discussion of C.van der Pol, "Technical Education in the South 
African Sugar Ind us try", Proceedings, SASTA 36 ( 1 962), pp. 1 5-17. . 
98 "Report of the Technical Education Committee", Proceedings, SASTA 
33 ( 1 959), pp. 7-8. 
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f 
outside the sugar industry if they so desired. This post-1959 training 
was intended then for milling comµmy employees, with SACGA no longer 
involved in the issue. Since 1957 the City and Guilds examination was 
no longer set, and the new course was taught, examined, and certificated 
by the Sugar Milling Research Institute (SMRI) in conjunction with the 
NSMA. A junior certificate was made the minimum required standard of 
schooling for applicants for the 3-year course. The rate of graduation 
from the course was regulated by having only one group of students 
taught in a 3-year cycle. Only 8 of the first 23 students graduated and 
10 out of the next batch of 12.99 
By .1959 sugarmillers' interests in the provision of technical training 
and the elevation of the standards of that training had become causally 
linked with the process of technological change in their sugarmills. 
Millers had been formerly virtually inactive when it came to providing 
theoretical training for their personnel. They had been fortunate to 
have rich sources of immigrants which they could tap to suit their 
needs, and training was treated as an organic phenomenon, to be gained, 
rather than provided, on the job. 
The ramifications of labour-saving policies and technical training on 
the division of sugarmill labour may be seen on the schedules produced 
in the 1942 Wage Determination and in the agreements reached by the 
Industrial Council since its registration in 194 7. The primary 
divisions observed in the wage schedules were between skilled, semi-
skilled and unskilled employees. Another significant division could be 
inferred between those employees covered by the schedules and those 
excluded, namely factory managers and chief engineers. These latter 
99 J.P.N.Bentley, "Interim Report on Technical Education", Proceedings, 
SASTA 37(1963), pp.8-11. 
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superordinate employees are dealt with in Chapter 6, and here 
consideration is g~ ven only to the employee categories covered by the 
schedules. 
The first points to be made are that between 1942 and 1961 there were 
few instances of skilled and semi-skilled categories being re-divided, 
and tha~ the occupational hierarchy was not substantially changed. 
Neither point is too remarkable given the nature of sugarmilling - a 
processing rather than an assembly operation - and the limited time-span 
in question. Figure 11 serves as a point of reference for discussing the 
more important of the changes that did occur. 
The fragmentation of categories reflected on the wage schedules can be 
conveniently discussed in terms of five groupings. Firstly attention is 
given to the unskilled categories, Groups I and II and Labourer, which 
although they were most fragmented, are not specified in the 
accompanying figure. The rrumber of Grade I jobs was doubled while the 
Grade II jobs were increased by '20% over the two decades under review. 
The six Grade I occupations isolated in 1942 - evaporator operator, mill 
engine driver or roller control operator, and sirdar or induna - were by 
1961 added to by the inclusion in this category of first-aid attendant 
and laboratory attendant, three railway related functions, and two 
operative jobs. The last two additions were linked to technological 
change, while the laboratory attendant had risen in status from Grade 
II. He, the laboratory attendant, now had a Grade II assistant to help 
him in preparing samples and making and recording certain measurements 
and readings, with the limitation that the assistant did not do any work 
which required the use of burettes or pipettes. The relatively few 
additions to Grade II, such as jobs involving the opening and closing of 
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rIGURE 111 WAGE DETERMINATIONS or THE INDUSTRIAL COUNCIL roR SUGAR HANUrACTURING ANO REflNING INDUSTRY1 
RANKING or SELECTED JOB CATEGORIES IN THE 1942, 1949, 1953 and 1961 DETERMINATIONS 
1942 1949/1953 1961 
Chemist Shift engineer Shi ft engineer 
factory overseer rectory overseer 
Chief storekeeper Chief storekeeper 
Chemist Chemist 
Compound manager Compound manager 
f oteman or Shi ft engineer Artisan or mechanic Assistant chemist (certificated) 
Qualified sugar pan boiler Artisan or Mechanic 
Assistant chemist (certificated) Qualified sugar pan boiler 
Artisan or Mechanic Qualified assistant overseer Qualified assistant overseer 
Qualified male clerk Assistant chemist (qualified) 
Assistant chemist (qualified) Qualified male clerk 
Qualified male clerk Maintenance worker Maintenance worker 
Compound manager Locomotive driver Locomotive driver 
Qualified sugar pan boiler Boiler attendant Boiler attendant (qualified) 
Truck repairer Truck repairer 
Assistant chemist Qualified female clerk Boiler attendant (unqualified) 
Assistant foreman/shift engineer 
Locomotive driver 
Boiler attendant Qualified tester j Qualified female clerk 
Qualified tester Qualified asst sugar pan boiler Qualified tester 
Qualified female clerk Qualified crane driver 
Handyman 
Building worker Grade II 
Weighbridge attendant 
Qualified asst sugar pan boiler Motor vehicle driver Qualified asst sugar pan boiler 
Qualified factory clerk Qualified factory clerk Qualified crane driver 
Qualified crane driver Head sirdar/induna Handyman 
Head sirdar/induna Building WDrker Grade II 
Weighbridge attendant 
Platen hand. Platen hand Motor vehicle driver 
Qualified factory clerk 
Head sirdar/induna 
Motor vehicle driver Qualified Grade I employee Platen hand 
Handymr.n 
Building worker Grade II 
Qualified Grade I employee Grade II employee Qualified Grade I employee 
Gr::idG II employee Adult labourer Grade 11 employee 
Adult labourer Female sack mender Adult labourer 
Female sack mender Juvenile labourer female sack mender 
Juvenile labourer Juvenile labourer 
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cocks and valves under supervision, drilling holes, fence erection and 
repairs, and attending to carbonatation tanks, char kilns or bagasse 
balers, hardly reflected ongoing fragmentation as such. Perhaps the 
most significant of additions to Grade II was, in 1947, that of 
"artisans assistant/handyboy''. The category "labourer" was a residual 
one in all the schedules, and subdivided according to workers' age -
above or below 18 years - with the only distinctive designation being 
that of female menders, cleaners, and bundlers of sacks. 
Secondly, the factory clerk designation was changed.- In 1942 this 
person might have been charged by a chemist, storekeeper, or compound 
manager with such multifarious tasks as checking theJarrival and 
departure times of workers, or interpreting and translating languages; 
or he might have been a weighbridge attendant. The weighbridge 
attendant €Fl.ined recognition in his own right in the 1947 schedule and 
he also earned a higher wage than the factory clerk. If the following 
description is anything to gp by the justification for his promotion was 
not difficult to find: 
The work may not require a high degree of skill, but it 
involves a considerable amount of responsibility. 
Nowadays [in 1940] in addition to weighing and 
calculating nett weights and keeping weighbridge books, 
the operator is expected to recognise mixed cane, and to 
draw attention to consignments marked with the wrong 
variety, and to observe all cases of spilled cane, and 
to report any other unusual conditions. With 
weighbridges near the carrier weighing is nearly 
continuous, and twelve hours is too long a shift. In 
many cases the work is left in the harids of 
inexperienced men not considered good enough for other 
work, or juniors, or Indians not-of the most reliable 
tyJ:>e ••• 
Some modern scale houses ••• are dirty, draughty, 
overcrowded, poorly lit and badly ventilated shacks. 
Sometimes they have no floors, usually no ceilings, and 
being made of unlined corrugated iron are either 
unbearably hot or uncomfor~~ly cold. No man can work 
well under such conditions. 
1 COJ.S.Moberly, "Some Notes on Weighing Practice in Sugar Manufacture", 
Proceedings, SASTA 14 ( 1 940), pp. 125-1 34. 
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Thirdly, there is the division of artisans' tasks to be considered. In 
1942 the ''building worker, grade II" was already listed, and in 1947 the 
"handyboy" and the "handyman" were introduced as Grade II and semi-
skilled workers respectively, and the maintenance worker as a skilled 
employee. The ''building worker, grade II" was defined as "an employee 
engaged in erecting houses or accommodation exclusively for occupation 
by non-Europeans". The handyman's work involved "general repairs and 
maintenance of site, buildings, plant equipment, and the making of small 
accessories appertaining thereto". The maintenance worker, al though not 
qualified as such, was nevertheless expected to do work similar to that 
of an artisan. During the off-crop he could be employed to do artisanal 
work for 1 5% less than an artisan's wage. Remembering that qualified 
artisans commanded one of the highest wages paid to sugarmill employees 
it is clear that the presence of these various unqualified surrogate 
artisans effectively lowered the cost of artisanal work, while the 
status of the white artisan was effectively raised by his having 
assigned to him an assistant "handyboy" to do the more menial work.101 
Fourthly, there is the noticeable increase of suffixes to certain job 
categories, which was related to the differentiation of trained and 
untrained personnel in especially the processing side of su.g:u'milling. 
Besides these four most obvious areas of fragmentation, the figure is 
also indicative of a few changes in the occupational hierarchy. Most 
noticeable are the relative loss of status of the tester, for unclear 
101Some employers were adept at manipulation in order to lower the costs 
of artisanal work without falling foul of the Industrial Council's 
regulations: during 1955 it was found that "coloured labour" was 
being used to repair cane trucks in an open field outside Renishaw 
sugarmill's workshop; the employers claimed that the work being done 
was of an agricultural rather than industrial nature (AEU Monthly 
Journal and Report 305 (April, 1955), p.95 ). 
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reasons which may have been related to the debated status of laboratory 
staff in general; and the elevation of the compound manager, whose 
position is discussed in Chapter 6. 
Scientific Management in the Sugermills: the Post-1962 Period 
A senior Natal sugar technologist reflected in 1962 that 
Natal had its own crises - the labour crisis, which led 
to the. introduction of Indians, the dearth of 
technicians and engineers, which led to the introduction 
of Mauritians and Scotsmen, and mo~~ic disease, which 
led to the introduction of Uba cane. 
It is surprising that he did not find the problem of domestically 
training the.required personnel critical enough for inclusion in this 
list. Sugarocrats had time and ~gain been berated in state inquiries 
into the su~ industry for their lack of attention to training and for 
their inefficient deployment of personnel. 
Now in the early years of the post-sugarocratic period, with export 
earnings having swelled enormously, nine of the sugarmilling companies 
I 
made large contributions to the Industrial Fund for Assistance to 
Private Schools during the early 1960s. The money would be used in 12 
schools, mainly to establish and equip laboratories.103 This initiative 
to generate a greater supply of trained scientists in Natal was 
complemented by the provision of scholarships to cover science OT 
economics courses at the University of Natal. Sugarmillers were now 
addressing the training issue with unprecedented directness, responding 
to a critical shortage of technicaJiy-skilled personnel which faced the 
entire South African economy. 
1 02Proceedings, SASTA 36 ( 1 962), p. 9. 
103"0pening Address", Proceeding3, SASTA 36(1962). 
179 
New importance was attached to the training of process personnel. Since 
1964 the SMRI, now on behalf of and in conjunction with SASMA, paid and 
trained white candidates for the diploma in sugar technology which would 
make them eligible for appointment as chief chemists or assistant 
process managers. The inability to attract sufficient white candidates 
forced a revision of the scheme so as to offer courses also to Indian 
students. 
Similarly, the training of artisans in the sugarmills was reviewed in 
the 1970s. With country-wide shortages of skilled labour worsening, the 
sugar com:p3Ilies turned their attention for the first time to systematic 
artisanal training. As Table 5 shows, sugarmill apprentices doing trade 
tests before this revision of training policy had fared well below 
average. What the data suggest is that an apprentice in a sugarmill 
could previously have expected training that was nothing short of 
unsystematic. The transformation brought about through the sugar 
com:p3Ilies' training schemes showed up the backwardness of the sugarmills 
as a training ground for artisans during the.sugarocra~ic era. 
Initially organised as a training school for white artisans, the Sugar 
Industry Training Centre at Mount Edgecombe subsequently had its doors 
opened to Indian and African students. In mid-1979 the Centre had 79 
white, 120 Indian, 17 "coloured", and 52 African trainees on its books. 
Although most were preparing to enter the sugarmills as skilled or 
semi-skilled artisans, 31 of the 268 students came from companies not 
engaged in sugar production.104 
Just as they had extended artis8..nal training to black workers, so were 
the sugar companies obliged to accommodate African trainees for process 
104SASJ 63:7(1979), p.313. 
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TABLE 5: SUGARMILL APPRENTICESHIPS, 1960s AND 1970s 
NEW OPERATIVE SUCCESSFUL CANDIDATES AS 
PROPORTION OF THOSE 
DOING TRADE TESTS 
1959 30 101 2/16 
1960 34 107 4/34 
1961 22 104 0/11 
1962 19 97 3/29 
1963 16 98 1/12 
1964 34 104 2/26 
1965 45 113 3/27 
1966 28 101 17 /21 . 
1967 28 113 4/19 
1968 32 131 1/27 
1969 28 126 3/41 
1970 22 110 5/29. 
1971 36 117 3/36 
1972 35 116 - 7/36 
1973 36 125 6/29 
1974 30 126 13/31 
1975 73 159 13/30 
1976 66 188 23/45 
1977 52 174 27/48 
1978 32 153 56/81 
1979 47 122 57/71 
Source: Annual Reports, Department of Labour. 
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work due to the poor response from white and Indian candidates. A 
scheme was hatched to train African students in sug:i.r technology from 
1981, at the newly established Mangosuthu Technikon in Umlazi. A 
contribution of R150,000 was made by SASMA towards this latter Anglo 
American sponsored institution, and the African sugar technology 
students were to be employed and sponsored by individual sugar 
companies. This extended training scheme encompassed a two-tiered 
structure of certification, enabling a student to graduate after 3 years 
with a diploma in sugar technology, or after 2 years with a certificate 
in sugar technology which was intended to prepare shift supervisors and 
assistant chemists. A matriculation with passes in mathematics and 
science was made the entry requirement for the various courses offered 
under the auspices of the Natal Technikon (whites), the M.L.Sultan 
Technikon (Indians), and Mangosuthu Technikon (Africans). Between 1964 
and 1978, 75 of the 168 white and Indian students enrolled for the 
courses graduated, only 6 of them stopping at the certificate level.105 
Tables 6 and 7 reflect the outcome of their training. 
It has been suggested that one reason for the institution of formal 
training for artisans and sugar house personnel in the pos1i-sugarocratic 
period was a general shortage of suitably skilled workers. A related 
factor was the growing need for operatives to attend to new machinery in 
the sugarmill. The expansion of management by professionals in th~ 
pos1i-sugarocratic period went hand-in-hand with the development of a 
more scientific approach to the efficiency of processes and personnel in 
the sugarmill. Within that context the technological advances of this 
period did not simply create the pre-conditions for training programmes, 
but were treated as being contingent upon access to satisfactory labour 
105H.F.Wiehe, "Activities of the Training Division of the SMRI - A 
Seventeen Year Review", Proceedings, SAS'rA 55( 1981), pp.59-61. 
TABLE 6: GRADUATING SUGAR TECHNOLOGISTS, 1964-1978 
Source: 
WHITE INDIAN TOTALS 
1964 10 10 
1966 9 9 
1968 6 6 
1970 3 3 
1972 8 8 
1973 6 7 13 
1974 5 1 6 
1975 2 5 7 
1978 7 6 13 
56 19 75 
H F Wiehe, "Activities of the Training 
Division of the SMRI - A Seventeen Year 
Review," Proceedings, Sou'th African Sugar 
Technologis'ts' Association 55 (1981), PP 
59-61. 
TABLE 7: GRADUATES EMPLOYED IN TH[ 
SUGAR INDUSTRY, 1981 
Mill Manager 3 
Process Manager 9 
Assistant Process Manager 25 
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Technological change in the post-sugarocratic period implied the 
introduction of automated and electronically controlled machinery into 
every stage in the sugar-making process. A revolutionary development in 
the extraction stage of sugar-making was reached by the use of diffusers 
in place of or in accompmiment with mills, first in 1964 at Dal ton, and 
by 1978 in 9 other sugarmills.106 This innovation was more decidely 
based on technical rather than labour-saving imperatives. It was an 
innovation which made possible both the automation of the entire process 
of sucrose extraction, and also the guarantee of steady conditions in 
that process which would "radically improve the possibility of the 
pans man producing a better quality sugar" .107 In 1970 fast clarifiers 
were introduced, and overall the efficiency and speed with which 
clarified syrup was supplied to the evaporators was greatly 
increased.108 Another step towards automation was taken in the late 
1970s when continuous vacuum pans were commissioned. Besides being 
relatively easy to automate, these required less attention, and their 
performance was less dependent on human skill than in the case of 
conventional vacwm pans.109 And the centrifugals employed to separate 
crystals from the mother liquid rem~ining after boiling and subsequent 
cooling were also modified. Until the late 1960s batch centrifugals 
were used, these being belt- or gear-driven, from a mutual shaft, or 
water- or electrically-driven. Batch centrifugals were replaced by 
continuous centrifugals which were not only labour-saving, but they 
106W .R.Buck, "Dal ton - South Africa's First Milling Diffusion Sugar 
Factory', Proceedings, SASTA 39 ( 1965), pp.114-121 • The introduction 
of diffusion did not mean that mills were abandonded, but that some 
mills within a tandem were replaced by a diffuser. 
107''President's Address", Proceedings, SASTA 40(1966). 
108Ibid. 




required considerably less maintenance and copsumed less p:>wer.110 
The technological and managerial changes which were sweeping through the 
industry had major implications for the structure of the sugarmill's 
occupational hierarchy. These changes were embodied in the Industrial 
Council agreements. The effects of the trend towards automated 
production were to be seen in the the new categories of semi-skilled 
work appearing on the agreement schedules; and the schedules themselves 
were structured in new ways ·in response to an ostensible 
"deracialisation" of the occupational hierarchy, but more importantly in 
response to ongoing rationalisation. These developments are approached 
with reference to Figure 12. · The figure contains three sample schedules 
including that of 1974, reflecting the first major departure from 
previous schedules; and that of 1981, which was based on the Paterson 
system of occupational grading. 
When the numbered ranking of occupations was introduced in 1974, 
apparently following the lead set by Hulett's and Tongaat, it was 
generally regarded as the "job evaluation agreement" .111 According to 
the 1974 schedule, Rates 1 to 4 applied to unskilled workers, Rates 5 to 
to skilled workers. The advent of Paterson grading in 1979 signalled an 
I 
entrenchment of the system of determining wages according to the 
bureaucratic principles of job evaluation in terms of levels of 
responsibility held and types of decisions ta.ken by each stratum of 
employees. The Paterson criteria are shown in Figure 13. It should be 
borne in mind that the Industrial Council has had no concern for grades 
110See Proceedings, SASTA 52(1978), pafJSim; C.G.M.Perk, "Centrifugal 
Machines", Proceedings, SASTA 27\1953), pp.34-47; and G.N.Allan, 
"Developments in South Africa's Sugar Factory Plant Installations 
1969-1973", Proceedings, SASTA 47(1973), pp.83-99. 
111SASJ 59:11 (1976), p.565. ' 
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FIGURE 121 WAGE DETERMINATIONS or JHE INDUSTRIAL COUNCIL FOR THE SUGAR MANUFACTURING AND REFINING INDUSTRY: 
RANKING or SELECTED JOB CATEGORIES IN THE 1968, 1974, and 1981 DETERMINATIONS 
1968 1974 1981 
Shi ft Engineer Rate: 16 Chemist Gradel CJ Chemist 
Artisan or Mechanic (on shift) factory Supervisor Supervisory Artisan 
factory Overseer Supervisory Artisan 
Chief Storekeeper 
Chemist "' Compound Manager ~ ;:: 
r-
Artisan or Mechanic 15 Assistant Chemist c2 Artisan 
,., 
0 -
Assistant Chemist (certificated) Artisan Boiler Attendant 
Qualified Sugar Pan Bo~ler 14 C1 Locomotive Driver 
Process Assistant 
Skilled Clerk 
Qualified Assistant Overseer Boiler Attendant Pan Boiler 
Qualified Assistant Chemist Locomotive Driver B5 
Qualified Male Clerk 1) Sugar Pan Boiler 
Maintenance Worker Administrative Assistant Tester 
Locomotive Driver Maintenance Worker B4 
Boiler Attendant (qualified) 12 
Truck Repairer 
Boiler Attendant (unqualified) 11 laboratory Assistant BJ Assistant Pan Boiler Process Supervisor Maintenance Worker 
Qualified female Clerk Assistant Pan Boiler Crane Driver 
(Grade I) 
10 Assistant Process Supervisor B2 
Boiler House Assistant 
Tester 
Qualified Tester Assistant Maintenance Worker Assistant Tester 
Assistant Pan Boiler 
9 (Grade 11) B1 
Assistant lester "' Clerk ,., ::i; 
Sergeant I 
'" lluali fied Assistant Sugar Pan Boiler Corporal A3 Routine Clerk :;, a. 
Qualified Crane Driver Overhead Crane Operator Centrifugal Operator c 
Handyman 8 (Grade I) 
z 
"' Building Worker, Grade n Supervisor (Grade I) "' -r-Weighbridge Attendant r-,., 
0 
Motor Vehicle' Driver Chauffeur Bag Sewer 
Qualified factory Clerk 7 leading Laboratory Attendant A2 Watchman 
Head Sirdar or Induna . Mass-Measuring Bridge 
Operator 
Mill Tandem Panel Operator 
Platen Hand 6 Routine Clerk A1 ~ample Carrier 
Grade I Employee 5 Mill Platform Operator 
(manual control) 
Security Guard 
Grade 11 El!l>loyee 4 Centrifugal Operator 
Policeman Messenger 
Labourer J Artisan's Hand 
Bag Sewer 
female Sack Mender 2 Conveyor Attendant 
Messenger (Grade 11) 
Juvenile Labourer 1 Sweeper 
Source: Government Gazette, 1~.11.1960; 2.0.1974; 26,6,1901. 
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D and E. These grades applied to chief engineers and their immediate 









FIGURE 13: PATERSON JOB-EVALUATION CRITERIA 
JOB CATEGORY EDUCATIONAL PRACTICAL 
REQUIREMENT EXPERIENCE 
Unskilled Nil Nil 
Semi-skilled Schooling ( 6 years) In-service training 
Skilled T-echnical Certificate Apprenticeship 
Interpretive Degree/Diploma/"Ticket" Pupillage 
Programming Technical/Business Degree Management 
8 Moor, "Technical Manpower Management - Neglected by 
technologists?," Proceedings, South African Sugar Techno-
logists• Association 56 (1982), pp 68-10. 
I 
With the adoption of new grading systems during the post-1962 period, 
the occupational hierarchy was modified and the differentiation between 
skilled and other employees was greatly revised. When the 1974 
agreement was concluded maintenance workers and "administrative 
assistants", as clerical workers had been re-named, were reduced to 
semi-skilled status. This left eight occupations in the skilled 
category (Rates 1 3 to 16), less than half the number of skilled -
occupations designated in the agreements of the previous decade. A 
range of factors accounted for the diminished size of the skilled 
category. Since 1968 artisans had been elevated in status; and in 1971 
assistant chemists, assistant overseers, and boiler attendants were 
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raised, and clerks relatively down-graded. The trend in progress was 
further to be seen in the re-designation of certain other occupations. 
In 1974 the posts of shift engineer, factory overseer, and assistant 
overseer were replaced by those of factory supervisor and supervisory 
artisan, while lower down the hierarchy laboratory assistants and 
process supervisors were introduced and specially catered for at Rate 
11. In 1979 the positions of factory supervisor and process supervisor 
. were eliminated, and mid-wa;y between their previous respective positions 
there appeared the process assistant. The 1979 agreement also ushered 
out the pan-boiler from the ranks of skilled workers. 
Apart from the above changes in the skilled category, the posts of chief 
storekeeper and compound manager were removed from the schedule in 1974. 
Within the semi- and Un-skilled categories, the surveillance and 
supervisory employees had their spheres of authority more clearly 
defined as the titles induna and sirdar were dropped; clerical work was 
fragmented; and a hierarchy of policemen incorporated. 
What this apparent flux in the post-1962 period represented was, 
firstly, a revision of process operations, secondly a restructuring of 
the engineering department, and thirdly, but least obviously, a movement 
of certain managerial staff beyond the ambit of the agreements. These 
) 
developments were primarily related to technological change and the 
consolidation of the process manager's role from the mid-1960s, and 
to the bureaucratisation of work. 
Technological change and the restructuring of the sugarmills' technical 
division of labour along the above lines acted in combination to raise 
throughput and output levels quite considerably. Between 1952 and 1977 
the number of personnel in all spheres of sugar production per 1000 tons 
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of cane crushed, fell from 15 to 6.112 In the sugarmills specifically, 
their combined 1968/69 crushing capacity of 3100 tons per hour was 
increased to almost 4000 tons per hour in the 1976 /77 season, despite 
the closure of two smaller sugarmills.113 
I 
. The gamut of changes dealt with here - and these are only amongst the 
I ones of greatest magnitude - are seen to have implied expanded 
I 
pro~uctivi ty on the one hand, and the reduction of labour requirements 
and the transformation of tasks on the other. But as far as the labour 
process as a whole went, another more profound_ transformation was in 
progress, that of continuous production. A combination of continuous 
and automated production with the disappearance of artisanal process 
workers opened the way for greater bureaucratic control over· sugarmill 
work. What is more, central participants in that sphere of work were 
caught up in the movement towards bureaucratic control, al though they 
remained essentially technical personnel. The technical writing of 
these technologists, whether chemists or engineers, has served to lend 
clarity in the survey of sometimes complex technological change. Their 
writing has also been indicative of their conscious pre-occupation with 
management or .company objectives. For them the challenge of automation 
and general technological modernisation were met enthusiastically as 
occupational goals. That the elimination of workers from the sugarmill 
was, the .objective or the result of their efforts implied that they, the 
innovators, had positions beyond jeopardy. 
Treated separately, the technical division of labour, technologi~al 
112South African ~ Year Book ( 1976-77) • 
113Ibid. 
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change, and technical training have each historically had their 
respective critical moments: changes in plant and technology are seen at 
times to have followed structural or technical dictates, causally (if 
usually not effectively) unrelated to the_nature of the workforce; 
bureaucratisation wrought changes upon the division of labour which 
might not have been predicated on technolgical change; and technical 
training was seemingly al ways provided under structural rather than 
internal duress. Treated jointly, these three aspects of the labour 
-
process were concurrently brought to a turning point in the mid-1960s, 
as sugarmill labour was re-divided under novel technical (and 
managerial) conditions, and a frontal assault was made on the problem of 
technical training. 
That this critical juncture was reached in the twilight years of 
sugarocratic dominion over the industry serves to confirm the criticisms 
levelled against sugarmillers, from different quarters and at various 
times, for their laggardly approach to scientific applications and the 
development of labour power. That the juncture was reached at all 
speaks of structural exigencies as well as the rise of professional 
corporate management and the harnessing of initially re la ti vely 
autonomous research practices in the industry. The wider implications 
of these developments, and the question of the relationship between the 
occupational hierarchy and the.racial division of labour, are discussed 




THE RACIAL DIVISION OF SUGARMILL LABOUR 
/ 
The whole question of racism is central to the global history of 
sug3.I'milling. Historically, the classification and oppression of people 
in terms of the amount of pigment in their skins has been practised in 
the aftermath of conquest and enslavement, and it has been an integral -
aspect of struggles amongst labouring people over different levels of 
exploitation or debasement in those situations. The ideology and 
practice of racism have been inter-related with certain characteristics 
of the international division of su~mill labour: African slaves were 
transported to the sugar plantations of the Ma.scarenes, the Caribbean 
islands, and the New World in general; skilled "creoles" from Demerara 
and Mauritius found their way to sugarmills on Africa's east coast, 
whence had come their ancestors; plantation ownership and management 
have commonly been in the hands of "whites". Thus have regional and 
cultural idiosyncracies been blended with racist ideology to reinforce 
the persistence of the distinctive occupational structure of 
sug3.I'milling. 
In the case of Natal the f\lndamental division that arose was that which 
saw white sugarmill employees placed in the posts of manager, engineer, 
chemist, artisan and clerk, and black employees in menial labour. 
Another fundamental schism separated Indian workers, who had initially 
come to Natal between 1860 and 1911 under an indenture system, and 
African workers. The need for owners to turn to immigrant indenture 
systems in a recently conquered and relatively populous colony reflected 
the capacity for Africans in Natal to adapt to their conquest without 
having to succumb immediately to the mode of production introduced by 
1 91 
the colonists. 
The objective of this chapter is to provide an understanding of the part 
played by the Natal sugarocracy in the establishment of a racial 
di vision of suga.rmill labour. An introductory passage on the question 
of cheap sugarmill labour sets the scene. Then, after first examining 
the division of black workers during three pre-World War II periods, the 
position of white sugarmill workers before the War is dealt with 
chronologically in two sections. Thereafter an analysis is made of 
internal structural influences on the reproduction of the racial 
division of sugarmill labour which do not lend themselves to strict 
periodisation; principally those associated with occupational mobility 
and inheritance over a number of generations. 
Cheap Sugarmill Labour 
Since the eighteenth century, global sugar production has been carried 
on with a particular labour configuration. While unskilled manual 
labour was intensively used in the fields, the suga.rmill itself became 
increasingly reliant upon skilled labour as sugar technology grew. 
Regardless of the extent of technological dualism between field and 
sugarmill, work in both spheres always implied, primarily because of its 
seasonality, some modicum of rationality in its organisation. 
Overriding all other influences on the configuration of labour was the 
question of the specific classes from which labour came into sugar 
production. Some connotations of the several varieties of labour which 
have historically been put to work by sugarmillers deserve brief 
consideration in order that a context be provided for the discussion of 
the division of sugarmill labour in Natal. 
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Broadly speaking, labour in sugar has taken five forms: namely, slaves; 
"apprentices", engage or enganche labourers, and indentured workers; 
colonos; migratory workers; and proletarian ,workers.1 Each form 
presented owners with particular possibilities and constraints. 
Slavery, it has already been argued, was a system which dictated very 
precise parameters within which production could take place. 
Quantitatively, a plantation owner could raise the brute labour power at 
his disposal by buying additional slaves, but the seasonality of crop 
production and the class position of slaves hampered a qualitative 
improvement in productivity.2 While the transition from slave labour to 
wage labour m0i)T have been accompanied by increased productivity, it is 
significant that in the case of Pernambuco, slaves were frequently in 
the nineteenth century better off than the free workers who replaced 
them, and owners, who although they did not achieve much by way of 
expanded production, were able to benefit from abolition by effecting a 
rationalisation of their labour costs.3 
Elsewhere, abolition was met with different responses from owners, many 
of whom successfully introduced slightly diluted variants of the slave 
1 For additional detail see S.L.Engerman, "Contract Labor, Sugar, and 
Technology in the Nineteenth Century'', Journal of Economic History 
43(1983), pp.635-659. 
2 An article of related interest is J.R.Ward, "The Profitability of 
Sugar Planting in the British West Indies, 1650-1834", Economic 
History Review 31:2(1978), pp.197-213. 
3 See P.L.Eisenberg, "Abolishing Slavery: The Process on Pernambuco's 
Sugar Plantations", Hispanic American Historical Review 52(1972), 
pp.580-597; and J .Reis, "From bangu.e to usina: Social Aspects of 
Growth and Modernization in the Sugar Industry of Pernambuco, Brazil, 
1850-1920". In Land and Labour in Latin America: Essays on the 
Development of Agrarian Capitalism in the Nineteenth and Twentieth 
Centuries, edited by K.Duncan and I.Rutledge. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1977. Another article of related interest is 
J.H.Galloway, "The Last Years of Slavery on the Sugar Plantations of 
Northeastern Brazil", Hispanic American Historical Review 51 ( 1971 ) , 
pp. 586-605. See also R. L i.nhart, lie Sucre et la Faim. Par is: Bi it ions 
de Minuit, 1980, p.42. 
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system. The "apprentices" of Jamaica and Mauritius,4 the enganche sugar 
workers of Peru,5 the Mo98Illbican engages in Ramion,6 and the indentured 
Asian workers throughout the British empire, 7 were all contractually 
bound to their employers under conditions closely resemblant of slavery: 
whatever their euphemistic title, these workers were subjected to extra-
economic coercion and deprivation.8 
In yet other sugar producing regions such as Mo98Illbique and Argentina, 
colonos offered owners an alternative to the post-slavery indentured 
diaspora.9 These colonos were workers from whom labour was extracted by' 
the owners who had dispossessed them of their land. Like the 
forementioned labour systems, this quasi-feudal system implied 
considerable extra-economic coercion, but it differed from the others in 
that it relieved owners of the legal obligation to employ colonos 
throughout the year. By contrast to other legf3.lly unfree wage-workers, 
colonos retained possession - however tenuous and inconsequential it may 
4 See G.E.Cumper, "Labour Demand and Supply in the Jamaican Sugar 
Industry, 1830-1950", Social and Economic Studies 2:4(1954), pp.37-
86; and M.D.North Coombes, "Labour Problems in the Sugar Industry of 
Ile de France or Mauritius 1790-1842". Master's dissertation, 
University of Cape Town, 1978. 
5 See P.F.Klaren, "The Social and Economic Consequences of 
Modernization in the Peruvian Sugar Industry, 1870-1930". In Land and 
Labour in Latin America, edited by Duncan and Rutledge. 
6 Mentioned in D.Lincoln, "Capital and the Milling of Sugar in 
Mo981Ilbique before 1942", Perspectives in Economic History 1 (1982), 
pp.30-42. 
7 See H.Tinker, A New System of Slavery. London: Oxford University 
Press, 1974; and K.Saunders, editor Indentured Labour in the British 
Empire, 1834-1920. London: Croom Helm, 1984. 
8 See inter alia R.Burbach and P.Flynn, Agribusiness in the Americas. 
New York: Monthly Review Press, 1980; W.Kloosterboer, Involuntary 
labour since the Abolition of Slavery. Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1960; and 
M.Lemoine, editor Sucre am.er: Esclaves aujourd'hui dans les Caraibes. 
Paris: Encre, 1981. 
9 See I.Rutledge, "The Integration of the Highland Peasantry into the 
Sugar Cane Economy of Northern Argentina, 1930-43". In Land and 
Labour in Latin America, edited by Duncan and Rutledge; and L.Vail 
and L.White, Capitalism and Colonialism in Mozambique. London: 
Heinemann, 1981. 
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in fact have been - of their means of production, and in this they bore 
a resemblance to migrant peasant or subsistence producers who worked 
seasonally for wages. In the case of nineteenth century Peru, migrant 
sugar workers were enganche workers; that is, their service was obtained 
by coercion rather than economic incentive.10 
In each of these above systems then, cost minimisation was an imix>rtant 
employer consideration, albeit at the expense of coercive control and 
thus less than optimum productivity. Were it not for the presence of 
proletarian workers alongside bonded workers of one type or another, 
limited technology might have been the characteristic feature of 
nineteenth and early twentieth century sugarmills. For reasons 
discussed in Chapter 4, the technical modifications made in those 
sugarmills required a proletarian presence - workers whose conditions of 
employment were negotiable. Just how negotiable those conditions were 
varied according to many structural and other factors, such as the 
degree of accommodation and resistance offered by the respective 
workers; certainly growing proletarianisation in the wake of the 
abolition of most of the above labour systems undermined the 
possibilities for continued unilateral wage determination by owners. 
Because sugarmillers had generally resorted to various labour systems, 
sometimes sequentially and sometimes concurrently; they had' drawn 
together in their sugarmills and estates workers of di verse regional 
origins, and accordingly placed them in diffferent occupational 
categories. Out of this process there evolved a racist ideology which 
sugar millers mobilised in the interests of di vi ding, controlling and 
cheapening their labour. This racist ideology has taken its toll 
10 Klarffi, "Modernization in the Peruvian Sugar Industry''. 
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throughout the sugar-producing regions of the world, not least of all in 
Natal. 
Black Suga.rmill Workers in Natal; the Pre-S!lBfll'OCratic Period: 1850-1905 
It was advocated by Cocqui in 1857 that in Natal "As a principle, Kafirs 
should be used in agriculture, and Coolie labour, if used at all, in the 
manufactory".11 Such was the rhetoric of many of the commentator's 
sugarmilling contemporaries in the colony, although by no means many 
were so circumspect about the use of Indian workers. By 1872, 
Robinson's narrative informs us, 12 most sugarmillers had "mixed" labour 
forces; that is to say, they used both African and Indian labourers. 
The largest estate in Natal at the time had as many as 500 labourers, 
but few others had as many as 300, and most had in the vicinity of 150 
or fewer. The mixture of labour in this fashion arose out of a 
compromise which had been reached by colonial planters over the issues 
leading up to and surrounding the Indian indenture system. As some of 
the Natal planters testified before Robinson, certain preferences 
mediated by pragmatism and necessity were responsible for heterogeneity: 
Osborn of Umtata Estate "prefers Natal kafirs to ~asutos and coolies; 
especially as the latter, since they became free of assignment, are much 
more insolent than they used to be ••. Basutos, though strong and 
muscular, are lazy and less trust-worthy than our natives"; 13 Shire 
"prefers Natal kafirs as workmen, but thinks a mixture is preferable"; 14 
Saunders "employs both coolies and kafirs and is partial to the 
former". 15 
11 A.Coqui, Practical Remarks on the Colony of Natal. London: Effingham 
Wilson, 1857, p.47. 
12 J .Robinson, Notes on Natal: An Old Colonist's Book for New Settlers. 
Durban: Robinson & Vause, 1872. 
13 Ibid., p.10. 
14 Ibid.' p.15. 
15 Ibid., p.27. 
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Robinson's information would tend to confirm L.P.Thompson's statements 
on the overwhelming preponderance of Indian over African workers on 
nineteenth century Natal's sugar estates.16 Although Thompson could 
find no figures showing the precise ratio, he did find cause to be 
assertive about the preference which planters had for the African 
workers who were so outnumbered on the estates by Indian workers~ The 
reasons offered as substantiation for his claim are of some salience: he 
could show that in 1872 African workers cost less than indentured or 
free Indian workers; African workers had stronger physiques than Indian 
workers; Africans were regarded as being more honest. than Indians; and 
the indenture system placed a financial burden on the Colonial 
Treasury. 17 
The prevailing Indian:African ratio in the colonial sugar industry's 
workforce has to be viewed against the background of endeavours on the 
part of Natal's sugarmillers, and other employers, to secure for 
themselves a permanently adequate supply of unskilled labour. As 
Harries has demonstrated quite convincingly,18 the question of labour. 
supply in colonial Natal outweighed labour cost considerations as a 
first concern of the emergent sugarocracy. The imp::>rtance of successful 
Reserve crop production for the Colonial Treasury restrained the 
Colonial Government from applying pressure ubiquitously to dislodge 
Africans from their lands in Natal; instead, labour importation schemes 
were devised by the Government in an effort to satisfy the demands of 
colonial employers. I_!arries has made a detailed study of the tens of 
thousands of Tonga workers who were as a consequence recruited between 
16 L.P.Thompson, "Indian Immigration into Natal 1860-1872", Archives 
Year Book for South African History 2(1952). 
17 Ibid., p.68. 
18 P.Harries, "labour Migration from Mozambique to South Africa; with 
Special Reference to the Delagoa Bay Hinterland, c. 1862 to 1897". 
PhD thesis, University of London, 1983. 
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"' the mid-1850s and the early 1880s for work in Natal. Initially the Tonga 
immigration schemes were disparate responses to employer appeals, but in 
1874 the importation of Tonga workers from southern Mo9ambique was 
placed on a more permanent footing. From that time some immigrants came 
overland under Dunn's agency. These were the highest paid of the Tongas 
in Natal, and the capitation losses incurred by employers as a result of 
desertion led in 1876 to the pass laws being extended to these workers, 
who then also faced a sentence of a three-year indenture for breaking 
their six-month contracts. Moc;ambique also supplied workers by sea, 
mostly on a voluntary basis to serve 2- or 3-year contracts at 15/- a 
month, but including a relatively small number of "liberated" slaves.19 
Although the end of the Anglo-Zulu War heralded an influx of Zulus into 
Natal, Tongas continued coming from Mo9ambique until 1884. The 
termination of the Tonga labour immigration schemes in 1884 was seen to 
be primarily attributable to the high capitation losses suffered by 
deserted employers, as well as to fears that smallpox would be spread by 
the immigrants from Mo9ambique. Undoubtedly the possibility that 
existed for Zulu workers to be employed at sometimes half the wages paid 
to Tonga workers, and the Indian indenture system, also had a 
considerable influence. 
The availability of local African labour had begun to show signs of 
increasing towards the end of the 1800s. Agricultural output in the 
Natal Reserves was steadily dropping and "the corollary of declining 
productivity and poverty was a rise in the number of migrant 
labourers".20 Across the Tugela, in Zululand, the Zulu Civil War 
between 1879 and 1884 had been the prelude to a greater efflux of 
19 NIC, Sessional Papers, 4, 187 4 . 
20 D.Welsh, The Roots of Segr~tion: Native Policy in Colonial Natal, 
1845-1910. Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1971, p.193. 
- - ------------------------------------------
migrant labour. As Guy has so cogently argued, 
there was a fundamental difference between the life of 
the Zulu before 1879 [when the territory was invaded by 
British forces] and their way of life after 1884. In 
the former period they were in possession of their land 
and largely in control of their labour and its products: 
a£ter 1884 they were losing this possession and control. 
These changes were ini t~~ted by external invasion and 
perpetuated by civil war. 
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Neither the developments in Natal nor those in Zululand provided an 
adequate basis for sugarmillers to retract their commitment to the 
Indian indenture system. Whether or not the growth of migrancy could 
have satisfied the sugarmillers' labour requirements is difficult to 
ascertain; but as long as part of their workforce was constituted of 
indentured workers who had to be paid throughout the year, it was 
unlikely that year-round employment would be given to migrants if this 
could be avoided. Moreover, the sugarmillers' cost of continuing with 
indentured labour must have been a factor which influenced the maximum 
wages paid to migrants (and thus the relative unattractiveness of the 
sugar industry for workers who had the alternative of going to the gold 
mines). 
What were the wage ceilings that colonial sugarmillers had been so 
determined to maintain, and how did they give shape to the composition 
of the sugarmill's manual workforce? These wage ceilings were, in a 
word, low. Once the Indian indenture system was put into operation, 
wage levels were established which neither creoles from Ramion nor 
Chinese workers were prepared to accept.22 As far as the total costs 
incurred by em players were concerned, the Indian indenture system was 
less attractive than the various schemes under which African workers 
21 J.Guy, The Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom. Johannesburg: Ravan 
Press, 1982, pp.243-244. 
22 F.N.Ginwala, "Class, Consciousness and Control - Indian South 
Africans 1860-1946". PhD thesis, Oxford University, 1974, p.76. 
-- ---- -- ----------------------------------
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were indentured, even if Indians' wages were the lowest of all. However 
circumstances necessitated their commitment to the Indian indenture 
system: although it may not have been a completely reliable recruitment 
operation it did guarantee a minimum of five years of work from its 
subjects, who were paid at an inflexible rate, and who were relatively 
easily policed. Having made that commitment, it would only be under the 
greatest of pressure that sugarmillers would be induced into paying 
unindentured workers any more than legislation held them to with respect 
to indentured workers. 
As Ginwala has reminded us,23 the wages paid to indentured Indian 
workers remained unchanged for 51 years - for men it was 10/- per month 
with an annual increment of 1 /- during the five year period of 
indenture, and for women it was a variable, but always lesser amount 
paid at a daily rate. By contrast to the stability of those wages, the 
wages paid to free Indians were, within a few years of the expiry of the 
first indentures, increasing. Employers had been forced to pay higher 
wages to these free workers as a consequence of, on the one hand, skill 
acquisition by Indians and, on the other hand, the wide scope that 
existed for work outside the sugar industry for free Indians; these were 
imperatives so long as the labour power of skilled white workers was 
expensive and the indenture schemes could not deliver to the 
sugarmillers as many cheap workers as they desired on a recurring basis. 
In Table 8 it is shown that by 1872 Indian workers were being subjected 
to wage and occupational differentiation as sugarmillers chartered their 
wage minimisation course through the complex of alternatives open to 
them. When Campbell listed the wages paid to black workers in the Natal 
sugar industry over the 20 year period 1866 to 1885 (see Table 9), the 
23 Ibid., p. 90. 
TABLE 8: FREE INDIAN SUGAR WORKERS' WAGES IN NATAL DURING THE 1870s 
1872 1873 1876 
MEREBANK REUNION WATERLOO REDCLIFFE MEADOW BANK 
MEN 
Field labour 13/- 16-18/-





Pan Boiler 80/- 30/- } 30-40/- 25-30/- 60-100/-double rations 
Carpenter 40/- 50-60/-
WOMEN 5/- 6d daily 6d daily 
no ration 
Sources: For 1872, Colony of Natal, Report of the Coolie Commission, Pietermaritzburg: Government Printer, 1872; 
for 1873, f N Ginwala, "Class, Consciousness and Control - Indian South Africans 1860-1946." PhD thesis, 
'oxford University, 1974, p 91; 





only commentary he offered regarding the fluctuation of those wages was 
that war inflation and railway construction had buoyed wages between 
1877 and 1880.24 What he might also have remarked on was that after 
1874 these wages were for the first time higher than those paid to 
indentured workers - until that juncture unindentured workers could be 
had at lower rates than those stipulated for indentured labour, which 
would seem to suggest that the indenture system had until then been 
close to fulfilling its purpose. After 1874, and especially between 
1877 and 1883, the sugarmillers were forced into paying substantially 
higher wages to supplement their indentured workforces. Upon closer 
analysis it is seen quite clearly that while they were the most 
impressive, war-time inflation and railwey construction were not the 
only causes for the departure from earlier trends in wage rates. 
TABLE 9: AVERAGE MONTHLY WAGES FOR AFRICAN WORKERS IN NATAL, 
1866-1885 
1866 10/- 1876 18/-
1867 9/- 1877 25/-
1868 9/- 1878 25/-
1869 8/- 1879 25/-
1870 9/- 1880 22/-
1871 10/- 1881 20/-
1872 11/- 1882 20/-
1873 13/- 1883 20/-
1874 15/- 1884 18/-
1875 18/- 1885 10/-
(Including 3lbs mealie meal per day) 
Source: W Y Campbell, The Natal Sugar Industry. Durban: 
P Davis & Sons, 1885, Appendix IV. 
24 W.Y.Ca.mpbell, The Natal Sugar Industry. Durban: P.Davis & Sons, 1885, 
Appendix IV. 
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Data from the relevant colonial records show that the high plateau 
reached by blacks' wages in general between 1878 and 1884 was neither 
exclusively a correlate of competition for labour, nor was the plateau 
devoid of undulation. Average monthly wages paid to Africans are 
plotted in Figure 14 to show how they fluctuated in the four main 
contemp:>rary sugar-producing areas of Natal, namely Umlazi district in 
the colonial county of Durban, Victoria county's two districts of Inanda 
and Lower Tugela, and Alexander county. It is seen that between 1877 
and 1883 wages in lower Tugela district, bordering on Zululand, were the 
least responsive to the pressure which had caused wages to rise in the 
other three districts; and that the steepest dips and peaks were 
experienced in the Inanda district. Explanations for these tendencies, 
as well as the over~l plateau effect on African's wages, mey be found 
in the annual returns of the respective resident magistrates. The 
impression gained from those returns has two dimensions: there is seen 
on the one side how employers became more reliant on Indian workers as 
many Tonga workers dispersed and other Africans were drawn into war-time 
service or railway work;25 in Alexander and Inanda some employers had to 
contend with ''unwilling'' African workers recruited through chiefs, while 
others had become dependent on labour contractors;26 there were · 
shortfalls in the supply of Indians indented for;Zl and in 1882 Zululand 
was still in an ''unsettled state".28 The other dimension of the picture 
painted by resident magistrates was of the growing number of 
alternatives to wage labour by means of which Africans could earn money: 
the sale of cattle during the early stages of the war,29 the 
substitution of iron ploughs for traditional implements,30 and transport 
25 Blue Book, 1878 and 1880; and Natal Mercury 4. 2. 1879. 
26 Blue Book, 1881. 
27 Blue Book, 1882. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Blue Book, 1879. 
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riding,31 were some of these. Incidentally although these developments 
were cause for disquiet amongst labour-hungry employers, they had 
something positive to offer sugarmillers too. Transport costs 
dropped,32 and mealies could be bought cheaply as rations.33 It was 
obviously a fragile independence that these Africans had won for 
themselves; as fragile as that achieved by some free Indians in Inanda 
district who had no option but to re-indenture themselves when their 
mealie crops failed in 1883.34 
By 1884 the supply of indentured Indians had been restored to earlier 
levels and meetings were held by employers intent on lowering other 
workers' wages.35 Those wages plummetted after 1884, only to rise again 
immediately after the opening of the Transvaal goldfields. From this 
time onwards the upward tendency of blacks' wages was sustained by the 
demand for mine labour. 
Such was the situation in colonial Natal then: owners generally although 
not unanimously expressed preference for African workers, yet out of 
necessity they used Indian workers. Part of the necessity was born of 
the limited availability of labour from any particular source and the 
uncertainty of its supply; part born of the variation in costs of labour 
from its respective sources; and yet another part born of the perceived 
advantages of exploiting the supposedly "racial" differences in 
docility, strength, loyalty and intelligence. These imperatives were 
reflected also in the growing preponderance of Indian workers inside the 
sugarmills, a trend which was already noticeable when the Coolie 
31 ID.ue Book, 1881 • 
32 Blue Book, 1883. 
33 ID.ue Book, 1881. 
34 Blue Book, 1884. 
35 Ibid. 
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Commission' reported in 1872)6 · 
As Table 10 shows, towards 'the end of the nineteenth century, in 1895, 
sugarmillers were still prominently featured amongst the largest 
employers of Indians in Natal. At the end of the century the vast 
majority of all ~rsonnel employed by Natal sugarmillers were Indians.37 
This continued preponderance of Indians amongst SUR,armill workers was 
however already beginning to diminish before the end of the colonial 
~riod,38 as proportionately more African workers entered the industry. 
TABLE 10: THE 25 LARGEST EHPL.OYERS or INOJANS IN NATAL, 1895 
Employer 
1 Natal Government Rail"ays 
2 Natal Central Sugar Co 
3 Reynolds Bros 
4 G S Smith 
5 Reunion Estate 
6 E Saunders 
7 A Michel 
8 r Addison 
9 J L Hulett 
10 C B de Gersigny 
11 Prospect Hall Estate 
12 Effingham Estate 
13 (late) J R Saunders 
14 Bazley and Sons 
15 Seace" Lake Estate 
16 A Wilkinson 
17 H P Harrison 
18 W R Hindson and Co 
19 J A Polkinghorne 
20 E W Hawksworth 
21 Barrow Green Estate 
22 Nicholson and Godfrey 
23 M P L A Cheron 
24 W Pearce 
25 African Boating Co 




























Throughout the pre-sugarocratic period sugarmillers had shown themselves 
to be capable of seizing every opportunity to facilitate labour 
recruitment and to minimise their own expenses. Not least of these 
36 Report of the Coolie Commission, Pietermaritzburg, Government 
Printer, 1872. 
37 Statistical Year Book for 1~. 
38 The Statistical Year Book for 1 ~3, the last in which th~ di vision of 
sugarmill labour was clearly quantified showed the proportion of 
Indian workers to have been almost 90%. See Chapter 8 Note 28 for 
detailed summary of statistics. 
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opportunities was that which came with political office, and their work 
as political agents had mirrored their changing fortunes as employers.39 
Political campaigning, the evolving pattern of labour recruitment, and 
wage manipulation were inseparable concerns of the infant sugarocra.cy; a 
unity of interests which could be advanced by reference to racist 
ideology. As Ginwala phrased it, 
the chief beneficiary of much of the nineteenth century 
anti-Indian legislation in Natal was not the small white 
colonial farmer, the shopkeeper or artisans, but the 
larger employer, who for sixty years had manipulated the 
ideology of racism to e~ure for himself a supply of 
cheap exploitable labour. 
Viewed from another perspective, 
Imi:erial policy in regard to the native population was 
apparently greatly influenced by negrophilism and the 
missionary outlook ••• This paternal attitude met with 
scant favour from the European settlers, who appear to 
have held the view that the indigenous labour was, in , 
effect, an assett which they had an inherent right to 
utilise, and to this end they {feely advocated a,"forced 
labour" system for the Native. 
Although he had not in the earlier part of the period been a 
sugarmiller, J.L.Hulett made speeches around the turn of the twentieth 
century that carried the message which his sug;:u-milling associates were 
themselves intent on putting before the Legislative Assembly. He had on 
the one hand to acknowledge "the undesirability of flooding the Colony 
with Indians", 42 while on the other hand he supported "the wish of the 
Government to increase the labour supply of the Colony. The question is 
how to do it effectually11.43 Hulett regarded whites to be naturally 
unable to perform manual work in the fields, and he sought to increase 
39 The Indian Immigration Trust Board was by the ena of the nineteenth 
century made up almost entirely of sugarmillers, and in 1910 the 
Colonial Secretary could find cause to remark that "the Indian 
Immigration Board resemble Directors of a Company" (NLA Debates, 
Vol.49, 417-424, 12.1.1910). 
40 Ginwala, "Indian South Africans" ,pp.64-65. 
41 Board of Trade and Industries, Report N~ 66, Report on the Sugar 
Industry, 1926. 
42 NIA Debates, Vol.25, 108-124, 1 .4.1897. 
43 NIA Debates, Vol.27, 560, 1898. 
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Natal's labour supply by renewing pressure on Africans. 
The Twilight Years of Indentured Labour in Natal: 1905-1914 
Until such time as African labour power could be harnessed, Hulett was 
prepared to allow the Indian indenture system to function: in 1907 he 
declared 
This is not a white man's country. It never was. It 
never will be •.• 
If there were plenty of reliable Native labour then we 
would not want Indians. I never wanted an Indian. In 
my operations I end~voured to do without them as long 
as I possibly could; 
and in 1908 he expressed his opinion that wages paid to Africans on the 
Kimberley diamond fields undermined the cause of Natal planters, as did 
the -"feudal system" of tenant farming in Natal, and therefore to put an 
immediate end to the indenture system would lead to the "annihilation" 
of plantation agriculture.45 He offered an interim solution to the 
dilemma in 191 O, when he proposed that "one of the objects that we have 
in view at the present time is to get as many Indians in the Colony as 
possible to re-indenture".46 
Hulett's proposal had been evoked during the second-reading debate to 
amend the Act in terms of which free Indians were required to pay an 
annual "licence" fee of £3. The Bill now before the Legislative 
Assembly was intended to relieve women of this form of taxation, and 
sugarmillers f!!3.Ve it support in the hope of encouraging more Indians to 
re-indenture themselves. As matters stood, two free Indian parents with 
one dependant child over the age of 13 years were liable for an annual 
payment of £1 0 to the colonial state - £1 as poll tax and £3 each for 
44 NIA Debates, Vol.42, 15. 7. 1907. 
45 N1A Debates, Vol.44, 326-354, 14. 7 .1908. 
46 NIA Debates, Vol.49, 402-407, 12.1.1910. 
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their "licences" - when, as E.Saunders pointed out, "the utmost wages a 
labourer can obtain is from £12 to £15 per year" .47 What somebody like 
Saunders found particularly disturbing was that indebted Indians, and 
this included those whose "licences" were ln arrears, were precluded 
from re-indenture. 
During the debate G.S.Armstrong put forward his own views on the matter 
thus: 
I employ Indians, although not to the extent that my 
colleague, Mr Saunders doeb; still I think that the 
object we all have as Colonists is not to allow these 
people to live permanently with us, and if we could get 
their indentures termi~ed in Ind~a, it would be to the 
interest of the Colony. 
For Armstrong the solution to the labour question facing sugarmillers 
was clear. As he had articulated 1 t in 1908, 
To educate a Native or an Indian, without teaching him 
to work, is to give him a weapon which he will use 
against us ••• 
••• our Natives have never been in want. And tcrday what 
is at fault is the laziness. They are an indolent 
people, and they want to be trained; and the only way to 
train them is to train them when they are young, and 
give them a continuous service for three or four 
years ••• the Indians work so well in th!~ Colony simply 
because they are indentured for a term. . 
Armstrong had repeated this proposal in the legislative Assembly,50 and 
although it did not receive widespread support, it was an idea that was 
pressed again by Friend Addison in his personal deposition in the 19QCJ 
Report of the. Indian Immiga.tion Commission. Addison had outlined there 
the benefits of a konza system for fourteen year old Africans. He 
believed in short that 
If the indentured youths are properly treated, housed, 
fed, and taught, they would and could not live as their 
47 NIA Debates, Vol.49, 341-342, 10.1.1910. 
48 NLt\ Debates, Vol.49, 521-528, 19.1.1910. 
49NIADebates, Vol.44, 145-167, 25.6.1903. . 
50 NLt\ Debates, Vol.44, 481-494, 22.7.1908, and 520-526, 23.7.1908. 
' 
forefathers did, and would be dissatisfied with the 
comforts of kraal life.?1 
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Colonial sugarmillers had quickly come to the realisation that the 
Indian indenture system could not fulfil their every need as employers, 
and they were perpetually searching for a means of keeping up the supply 
of cheap labour. Suggestions for a konza system were never put into 
practice, and the indenture system itself was lost to sugarmillers in 
1911, and so inevitably the restructuring of the sugarmill's workforce 
gained momentum in the post-colonial period. That African labour would 
be progressively substituted for Indian labour in the post-colonial 
sugarmills was in many respects a belated response to the measures which 
sugarmillers had so heartily supported during the nineteenth century to 
drive Africans into wage labour; it also reflected the resistance put up 
by free Indians to the conditions under which they were expected to work 
in the sugarmills. However, the sugarocracy still found their search -
for African labour to be problematic,52 and it had been with some 
desperation that they had discussed means of getting Indian workers to 
re-indenture themselves. 
By the end of the indentures period wide variations had emerged in the 
wages paid to the three categories of black workers: free Indian 
workers, the nucleus of as.table resident black workforce, were paid 
approximately 35/- a month; I African workers' wages fluctuated with the 
tide of labour supply at around 30/- a month; and indentured and re-
indentured workers' wages (frequently only paid every two months) were 
kept at the minimum permissible levels of 10/- to 14/- for the former 
and '28/6 for the latter.53 
51 Report of the Indian Immigration Commission, Pietermaritzburg, 
Government Printer, 1909, Appendix 1. 
52 See S.T.van der Horst, Native Labour in South Africa. London: Oxford 
University Press, 1942, p.197. 
53 TAD, K39, Vol.5, Indian Wages, 1922. 
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When the end of the Indian indenture system appeared on the horizon, 
sugarmillers lost little time· in beginning to search for an alternative 
reliable source of labour. In their quest it was never clearly 
demonstrated that the labour they sought was to be used in the 
sugarmills. Most relevant documentation referred to agricultural labour, 
yet the sugarmills did exp;rience shortages, and sugarmillers stood out 
more prominently than growers in the related negotiations with 
government officials. 
In December 1913 representatives of the Natal Sugar Association (NSA) 
met in Durban with the Director of Native Labour, Pritchard, to discuss 
measures that might be taken to offset the loss of the Indian indenture 
system as a source of labour.54 The Labour Committee of the NSA had 
passed a number of resolutions which they had then given to Pritchard in 
the form of proposals. He could offer them little immediate consolation 
regarding the appeal to have labour touting abolished in a 50-mile wide 
belt along the Natal and Zululand coast, which would protect local 
employers against competition with mine-owners; and regarding the 
request for the government's assistance in procuring labour from north 
of 22° latitude he could ·only suggest that the NSA approach the 
Witwatersrand Native Labour Association in an attempt to have the latter 
organisation recruit workers in Mo9ambique on their behalf.55 Little 
more than sympathetic assurances were immediately forthcoming when a few 
months later sugarmillers and other Natal employers comprising the Natal 
Labour Association waited on the ·Prime Minister in Cape Town. The most 
optimistic note in Botha's response was his promise to facilitate 
recruiting in the Rhodesias and Mo98Jllbique if this entailed no changes 
54 TAD, GNLB 81, Notes of Meeting between Director of Native Labour and 
Sugar Planters, 15.12.1913. 
55 TAD, GNLB 81, Resolutions Passed by Natal Sugar Association Labour 
Committee, 1913. 
in the existing legislation.56 
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· The idea of systematically recruiting "tropical labour" did not 
materialise, and although sugarmillers had earlier been given a fillip 
by the government's definition of certain labour districts in Natal 
within which they could recruit under licence without having to compete 
against Transvaal employers, they were nevertheless not relieved of 
their problem of procuring labour.57 Besides the problem of having to 
comJ:ete as a weaker party in this respect, sugarmillers also found the 
Pass Laws wanting when it came to rounding up deserters. They saw the 
solution to these problems as hinging on the reconciliation of the terms 
of the colonial Masters' and Servants' laws and the 1911 Native 
Regulation Act.58 This latter problem was exacerbated by the fact that 
African workers were generally attracted to sugar work by cash 
advances,59 which were lost to employers in cases of desertion. 
By the end of 1917 the shortage of labour had become so acute a problem 
that in January 1918 a deputation of sugarmill and coalmine owners 
travelled to Cape Town to meet with the Minister of Native Affairs. 
Consequently the Minister appointed a Departmental Committee to 
investigate the labour question in Natal. 60 It was found that as at 
mid-1918 sugarmillers experienced a 40% shortage of African labour, 
56 TAD, GNLB 81, Notes of Meeting between Prime Minister and Natal 
Labour Association, 16.3.1914. 
57 Sugar companies appeared confused by the regulations surrounding 
recruitment licences, as see TAD, GNLB 253, 357/16/53, A.Boulle 
(Tongaat) to Director of Native Labour, 1.2.1918; and TAD, NA 7, 
42/15/F2, J.M.Pearce (Illovo) to Minister of Justice, 28.8.1919. 
58 See SASJ 9:3(1925), p.203. 
59 See TAD, GNLB 252, Shortage of Native Labour Committee's Durban 
Evidence, 22.6.1918; and House of Assembly, Annexure N? 53, 1919. 
· 60 House of Assembly, Annexure N<: 53, 1919. 
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which was related to a considerable extent to the 10% annual 
depreciation in the numbers of Indian workers available to them. While 
supporting the employers' plea to have some assistance from the 
government, the Committee made the recommendation that was to be oft-
repeated, namely that by "sympathetic" treatment and improved conditions 
would a positive response be elicited from African workers.61 The 
Transvaal mine-owners were regarded as better employers, and this 
observation may have been what prompted W.A.Campbell to send an employee 
to study conditions on the mines.62 
By this stage, during 1918, the majority of sugarmillers had joined 
forces to form the Natal Coast Labour Recruiting Corporation (NCLRC). 
The NCIRC's secretary, Eadie -(who was also secretary of SASA), had given 
evidence to the Departmental Cammi ttee of the Corporation's system of 
seeking recruits in Zululand, Swaziland, and the Transkei, through the 
medium of white agents.63 Immediately after the Committee had made its 
report the NCLRC resumed applying pressure on the government to 
facilitate the recruitment of labour in Mo9ambique and the tropical 
British colonies.64 Although others did employ African workers from 
British colonies to the north,65 Campbell would appear to have been the 
most successful in drawing "tropical labour11.66 In 1919 it was observed 
that, at Mount Edgecombe, Campbell 
had em ployed 200 to 300 Makalangas some little time back 
b1 Ibid. 
62 TAD, GNLB 253, 357/16/53, W.Campbell to,Director of Native Labour, 
25.3~1918. 
63 TAD, GNLB 252, Shortage of Native Labour Committee's Durban Evidence, 
22.6.1918. 
64 TAD, GNLB 252, NCLRC to Secretary for Native Labour, 23.12.1918 and 
3. 1 .1919. 
65 Umfolozi was one of these, as see the application for passes for 5 
men and 3 of their wives who had travelled from Nyasaland to begin a 
second term at the sugarmill (NAD, CNC, 1916/1874, Passes Inward, 
1916). 
66 NAD, CNC, 1917 /2105, Natal Estates' Application for 140 "tropical" 
workers, 11.4.1917. 
who arrived looking like skeletons and went back pig 
fat. He had never had a finer type of labourer. Man for 
man they were the equal at the end of their term of the 
Indian. They came for 12 months and stayed 15 and would 
have stayed longer bu~ for the Influenza Epidemic which 
frightened them away. 7 
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The NCLRC was essentially a millers' organisation, but representing also 
a small number of growers. It was never made clear what proportion of 
labour recruited by the Corporation went into SU&ll'mill work, but there 
exi·sts at least one document suggesting that such ambiguity was 
deli berate secrecy: it was alleged that African workers recruited by 
sugarmillers were first put to field work and registered as agricultural 
labour, and then later moved into the sugarmills without being accorded 
their rights in terms of industrial legislation. 68 
Whatever the means so far employed by sugarmillers in their struggle to 
cope with the passing of the Indian indenture system, the onset of the 
inter-war economic depression introduced a labour situation which they 
could handle without difficulty. On the eve of the depression the black 
workforce on Natal sugarmillers' properties was as shown in Table 11. 
The data for 1926 indicate the order of the proportion of sugar company 
employees who were sugirmill workers; they also specify the prevailing 
racial division of sugarmill labour. 
As the depression deepened local African labour became more plentiful,69 
67 TAD, GNLB 308, Notes of Meeting, 26.11.1919. 
68 TAD, GNLB 253, 357/16/53, Secretary for Native Affairs to Director of 
Native Labour, 23.10.1919. · 
69 It is significant that the Department of Native Affairs was 
particularly concerned with the effects of the depression and the 
drought on unemployment levels on the Witwatersrand; and it 
instructed Native Commissioners to restrict the movement ·of Africans 
to the gold, diamond, and manganese mines. (NAD, Lower Umfolozi 
Magisterial Archives, 3/4/9/1, Secretary for Native Affairs' 
Circular, 25.1.1932; Secretary for Native Affairs' Circular, 
11.2.1932; Director of Native Labour's Circular, 17.3.1933). 
----------------------------~ 
TABLE 11: SUGAR WORKERS IN NATAL: 1920, 1923, and 1926 
AFRICAN WORKERS, 1923 SUGARMILL WORKERS, 1926 
"O QJ 
c "'C "'C .... :J 
co c "'C c co c co C" "'C c Cl) .... co c '"' ..... co co ..... c QJ 
co "' 0 .... 'co QJ Ol .... > .0 co c M u QJ • ..., co ........ .c. QJ ..... Ol E M ...I u co :J QJ ...I 
..... .:,t.0 :J Ol QJ co :J ..., "O N c co QJ ~ ..... . .... 0 ..., ~ 
MMN Ol co 0. ..., .... "'0 co co C> .c. ..... M "C .... . .... ..... 
.... 0 °' co >.. co co :J 0 .c. J: M 0 ..., 0 .._ c 0 ~ 0 ~~ ..... CD z u ZN za: U') ..... ::;: 0 ..... ~ ..... u ..... 
South Coast 
Umzinkulu 63 103 166 167 92 - 2 261 
Esperanza 958 231 1 189 177 166 5 42 390 
J W Kirkman 60 2 67 95 164 20 18 4 3 45 
E W Hawksworth 350 96 329 425 130 120 4 13 267 
Renishaw 53 137 274 464 88 112 21 221 
Illovo 540 325 543 868 175 220 29 424 
Prospecton 20 31 117 148 15 40 4 59 
Hulsar 130 224 182 64 470 
S A Refinery 65 
North Coast 
Mount Edgecombe 1 056 24 154 733 7 2 920 
Ottawa 180 66 91 157 
Central factory 156 1 50 240 1 292 40 100 21 161 
La Mercy 180 50 2 111 77 240 62 144 26 232 
Tongaat 540 76 226 406 21 729 60 297 34 391 
Chaka's Kraal 110 2 171 2 12 187 370 81 16 467 
Tinley Manor 40 4 14 24 162 204 134 196 28 358 
Gledhow 158 3 573 71 647 221 129 25 375 
Melville 25 51 7 58 175 115 1 20 311 
Glendale 25 30 30 77 157 11 245 
New Guelderland 33 34 32 66 59 59 9 127 
Darnall 200 183 107 290 420 203 44 667 
Zululand 
Amatikulu 163 90 19 165 3 277 275 181 46 502 Emoyeni 5 168 5 8 181 Felixton 72 32 6 161 199 357 129 54 540 
Empangeni (ZSM) 131 1 232 45 278 289 144 57 490 
St Lucia (Umfolozi) 270 
Source: For_ 1920, T~D,_GNLB 308, Inspectors to Director of NRtive Labour, 1921; for 1923, TAD, GNLB 308, Chief 
Native Comm1ss1oner to Secretary for Notive Affairu, 1924; for 1926, Board of Trade aGd Industries, 
Report No 66, Report on the Sugar Industry, 1926. 
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and, literally as a result of starvation in the Reserves, 70 the NCLRC 
went into voluntary liquidation in 1931.71 But simultaneously, with the 
malaria epidemics which raged between 1929 and 1932, migrant African 
workers in Zululand "fleeing in fear to their homes left a trail of 
corpses behind them". 72 
The Umfolozi sugfl.I'mill was the most severely affected by malaria. In 
1926 Umfolozi's black workforce comprised two workers from outside 
Zululand for every worker from proximate areas of high malarial 
endemicity (primarily Tongpland); the sick rate of the former group was 
45% against that of 10% for the latter group of workers.73 Since 1926 
only local workers were employed, and Swellengrebel in his 1931 Report 
on malaria in South Africa cited this as a case in support of his 
recommendation that the recruiting of workers for the malaria-affected 
districts be strictly confined to areas of high malarial endemicity.74 
The recommendation was followed in the 1934 revision of the Mot;ambique 
Convention.75 While it may have brought relief to employers, by 
allowing workers from Mot;ambique into Zululand, the revision created a 
conduit for those workers who had their sights on employment on the 
Witwatersrand.76 
70 SASJ 15:11 (1931 ), p.695. 
71 NAD, Lower Umfolozi Magisterial Archives, 3/4/9/1, Chief Native 
Commissioner's Circular, 11.1 2. 1 931. 
72 Report of the Native Farm Labour Committee 1937-39, Pretoria, 
Government Printer, 1939. 
73 ·Report on Investigation into Malaria in the Union of South Africa 
1930-31, Pretoria, Government Printer, 1931. 
74 Ibid. 
75 See van der Horst, Native Labour. p.288; and for official 
interpretations of what the revisions implied for employers in 
Zululand, see NAD, Lower Umfolozi Magisterial Archives, 3/4/9/2, 
Chief Native Commissioner's Circular, 1.3.1935. 
76 On the flow of workers from Mo9ambique to the labour-saturated 
Witwatersrand, via the sugar belt {by means of passes issued to these 
workers in Natal after the termination of contracts with employers 
who were no longer obliged to repatriate foreign recruits), see NAD, 
Lower Umfolozi Magisterial Archives, 3/4/9/3, Secretary for Native 
Affairs' Circular, 27.11.1935; Chief Native Commissioner's Circular, 
30.4.1936; and Chief Native Commissioner's Circular, 19.5.1936. 
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The Immigrant Sugarmill Artisanate: 1850-1905 
As the data recounted in the previous chapter show, nineteenth century 
open-pan sugarmills required few skilled men iri their operation. These 
men, perhaps two or three in number and perhaps inclusive of the owner 
himself, were occupied primarily as mechanics or as sugar boilers. 
Every sugarmill also had a need for carpenters, wheelwrights, and 
blacksmiths in its allied workshops. Al though reference has been made 
to one or two Indian sugar bqilers and blacksmiths, it was British 
settlers who usually met these artisanal needs. I~ was said of colonial 
Natal's artisans that their "Trades are not so sharply defined as in 
England", 77 and the opinion was also expressed that because the savings 
of the "poor class artisan" were inadequate to pay his passage from 
Britain to Natal, the colony was· "stocked with· first class artis8IlS".78 
As Figure 15 shows these colonial artisans were paid wages which 
fluctuated no less than, and in general correspondence with, black 
workers' wages. While the sugarmills absorbed British settlers to meet 
their artisanal needs, Britain was not the sole source of skilled 
operatives; when vacuum-pan technology- and generally more sophisticated 
plant came to the Natal sugarmills after the mid-1870s, Mauritian 
artisans were favoured by em players. 
Whereas some Mauritian artisans were already by then to be found in 
Natal's sugarmills, it was in 1878 that the first major influx of 
Mauritians occurred, when the newly formed Natal Central Sug3r Comrany's 
sugarmill at Mount Edgecombe was opened: the milling plant, a Mauritian 
general manager, and the remainder of the skilled personnel required to 
operate the sugarmill came from Mauritius. (See Figure 16) This surge 
77 Handbook to South Africa. London: S.W.Silver, 1891, p.348. 
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FIGURE 16: MOUNT EDGECOMBE SUGARMILL'S WAGE BILL, 1899 
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of new immigrants destined for the Mount Edgecombe sugarmill was the 
commencement of a steady flow associated partly with the innovative 
vacuum-pan technology. However it was not only pan-boilers who came 
from Mauritius. Blacksmiths, fitters in some number, and other artisans 
were also imported by most of the larger millers. 
The recruitment of these Mauritian workers required official approval, 
and it therefore sometimes involved correspondence between suga.rmillers 
and government officials. Thus we find that in 1899 E.Saunders 
consulted the local magistrate before bringing to Tongaat two Indian 
engine drivers from Mauritius.79 Correspondence was entered into ,when a 
permit was requested in 1902 for the wife and children of a Mauritian 
pan-boiler at Esperanza to travel from Australia to Natal to be with 
him, 80 and when Umhloti Valley Central Sugar Mill applied in 1903 for 
permission to allow two Mauritian engineers to enter Natal from 
Mo9ambique.81 When Hulett's applied in 1904 for permission to re-
appoint two Mauritian workers who had previously been employed by the 
company, a letter of approval from the Mauritian authorities was 
required of them.82 A bond of £50 was asked of Saunders, who then took 
on the two workers under a contract which expired in 1905, when they 
returned to Mauritius.83 
There was a two-fold incentive for su§3.rmill artisans to emigrate from 
Mauritius when they did, and take up employment in Natal. On the one 
hand there are the effects of centralised SU§3.rmilling in Mauritius to 
be considered, and on the other hand,the promise of better conditions in 
Natal must be taken into account. A very rapid process of 
79 NAD, IRD 371/1899. 
00 NAD, IRD 794/1902. 
81 NAD, IRD 187/1903. 
82 NAD, IRD 415/1903; IRD 138/1904. 
83 NAD, IRD 1036/1905. 
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centralisation was under way in the Mauritian sugar industry at the same 
time that the demand in Natal for skilled sugarmill artisans was 
strengthening: in 1870 Mauritius had 218 sugarmills, and by 1892 there 
were 104 sugarmills on the island.84 Inducements offered in Natal to 
immigrant artisans were attractive by Mauritian standards, with fitters 
in the late 1800s being offered in the region of £8 per month and a free 
house and servant, and pan-boilers £15 per month (to offset unemployment 
during the annual off-crop) and a house and servant.85 The fact that 
the annual off-crop was of longer duration in Mauritius . than it was in 
I 
Natal meant also that some Natal sugarmillers ·could employ itinerant 
Mauritian artisans to do off-crop maintenance work. 
Usually assigned to the sugf3.rmill's workshops, fitters spent their time -
making, maintaining, and repairing plant, with few mechanical aids at 
their disposal. Their skills were thus manual skills which enabled them 
for example to wield hammer and chisel and precisely cut a key-way out 
of a solid steel shaft, a task requiring days of labour. Another 
arduous, and more common task of the fitters was to cut and shape teeth 
in the trash p~ates which combed fibre from the grooves of mill rollers. 
And blank cast.iron rollers were, since early this century, grooved by 
workshop hands according to detailed patterns. The exacting job of 
manufacturing patterns was undertaken in the sugarmill's pattern shop. 
An equally exacting job was that of the moulder, whose skills were 
applied in foundry work. All these artisans' workshops and the foundry 
were generally housed under the same roof as the SUgf3.rmill itself. 
84 R.Lamusse, "The Economic Development of the Mauritius Sugar 
Industry", Revue Agricole et Sucriere de l'ile Maurice 43: 1 ( 1964), 
pp.22-38; and A.North Coombes, The Evolution of Sugar Cane Culture in 
Mauritius. Port Louis: General Printing& StatioRery, 1937, p.165. 
85 J.P.N.Bentley, "A Century of Sugar Milling", Condenser 3:2(1954), 
pp.36-39. 
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"Civilised Labour" in the Suga.rznills: 1 ~5 - late 1930s 
Except for the sugar boiler, whose duties might have been performed by 
the manager, artisans in open-pan sugarmills had all been essentially 
maintenance workers who were not directly involved ,in sugar processing. 
An increase in the size of the processing artisanate was thus one of the 
more important consequences of technological change, while the more 
precise division of artisanal labour was another. For white manual 
labour in general the consequences were deeper. As sugar technology 
advanced, whites were taken into the sugarmills as semi-skilled 
weighbridge attendants, crane drivers, and locomotive drivers, inter 
al..ia, and later as process overseers and laboratory assistants. 
A qualitatively important episode in the history of white manual 
sugarmill labour occurred in the aftermath of the 1913 Indian strike. 
On Christmas eve, 1913, E.Saunders wrote a letter to Smuts in which he 
made the following appeal: 
In consequence of the Indian Strike it has become 
imperative to look for other sources of labour, and I 
would very much like to try the expsriment of employing 
poor whites ••• 
I would like to start with to get about six young 
fellows, say of from 18 - 25 years of age and place them 
in the more responsible positions now held by Indians. 
If possible I would like to get young men who have been 
accustomed to work on railway construction or elsewhere, 
who have enough education to be able at any rate to keep 
the time of Indians & Natives. As to start with I 
propose employing them as Gangers. If the experiment is 
satisfactory I wish to bring others into positions now 
occupied by the more Intelligent Indians ••• 
••• let me know if such a class of young Dutchman is 
available and if so~hat would be regarded as a 
reasonable rate of pay. 
Saunders was being extremely cautious. It was not a question of 
replacing Indian workers wholesale that he had in mind, and he was not 
86 TAD, MNW 238, MM 1275/14, E.Saunders to Smuts, 24.12.1913. 
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committing himself to the employment of all comers. 
Reporting to the Secretary for Mines and Industries a year later, 
Saunders expressed his view that "a good deal of picking and choosing'' 
would in future be necessary if his experience with the nine poor white 
workers he had employed was anything to go by.87 The germ of an idea 
had nevertheless been sown, and the Deputy Commissioner of Mines in 
Nat_al met with sugarmillers early in 1915 to discuss the possibility of 
employing poor whites on a large scale. C.G.Smith took it upon himself 
to solicit the opinions of employers in the industry on the issue, and 
over 200 letters were sent from his offices during February 1915. 
Interestingly, the discourse surrounding the issue took a turn away from 
the terms used by Saunders in his earlier letter to Smuts, as Smith 
opined in his circular that "It would undoubtedly be a splendid thing 
for the country if an opening could be found for the permanent 
employment of these unfortunate white people".88 Patriotism rather than 
the lessons of the 1913 strike was now at the base of the discourse. 
As it turned out, the employment of poor whites in the sugar industry 
probably never reached the levels anticipated by government officials, 
and the scheme certainly did not have deep consequences for the 
comrosi tion of the country's sugarmilling workforce. The responses of 
sugarmillers to Smith's circular exposed the reasons for this unexpected 
outcome. William Campbell wrote that 
both father and I had a long conversation with the 
Assistant Inspector of Mines of Natal on this matter, 
and both of us feel that on public grounds, if on no 
other, the Industry should employ a number of these men 
and we are ourselves quite prepared to give the 
experiment a fair trial. From what we could 
gather ... the class of man would be quite illiterate and 
87 TAD, MNW 238, MM 1275/14, E.Saunders to Secretary for,Mines and 
Industries, 7.12.1914. 
88 TAD, MNW 238, MM 1275/14, C.G.Smith to Sugarmillers, 12.2.1915. 
/ 
unfit for anything else but manual labour. We feel 
certain that in the Factory and yard one of these men 
could replace at least two Indians as they should put 
more ''beef" and intelligence into their work ••• 
So far as our particular Estates are concerned, we would 
have very little room in the fields for these men as we 
have a large white staff and we take the very greatest 
care in the selection of this Field Staff, who are all 
of gentle birth and refinement ••• 
••• We continually have to import from Mauritius for our 
technical staff because we can get no one to train here. 
We would take four young Dutch lads right away i~ this 
branch, but they must ••. be able to read and write. 9 
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Similarly, G.S.Armstrong, believing that those poor whites who were 
taken on should be apprenticed, noted that 
there is a very great difficulty at the present moment 
.in getting good Pan Boilers and Sugar Makers in Natal, 
in fact, we are entirely dependent on the Mauri~ians in 
this regard. 
We would be quite prepared t§b try 3 or 4 of these young 
men during the coming season. 
Frank Reynolds was most guarded in his remark that 
We have already had experience of employing them on this 
estate, and have found that they tamper ~f th our 
Natives, and are altogether undesirable people. 
The Umhloti Valley Central Sugar Mill and Estate Comp:my was reported to 
have made an offer to employ three "preferably married, men, who must be 
poor Dutch men, as overseers" ,92 and New Guelderland offered "a free 
house to a competent Blacksmith & handyman who has one or two daughters 
willing and capable of acting as mothers helps and Nurses 11 .93 It was 
apparent that where 1nterest had been shown in the scheme, sugarmillers 
had skilled and/ or educated men in mind as recruits for sugarmill work. 
, 
All told, there was little enthusiasm for the poor white scheme, and 
available evidence suggests that very few poor whites were taken into 
the sugar industry, and then only a small proportion of those went into 
the sugarmills. 
89 TAD, MNW 238, MM 1275/14, W.A.Campbell to C.G.Smith, 15.2.1915. 
90 TAD, MNW 238, MM 1275/14, G.S.Annstrong to C.G.Smith, 19.2.1915. 
91 TAD, MNW 238, MM 1275/14, F.Reynolds to C.G.Smith, 17.2.1915. 
92 TAD, MNW 238, MM 1275/14, Assistant Inspector White Labour to 






The divisions amongst workers who were classified as neither Africans 
nor Indians were less precise than those that existed amongst black 
workers. Regional origins had a bearing on the differentiation that did 
take place with respect to workers who were not regarded as blacks, as 
indeed had racial considerations. However not all of these workers were 
regarded as whites, even if they enjoyed a relatively privileged status 
compared with that of black unskilled workers and the few black workers 
who did acquire skills. These manual workers who were neither Africans 
nor Indians were, in the rubric of South Africa's erstwhile post-
colonial rulers, "civilised labour" deserving of preferential treatment. 
Long before the civilised labour policy had seen the light of day 
J.L.Hulett had spoken out on his commitment to employing whites in 
preference to blacks; 94he had also caused a furore in certain circles 
for having stated that a special tax should be levied on Indian workers 
in clerical jobs; 95 and E.Saunders had in 1921 expressed the view before 
the Unemployment Commission that coastal employers would employ whites 
before blacks.96 
Then in 1925 the NSMA drafted a statement to the Wages and Economic 
Commission, which included references to the blend, in sugar production, 
"of uncivilised labour, indigenous or imµ:irted, and European inventive 
genius and managerial energy"; 97 and to the "considerable ingenuity 
[which] has to be displayed in so balancing the European staff that it 
can be employed during the off-season".98 This view was ultimately to 
become embedded in the legislation which upheld the Pact Government's 
94 NLA. Debates, Vol.41, 137-140, 4.12.1906. 
95 Indian Opinion 23. 5. 1 908. -
96 SASJ 5:2(1921 ), p.165. 




"civilised labour policy". As Davies has shown, 99 it was by means of 
four devices (and attendant propaganda) that the state implemented this 
policy in an attempt to address the "poor white problem": the 1922 
Apprenticeship Act; the 1925 Customs Tariff Act; the 1925 Wage Act; and 
"fair labour" clauses in tendered government contracts. 
Another upshot of the "civilised labour policy'' was an amendment in 1926 
to the Mines and Works Act which now defined skilled Mauritians as 
"civilised"; as the Minister of Labour later put it, they were so 
regarded "provided that they 'conform to European standards of 
living" .100 Because special statutory provision had been made for 
' 
"creole" Mauritian artisans, their position in Natal's sugarmills was 
obviously a curious one. Employers' attitudes towards these artisans 
were seldom publicly articulated, one of those occasions being in 1926 
when C.G.Smith spoke in the South African Senate: 
As regards the labour position in the sugar industry, 
that is a point again which the Government should watch 
very_ carefully. I have made this accusation against the 
sugar industry in Natal; they have never paid the 
district wages for skilled workers. They have never 
done so. There was only one occasion when they 
approached near to that scale, and at that time there 
was an enormous scarcity of skilled men. They pref er to 
get Creoles, and while I am not saying anything 
derogatory to their cleverness or their smartness at the 
work, or that they are not good tradesmen, I do sas- that 
the reason they are engaged, is because they are cheaper 
than white men. Another objection to Creole labour is 
that they come from Mauritius on a kind of holiday 
during the repair season and they work in the sugarmills 
during that period, and for le_ss wages than the local 
[i.e. permanently settled]
10
rreoles get, and then they 
go back to Mauritius again. 
Certainly by the time the Board of Trade and Industries reported on the 
sugar industry in 1926, whites were seen to have replaced "coloureds" 
J 
99 R.H.Davies, Capital, State and White Labour in South Africa 1900-
1960. Brighton: Harvester Press, 1979, pp.199-228. 
10CQuoted in Race Relations 2:5(1935), pp.55-61. 




(presumably Mauritians) in the boiling house and engineering 
departments. On the other hand the Board found that Indian centrifugal 
workers had been replaced by Africans rather than whites, and that this 
was inappropriate, except in Zululand where the climate might "render 
this type of work somewhat trying for Europeans".102 This was no less 
of an inconsistency that was being noted than that surrounding the 
replacement of white with Indian laboratory workers. A further example 
of the sugprmillers' inconsistency in this respect was the way in which 
the company owning the Doornkop sugarmill put 22 unemployed white men to 
work as cane cutters during 1932 for 1 /6 per day, the prevailing wage 
for black cane cutters.103 When in 1933 representatives of the sugar 
industry met with the Minister of Labour, it transpired that they had 
(ostensibly at least) been acting in the belief that they were expected 
by the government not to em ploy any more "non-Europeans" .104 
Though white workers were generally advantaged, the sugarmillers' search 
for cheaper labour did not allow for formal colour bars in unskilled 
categories of work. And, because skilled Mauritian workers were 
variously classified in terms of racist ideology, sugarmillers had to 
openly oppose job colour bars. The editor of the SASJ must have been 
airing the views of sugarmillers when in 1935 he referred to the 
imminent parliamentary reading of a minimum wage bill: 
we have a large number of Mauritians of different shades 
and races most of them brainy and clever at their work, 
and good law-abiding citizens who deserve a lot more 
than they get. 
We wonder if Mr Fourie [Minister of labour] would expect 
a Mauritian chemist, with a tinge of colour, which he 
could not help, to be superseded by a chemist with a 
purely white skin ••• And the same applies to the 
102Board of Trade and Industries, Report N? 66, Report on the Sugar 
Industry, 1926. 
103Natal Mercury 12.5.1932. 
104SASJ 17: 10 ( 1933), p.523. Between 1925 and 1935 there was a 56% 
increase in the number of whites employed in the sugar industry (SASJ 
19:4(1935), pp.201-203). 
engineering workshops, where there are numerous 
Mauritians and coloured workmen. 10gey are conscientious workmen, experienced and capable. 
227 
This was a recognition, if not an admission, of the level of 
exploitation specific to "creole" artisans. If it conveyed a 
transparently patronising attitude towards Mauritian employees, it also 
indicated that skin colour was not accepted as grounds for appointing to 
skilled positions "conscientious workmen" who were also "good law-
abiding citizens". 
Sugarmillers obviously dealt with the question of white labour 
preference in an ambivalent fashion. Skills and relative costs 
determined the manner in which workers of different "racial" categories 
were employed in Natal's sugarmills. While racism aided and abetted the 
cause of wage minimisation through the cost-effective division of 
occupational strata, sugarmillers were not averse to placing cheap black 
labour in positions formerly occupied by more expensive white labour. 
Skills and wages were far more critical factors than racist ideology 
when SU€J3.rmillers came to implementing white labour preference. As was 
seen in Chapter 4, it was more a question of employing the most skilled 
workers at the lowest rates of pay without having to incur the costs of 
training; the question of control (or "obedience") being an important 
factor when it came to selecting workers for assignment to any 
particular branch of the sugar industry. 
The Reproduction of the Racial Division of Sugarmill Labour 
Plainly, neither racism nor relative costs were the sole determinants of 
the peculiarities of the sugarmill''s division of labour: although 
superficially inseparable, ideological and material imperatives had 
105 SASJ 19:1(1935), pp.3-7. 
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complementary but distinct roles to play, and racism, like legal 
statutes, worked primarily as a qualifying or a£firmative factor. In 
other words, the racial division of sugarmill labour was not at the 
outset simply a response to the proscriptions of racist ideology; rather 
than being a causal pre-requisite, racism acted as a catalyst.. In any 
event, the racial basis for the division of labour had not shown. signs 
of weakening by World War II, nor had its wider ideological and material 
context diminished in influence. 
The colonialist epithets "coolie" and ''kaffir" enjoyed wide usage in the 
sugarmills long after they were replaced in official and company 
nomenclature. Similarly the term "creole" was sometimes applied to 
Mauritians who were not regarded as "European" or "French", which is 
quite different from the use of the term elsewhere to denote those born 
in the colonies, for all Mauritian immigrants fell into that category. 
Thus "creole" became in Natal a qualified synonym for "coloured". The 
pej or at i ve connotations of these terms related in part to notions of 
"racial" or cultural superiority held by those who voiced them, and no 
sector of the workforce was excluded from claims to such superiority. 
In another, related sense they were historically derived terms, 
reinforced by the conformity of subjects to the imagery upon which the 
terms were based. 
The "lazy native" and the. "untrustworthy Indian" are two stereotypes 
that have already been encountered. Their resilience and their 
resistance to conditions of indenture and wage-labour in the formative 
years of the Natal sugar industry were interpreted by their masters as 
traits, both natural and cultural, of all Africans and Indians. What is 
more, many of the said masters had previous experience in other colonies 
where the racist imagery of their class had a long history. Once 
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indolence, insubordination, and dishonesty, or mental capabilities and 
intel.ligence (the "more intelligent Indian"), were understood to be 
cultural attributes, employers could find another reason to relegate 
black workers to menial tasks, over and above the fact that there were 
no skilled blacks in Natal in the early colonial period; the "original 
sins" could not be abs.cl ved by skill or Christianity once super-
exploi tat ion had become connected, both in ideology and in practice, 
with blacks. Certainly some blacks were relatively privileged as a 
result of employers' attempts to avoid the expense of white labour, but 
this was precisely because they were black, relatively cheap, and 
tractable. To have acquired the same skill as whites did not mean that 
the same occupational status had been achieved, nor did it give the 
black worker immunity to stereotypification. 
The reproduction of racial skill divisions in the sugarmill was neither 
simply a structural phenomenon nor solely contingent upon ideological 
connivances and sectarian imagery. There were also other factors which 
gave continuity to the racial division of labour, most notably the 
network of relationships amongst various strata of the sugarmill's 
workforce which brought successive generations of subordinate and 
managerial employees into juxtaposition. Patterns of occupational 
mobility and occupational inheritance amongst three categories of 
employees are now presented in order to illustrate this point; Indian 
workers, Mauritian artisans, and managerial and senior technical 
employees are considered respectively. 
In the case of Indian workers who were neither indentured nor artisans, 
their movement within the twentieth century sugarmill was greater than 
that of any other category of employee. Al though there were many who 
for decades remained "office boys", laboratory assistants, or such like, 
0 
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Indian sugarmill employees were often put through a haphazard variety of 
jobs during their working lives. The sequence of occupations of eight 
Indian workers formerly at the Illovo sugarmill illustrates this point 
quite clearly. 106 (See Figure 17.) 
Some information about these particular workers may be safely taken as 
being generally applicable to their contemporaries. throughout Natal's 
sugarmills: they, mostly born of indentured parents, began working at an 
' 
early age for the company served by their parents; they were 
consequently minimally or un-schooled; their first assignment was to the 
fields or to menial tasks in the sugarmill or office; their first 
promotion was based on criteria other than skill; and, a transfer from 
field work to sugarmill work was an important promotion as it implied 
less strenuous work under more regulated and predictable conditions, as 
well as bringing an increment in wages. . 
The individual histories reveal less obvious aspects of sugarmill work 
as it was experienced by Indian workers before World War II. In most 
cases job mobility within the sugarmill took place on a lateral plane 
rather than being promotional. Where significant upward mobility in the 
hierarchy' of occupations did take place, it may be hypothesised that the 
worker in question was the beneficiary of a more or less informal 
process of selection. For a few, such as the worker A.A., skill did 
have a part to play but only once the opportunity to learn that skill 
had, perhaps randomly, presented itself. No less fortuitous were the 
promotions of the sort given to workers such as P.K. or V.P. who, as 
"tea boys" in daily contact with managers, were in a position personally 
and without the mediation of overseers or sirdars to make an impression 
106Similar case histories abound in the journals of the sugp,r industry. 
See for example Condenser 5:5(1967), pp.20-24; Dkosibomvu (December 
1981 ) , p.5; and SASJ 59: 1 ( 1975), p.27. 
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BIRTH FIRST JOB SUBSEQUENT WORK/DEPT AT ILLOVO 
AT ILLOVO 
1914 At age 15 as Juice heaters; icing plant; car-
cane picker pentry shop; jelly pan; refined 
pan sugar boiler; raw sugar pan 
boiler; senior pan bofler 
1902 At age 7 as Cane picker/roads gang; 'tarmbu 
India weeder boy'; 'brake-boy'; mule truck 
driver; platelayer; centrifugal 
operator; platelayer; factory 
cleaner 
1908 At age 10 as Centrifugal operator; mill yard . 
Port weeder crane driver; pipe-fitter 
Shepstone 
1929 Revivifier attendant; crystal-
as millyard lizer attendant; 'oil-boy'; 
cleaner generator attendant 
India At age 13 as Laboratory; wax plant; sugar 
·'tea-boy' for floor sirdar; generator attend-
Wm Pearce anti clarification sirdar 
1922 At age 13 as Transport .dept; millyard clean-
Illovo weeder er; platelayers gang; hospital 
hygiene gang; barracks cleaner 
1901 At age 22 as Carpenter's handyman; shift 
Tongaat syrup melt tank fitters handyman; vacuum pump 
attendant; mill engine driver 
1908 At age 15 as 'Mule-boy'; centrifugal operator; 
·' te_a-boy' · crystallizer attendant; time-card 
checker 
Illovo Digest, March (1969), p 16; December (1971), p 23; 
March (1972), p 22; March (1973), p 22; June (1973), p 34; 
December (1973), p 10; March (1974), pp 19-20. 
' I 
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of diligence and loyalty. Others may have benefi tted from the 
favourable records of their fathers. Indeed, occupational inheritance 
must always have been a factor which either marred or improved the 
promotional chances of successive generations of workers, such as the 
three children of V.P. who followed him into the Illovo Sugar Co •• 
Another Indian worker, M.P. (not included in Figure 17), who began his 
55-year service to the same company in 1916 at the age of 10, had five 
sons with Illovo;107 and M.C., who began there in 1925 at the age of 15, 
could reflect on the relative success of. his eldest son, a bench 
chemist, and two other sons, apprentices, with the COmpllly. 
In summary, the hypothesis is that the occupational histories of Indian 
workers were, before World War II, dependent upon an informal procedure 
of recognition, the chances of that recognition being enhanced by 
factors largely beyond the control of the workers themselves. After the 
War the pattern was slow to change, and still in the 1950s it could be 
bluntly stated that as far as these workers were concerned "a lack of 
schools keeps them largely illiterate, and ignorance of employment 
opportunities elsewhere, together with the absence of savings, confines 
them to the same occupation".100 
Regarding Mauritian artisans, there were numerous instances of family 
succession in particular sugarmills, frequently in the very same line of 
work. Figure 18 speaks for itself on this point. Occupational 
inheritance per se, with men going into the same positions held by their 
fathers or uncles was most evident amongst pan-boilers. A case in point 
107Illovo Digest (December 1975), p. 26. 
108H.R.Burrows, Indian Life and Labour in Natal. Johannesburg: South 
African Institute of Race Relations, 1952, p.19. On the wages paid 
to Indian sugarmill workers, and on their general working conditions 
in the early 1950s, see also C.A.Woods, The Indian Community of 
Natal. Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1954, pp.25-27. 
FIGURE 18: 












































A SELECTIVE LIST SHOWING THE fAMILY TIES OF 
NON-MANAGERIAL MAURITIAN SUGARMILL EMPLOYEES 























































































Source: South African Sugar Year Book and Directory (1934). 
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is that of a former pan-boiler whose maternal grandfather emigrated from 
Mauritius in the 1870s to be employed in Natal as a sugarmill's 
blacksmith. His four uncles - the sons of his maternal grandfather -
became sugarmill artisans in Natal, two of them as pan-boilers. On the 
other side of his family, his paternal grandfather came from Mauritius 
last century to work as an artisan in Durban, and his father, who was 12 
when they disembarked in Durban, subsequently became a pan-boiler. His 
uncles on that side of his family were also sugarmill artisans, one as a 
pan-boiler. When he himself began sugarmill work in the 1930s, he was 
taught the skills of pan-boiling by a 72 year old Mauritian.109 
By contrast to the above two categories of sugarmill employees, 
chemists, engineers, and managers had quite different occupational 
histories. These senior employees were sometimes transferred. from one 
sugarmill to another belonging to the same comJ1311y; they also appear to 
have changed employers far more frequently than the former two groups. 
(See Figure 19.) 
Other instances where movement between sugarmills took place included 
the cases of P.G. and W.D •• In 1922 P.G. was appointed as the chemist in 
the Amatikulu sugarmill after his arrival there from a sugarmill on the 
Zambezi.110 Three years later, by which time he had been made factory 
manager and chief chemist of the Darnall sugarmill, P.G. was in a 
position to advertise his services thus: 
To Sugar Millers 
A thoroughly competent Factory Manager and Chemist, age 
32, desires position in large progressive central 
factory, particularly where experience can be gained. 
Fifteen years in Mauritius, Natal, Zululand and 
Mocambique; for past three years manager and chief 
chemist of one of the largest central mills in 
109Interview with the subject, Tongaat, 28.6.1982. 
110SASJ 6:5(1922), p.331. 
Natal ••• Speaks Fnglish,11~rench and Portuguese fluently, also Indian dialects. 
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Similarly, the far more experienced W.D. went from Mauritius to Natal, 
via Australia; then to Mo~ambique; back to Natal; and, after 
relinquishing his post as general manager of Umfolozi, he was involved 
with staff training in the Sena suga.rmills of Mo98J1lbique, before finally 
retiring in Natal. 112 
flGURE 19: MOVEMENTS or SELECTED ENGINEERS AND 
CHEMISTS~ 19)0-1960 
CB Chief Chemist - Umrolozi; Chief 
Chemist - Ooornkop; Factory Manager -
Doornkop 
H C Chief Engineer • Umzinkulu; Chief 
Engineer - Central Factory; Chief· 
Engineer • Tongaat 
DH Chief Chemist - Tongaat; factory 
Manager - Tongaat; Factory Manager -
Esperanza a factory Manager -
Renishaw 
c J Chief Chetnist • New Cuelderlends 
Factory Manager - Darnall; General 
Manager • [mpangeni 
OM factory Manager - Ooornlcop; General 
Manager - Ooornkop; General Manager -
Uafolozi 
L S Manager - La Mercy; Factory Manager • 
Chaka'a Kraal 
J w Chier Engineer - Tongaat; Chief 
Engineer - Prospecton 
Source: South AErlcan Sugar Journal passim. 
What is especially interesting about P.G. and W.D. is that during their 
working lives they travelled across international borders, going from 
one sugar producfng region to another. Such ease of movement could be 
f11SASJ 9:9(1925), p.635. 
112SASJ 11:8(1927), p.509, 13:12(1929), p.79, and 35:1(1951), p.63. 
.. 
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said to have been widely shared among senior employees, given the 
relatively small size of that component of the workforce. It was by 
this international movement that Natal gained a net inflow of Mauritian 
personnel, and by this movement too that Natal-trained chemists, 
engineers, and managers made their way to Mo9ambique, Kenya, and 
elsewhere • 11 3 
The most obvious point that can be deduced from the foregoing is that 
each of the three categories of sugarmill employees discussed had .q~ite 
distinctive occupational histories. This observation can now be 
extended by saying that sectional occupational histories, such as these, 
were at once a product of the system of racially divided sugarmill 
labour, and a stimulant for the perseverance of that system. In 
addition to giving momentum to the system, occupational inheritance held 
successive generations of manual workers in a relationship with managers 
and owners which, as is later shown, was conducive to dependence and 
quiescence. The long term ties of entire families of workers to 
particular companies were strengthened by the relative immobility of 
manual workers. Although senior employees were far more mobile, many 
nevertheless stayed in one sugarmill or with a particular compmy for 
many decades. In this way a somewhat personalised relationship was 
maintained between managers and lineages of workers throughout the 
industry; the careers and reputations of engineers, chemists, and 
managers could be followed and discussed by their subordinates whose 
collective and family networks preceded and outlasted the presence of 
individual bosses; workers' reputations and careers were not unaffected 
by the records of other family members; and the structure of the 
industry was such that strong social connections were made between the 
113For exa,mples see SASJ 13:5(1929), p.263, 14:4(1930), _p.229, and 
1 5:7 ( 1931 ) ' p.435. 
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various sugarmills. 
On the face of things, the form taken by the racial division of 
sugarmill labour in. Natal might be explained simply as a microcosm of 
the social division of labour in South Africa. Historical analysis 
shows the superficial consistency to have arisen largely from impilses 
which were specific to the sugar industry. There are two themes in 
particular-which are seen to have underlain that .impetus within the 
· sugar industry. Firstly, the nature of the industry necessitated an 
internally dualistic labour process. The sugarocracy was always 
compelled to compete for workers for its labour intensive field 
operations, while simultaneously having to maintain a corps of variously 
skilled sugarmill workers. In striving to meet this imperative, 
sugarmillers laid the foundations for the racial division of sugarmill 
labour. Secondly, al though the system was continuously being internally 
modified, its racial basis was not disturbed. 
As a system, the racial division of sugarmill labour was originally 
squarely of the sugarmillers' making, but later they could depend on its 
reproduction without their intervention: the role of the sugarocracy 
had passed from an.instrumental to a more.passive stewardship over the 
racial division of sugarmill labour. Although the system persisted, the 
sugarmillers did not balk before replacing white workers with lower-plid 
black workers when opportunities arose to do so. As is demonstrated in 
the following chapter, when in the decade before the take-over of 
sugarmilling by the industrial corporations ostensible efforts were made 
to "de-racialise" the sugarmilling labour process, these were 
overshadowed by structural and ideological continuities. These 
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continuities were manifested in segregationist policies in the sugarmill 
and, as Chapter 7 shows, in the sugar village. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
AUTHORITY, CONTROL, AND AUTONOMY 
The social group over which sugarocrats have historically expected to 
command authority may be described as a re la ti vely closed community. 
Suga.rocratic dominion over this community has usually prevailed until 
internal corporate growth dissipated family control, or sug;a.r comP3llies 
became subsidiaries to larger, usually multinational corporations. An 
interesting anomaly in the global context, was the Pernambuco 
sugarocracy, which demonstrated a reluctance to expand its operations 
1 beyond the scope of family control. Far more common was the course 
followed in the proximate Sao Paulo region of Brazil where expansion 
proceeded vigorously under pressure from professional managers.1 
Generally then, formal control over the sugarmill and its community has 
passed from sugarocrats to professional administrators. 
After laying out a theoretical basis for the study of control, the 
remainder of this chapter is devoted to an examination of control over 
sugarmill work. The analysis attends to four main features of control: 
the role of the sugarmill owner as operative, and the consequences of 
\. 
his departure from the sugarmill itself; the authority of factory 
managers, engineers, and chemists, and their respective claims to 
control over technical processes; the question of occupational autonomy 
as it has been experienced by pan-boilers; and the development of 
structural control. 
K.S.Taylor, Sugar and the Underdevelopment of Northeastern Brazil, 
15~1970. Gainsville: University of Florida Press, 1978, pp.79-80. 
An article of related interest, which offers an alternative view of 
Pernambuco sugarmillers, is E-S.Pang, "Modernization and Slavocracy 
in Nineteenth-Century Brazil", Journal of Interdisciplinary History 
9:4 ( 1 979), pp. 66 7-688. 
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Control and Authority 
Bourgeois control over working people may be gained in a number of ways, 
and with varying degrees of subtlety. Compliance might at the one 
extreme be achieved by outright coercion, and at the other extreme it 
might be a consequence of ideologically uncontested bourgeois control. 
Both situations are likely to occur only in limited amounts, if at all, 
as they come into direct conflict with the social relations of 
capitalist production - coercion destabilises class relations, and 
consensus over the objectives and organisation of production is an 
elusive goal of the bourgeoisie. A more likely intermediate situation, 
exhibiting some stability in the long term, is one in which control is 
achieved by means of a 
structure of sanctions and rewards deployed by the 
owners and/or agents of capital to maintain and promote 
their authority in the work place. All such systems of 
control employ elements of control and legitimation, 
albeit in differing degrees and forms. The hierarchy of 
occupational status and the technical division of labour 
also form imp:>rtant parts of management control systems.2 
As the above quotation suggests, occupational hierachy,and the technical 
division of labour can be counted amongst the systems of domination and 
control within the sugarmill. Then there is the coercive aspect of 
control to be considered. Violence and brutality perpetrated by 
overseers upon unskilled labourers are the most conspicuous type of 
direct coercion. More subtle forms of compulsion, which may 
nevertheless imply the threat of force, are found inter a1ia in 
particular systems of labour recruitment and associated methods of 
driving subsistence agriculturalists into wage labour;3 in systems of 
2 C.Scott, "The Labour Process, Class Conflict and Poli tics in the 
Peruvian Sugar Industry'', Development and Change 10:1 (1979), pp.57-
89. 
3 Reference has already been made in Chapter 5 to the cases of 
Mo981Ilbique and Peru. 
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surveillance over worker organisation;4 and in the payment of workers by 
some alternative to regular currency.5 These particular means of 
compelling workers to do the employers' biddiri.g more often than not rely 
on state support, in which case employers are relieved of the task of 
invoking them. They apply primarily to unskilled sugarmill workers, 
over whom control is effected more by threat of sanction than by promise 
of reward. Finally, control by legitimation refers to efforts made to 
promote among employees ideological compliance with the assumed 
authority of the sugarmiller. 
The sugp.rmillers' search for legitimacy in the sphere of relations with 
employees has to do with consciously establishing authority. Sennett, 
invoking Gramsci and Weber, has shown succinctly how authority, 
coercion, and domination are inter-related: 
we can al ways tell when a sense of authority exists in a 
society: it is when people voluntarily obey their 
rulers. If they have to be coerced, it is because they 
don't find the rulers legitimate. Authority ••• [ is] ... ~ 
belief in legitimacy, measured by voluntary compliance. 
4 See for example Scott, "Peruvian 9uga.r Industry". 
5 See S.W.Mintz, "The Folk-Urban Continuum and the Rural Proletarian 
Commmity", American Journal of Sociology 34:2(1953), pp.136-143, on 
"the extension of credit to workers for purchases in corporation 
retail stores". Payment in scrip or coupons was a major grievance of 
Cuban sugar workers according to F.Grobart, "The Cuban Working Class 
Movement from 1925 to 1933", Science and Society 39: 1 ( 1 975), pp. 73..:. 
103. During the 1920s it was observed that sugar workers in 
Mo9ambique were paid in escudos, which currency had then to be 
converted at great expense into British sterling to pay hut tax 
(E.A.Ross, Report on Employment of Native labor in Portuguese Afrie& 
New York: League of Nations, 1925). 
6 R.Sennett, Authority. New York: Vintage Books, 1981, p.22. The 
Weberian influence on this statement may be seen by returning to the 
concept of "imperative control", which is "the probability that a 
command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group 
of persons" (M.Weber, The Theory of Social and F.conomic Organization. 
New York: Free Press, 1947, p.152). Authority is then "the 
legitimate exercise of imperative control" (ibid., p.153), and in 
"every tri...e relation of imperative control ..• is a certain minimum of 
voluntary submission" (ibid., p.324). 
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Legitimacy in any situation where the means of production are privately 
owned, is commonly established around property rights in the first 
instance.7 Thereafter, in an industrial context, legitimacy is sought 
by.means of managerial ideologies which relate to the 
establishment of management as a separate function, 
distinct from shop floor workers, with unique expertise 
and responsibilities, and with major and critical claims 
to authority over the shop floor upon which the 
efficiency of the whole enterprise depends ••• once this 
conception of management has been accepted by workers, 
they have in effect, abdicated from any questionin~ of, 
or resistance to, many aspects of their domination. 
And, to follow this line further, 
The imp:>rtance of notions and levels of legitimacy does 
not depend upon the achievement of a constantly 
deferential, acquiescent and obedient workforce. If it 
did it would clearly be invalid since these conditions 
have never been met. The imp:>rtance of these efforts is 
that they supply, when successful, a moral backdrop 
against which particular circumstances are argued or are 
seen to be exceptional.~ 
In sugarmilling, as in any other industry under capitalism, the way in 
which control and legitimation have been blended, historically, is 
indicative of an evolutionary process. The three primary problems faced 
by purchasers of labour - the extraction of work, the rendering of work 
as a predictable and sustainable force, and the countering of 
resistance10 - have been dealt with with decreasing levels of coercion 
and increasing attempts to establish owners' and managers' au~hori ty. 
This evolution has implied changes in the constitution and role of the 
cadre of control agents; it has also implied the growth of impersonal. 
control. In the hands of :Ed wards, this tendency has been treated as a 
transformation from simple control to structural control in the 
7 See H.Newby et al Property, Paternalism and Power. London: 
Hutchinson, 1978, Chapters 1 and 8. 
8 C.R.Li ttler and G.Salaman, "Bravermania and Beyond: Re.cent Theories 
of the Labour Process", Sociology 16:2(1982), pp.251-269. 
9 Ibid. 
10 J.Storey, Managerial Prerogp.tive and the Question of Control.· London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983, p.11. 
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capitalist work-place.11 
Simple control refers to the situation, prevalent in nineteenth century 
industries, where owners and bosses personally intervened in the labour 
process, hiring and firing ~labour at their discretion.12 Structural 
control, essentially a post-World War II development, encompasses 
the formal, consciously contrived controls [which were] 
embedded in either the physical structure of the labour 
process (producing "technical" control) or in its social 
structure (producing ''bureaucratic" control). 15 
The growth of the managerial stratum, and the associated linkage of the 
I 
regimen of work with written rules and specif~ed procedures, constitute 
an im p::>rtant phase in the development of structural control. Equally 
important are the forms of sanction which accompanied this development. 
Ed wards has isolated three types of behaviour which are rewarded by 
bureaucratic control; namely, positive orientation to bureaucratic 
rules, dependability and predictability, and the internalisation of 
company goals and values.14 
Al though there is some heuristic value in Ed wards' distinction between 
simple and structural control it is difficult to conceive of an 
industrial setting-where one can be said to exist in the complete 
absence of the other. The distinction between the two forms of control 
is analytically imp::>rtant, but they are not viewed here as belonging to 
a continuum.15 
11 R.Edwards, Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in 
the Twentieth Century. London: Heinemann, 1 CJ79. 
12 There is a degree to which simple control represents a-euphemism for 
what Weber referred to as patriarchal control or a variation thereof, 
namely patrimonial control (Weber, Social and :Economic Or~zation. 
pp.346-347). See also H.Newby, The Deferential Worker. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979, p.121. 
13 Bi wards, Contested Terrain. p.20. 
14 Ibid., pp.144-150. 
15 For other criticisms, particularly on Edwards' insensitivity to 
informal controls such as occupational hierarchy and the technical 
division of labour see Littler and Salaman, "Bravermania". 
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Structures of control in the cane sugarmill had their source in the 
organisational principles of the slave plantation. The fundamental 
organisational principle in former slave-plantation colonies, was to 
form slaves, then indentured workers, and then free workers, into gangs. 
The implications of the technique may be explained by reference to a 
description of its application in Mauritius early this century. On the 
first day of the harvesting and crushing season a bell would be rung 
before dawn, at 3:30 a.m., to waken the wives of labourers so that they 
could prepare food for their husbands. The men themselves would rise 
when a second bell sounded at 5 a.m.. Shortly thereafter the roll-call 
would be taken - "appel, appel" - with workers formed into gangs in 
double rows behind their respective sirdars. The militaristic ritual 
proceeded with the order being given to "dressez la ligne" as the 
managers arrived on the scene. The factory manager would then select 
the gangs he wanted for work inside the sugarmill, before the other 
gangs were chosen for work in the fields and the other departments of 
the estate. When a third bell tolled at 6 a.m. work commenced, and 
because it ~as the first day of the season the general manager would, 
according to tradition, cut the first stalks of cane. 1 The cutting gan{!f3 
would watch in silence, and then after applauding the ceremony they 
would be called to work by their sirdars. At 10 a.m. the wives and 
daughters of the field workers would bring them their food, and while 
the men ate, the women would carry cane and load it onto awaiting 
carts.16 And so the work would continue uninterrupted until dusk, as it 
-had done since the days of plantation slavery. 
The agent of control who was closest to the bulk of the workforce under 
such a system was the gang-driver; called in this case a sirdar. On the 
16 This description comes from F.North Coombes, ~es Champs et Mon 
Moulin. Port Louis: General Printing and Stationery, 1950, pp.50-52. 
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slave plantation it would have been a "dri v.er" or "contramqoral" who 
occupied the sirdar's position, and he would in all likelihood have be~n 
himself a slave, whose "promotion" was characteristically an affair of 
great pathos: referring to contr~oral.es in eighteenth century.Cuba, 
Moreno Fraginals has written: 
these men who managed slaves of their own blood are an 
especially long-standing tradition. Without trying to 
penetrate his psychological traumas, we maor assert that 
the black assistant overseer must have been moved by 
deep ancestral fears. Above all, there was the fear of 
returning to the slave crew, fear of the overseer and 
the white master. Whipping others was insurance against 
being whipped himself, and also of slightly bett.er 
rations, a little more clothing, and sexual satisfaction 
with some of the .Jllill's few black women. And of a 
little more sleep. 1 · f . 
In the wage-labour agre>-industrial complex, the sirdar, like the slave-
driver, filled the lowest position in the hierarchy of control agents, 
and he too received privileges in return for being efficient in his 
role. By contrast to the slave-driver, the sirdar could avail himself 
of opportunities related to the receipt of wages by workers under his 
control in order to increase his own stature and income.18 This 
development notwithstanding, the occupational roles of slave-drivers and 
sirdars were the same, and the relationship between them and overseers 
remained one that was based on ·fear. 
These aspects of control which originated in the slave plantation were 
to be maintained in most sugar-producing countries until well into the 
post-World War II period, if not to the present. They applied to the 
majority of workers - those deemed unskilled - in the plantation and 
17 M.Moreno Fraginals, The ~ill: The Socioeconomic Complex of Sue;:u-
in Cuba. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976, p.152. 
18 See A.North Coombes, The Evolution of Sue;:u-cane Culture in Mauritius. 
Port Louis: General Printing and Stationery, 1937, p.36, on how 
sirdars in Mauritius enriched themselves legally by accumulating 
capitation fees. 
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industrialised sugarmill alike. By contrast, the transition to 
industrialised sugarmilling implied major changes in the. managerial 
strata. The plantation had a single manager (possibly the ow~er) in 
control of the fields and the sugarmill. The engineer and sugar-boiler 
had virtually unbridled occupational autonomy, and the only agents of 
control situated between the manager and the gang drivers were the 
overseers whose sole "skill" lay in their ability to keep workers 
· working. This structure of managerial and technologists' con~rol was 
transformed by industrialisation. 
The typical pre-World War II agro-industrial complex was headed by a 
general manager who had overall responsibility for the estates and the 
sugarmill. Whether or not he was a member of a suga.rocratic family it 
would not have been uncommon for him to have gained experience in the 
sugarmill and perhaps the plantation too. Taking the case of Java, the 
career of a general manager would usually have begun in the sugarmill 
itself, where the incumbent might have been selected for transfer from 
the sugarmill to the plantation where, after a few years as field 
overseer he would have been promoted to the position.of chief field 
overseer or sub-manager, before finally ta.king full control of the 
entire complex. Before World War I this general manager would have 
received in addition to his basic salary a commission of 10% of the 
sugarmill' s. profits. By the late 1920s this commission had been reduced 
to between 5 and 8 per cent of profits, which nevertheless meant that in 
a prosperous year his annual salary of £800 to £1000 might have been 
augmented to as much as £2CXXXJ. His immediate subordinates, the chief 
engineer, the chief chemist, and the chief field overseer, were also 
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paid a commission of 10% of profits, over and above their basic 
salaries. 19 
In the British colonies it was more common to have above the chief 
engineer and the chief chemist a factory manager who was accountable to 
the general manager.20 In most instances the chief engineer would have . 
started his working life as an apprentice, and the chief chemist usually 
had gained some scientific training either before entering the sugarmill 
or by part-time study while he was employed, perhaps as a laboratory 
assistant. If the chief chemist had enjoyed a degree of managerial 
status, it did not imply that he had slipped into this position with 
ease. Perhaps it was the memory of the assertive independence of the 
erstwhile sugar masters which made sugarmillers at the turn of the 
twentieth century wary of introducing chemists in the wake of new 
processing technology. There was a recurring and not insignificant 
reason for this apparent laggardliness on the part of late nineteenth-
and early twentieth century sugarmillers, who generally acquitted 
themselves as revolutionary protagonists of technological progress. As 
the heirs of an industry which had relied for centuries on empirical 
procedures, they were sceptical of a scientist's presence in the 
sugarmill. Such scepticism attended the development of chemical control 
in Mauritius, for example.21 The early chemist in Mauritius "il 
semblait au profane un etre mysttrieux verm d'un autre monde, avec des 
secrets bien gardlls et des connaissances hors pair [he appeared to the 
outsider /layperson to be a mysterious being from another world, with 
19 F.Maxwell, :Economic Aspects of Cane ~ Production. London: Norman 
Rodger, pp.158-159. / 
20 Ibid., pp.159-160. For additional material on Queensland see 
A.A.Graves,"Pacific Island Labour in the Queensland Sugar Industry, 
1862-1906". DPhil thesis, Oxford University, 1979, pp.223-226. 
21 North Coombes, Champs et Moulin. p.22. 
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well-kept secrets and extraordinary knowledge] 11.22 This "mysterious 
being'' had a managerial position beside the chief engineer in the pre-
World War II sugarmill but without the same status. In any event, the 
main criteria for promotion to the summit of the occupational hierarchy 
in the pre-World War II sugarmill were technical knowledge, experience 
in control, and commitment to company objectives. 
The sugarmill's administrators ( te.chnical and bureaucratic) and senior 
technologists (engineers and chief chemists) have been presented as 
figures of managerial and/or technical authority. Beneath this lofty 
layer of superordinates extended parallel chains of "command" through 
personnel in the engineering, processing, and administrative sectors of 
the sugarmill; with technical skills, bureaucratic skills, or experience 
being either jointly or severally the main determinants of an 
individual's conferred authority and occupational status. Such a 
structure implies a hierarchy, or a combination of hierarchies, which 
does n~t allow scope for individual autonomy in the sense of freedom· 
from interference or constant surveillance. In view of this implicit 
rule of the capitalist labour process, the relative autonomy of the pan-
boiler represented a special case. 
The pan-boiler represented the last vestige of an artisanal presence in 
sugar making per se, and he clung tenaciously to the autonomy which his 
skills had earlier won him. In other words, his unique and even 
anomalous status was.not merely ascribed by the technological status 
quo, but had to be vigorously defended against the effects of 
industrialisation. His defence lay in his ability to rebut the tide of 
instrumentation and bureaucratic control that attended the advance of 
sugar technology, and it took on the appearance of a campaign of 
22 Ibid.' p.23. 
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secrecy. He was in that sense in a position which was analagous to 
that of the erstwhile sugar-master. He required no formal education as 
such to do his job or acquire his "secrets", yet his was very 
specialised knowledge and his responsibilities in the sugarmill great. 
Because a good pan-boiler had long experience with empirical rather than 
scientific techniques, and because he was in charge of the most critical 
stage in sugar processing, he had in the late nineteenth century been 
"in a position to dictate to the management".23 His terrain was not 
much interfered with in the period before World War II and a cordial 
I 
relationship of interdependence with managers characterised his status 
in the sugarmill's occupational hierarchy. 
The pan-boiler was recognised as "the true artisan" of the post-eighteen 
fifties sugarmill, for 
All in all, the sugar boiler has a number of very 
important variables to control, and he does this by 
manipulating principally the vacuum in the pan and thus 
the temperature. "Giving the pan a drink", even water 
in an emergency, also increases his control to some 
extent. He follows the course of the boiling mass and 
by the feel of a smear which is withdrawn from the pan 
in the "proof stick'1.24 
He was a "true artisan" then in that his expertise was empirically 
grounded, and his sphere of control exclusive. And as an artisan he 
had autonomy which, as Walter Rodney explained in his history of Guyana, 
should be viewed as a culmination of struggle "that might otherwise be 
easily overlooked: namely, the search for dignity and self-fulfillment 
on the job11.25 In the sugarmills of Guyana, wrote Rodney, 
23 N.Deerr, The History of Sugar. 2 Vols. London: Chapman & Hall, 1949, 
p.582. 
24 A.van Hook, Sugar: Its Production, Technology, and Uses. New York: 
Ronald Press, 1949, pp.39-41. 
25 W.Rodney, A History of the Guyanese Working People, 1881-1905. 
London: Heinemann, 1981, p.161. 
The greater the skill, the more predictable it was that 
a category of labour would accommodate only on terms 
that went some way toward satisfying their demands. 
Pan-boilers represented the extreme of this tendency, 
possessing as 1they did a store of knowledge denied to 
the factory overseer. They were the elite of the 
Creoles within the factory, and factory managers 
accorded them a grudging respect. The tempering of the 
cane juice was generally left entirely to the head pan-
boiler.· In the Overseers' Manual [of 1882], the 
factory overseer was .advised to check on the pan-boiler 
about one hour after granulation - but "let him do it 
with tact as pan-boilers do not like being interfered 
with. It is almost needless to SEf¥ that the tricks and 
unjustifiable resources of our professional pan-boilers 
in Demerara are legion." Pan-boilers produced; and that 
is why they were left alone to respond to the most 
advan°21f technology which the sugar industry had to 
offer. 
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Writing in a less prosaical vein, a former Mauritian sugarmill manager 
had much the same to sey of the island's pan-boilers, but with the added 
observation that with the advent of the cuitometer (a pan control 
instrument) in the 1940s the pan-boiler's reign over the pan floor was 
drawing to a close.Z7 
Having spelt out in some detail the background of sirdars and the 
figures of ultimate managerial and technical authority, and having also 
drawn out the pan-boiler from his well-guarded niche, the development of 
structural control in Natal's sugarmills may now be examined both as a 
process and in ter~s of the changing composition and roles of those 
employed primarily as agents of control. This examination follows the 
transformation of control mechanisms from the deys of owner-operative 
rule during the indentured labour period, to the system of management by 
professionals. 
26 Ibid. 
27 North Coombes,,Cbamp:J et Moulin. pp.~91. 
.\ 
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Sugarocratic Owner-Operatives in Natal 
Before the advent of centralised sugarmilling, most of the plantation 
, 
owners were not merely resident owners but also practical sugar 
producers, personally involved with the working of their lands and 
sugarmills. This meant that the first sugarocrats (relative latecomers 
J.L.Hulett and C.G.Smith excepted) gained first-hand experience as 
artisans or overseers and, simultaneously, they imparted a personal 
quality to the employer/employee relationship. In effect then, there 
was little, from recruiting workers to technology and to control, in 
which the owner-operative did not intercede. In 1861 a typical working 
da;y for William Campbell was described by his father in this wa;y: 
_He is manager, clerk, etc •••• The first rays of the 
morning sun find him at the factory, where, after he has 
set the kaff irs to work and raised the steam for the 
battery, etc., he returns to the house, has breakfast, 
and then orders out the remaining ka.ffirs, 60 to 70 in 
number, where, standing a few yards in front, he issues 
his mandates in the kaffir language with volubility and 
correctness. He names eight, ten or more, as the case 
may require, to cut wood, so many more to cut cane, so 
many more to one duty or another, and then with a wave 
of his hand the place is cleared in an instant. He then 
goes to the factory where his chief business is to 
attend to the sugar boiling. By this time I have torn 
myself from the grasp of Morpheus and I report myself as 
quickly as possiQle to the factory, where I start the 
big engine and commence crushing. Soon after, William's 
horse, saddled, is brought to him and he rides off and 
inspects the workmen on various parts of the estate. He 
returns and arranges the work in and aro~d the factory 
until night; then he writes up his books. 
By being integral participants in sugarmill work, the early sugarocrats 
were themselves subjected to the discipline imposed by that work. In 
the words of William Pearce, in the late 1880s 
I had to be manager, sugar boiler, a bit of an engineer 
and field overseer and having served five years in a 
wagon-making and blacksmith shop, I was able to do all 
28 E.Campbell, The Life of Sam Campbell. Durban: Privately published, 
1933, p.170. 
my own repairs ••• I also had to keep my own books ••• You 
can imagine I had a bit of a lively time and I never got 
to bed until 1 Op.m. or 11 p.m.. In the crushing sea~on 
it was necessary to be up again at about 2 or 3a.m • .2'~ 
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And two of Pearce's contemporaries, the brothers Frank and Charles 
Reynolds, often put in a 21-hour day during the founding years·of their 
empire.30 
In these circumstances, control implied more than owners' supervention 
in the recruitment and dismissal of labour or in the determination of 
the intensity and duration of work. Sugarmillers were in the position of 
' 
having to control and produce simultaneously, of having to oversee the 
work of others and do physical work themselves; and by being seen to be 
operatives with a working day as long as if not longer than the next 
worker's, they must always have had that as an example and yardstick 
against which to compare the work of employees. It was the visible 
presence and work of sugarocrats then which typified simple control in 
the sugarmills. 
Simple or patriarchal·cqntrol by owner-operatives had structural aspects 
I 
which were related to the functioning of the Indian indenture system in 
Natal. From Manri tius had come much of the inspiration for the Indian 
indenture system in Natal, and its example was, whether consciously or 
not, closely followed in putting to work indentured workers.31 For 
indentured Indian workers in Natal the regimen of gang work was similar 
to if not more harsh than that which prevailed in Mauritius. Typically 
29 Illovo Digest (May 1966), PP·5-8• 
30 SASJ 14:10(1930), p.681. . 
31 The conscious reference to Manri tius has been shown by L.M.Thompson, 
"Indian Immigration into Natal 1860-1872", Archives Year Book for 
South African History 2(1952). Colonial administrators had also 
looked to British Guiana for guidance on the question of indenturing 
women as workers (NLC, Sessional Papers, 7, 1874), and to Jamaican 
law for guidance on immigration control (NLA, Sessional Papers, 5, 
1894). 
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(and minimally) daily work would be performed from dawn to dusk, wit~ 
one or sometimes two breaks for meals, and on Saturday afternoons 
workers would collect their weekly rations.32 
The indenture system proved itself to be extremely malleable in the 
hands of Natal's sugarmillers. For all the checks (real .and ostensible) 
against abuse, sugarmillers had found it possible to squeeze every 
conceivable advantage out of the system and its victims. Not least of 
these efforts were those which revolved around the predictability 
· pr'omised by the indenture system. Sugar production by a largely 
indentured workforce implied production within set parameters. This 
advantage of the indenture system, from the sugarmillers' point of view, 
was clearly spelt out in a remark made by Hawksworth in 1880: 
I know of many planters who would not make a single ton 
of sugar but for the Indians in their employ. As it is, 
the work progresses from Monday morning to Saturday 
night, and the planters can always gauge the exact 
amount of la'Q.Qur that the Coolies can get through in a 
given period • .,) 
A detailed exp::>sition of what that work regimen entailed was contained 
in evidence before a Commission of Inquiry into conditions on 
F.Reynolds' property. In her summary of the evidence Teyal posited that 
by their response to the case, other sugarmillers in Natal showed that 
they· probably treated workers no differently from Reynolds.34 Between 
1884 and 1907 Reynolds' workers worked a minimum 12-hour day during the 
off-crop, starting with roll-call by torchlight. During the crushing 
season, which lasted from July to December or January, work was 
intensified to the-extent that workers were woken at about 1 a.m. to 
work a 17- or 18-hour day under the supervision of two shifts of 
32 On t·he length of the working day see W.Y.Campbell, The Natal Sugar 
Industry. Durban: P.Davis & Sons, 1885, p.48; and NLC, Sessional 
Papers, 6, 1876. 
33 NLA Debates, Vol.1, 474-480, 28.1.1880. 
34 M.Tayal, "Indian Indentured Labour in Natal, 1890-1911 ", Indian 
Economic and Social History Review 14:4(1977), pp.519-547. . 
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overseers. 
Sirdars in Natal executed their duties in much the same manner as their 
counterparts elsewhere. Their proclivity to the use of threats and 
violence against labourers placed in their charge was widespread. 
Sirdars' coercion frequently met with resistance from workers and, 
probably far less frequently, with magisterial approbrium and 
convictions. During 1909 the Protector of Immigrants noted a growing 
reluctance amongst employers to keep sirdars (or wh;i.te overseers) in 
their pay if they had assaulted a worker, and that employers were 
generally "less inclined to screen them than in years gon~ by'' .Y.J What 
this meant in quantitative terms' is unclear. By contrast to the greater 
numbers of the past, there were only of the order of 8 to 10 annual 
convictions of sirdars during the early nineteen hundreds.36 Neither 
the figures nor the observed trend m~ be regarded as telling much about 
the true extent of assault by sirdars. If account is taken of the 
constraints placed on workers who wished to lay charges of assault 
before a magistrate, most notably the need for a pass to do so; if 
consideration is given to the claim that there was pomplicity between 
colonial magistrates and sugar interests;37 if there was "screening". of 
guilty sirdars by owners; and if consideration is given to the large 
discrepancy between prosecutions and convictions for assault, then it is 
. difficult to imagine that official colonial data conveyed an accurate 
picture of sirdars' (or overseers') precise means of control. 
That sirdars were entrusted with controlling the work of gangs and 
disciplining them too, meant also that it was mainly upon t-heir word 
that employers gauged the worth of individual workers. The relative 
35 ·Protector of Inm:igrants, Report for 1m. 
36 Ibid., Amrual Reports, 1900 - 1910. 
37 See Thompson, "Indian Immigration". 
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anonymity of the gang worker in the employer's eyes; the fact that 
physical strength or dexterity were the criteria by which workers were 
assigned to particular gangp; and the sirdar's conferred authority, were 
in combination the factors which determined whether a worker stayed in 
the fields or was assigned to the sugarmill. The role of the sirdar and 
the arbitrariness of this state of affairs were in themselves structural 
controls which functioned within the context of simple control. 
Sirdars represented the continuity of organisational principles which 
had been born of the plantation system. But if the sirdar's role was 
preserved, his relationship with the sugarocratic owner-operative became 
increasingly impersonal as the owner's role as operative changed. 
Expansion and centralisation demanded a di verse complex of technical 
expertise as much as they did capital. Within four or five decades of 
the beginning of Natal's sugar history it was no longer possible for a 
sugarmill owner to command ubiquitous authority as employer and 
operative at once; a factor which did not prevent him from maintaining a 
specialised interest in a particular facet of production. Whereas most 
early sugarocrats in Natal were immersed in sugarmilling as owner-
operati ves, ·it went beyond the ability of individual sugarocrats 
indefinitely to exercise personal surveillance over sugarmill employees, 
let alone become proficient with their every task. With the passage of 
time, a combination of exp:mded capital in sugarmilling, technological 
change, and a growing complexity in the sugarmill's division of labour, 
necessitated the delegation of sugarocratic authority in an ever more 
complex manner. As the sugarocracy's powers of surveillance became 
increasingly reliant on an exp:mding network of control over employees, 
machines, and processes, other changes, primarily in the technical 
sphere, brought into existence impersonal mechanisms of ·Control. 
256 
Instead of seeing in these changes a straight-forward sequence of 
delegation, and the growing remoteness of sugarocrats from control at· 
the point of production, the corresponding changes in levels of various 
employees' authority and autonomy need also to be considered for their 
reverberating effect on the control process. In this way the full 
spectrum of control devices operative within the sugarmills, whether 
within or beyond the purview of individual sugarocrats, ma;y be exposed, 
as ma;y the structural im:t:ediments to sugarocratic and managerial control 
over sugarmill work. 
'· Managing Directors, General Managers, and Factory Managers 
The stratum of individuals closest to the sugarocracy when its 
respective empires expanded, and immediately responsible for the 
exercise of sugarocratic control, were those managing directors and 
general managers who did not belong to the sugarocracy as such. These 
individuals to whom sugarocratic authority was extended held wide powers 
which enabled each to make a personal impression on some facet of 
sugarmilling history. Although certain of them attained their positions 
after a series of promotions within the sugarmills, they came more 
frequently from outside the sphere of sugarmill work, sometimes 
beginning as comµmy secretaries. In any event they were a small group 
of sugarocratic lieutenants, for there were at any one time few 
pos~tions of general manager and managing director, and these were often 
occupied by members of the sugarocracy. The role played by the 
Mauritian A.Boulle as Tongaat's general manager in the 1910s and 20s 
reached virtually legendary proportions.38 A contemporary of Boulle's 
was A.Warner, who was born in Scotland in 1866. After working as a 
38 See R.G.T.Watson, Tongaati: An African Experiment. London: Hutchinson, 
1960, passim. 
257 
young man as a sugar estate manager in Trinidad, he spent some years 
cattle ranching in Venezuela, and 'then in 1904 crune to Natal to join the 
staff of the Tinley Manor sugarmill, of which he soon became manager. 
In 1908 he was appointed manager of the new Amatikulu suga.rmill, and in 
1920 he became general manager of Hulett's Zululand operations. Seven 
years before his death in 1948 he was made alternate for Sir L.Lyle on 
the Hulett' s board of directors.39 
A younger incumbent of the sort of position occupied by Boulle and 
Warner was R.H.Waring, who came to South Africa in 1901, five years 
' 
after his birth in Lancashire. He joined Crookes Bros. at Renishaw in 
1921, and was later transferred to C.G.Smi th & Co.. After a spell as 
secretary of Illovo Sugar Estates, in association with S.F. and 
V.Crookes, he was.returned to C.G.Smith in 1935. In 1938 he became 
administrative manager of Reynolds Bros.' estates, and in 1952 he rose 
to the position of general manager of Pongola sugarmill.40 
By contrast to the above three individuals, H.W.Shuker was appointed as 
Hulett's Zululand general manager in 1954 after a 35-year career as 
artisan and engineer in Natal sugarmills. Born in Sheffield in 1894, he 
was apprenticed as a fitter in the Darnall sugarmill in 1919. After 
promotion to second engineer of Amatikulu sugarmill, he was in 1929 made 
manager of Emoyeni sugarmill, "the training ground of many of Huletts' 
leading engineers". There followed appointments as chief engineer and 
then as manager of Amatikulu and, two years before becoming a general 
manager, as manager of Felixton sugarmill. 41 
Although being a factory manager was not a pre-requisite, it was 
39 SASJ 32:10(1948), p.635. 
40 SASJ 41:11 (1957), p.919. 
41 SASJ 52:2(1968), p.135. 
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unlikely that any other sugarmill-based person would be appointed to the 
position of general manager. Factory managers in Natal were until World 
War II invariably engineers. These engineers were usually immigrants 
from either Mauritius or Scotland; Scottish engineers being highly 
regarded, as was the milling plant that was imported from Scotland. 
Most of the north coast sugarmills were at some time administered by 
Mauritians, as were some of the south coast sugarmills. This 
characteristic feature reflected the general links between the sugar 
industries of Mauritius and Natal, and also the more particular and 
' 
personal contacts between owners and managerial personnel in the two 
regions. There were strong connections between the early Saunders' and 
Mauritius, and J .L.Hulett personally recruited a Mauritian IQ.anager who 
had first come to Tinley Manor as a consultant in 1903, and who 
subsequently worked for Hulett and his compmy for some forty years.42 
This latter manager, E.Boulle (not directly related to Tongaat's 
A.Boulle), was one of the Mauritian settlers in Natal who was visited in 
1915 by F.North Coombes, a compatriot of some standing amongst managers 
in Mauritius; the visitor was also received by some of Natal's 
sugarocrats; he was made three offers of work in the Natal sugar 
industry; and he was disappointed when his proposal to fill the 
vacancies of factory manager and chief chemist at Mount Edgecombe was 
refused on the grounds that his salary would exceed that of the chief 
engineer.43 The importance of personal contacts amongst managers in 
Natal and Mauritius, and between them and the local sugarocracy, is 
illustated by this episode; it also conveys an idea of how exclusive the 
engineer/manager stratum was within the pre-World War II sugarmills. 
42 ''Darnall Area Annals", Womens' Institute, no date. 
43 North Coombes, Champs et Moulin.pp.306-307. 
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Technologists' Authority and Pan-Boilers' AutonoII\Y . 
The sequence of promotions whereby senior technical personnel in Natal 
achieved their status before World War II was similar in the engineering 
and process departments. Following an ·apprenticeship and service as an 
artisan and journeyman, a fitter and turner might then have been 
selected for promotion to the posi-tion of foreman or shift engineer, 
then to second engineer awaiting a vacancy for a chief engineer. To 
climb beyond the position of foreman or shift engineer was the most 
important step, and by the mid-1930s it was already considered 
improbable that an "average fitter without technical training or 
administrative ability" could ever become a chief engineer.44 An 
anecdotal reference to the stature of the chief engineer bears 
repetition: it has been recalled that before World War II, at Mount 
F.dgecombe, 
lined up on the verandah outside the offices, squatting 
in their isabella coloured rags, were ten or a dozen 
little chok:ras - small Indian boys. These were runners, 
and the moment anyone in the offices yelled "Boy!", the 
first in line would spring into action and dash off on 
the message. But Fred [the chief engineer] had his own 
special runner who al weys followed him round the factory 
wherever he went, carrying a great big enamel teapot4~d a cup, and who never answered except to Fred's call. ? 
Technological change and industrial legislation during the late 1930s 
and early 1940s necessitated a division of his labour. As the president 
of SASTA put it, 
I am glad to notice that many compmies have appointed 
assistant certificated engineers to take over the 
routine duties. This will allow the chief engineer to 
give more study to developing his plant for their 
arduous work, attending to Government requirements 
concerning labour and machinery and devising means to 
r 
44 "President's Address", Proceedi.ng3, SASTA 10( 1936). 
45 Condenser ~:5(1967), pp.6-7. 
overcome the rising costs caused through shorter day 
legislat41>on and through plants running to full 
capacity. 
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The function of senior engineers had thus grown to embrace bureaucratic 
work in addition to responsibilities of a purely technical nature, and 
it had stronger control connotations .than that of senior chemists. 
The other route to seniority was that which began for cane-testers and 
bench chemists when they were placed in the sugarmill as process 
operators or supervisors. Thereaf'ter they might have been promoted to 
factory overseer, in which case they fell in line for promotion to 
assistant chemist and ultimately chief chemist. However chief chemists 
were not faced with the same prospects as chief engineers for eventual 
promotion to top management, and the factory manager of a pre-World War 
II sugarmill was typically a former chief engineer. 
In most sugar producing countries chemists had not been favourably 
looked upon by owners and engineers alik~ until as recently as World War 
I, and in Natal for some time thereafter.47 Like their counterparts 
abroad, sugarmill owners in Natal had very limited knowledge of 
theoretical and analytical chemistry before World War I, and they 
displayed a scepticism of chemical control. Prejudice and jealousy 
moved them and their managers - engineers with many years of "on-the-
job" experience- to be outspoken about their reluctance to intr?duce 
chemical control. Although the technically advanced Mount Edgecombe 
sugarmill had appointed its first chemist, a Mauritian, in 1908,48 the 
prejudice of Natal sugarmillers was still in 1918 found to be 
46 "President's Address", Proceedings, SASTA 14(1941). 
47 The "rift" that existed between engineers and chemists in Natal was 
noted in an article on "The Status of the Sugar Factory Chemist" in 
SASJ 6:3(1922), pp.193-197. 
48 SASJ 60:10(1976), p.785. 
commonplace.49 Indeed, C.G.Smi th himself conceded that 
I am one of the people who used to say "I don't think 
these Chemists know anything about it at all." But I 
have come to the conclusion that I was the fool there ••• 
I have visited several of the sugar countries, and made 
a little money out of the East Coast. We had a very 
fine factory there that had no chemical control 
whatever, but directly we- im p:>sed chemical control there 
we made a lot of money.JU 
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It goes without saying that the absence of chemical control during the 
first two decades of the twentieth century reflected the absence of 
chemists. Change from this state of affairs and in the direction of 
\ 
chemical control was erratic, as Osborn outlined in a draft chapter of 
; 
"Sweet Concord". Osborn's notes, which were based largely on a paper 
published in the SASJ during 1937, traced the origins of chemical 
control in Natal back to 1887, when a chemist from Jamaica was taken on 
at the Blackburn sugarmill and 
his request that a laboratory be built for him were 
looked upon with mild amusement. 
But he was asked to go ahead, 'and soon found himself in 
trouble with the panboiler, who was suspicious, and 
quite unfriendly. The panboiler had proved himself, the 
newcomer had not. The upshot was inevitable. For the 
next eighteen years until the mi15
1
closed down, [his] 
instruments and apparatus lay idle. 
Although there were chemists employed during the early 1900s, and 
W .Campbell had tried in 1913, and W.E~R.Ed wards in 191 5, to introduce 
chemical control across the industry, 
The time was not ripe. There was too much prejudice 
against modern methods, too
2
much reserve, and a great 
lack of co-operative spirit.? · 
And in 1922 the growers' protagonist, Heaton Nicholls, pondered 
what Mr Saunders would have said if I had gone to him 
some years ago and asked him for figures. It is only 
recently that one mill would disclose its figures to 
49 SASJ 1:10(1918), p.733. 
50 "Opening Address", Proceedings, SASTA 8(1934). 
51 R.F.Osborn, "Sweet Concord", p.364. 
52 Ibid., p.365. 
another mill ••• There is not a single chemical result 
published in the Sugar Journal
5
in all its existence 
relating to a South African Mill. ) 
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After t~e signing of the Fahey Agreement in 1926, and against the 
background of a deteriorating world sugar market, there was an ''unusual 
exµmsion of chemical control",54 as well as a growth in the number· of 
sugarmills which reported their performances for comparative purposes 
(see Table 12). 
TABLE 12: SUGARMILLS REPORTING ON CHEMICAL 
CONTROL, 1925-1931 
SUGARMILLS IN SUGARMILLS 
OPERATION REPORTING 
1925/26 25 11 
1926/27 23 13 
1927/28 21 14 
1928/29 25 14 
1929/30 25 16 
'· 1930/31 23 17 
Source: Proceedings, South African Sugar Tech-
nologists' Association 4 ( 1930) and 6 
(1932). 
Engineers remained cautious about chemists throughout the 1920s, and it 
was only in the 1930s that their jealousy was noticed to have given way 
53 TAD, K 39, Vol.3, Heaton Nicholls to Sugar Commission, 20.4.1922. 
54 "Report of Committee on Training of Sugar House Apprentices", 
Proceedings, SASTA 4 ( 1930), pp. 108-11 O. 
263 
td co-operation.55 Interestingly, C.G.Smi th expressed the view in 1934 
that 
I should like to see the Technologists [engineers and 
chemists] get much closer .in touch with each other ••• but 
I do not know how much the despots, that is the-1ianaging 
Directors, are going to stop this development.56 
This opinion on the amount of autonomy enjoyed by technologists m~ well 
have been shared by the SASTA president who remarked later in the 1930s 
that "In/ many instances, the Sugar Factory Engineer and Chemist have to 
deal with and take orders from individuals and groups of men who are 
non-technical11 .57 
Chemists had on their part shown concern for their status. Having 
thrown their weight behind SASTA in its formation in 1926, and at its 
annual congresses thereafter, chemists' expressed their felt need for 
collective organisation and made calls also for the registration of 
chemists and control ave~ their qualifications.58 They did not ever 
create an autonomous body, but in SASTA they were able to establish 
closer rapport with engi??-eers. By providing a forum, independent of · 
owners and their companies, within which the findings of engineering, 
chemical, and agricultural research could be aired, SASTA embodled the 
sense of mutual occupational interests amongst its members. Upon . the 
initiative of its members, the practice of annually analysing data from 
collaborating sugarmills was done under SASTA auspices. SASTA also 
promoted formal contact with overseas technologists by calling on SASA 
to send delegates to congresses of the International Society of Sugar 
Technologists.5~ It was in this manner that engineers and chemists 
spontaneously (as for example Herisson of Verulam's Central Factory did 
55 ''President's Address", Proceedings, SASTA 10(1936). 
56 "Opening Address", Proceeding;:3, SASTA 8(1934). 
57 "President's Address", Proceedi~, SASTA 11 (1937). 
58 See Proceedings, SASTA 3(1929). 
59 See Proceeding;:3, SASTA 5(1931 ). 
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by inventing a· water-cooled crystalliser in the late 1920s)60 provided 
the research infrastructure for the Natal sugarmills until 1949, when 
the SMRI was established by sugarmillers with the co-operation of the 
state. However, despite the suppo~tive role played by SASTA, chemists 
had generally still not al together achieved parity with engineers by 
World War II. 
Although some chief chemists had been eligible before World War II for 
promotion to the position of factory manager, their payment was, by · 
contrast to that of factory managers and chief engineers never 
deliberately kept secret. · This privatised relationship between owners, 
factory managers and engineers was something which lent emphasis to 
their relative authority. How that authority was exercised may have 
depended upon the level of personal involvement of sugarocrats in the 
running of their sugarmills, but because it was based on technical 
acumen, engineers and factory managers were endowed with claims to a 
particular type of authority, quite distinct from that of non-technical 
superordinates. 
Apa.rt from technical ex~rtise, factory managers and engineers had to be 
seen to have the ability to wield that authority over designated 
. 
subordinates. On this issue it is illuminating to pursue the 
I 
observation that the destination of enigr~ Mauritian managers was not 
confined solely to Natal, and that their pres~nce in the sugarmills of 
Mo9ambique since the early 1900s was suggestive of noteworthy 
similarities in employer practices in the two colonies. In Mo~bique 
the largest sugarmilling venture had mainly Scottish engineers, as well 
as Mauritian managers, chemists, and operatives. Two of Mo~bique's 
sugarmills were for some time owned by Natal sugarmillers, and in the 
60 SASJ 13:5(19~9), p.275. 
265 
case of C.G.Smith's sugarmill on the Buzi river, "skilled white men were 
placed in the key positions, assisted by educated Mauritians, Demeraras 
and Blantyre boys [sic]11.61 That Mauritian managers in particular could 
be so readily accommodated during the early stages of suga.rmilling in 
both Natal and Mo9Blllbique, showed that they were equally at home in two 
foreign regions with structurally different but comparably coercive 
labour systems. In other words, Mauritius had proved itself.in the 
period before World War II to be a perfect seed-bed for sugarmill 
managers in a labour coercive context: Mauritius was a relatively 
advanced sugar producing country capable of yielding experienced men, 
and it displayed all the trappings of colonialism which contributed to a 
managerial consciousness within which any questioning of the status quo 
could not be countenanced. In Mauritius managers were accustomed to 
being addressed by workers as bourzois (bourgeois), and in Natal (or 
Mo9Blllbique) they were unlikely to tolerate anything short of complete 
servility from workers, many of whom had first-hand acquaintance with 
Mauritian managerialism. 
I 
Amongst those who were best acquainted with Mauritian maµagers in 
Natal's sugarmills were those pan-boilers who came from Mauritius. Many 
of the early pan-boilers were attracted from Mauritius, where vacuum 
pans had been in use for some thirty years before being installed in 
Natal, and by the turn of the twentieth century they dominated by 
numbers (see Figure 20) and by reputation in the specialised sphere of 
pan-boiling. ·Although the practice of employing Indian pan-boilers 
originated contemporaneously with the employment of the first Mauritian 
pan-boilers, it was on a very much smaller scale. Freed by then from 
their indentures, these Indian pan-boilers were considerably better 
61 R.F.Osborn, C.G.: A Great Natalian: A Biograpey of Sir Charles George 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































remunerated than other free Indian workers, but far less so than the 
Mauritian pan-boilers who became by tradition the masters of the pan 
floor in Natal. 
The number of enigr~ Mauritian pan-boilers (many of whom were regarded 
as "creoles") grew until about the turn of the twentieth century, after 
which time their expertise could be depended upon for the training of 
successors. That there have been Indians and non-Mauritian whites 
amongst these successors stresses the anomalous nature of the pan-
boiler' s position in the South African context. These latter pan-
boilers, the non-Mauritians, were to be found primarily in- the 
sugarmills of the south coast but also in the smaller sugarmills of the 
north coast. In one particularly interesting case a white apprentice 
pan-boiler was taught in the 1930s by two Indian artisans, one of whose 
sons subsequently served his apprenticeship under the white pan-
boiler.62 
Although the training of pan-boilers was for 'ail intents and purposes 
undertaken as an apprenticeship, trainees were not accommodated when in 
1948 the Apprenticeship Committee for the Sugar Manufacturing and 
Refining Industry was formed by the Department of Labour. They were 
treated instead in the same way as learner factory overseers or bench, 
chemists, who became qualified after a specified period of experience as 
assistant to a person already deemed qualified. For a learner pan-
boiler this meant a three-year spell as assistant to a qualified pan-
boiler, at a higher rate of P8¥ than either learner overseers and bench 
chemists, both of whom served for five years as learners, or 
apprenticed artisans, who fell under statutory regulations. These P8¥ 
differentials reflected the ambiguity of the pan-boiler's position of 
62 Illovo Digest (April 1971 ) , p.8. 
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dependence/independence. Like overseers and bench chemists, their 
knowledge had little relevance outside the sugarmill; their 
vulnerability, which stemmed from such relative dependence, was 
countered by their self-conscious independence and resourcefulness. 
A survey reported in 1943 showed that pan control instruments were not 
then in general use in Natal,63 and until the late 1940s the pan-boilers 
of Natal still worked within an aura of artisanal "secrecy'1.64 In 1947 
the Board of Trade and Industries reported that "The greatest divergence 
of method between mills was noted in pan boiling. This process is still 
regarded as a somewhat mysterious art and every pan boiler makes use of 
his o.wn particular methods". 65 Whereas formerly crystals of consistent 
size and quality could only be obtained under an expert pan-boiler's 
tight control, the cuitometer, in the words of a Natal sugar 
technologist, "enabled one who had no previous experience, to boil a pan 
of sugar as easily as they ,could11.66 This was perhaps an overstatement 
of the situation, but pan-boilers must have made a similar assessment of 
the cui tometer's potential, as they did not welcome its arrival with 
open arms. Indeed, they were regarded by technologists to resent any 
) 
manner of interference, let alone when it threatened to lay bare their 
secrets. 
In 1951 some technologists had forecast that extensive experience with 
\ 
the cui tometer would lead the way to automatic pan control, 67 and there 
63 R.M.Bechard, "Survey of Pan Boiling Practice in the South African 
Sugar Industry", Proceedings, SASTA 17(1943), pp.36-40. 
64 A.E.Rabe, "Some Experiences with Conductivity Control of Pan 
Boiling", Proceedings, SASTA 25(1951), pp.52-56. 
65 Board of Trade and Industries, Report N9 298, The South African Sugar 
Industry, 194 7. 
66 Rabe, "Conductivity Control". 
67 See discussion of Rabe, "Conductivity Control" in Proceedings, SASTA 
25 ( 1951 ) • 
------------ ----------------------- - ---------------------------. 
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was little doubt that with the appearance of the instrument, the death 
lmell had been sounded for the "finger and thumb" method by which the 
pan-boiler decided when to "seed" (or "grain") the syrup in the vacuum 
pan, and when to stop crystal growth and "strike" the pan. 68 However, 
experimentation throughout the 1950s was indicative of the technical 
problems that complemented pan-boilers' prejudice to prevent the rapid 
instrumentation of pan-boiling. 69 Thus persisted the "finger and thumb" 
me.thod in many Natal sugar mills: few innovations were so slowly 
diffused through the Natal sugarmills during the twentieth century as 
~ instrumentation. 
Despite the threatened erosion of artisanal pan-boiling skills during 
the 1950s, the old pan-boilers still retained considerable autonomy.70 
Although their own jobs were not jeopardised and their knowledge 
remained viable and necessary, artisanal pan-boilers were witnesses to 
the process that destined their skills for redundancy. 
At a more general level the instrumentation of pan control had two major 
ramifications: on the one hand it meant that artisans would be replaced 
by schooled but unskilled operators, and on the other h~d, as a 
technologist noted in 1954, "A corollary to the elimination of th~ pan 
boiler's judgement in graining, is that the responsibility for the final 
crystal size moves from the pan boiler to the Factory Manager11.71 Both 
of these developments, which proceeded through the 1960s, reflected the 
extension of bureaucratic control to the pan f1.oor. The final stage in 
68 C.L.Steyn, "Molasses Graining and the Magma System under Natal 
Conditions", Proceedings, SASTA 28(1954), pp.117-119. · 
69 See the article by pan-boiler A.F.Ducasse, "An Aid to Pan Boiling", 
Proceedings, SASTA 28 ( 1 954), pp. 115-116. ' _ 
70 This was emphasised in the case of a retired pan-boiler who was 
specially contracted to lend his wisdom on a Natal pan floor during 
two troublesome seasons in the 1980s. 
71 E.Beesley, "Some Notes on 'True' Seeding of Vacuum Pans", 
Proceedings, SASTA 28( 1954), pp.111-114. 
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the break-down of artisanal autonomy on the pan floor would come with 
full automation. 
The pan-boiler, it has been argued, personified the final strain of 
artisanal production in the industrialised sugarmill, yet his origins 
could be traced to the period of transition from plantation to 
industrialised sugarmilling. His raison d'etre was the un-instrumented 
vacuum pan, an artefact of scientific application which still had to 
have severed from it its human component. Until the threshold of 
t 
instrumentation was crossed, the pan-boiler was afforded relative 
privilege, particularly if he fully appreciated the value of his 
"secret" resources. 
The Development of Structural Control 
Each of the various agents discussed above had their positions within 
the technical division of labour and their status within the 
occupational hierarchy altered as structural (bureaucratic and 
technical) control developed within the sugarmill. The course of that 
development is now sketched; the first issue to be considered being the 
bureaucratisation of formal and direct control over sugarmill workers. 
As has already been indicated, the agent most immediately responsible 
for the control of workers at the point of production has historically 
been the sirdar - the earliest J>ersonification of structural control in 
the SUgflrmill, and whose authority has remained a fundamental comp:>nent 
of Telationships within the racially divided.sugarmill workforce. A 
special characteristic of the sirdar in Natal is that he has shared his 
occupational status with the induna. The sirdar and the induna have 
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performed identical functions, but usually with respect to Indian and 
African workers respectively (and thus frequently in specific 
departments of work). Although language considerations did not define 
their mutual role, sirdars and indunas have been appointed primarily 
according to the ability to interpret commands and supervise their 
execution. The essential difference then between them has been an issue 
of ascribed ethnicity. The nomenclature itself lays stress on the issue 
of ethnic differentiation, in the sense that the term induna was adopted 
from the Nguni denotation for various strata of state functionaries, 
including military officers, and it has been a title tra.di tionally and 
in the sugar industry conferred from above. 
Though sirdars and indunas are symbols of a racial system of control, 
they are themselves subject to that system. This system was in the pre-· 
World War II period an "organic" part of the larger system of the racial 
division of labour, in that it had no person specifically assigned to 
regulate it. Despite legislation to the effect that employers of over 
fifty black workers should employ a compound manager,72 and despite 
suggestions that were ma.de by government officials in the early 1920s, 
to the effect that compound managers should be employed by sugarmillers 
more or less as welfare officers over black workers,73 few compound 
managers were to be found. in the pre-World War II sugar villages.74 
When, after the War, the employment of compound managers became the rule 
rather than the exception, these men were given authority over compound 
72 Act N\' 15 of 1911 ("Native Labour Recruiting Act"). 
73 See TAD, GNLB 308, Notes of Meeting, 26.11.1919. 
74 This fact was ma.de evident when the information upon which Table 4 is 
based was collected. An exception, J.R.Saunders, had during 1910 
announced that as a large employer he was "forced to keep a European 
compounder" (NLA Debates, Vol.49, 417-424, 12.1.1910). The powers 
vested in the compound manager could be abused, as was found when 
Gledhow's compound manager was convicted in 1936 for a number of 
thefts and for accepting payment from workers in return for positions 
in the sugannill (SASJ 10:9(1936), p.553). 
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inmates. They took charge of the nutrition, discipline, and often the 
recruitment and dismissal of African sugarmill workers. In this.sense, 
the racial system of control was more formally institutionalised. 
The comp:>und manager symbolised the bridge between' simple control and 
bureaucratic. control.· When personnel management was generally 
established by the sugar comp:uiies as a headquarters function during the 
' 
1960s, the compound manager could have been regarded as the final link 
in that particular chain of control. His own functions were re-defined 
in accordance with the re-naming of compound managers as labour managers 
in the wake of the exp:uision of personnel management, and he was until 
the very end of the sugarocratic era generally the only agent of that 
branch of management who was based in a sugar village. It was usually 
he who was placed in command of the village police force, which also 
became highly regimented during the 1960s. Uniforms and ranks were 
given to these policemen; 75 they were subjected to militaristic 
discipline; 76 and they were paraded before employees on occasions such 
as when long-service awards were made.TI 
Structural control in the sense of technical control and the "inversion" 
of the worker/machine relationship, can be said to have had its origins 
in South African sugarmills during the 1960s. There have historically 
been only two skills to speak of which were exclusive to the sugarmill, 
namely those of the erstwhile sugarmasters and those of the pan-boiler. 
It has been shown how sugarmasters were dispensed with before 
sugarmilling commenced in Natal, while the pan-boilers' skills have only 
in the last two decades come under meaningful assault. The factors 
which have undermined pan-boiling skills have also produced a situation 
75 See Figure 12. 
76 See for example Smi thlink 2: 6 ( 1980) , p. 12. 
TI See Condenser J88Sim. 
\ 
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where growing numbers of sugarmill workers have their work-days 
regulated by the performance of the automated machinery under their 
constant gaze. With the exception of events on the pan floor, the 
altered relationship between workers and.machines has implied the 
transformation of semi-skilled work. Manual operatives have been 
replaced by "operators" who are adequately schooled to be able to 
respond to the controls of automated plant. Change at the level of 
sugarmill management was seen in the general post-1960s trend of process 
managers being appointed above chief chemists, or replacing them, and in 
l 
the possibilities that developed for promotion from process management 
to factory management - the chief engineer was no longer implicitly the 
heir apparent to factory management. 
The development of structural control in the above sense meant more than 
the expansion of bureaucracy and transformations in the personnel 
structures of labour control and technical control.78 In addition to, 
and complementary to, these changes there emerged extra-work 
institutions, on the one hand, and organisational means of conducting 
capital/labour relations on the other hand (both of which are more fully 
analysed in Chapters 7 and 8 ). The former institutions were related to 
the employers' quest for stable work relations through identification 
with the sugar comp:mies, and the latter had to do with the management 
of employees' material demands. Employees' identification with the 
sugar comp:mies was sought through such devices as long-service awards 
and company journals, and through the community-building programmes 
which are discussed in the next chapter; the articulation of a "comp:my 
philosophy" was another means to this end. The much-publicised "Tongaat 
78 SASA 's Personnel Consultant, T. Vogel (Interviewed, Durban, 
11.9.1985), would argue that one of the most progressive steps taken 
by the sugarocracy was the appointment of professionals, such as 
Vogel himself, in the early 1960s. 
philosophy" was formulated along the lines of 
a philosophy of food, family life, and freedom from fear 
for all, regardless of race, colour or creed, welded 
together with a sense of pride and belonging. We [the 
Tongaat Sugar Company] have gone to extreme lengths to 
create in the mind of the individual what is good and 
what is best ••• 
••• Our problem is one of multi-nationalism and it is 
only through partnership that we can attain progress, 
and progress is pros%ri ty and we believe that 
prosperity is contagious. 
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In 1980 the "Tongaat philosophy" was expmded to indicate the compmy's 
support for 
free collective bargaining ••• [negotiations with] 
registered trade unions ••• [ which would] best be ~rved 
by the developnent of multiracial industry unions. 
These were all essentially one-wB¥ processes, conceived of and projected 
by sugarmillers. By contrast, the management of employees' material 
demands involved dialogue and c?nflict. 
Until the first Wage Determination was made in 1942 (and the subsequent 
establishment of the Industrial Council for the Sugar Manufacturing and 
Refining Industry in 1947), wages and other expenditures on labour were 
determined unilaterally by sugarmillers. Although the 1942 Wage 
Determination involved dialogue it did not embody negotiations as such; 
the registration of the Industrial Council had to be awaited before a 
modicum of negotiation was possible. 
The first Industrial Council wage agreements were concluded between 
employers, on the one hand, and the Amalgamated Engineering Union 
(AEU)(large artisan union), the Sugar Industry Employees' Association 
(SIEA)(small white union), 81 and the NSiill (Indian "parallel" union) on 
79 SASJ 52: 7 ( 1 968) , p:p. 589-593. 
00 Mrosibomvu 20 ( 1900) ' p. 1 • 
81 See I.L.Walker and B.Weinbren, 2000 Casualties - A History of the 
Trade Unions and the Labour Movement in the Union of South Africa. 
Johannesburg: South African Trade Union Council, 1961, p.377. 
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the other hand. From 1949 to 1971, inclusive, wage schedules were 
separately drawn up for skilled workers, and for semi-skilled and 
unskilled workers. In the case of skilled workers' wages, workers' 
representation on the Industrial Council was made through the AEiJ, the 
SIEA, and, since 1961, the South African Electrical 'Workers' 
Association; the NSIEU was the sole union involved with semi-skilled and 
unskilled workers' WS{59 negotiations. The 1974 determination reflected 
the re-integration of the two sectors of the Industrial Council, which 
was enlarged when the 1979 and 1981 determinations were made,. by the 
inclusion of the South African Boilermakers', Iron and Steel Workers', 
Shipbuilders' and Welders' Society, and the National Union of Sugar 
· Manufacturing and Refining Employees (NUSMRE)(African), respectively. 
While the creation of the Industrial Council represented a further step 
tow.fl.rds greater bureaucratic control over workers, it also stood as a 
form of control over sugarmillers. Having called the tune until 1942, 
sugarmillers were not prepared to allow their role in the wage 
determination process be subordinated to an institutional structure 
which they did not ultimately control. In the early years of the 
Industrial Council's existence, it is shown in Chapter 8, employers-had -
played an obstructionist role by trying to hamper the organisational 
work of the NSIEU. Although coercion in this context seems to have been 
strongest in the 1940s and early 1950s, employers did not remove 
themselves from the sphere of workers' organisation. In the 1960s they 
were said in at least one instance to be involved in union affairs,?2 
and after 1973 they collectively gave considerable attention to the 
formation and functioning of the works and liaison committees which they 
portrayed as democratic organs for black workers' representation. Such 
82 P.L.van den Berghe, Caneville: The Social Structure of a South 
African Tovn. Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1964, p.97. 
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was the background to the "within the family" ideology which has been 
sustained by employers since the early-1970s. 
The employers' campaign to keep wage negotiations strictly "within the 
family" developed from about the time that it was conceded by a 
sugarmiller, in 1971 , that "the wage scales at best have been a matter 
of tra.di tion. Anomalies were therefore the rule" .83 Later that year 
C.J.Saunders had argued ~hat "employers should cease viewing workers in 
racial groups, and to start thinking of them as men, co-workers and 
I 
fellow ci tizens11.84 Employers were spurred on in the direction 
suggested by these pronouncements after the relevant legislation was 
provided in 1973 to create works and liaison committees at each 
sugarmill - in the case of Tonga.at this meant the re-designation of the 
Non-European Advisory Committee which the company had established in 
1962.85 Then in April 1976, when African representatives were for the 
first time admitted to the Industrial Council, this representation was 
made by 6 delegates elected from a joint committee of the existing works 
and liaison committees. These latter committees were made up of 
workers selected under employers' control, and in the case of Tongaat, 
the employers provided their liaison committee with training at 
Hilton.86 It could not under these circumstances have been unexpected 
when a particular works committee's chairman declared in 1976 that 
to-day, we have a very fine worker/management 
relationship. This means that we have achieved a good 
understanding with management of our mutual problems and 
aspirations. With this in mind we_would not like to see 
trade unions come onto the scene.~f -
Though he might have been dissatisfied when the NUSMRE was founded in 
83 ''President's Address", Proceedings, SASTA 45(1971 ). 
84 SASJ 55:9(1971) p.493 •. 
85 Condenser (1976~, pp.50-51. . 
86 Ibid. 
ITT Cmdenser ( 1 976 ) , pp. 3-7. 
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1980, the Union was launched with the backing of employers. 
According to the proponents of the "within the family" ideology, all 
dealings and negotiations between employers and sugarmill workers should 
be amicably conducted without interference from "outside". As one 
senior industrial relations manager in the industry put it, 
Do you not think that, provided our sugar workers are 
given the basic rights of organisation, negotiation and· 
- where necessary - even to strike, that it would be 
better to meet with employers in the industry 
themselves, rather than through some nationally 
organised trade union which might represent a wide 
spread of industrial interests.89 
This view took for granted the membership of white sugarmill workers in 
such unions, and that employers themselves had "a wide spread of 
industrial interests" (or for that matter that sugarmillers were said in 
1960 to have colluded in ?- "gentleman'.s agreement" to keep wages to the 
minima laid down by the Industrial Council).89 The ideology is founded 
upon the employers' definition of who constitutes the paterfamilias and 
who the kindred. When the NUSMRE went to court during 1982 and won its 
case against C.G.Smith to have loading in cane trans-shipment zones 
classified as industrial work, employers had contested the issue on the 
grounds, inter alia, that the sphere of Industrial Council agreements 
ended at the factory fence.90 Clearly employers, as millers-cum-
planters, place themselves at the head of two lineages, sugarmill 
workers and field workers, between which they strive to prevent 
association in the wage determination context. 
Sugarmillers presented an elaboration of the "within the family" 
ideology when they claimed that sugarmills were unscathed by statutory 
88 Ibid. 
89 van den Berghe, Caneville. p.140. 
90 Financial Mail 27.8.1982, p.1009. 
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job-reservation.91 When it was also claimed that all allusions to 
"racial and all other extraneous factors" were to be eliminated from 
wage agreements, 92 it was a claim which was unlikely to be realised 
given the current reality of the wage determination process. Although 
references to gender have been dropped from the most recent wage 
schedules, it remains to be seen whether this implies that women are to 
receive the same treatment as men and whether they are to be accepted to 
do any kind of work other than that which they currently do. 
Until 1983 the system of Industrial Council representation remained 
fundamentally "racial", not only in the sense of embracing racially-
di vided unions, but also with respect to the relative "bargaining" 
positions of the minute white sector of the workforce and the major 
black sector. Then in 1983 the Industrial Council's constitution was 
amended to give participating unions proportionate representation on the 
basis of one delegate per one thousand members. The balance of forces 
amongst workers' representatives on the Council was thus shifted in 
favour of the NUSMRE, which would have six delegates against the five 
other union representatives.93 It would seem that employers are poised 
to propose a further revision, possibly by trying to revert to a 
dualistic Industrial Council.94 
The notional "de-racialisation" ties in closely with claims regarding 
the narrowing of the ("racial") wage gap. As close scrutiny of wage 
91 SASJ 62:2(1979), p.65 
92 Ibid. 
93 Although the NUSMRE was relatively well-placed as an employees' 
· party, the first attempt at voting in the Industrial Council failed 
because the employers and the "white unions" constituted a bloc which 
could have its own way. An informal decision has been adopted to 
seek consensus in future, rather than to vote (Interview, E.Tough, 
Industrial Council Secretary, Durban, 9.9.1985 ). See B.Horlock, 
"Changing Face of Industrial Relations in the Industry", South 
African Sugar Year Book ( 1982-83), p.35. 
94 Ibid. 
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schedules will confirm, the lowest wages as a proportion of the highest 
wages have reflected a tendency of growth since the signing of the first 
agreement. In the schedules of the 1970s this "wage-narrowing" was 
accompanied by progressively improved leave and other conditions for 
semi- and unskilled workers.' With regard to these most recent 
agreements in particular, it would be valuable· to know in quantitative 
terms the extent to which the sector of sugarmill employees not covered 
by the agreements has been growing - before World War II only engineers 
and factory managers had constituted the sala,r:iat of the sugarmills; now 
the managerial/bureaucratic stratum is much expmded, and the highest 
wage-earners covered by the agreements are of relatively much lower 
occupational status today than they were yesteryear. Thus without 
examining the economic minutae of the issue it may tentatively be said 
that if the wage-gap is narrowing so too is the proportion.of the total 
sugarmilling workforce to which this notion relates narrowing. 
And regarding the minimum wages laid down in the Industrial Council 
schedules, the SALDRU study on Industrial Council wage rates has shown 
that despite the large growth of semi- and unskilled workers' wages 
between 1973 and 1983, in Natal "Not one labourer's wage rate exceeds 
the Supplementary Living Level. This means that ••• all labourers' 
minimum wages fall below the level considered necessary to live a life 
resembling decency" .95 This claim is rejected by the Industrial 
Council's secretary as untenable and based on outdated information.96 
Indeed, although during the sugarocratic era sugarmillers had-given the 
impression of being reluctant to negotiate in the Industrial Council, 
since the mid-1970s the Council has been portrayed by employers as being 
95 D.Budlender et al Industrial Council W~ Rates. Cape Town: SALDRU, 
1983, p.24. 94 Interview (to be detailed). 
96 Interview, E.Tough, op cit. 
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a vehicle for reform by consensus between them and their employees. 
Summary 
Simple and structural control are neither absolute nor mutually 
exclusive, and elements of both forms have co-existed in Natal's 
sugarmills since the industry was established. This co-existence was 
evident in the plantation sugarmill where the owner-operative relied 
upon a system of gang-labour within which the sirdar had the authority 
to motivate and discipline workers. 
As the industrialisation of sugarmilling intensified, and sugar 
companies expanded, sugarocratic authority was delegated to general 
managers' and factory managers. Wh~le general managers were, as 
essentially administrative chiefs, the first superordinate bureaucrats 
in sugarmilling, factory managers were charged with control over 
machinery and personnel at the point of production. The factory 
manager had a background ~n engineering, and in the pre-World War II 
period he and his subordinate engineers could lay claim to authority 
over the production process at large. During that period there was an 
obvious reluctance on the part of sugarocrats and engineers to admit 
chemists to the sugarmills, and when it was fully conceded in the wake 
of the 1925 sugar c;risis and the 1926 Fahey Conference Agreement that 
chemists had a role in the production process, the pattern of authority 
was not readily altered to accommodate the new-comers. 
The sugarocracy's deep-rooted confidence in machinery provided the basis 
for the continued inequality in the levels of authority vested in 
engineers and chemists respectively. However engineers had ~o sway in 
the sphere of pan-boiling, and the long-lasting autonomy of artisanal 
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pan-boilers reflected the limits of machine technology and mechanical 
specialists' authority. 
-After World War II the complexity of structural control developed apace 
both in the sense of bureaucratisation and technical control. Compound 
managers were employed universally as agents of control over African 
workers between their shifts, thus entrenching a sugarmill-domicile 
continuum; artisanal authority and autonomy were undermined by new 
technology; and the wage determination process was institutionalised. 
These developments had already had im10rtant ramifications for sugarmill 
labour by 1962, when the sugarocratic era closed. Since 1962, a new 
dimension was added to the developing pattern of control by the 
employers' use of ideology to inculcate workers' commitment to the sugar 
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Al though there is a long and depressing histc;>ry of workers housed by 
their industrialist employers, bourgeois owners have generally moved to 
concentrate their investments and control in the "hidden abode'' of 
prqdµction, leaving it to the state to r~gulate social and ideological 
reproduction. Company towns, and this embraces many if not the majority 
of' agro-industrial sugar complexes~ do not reflect this general 
tendency. In those regions where the sugar village has doubled as a 
site of production and reproduction, sugarmillers have taken on the role 
of a local state vis-fl-vis the village residents. 
As in the case of work relations, the extra-work relations amongst South 
Africa's sugar village residents have historically been conditioned by 
' structural and legislative factors over which the sugarocracy haa had no 
direct control. Where their own initiative has been applied to sugar 
village organisation, the Natal sugarocrats have shown themselves to 
have had a certain urtity of purpose and of practice. Their conformity 
to a number of written and unwritten "principles" regarding communi tj, 
ciass, and quotidian. culture were reflected in the physical 
infrastructure of the. sugar villages. This ''built environment" has had 
a bearing on the reproduction of the work relations discussed in the 
last three chapters. 
These prefactory remarks should not be taken to imply a recognition of 
the existence of sugarocratic hegemony. The limiting factor, that of 
e,mployees' responses, is discussed in Chapter 8, and in this chapter it 
is only sugarocratic aspirations and campaigns in the cause of hegemony 
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that are considered. After a general treatment of methods of 
suga.rocratic involvement in social control, the Natal case is dealt with 
in four sections. The first section covers the built environment and 
population structure of the sugar villages. The following three sections 
involve a chronological analysis of the sugarocracy's policies on 
village life until the end of the suga.rocratic period. 
Sugarocrats and Social Control 
During the later part of the nineteenth century, the sugarocrat in the 
Caribbean and in Portuguese America established his realm around his 
central.e, or usina. His agro-industrial complex represented the success 
of sugar production under a capitalist mode of production, although, as 
Ortiz had indicated with reference to Cuba in the early 1900s, it still 
retained certain pre-capitalist relations: 
It is a complete social organism, as live and complex as 
a city or municipality, or a baronial keep with its 
surrounding fief of vassals, tenants, and serfs ••• 
••• all forming a complete empire with subject 
colonies ••• all this huge feudal territory is practically 
outside the jurisdiction of pubtic law; the norms of 
private property hold sway there. 
In northeastern Brazil the usina also in certain respects represented 
the personal triumph of the sugarocrat over the plantation owner or 
senhor do engenho. Owners of central sugarmills which appeared in that 
region during the 1870s were prevented by charter from owning farm 
lands, and their zones of cane capture were also legally assigned; both 
devices were intended to protect the owners of engenhos. Once the 
scheme's failure had been reluctantly acknowledged, usinas were from the 
F.Ortiz, Cuban Counterpoint. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1947, quoted by 
S.W.Mintz, Foreword to Sugar and Society in the Caribbean, edited by 
R.Guerra y S!nchez. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964. 
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1880s successfully established on the lands of former engenhos.2 
The transition from engenhos to usinas was in other words more than a 
technological breakthrough in that it was attended by major social 
changes. Firstly, the ~sina was the property of bourgeois owners; 
secondly, it was kept in motion by wage-labourers;· thirdly, its owner 
had economic and political interests which distinguished him from the 
planter; and finally, although it exhibited strains of plantation 
culture, the usina's culture embraced industrial rather than agrarian 
relations. Notwithstanding these changes, which were coincident rather 
than discrete events, the central industrialised sugarmill retained one 
critically important attribute of the erstwhile plantation, but on a 
much vaster scale: 
Large industrial plants came into rural settings where 
economic units were characteristically small. The 
·central became the economic and social core of the 
entire community, to the point where the manufacturing 
enterprise ~ on a par with the constituted political 
authorities.-' 
This claim lent weight to Ortiz' observation that by virtue of law and 
tradition, sugarocrats in the abovementioned regions wielded , the same 
measure of control over the conditions of reproduction of their 
employees as had the plantocracy before them. Subsequent tendencies 
towards corporate sugarmill ownership, bureaucratic control, and 
heightened worker consciousness altered or eroded sugarocratic hegemony, 
yet certain continuities were perceptible in the social life of the 
sugar village. 
The transition to capitalism in the former plantation societies is a 
relatively recent phenomenon, two or three generations past, and this 
2 K.S.Taylor, Sugar and the Underdevelopment of Northeastern Brazil, 
1500-1970. Gainsville: University.of Florida Press, 1978, pp.68-69. 
3 B.C.Swerling and V.P.Timoshenko, The World's Sugar. Stanford: 
Stanford '(Jni versi ty Press, 1957, p. 7.1. 
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temporal aspect in itself had significance for the continuing impress of 
plantation culture on the sugar village. Moreover, .al though workers 
scored important victories in their struggles against employers, the 
transi t'ion to capitalism had not fundamentally upset the balance between 
the individuals who dominated and those who laboured in the societies in 
question. As Frederick Cooper put it, 
For slaves in many places and at many ti mes 
emancipation ••• has been a time of disillusionment as 
well as joy. The individUal plantation owner may have 
ceased to be lord and master over his slaves, but the 
planter class did not lose its power. 
There were two levels at which cultural practices with roots in the 
slave plantations continued in postr-slavery plantation societies. On the 
one hand, continuity was manifested broadly across the entire society, 
J 
and on the other hand it was manifested within the unit of sugar 
production. In the first instance the impress of racism, language, and 
rituals, on society are implied. Firstly, racism nurtured as a form of 
extra-economic control was entrenched in post...:'.s/°'-vey society, and the 
distinction between poverty and wealth could be drawn in terms of skin 
pigmentation. Thus twentieth century Cuban society has been analysed by 
reference to "colour-class" categories, 5 while it has been concluded 
that in Mauritius "plantation society retained its servile base after 
1842". 6 Secondly, the hybrid creole vernacular or patois endured the 
transition to capitalism as the language of the proletariat, while the 
language of those in power symbolised a link with seats of empire and 
metropolitan bourgeois culture. Thirdly, "African survivals" in the 
4 F.Cooper, From Slaves to Squatters. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1980, p.1. 
5 D.Booth, "Cuba, Color and the Revolution", Science and Society 
40:2( 1976)' pp.129-172. 
6 M.D.North Coombes, "Labour Problems in the Sugar Industry of Ile de 
France or Mauritius 1790-1842". Master's dissertation, University of 
Cape Town, 1978, p.334. 
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regions formerly hosting plantation slavery endowed workers with 
particular cultural attributes in the spheres of cuisine, -music and 
dance, folklore, religion, marketing, traditions, and values.7 In 
short, 
Emancipation no more put an end to the development of 
those [plantation] cultures and societies than it put an 
end to the oppressive control of the people who used to 
own the slaves bodily, and who subsequently proceeded to 
prolong that ownership in more subtle weys. The value 
systems and institutions forged during th~e centuries 
of slavery still have considerable utility. 
·, 
At the level of the agro-industrial sugar complex, patterns of village 
leyout, and material culture in general, stand out as the most readily 
apparent expressions of continuity. Thus, 
The center of life on a tropical estate was the "great 
house", the home of the owner, or, in his absence, that 
of the overseer ••• an imposing structure. Wherever 
possible, it stQod in a commanding position, frequently 
facing the sea.l:J 
And, "The plantation blacks lived in their own quarter some distance 
behind the great house".10 -This arrangement, which had more than 
symbolic connotations, was replicated throughout the sugar colonies and 
kept intact after the passage of plantation slavery.11 
7 V.Rubin, "CUlturaJ. Perspectives in Caribbean Research", and C.Wagley, 
"Plantation America: A Culture Sphere". Both in Caribbean Studies: A 
Symposium, edited by V.Rubin. Jamaica: University College of the West 
Indies, 1957. 
8 M.Schuler, "Afro-American Slave Culture". In Roots and Branches: 
Current Directions in Slave Studies, edited by M.Craton •. Toronto: 
Pergamon, 1979, p.129. 
9 L.J.Ragatz, The Fall of the Planter Class in the British Caribbean, 
176~1833· 1928. Reprint. New York: Octagon Books, 1971, pp.5 and 7. 
See N.Pike, Sub-Tropical Rambles in the Land of the Aphanateryx. 
London: Samson I.ow, Marston, I.ow & Searle, 1873, pp.123-125 and 340, 
for descriptions of the houses and general ostentation of Mauritian 
planters. E.V.Goveia, Slave Society in the British Leeward Islands at 
the End of the Eighteenth Century. Westpoint: Greenwood Press, 1900, 
pp.109-110, provides additional information on the extravagances of 
plantocracies. 
10 Ibid., p.27. 
11 See for example I.Vogeler, The Myth of the Family Farm: Agribusiness 
Dominance of U.S. Agriculture. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 
1981, pp.166-167. 
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Less apparent were the subtle variants of paternalism which permeated 
sugar village culture globally. In paternalism is grounded one of.· the 
more salient forms of inf1.uence exerted by sugarocrats on the culture of 
a relatively closed work and community situation; one of the strategems 
in the sugarocratic quest for class stability. Ostensible benevolence, 
or even-well-intended largesse extended by sugarmillers to employees, 
constitutes the material veneer of paternalism. Beneath these acts lies 
the owner's imperative of securing the compliance of an exploited 
workf'orce whom he daily has to face as employer. Because paternalism 
involves the direct and personal interface between master and subject, 
it tends to fade when "traditional -a.uthori ty" is superseded by 
bureaucratic organisation of the work si tuation.12 That is not to say 
that where once it was deeply embedded within social relations, 
paternalism is ended with ~he development of capitalism. Paternalism 
may indeed persist, albeit reduced to considerably lesser significance. 
As Genovese saw it, . "paternalism onl-y exists as an echo of a displaced 
era when it passes into modern bourgeois society'1.13 Paternalism is, 
- then, a transitory relationship, symptomatic of a particular stage in 
the history of class relations and work-place culture. Besides this 
historical qualification, paternalism should b~ recognised as "a loose 
descriptive term", al though it can refer to "a profoundly important 
component not only of ideologv but of the actual institutional mediation 
of social relations11.14 Furthermore, employers may be forced. "into 
various forms of entirely unpaternal behaviour •.. [and] it is .the limits 
12 On traditional authority see M.Weber, The Theory of Social and 
Economic Organization. New York: Free Press, 1947, pp.341-358. On 
the transformation of traditional authority see R.Sennett, Authority. 
New York: Vintage Books, 1981, p.21; and P.Joyce, Work, Society and 
Politics: The Culture of the Factory in later Victorian England. 
Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980, p.136. 
13 E.D.Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll. New York: Pantheon Books, 1972, 
p.679. 
14 ·E.P.Thompson, "Eighteenth-Century English Society: Class Struggle 
without Class?", Social History 3:2(1978), pp.133-165. 
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of paternalism which are impressive, not its victory'1.15 
It would be overly simplistic to regard deference as the obverse of 
paternalism, intimating thus that where employers practice paternalism, 
deference is the concomitant employee response. Such a definition also 
leads easily to an interpretation -of deference that sees it as the 
consumation of paternalism; it leads equally easily to a conflation of 
internalised deference and pragmatic or ritualistic deference. Matter£ 
are not made easier given that much ambiguity surrounds the 
I 
conceptualisation and interpretation of deference. Whereas it has been 
argued that "the deferential worker identifies closely with his social 
i::iuperiors and seeks contacts with them in and out of work", 16 it has 
been claimed elsewhere that "the deferential worker does not identify 
himself with his superiors or strive to reach their status; he defers to 
them socially as well as poli tically".17 Instead of drawing the 
inference that a conceptual impasse exists, the ambiguity should be 
taken to be a cautionary injunction against an undue emphasis on 
deference (or paternalism) when considering class stability. 
Both Joyce and Newby have shown the parallels between paternalism and 
deference where "traditional authority" prevails, 18 but in presenting 
deference as a form of quiescence which is reflected in deferentialr 
behaviour and deferential ·attitudes, they have also made the important 
15 H.I.Dutton and J .E.King, "The Limits of Paternalism: The Cotton 
Tyrants of Nor th Lancashire, 1836-1854", Social History 7: 1 ( 1982), 
pp.59-74. 
16 J.Curran, "Class Imagery, Work Environment and Community", ·British 
Journal of Sociology 32: 1 ( 1981 ) , pp.111-126. 
17 D.Lockwood, "Sources of Variation in Working-Class Images of 
Society". In Working-Class Images of Society, edited by M.Bulmer. 
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975. 
18 Joyce, Work, Society and Politics.; and H.Newby, The Deferential 
Worker. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979. See also H.Newby, "Paternalism 
and Capitalism ". In Industrial Society: Class, Cleavage and Control, 
edited by R.Scase. London: Allen & Unwin, 1977. 
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observation that it is maintained by the momentum of family and 
community life. Deference can in other words be conceived of as a 
quiescent response to class rule, which is based on an imagel_"Y of class 
dependence as opposed to an imagery of class domination. While it might 
not suppress the nurture of worker solidarity, deference tends to 
complement paternalism by being also rooted in a hierarchical image of 
society. 
With the links between deference and paternalism established, it remains 
briefly to consider evidence of paternalism at work in a sugarmilling 
context. Paternalism, it has been suggested, is during a particular 
period merely the most tolerable of tactics amongst the range of 
employers' controls; it is moreover on the one hand an historically 
impermanent relationship, and on the other hand it does not exclude the 
use of coercion. Paternalism was commonly witnessed during the period of 
plantation slavery, yet, as Saunders has argued,19 labour employed under 
an indenture system in Australia's sugar industry was an unlikely focus 
for paternalism given the transience of the workers in question. 
Paternalism has been observed in different forms in twentieth century 
sugar villages. It has been written that in northeastern Brazil during 
the 1950s, "on the factory plantations there is a mild form of 
paternalism which is stronger ••• [near J to the house of the usineiro11• 20 
Michael Manley also found in the 1950s that paternalism was, in the 
Jamaican sugar industry, a "focus for all that is ambivalent in the 
employer/employee relationship 11 .21 Elsewhere, in the Tuman sugar 
19 K.Saunders, "'Troublesome Servants': The Strategies of Resistance 
Employed by Melanesian Indentured Labourers on Plantations in 
Colonial Queensland", Journal of Pacific History 14:3-4(1979), 
pp.168-183. 
20 H.W.Hutchinson, Village and Plantation Life in Northeastern Brazil. 
Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1957, p.71. 
21 M.Manley, A Voice at the Workplace. London: Andre Deutsch, 1975, 
p.58. 
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complex in Peru, a system of "coercive paternalism" flourished in the 
early 1970s. There, as far as the family of owners was concerned, 
"subordinates were expendable and would be dismissed if 1 t was necessary 
for the preservation of the paternal guardian role that the family-
arrogated to itself''.22 
The survival of coercive paternalism in sugar complexes into the latter 
half of the twentieth century points to the significance and strength of 
the control which owners haye over employees in compmy towns. Villages 
serving sugarmills have not universally been company towns in the sense 
of suga.rmill owners having erected housing at their expense on their own 
land.23 However, where the land and buildings forming the sugar village 
have constituted company property, owners have related to company 
personnel as employers and landlords at once. 
The annals of the culture of comi;any towns attest to the extraordinary 
,IX>wer exercised by owners over their employees,24 but they also include 
episodes of rebellion.25 Though the company town does not provide a 
water-tight guarantee against rebellion, it represents a structural and 
very powerful form of control over workers. While owners of company 
towns hold workers in a "double grip", 26 they have the opportunity of . 
engaging directly in forms of social control which other employers 
seldom have. As Patrick Joyce .found in his study of nineteenth century 
22 C.Scott, "The Labour Process, Class Conflict and Poli tics in the 
Peruvian Sugar Industry'', Development and Change 10:1 (1979), pp.57-
89. . 
-23 See for example C.H.Grant, "Company Towns in the Caribbean: A 
Preliminary Analysis of Christianburg-Wismar-Mackenzie", Caribbean 
studies 11:1(1971), pp.46-72. · 
24 H.G.Gutman, Work, Culture, and Society in Industrializing America. 
New York: Alfred A.Knopf, 1976, pp.326-343; L.Mumford, The Culture of 
Cities. London: Secker'& Warburg, 1940, pp.393-491; and Sennett, 
Authority. pp.62-77. 
25 Gutman, Work. op cit.; and Sennett, Authority. pp.62-63. 
26 C.Abrams, Housing in the Modern World. London: Faber & Faber, p.145. 
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factory culture in northern England, it was ''by pervading quotidian life 
and permeating the loyalties of occupation and place that employer 
influence worked11 • 27 Might the same be said about the culture of the 
South African sugarmill? Certainly, as this chapter shows, sugarmillers 
did indeed develop an interest in fostering "loyalties of occupation and 
place" in their sugar villages. 
The Natal Sugar Village 
I 
Two centrally important influences on sugar village layout in Natal were 
the site of the sugarmill and residential segregation according to 
racial criteria. In order to draw sufficient water for boilers and 
other appliances, and also to transport certain wastes, the sugarmill 
had to be located close to a river. How the sugarmill's attendant 
( 
village then developed depended partly on the nature of company land 
holdings, whether for example the river represented a property boundary 
or not; and partly upon local topography. Within these co-ordinates and 
the dictates of racism, the sugar village took on a cell-like form. 
White employees' houses, including that of the manager, which was 
usually built on a promontory overlooking the village, constituted one 
cell. This part of the village might on its periphery have had the 
house.s oocupied by "creole" Mauritian settlers. The houses :(or white 
employees, predominantly detached but including a small number that were 
semi-detached, were spread over a greater surface than other housing _ 
areas in the village; with each house typically surrounded by a fenced 
garden. Single white sugarmill employees, predominantly apprentices and 
permanent or contracted artisans, were lodged in what was generally 
known as the "mess". Within the white residential area the occupational 
Z7 Joyce, Work, Society and Politics. p.192. 
I 
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hierarchy of the sugarmill was broadly perceptible in the size and style 
of the houses and gardens, in the age of the buildings, and in their 
relative elevation or distance from the sugarmill. And 'whereas all 
employees in the pre-World War II village would have been in easy 
walking distance from the sugarmill, each new batch of houses built 
since the war took the outer borders of the white cell further from the 
sugarmill and usually . also onto higher ground. 
In st~k contrast .to the white cell, the Indian workers' quarters were 
generally relatively close to the sugarmill, and characteristically 
densely concentrated. The quality of the housing was al ways greatly 
inferior to that provided for whites, and the sizes of the houses much 
smaller. While whites commonly had servants' quarters and garages in 
their grounds, the only outbuildings that might have been expected in 
the pre-World War II Indian cell were latrines, if these were provided 
at all. 
Another cell of the sugar village, the smallest of all, was the comp:mnd 
for African workers. The increasing number of African workers as a 
proportion of all sugarmill workers did not much alter the proportion of 
company property occupied by their single-men's compounds. The 
provision of family quarters for Africans was rare before World War II, 
and only in some cases did African "villages" arise within the sugar 
villages, apart from the compounds. 
As a rule the permanent population of the sugar village did not exceed a 
few hundred people, but because some villages were not completely 
isolated these were not al ways "closed" agro-industrial complexes as 
such. Tongaat presented such an exception, abutted as it was by a 
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flourishing town and situated also on a main road. In the case of 
Felixton, a paper mill was erected in the mid-1950s next to the 
sugarmill, from which it received bagasse to be used in paper making. 
Felixton's vi~lage was expanded by the arrival of the paper mill's 
personnel, many of the white staff having come from Italy, but it 
remained as "closed" as any other sugar village which was on company 
property and at a terminal point within the public road system. 
R~gardless of the relative distance from other settlements, the villages 
situated on sugar company properties had few inhabitants who were not 
·employed by those compmies. These "outsiders" were associated with ·the 
services .which were not provided by the companies, such as post offices 
and railway st.ations, both state-run, and general trading stores and 
- butcheries. 
The cell-like structure of the sugar village was mirrored in the social 
practice of segregation. Few whites would ever have had cause to visit 
an Indian worker's home, while those blacks who entered a white worker's 
home would have done so only in the context of domestic service or house 
maintenance, rather than on a social call~ Unlike Indian domestic 
servants (washer-women and men ( dhobis)), who lived permanently in the 
Indian quarters of the village as members of sugarmill workers' 
families, African domestic workers in white employees' homes were 
officially isolated from black sugarmill workers. 
That the sugar village was a company village, standing on company 
property, and subject to comµuiy policy, did not in itself account for 
the existence of social practices which mirrored the built environment. 
Also inimical to the development of an organic, if class divided, 
"village community" was the fact that the Natal sugar village "way of 
life" was (and undoubtedly still ,is) shot through with racism. The 
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material and ideological underpinnings of the sugar village worked 
together to produce a facade of ~tability which, in sugarocratic 
historiography at least, has concealed the fundamental disunity of the 
sugarmilling "community" •. 
Although there is a tendency to regard the sugar village' as being 
stable, it should be mentioned that when a sugarmill is closed down its 
allied village loses. its raison d'etre. The centralisation of sugar 
production has proceeded apace in the post-World War II period, and 
three sugarmills were closed during the 1970s alone, with far-reaching 
social implications.28 That the problem persists is reflected in the 
I 
attempt made in 1978 by C.G.Smith to buy Union Co-op.'s Dalton 
sugarmill, and a bid made by Hulett's in 1979 for the Umfolozi . Co-op.'s 
sugarmill.29 Success in the first venture would have enabled C.G.Smith 
to close the Dalton sugarmill and direct cane supplies to its own 
Noodsberg sugarmill. Union Co-op. refused the offer for various 
reasons, including the detrimental social upheaval it envisaged would 
follow the closure of the sugarmill. Umfolozi also turned down the 
off er for their sugarmin.30 
Sugarmill Workers' Housing and Heal th 
during the Indentures Period: 1860-1914 
If black sugarmill workers' wages were low, there was little by way of 
\ 
compensation in the conditions under which they had to live in the sugar 
villages. An examination of the history of their housing shows that 
' 
until the closing years of the sugarocratic era , standards were 
appallingly low, if standards as such could be spoken of at all, and 
28 See D.Lincoln, "South African Sugar Mill Labour during the 1970s", 
South African Labour Bulletin 6:6(1981), pp.37-48. 
29 SASJ 62: 11 ( 1 978), P• 587. 
30 SASJ 63:7(1979), p.332, and 63:9(1979), p.420. 
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even where expenditures were made on improvements, blacks were. housed in 
structures which were generally regarded to be inferior to Transvaal 
mine workers' accommodation, let alone that of white suga.rmill workers. 
Such a racial housing policy in the sugar villages could be linked to 
what emerges from available evidence on nutrition, sanitation, and other 
factors, as racial epidemics. 
The housing norms established during the Indian indentures period were 
to prevail as the basis of sugarocratic housing policy until at least 
the 1930s. The four-man Wragg Commission, one of whom was J.R.Saunders, 
found indentured workers' accommodation in the late 1880s to have. been 
of thre.e types; namely, iron-roofed masonry barracks, corrugated iron 
• "lines", and grass huts. The Commissioners found little objectionab;Le 
about the constructions themselves, and their recommendations related to 
measures that might be taken to improve hygiene and to lower the risk of 
fire.31 It is not surpising that a retrospective study on the 
indentures period which used the Wragg Commission's Report as a vehicle 
for discussing housing and amenities should have concluded that 
the indentured Indians on the sugar estates were secured 
against want by a system which provided both for the 
regular inspection of their living conditions and the 
introduction of reforms considered essential to their 
well being ••• 
The general working conditions for indentured 
Indians ••• were satisfactory. They 3~ere well housed ••• Their health was found to be good. 
The historical record provides a different picture, and even if, as 
Polak wrote, 
On such estates as those of Sir James Liege Hulett, the 
Hon. Marshall Campbell, and Mr. Hindson ••• the indentured 
31 Report of the Indian Immigrants Commission 1885-1 eB7, 1007. 
32 A.G.Choonoo, "Indentured Indian Immigration into Natal, 1860-1911, 
· with P;:u-ticular Reference to its Role in the Development of the Natal 
Sugar Industry". Master's dissertation, University of Natal, 1967, 
pp.217-218. 
labourers' material welfare is far be:t_ter than it would 
have been had they remained in India,)5 
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these employers were "the worst enemies of the Indian community''.34 The 
source of enmity, according to Polak, was in the justification given the 
indenture system by such material differentials. Whether or not there 
was substance to this view, it is nevertheless evident that the 
indenture system had permitted sugarmillers, as much as any other 
employer, to depress the costs of labour power by housing workers under 
conditions that were by no stretch of the imagination salutary. 
Housing provided for indentured Indian workers was frequently criticised 
by the Protector of Immigrants. Al though his criticisms diminished 
after the turn of the twentieth century, when the sugarocracy could be 
said to have come into its own both as a group of sugarmillers and as a 
political body in virtual control of the Indian Immigration Trust Board, 
Medical Officers furnished evidence of insanitary and grossly inadequate 
accommodation. For example, in 1902 a Medical Officer reported that in 
the Kearsney district, where Hulett had his tea estates inter alia, 
most of the barracks are very far from being in a 
sanitary condition. The miserable grass hut, the usual 
accommodation supplied for the Indian, is about the best 
receptacle and retainer of in~~rious micro-organisms 
that could possibly be devised.~ . 
It was equally common to find, as Stanger's Medical Officer did in 1902, 
that "Privies are almost unknown, the calls of nature being 
relieved ••• as near as possible to the hut door11.36 The ubiquitous grass 
hut was however being replaced from about this time by ''brick and zinc 
lines", probably to inhibit diseases, but when another contemporary 
Medical Officer claimed that the prevalence of overcrowding in the 
33 H.S.L.Polak, The Indians of South Africa: Helots within the Empire 
and Bow They are Treated. Madras: G.A.Natesan & Co., 1909(?), p.22. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Protector of Immigrants, Report for 1~. 
36 Ibid. 
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rudimentary abodes generally provided, was "entirely due to the tendency 
the Indians have for huddling together" ,37 he was contributing to the 
ideological explanations that abounded for the link between poor housing 
and the spread of disease. 
The persistence of insanitary and inadequate housing conditions can be 
' 
put down to the imbalance, in the employers' eyes, between ideological 
and, above all, cost considerations, on the one hand, and criticisms and 
disease on the other: the former would outweigh the latter in 
determining housing policy in the sugar villages. Thus the observer who 
charged in 1905 that certain employers provided "piggeries" for the 
accommodation of indentured workers,39 would have his porcine analogy 
repeated some two decades later by government investigators into sugar 
workers' housing.39 The erection of ''lines" in place of grass huts did 
little in itself to alter the indentured workers' quality of life, and 
they were not relieved of affliction by the tuberculor, venereal, and 
intestinal diseases which sprang from both their housing and demographic 
circumstances. The workers' rations did not offer the most efficient 
means of equipping the body to combat ill health. 
During the indentures period indentured men had generally received as a . 
minimum ration a pound each of rice and mealie meal per day, while women 
and children under the age of 10 years had qualified for half this 
amount; regulations were also made for the supply in lesser amounts of 
dholl, salt fish, ghee, and salt, but these were not always obf2._erved.40 
37 Protector of !nl!Jigrants, Supplementary Report, 1891. 
38 Indian Opinion 15.4.1905, pp.237-238. 
39 "Hulett's are housing Natives in a species of piggery" (TAD, GNLB 
253, 357/16/53, Assistant Health Officer to Director of Native 
Labour, 2.12.1921 ). 
40 Report of the Coolie Comnission, 1872. 
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Insanitary housing and the sugarocracy's disregard for the relevant 
statutes were aggravated by its lack of concern for environmental 
factors, and workers were placed in what must.have been a frustratingly 
vulnerable position. The siting of barracks and comµ>unds close to the 
banks of rivers made their occupants vulnerable to flooding, while 
pollutants presented a threat to the health of those close to or reliant 
upon river waters. A case in point was revealed during 1895, when an 
official investigation was conducted after a complaint from the Tongaat 
School Committee about the "nuisance" emanating from ·the Tongaat 
sugarmill. The police report found a severe health hazard and an 
"unbearable" smell, particularly near the company's Indian compound. It 
\ 
was recorded that Saunders and his manager were doing their best to 
eliminate '!;he problem, not by putting an end to pollution, but by mixing 
ash with the sulphurous wastes going into the river.41 
If polluted water was an endemic problem for black sugarmill workers, it 
was no less serious than the threat of floods. When devastating floods 
occurred in the coastal district in May 1905, many lives were los~, 
including, in the Inanda district, those of a white railway employee and ' 
51 black men, women, and children, mostly from sugar villages. 42 This 
was an extreme but not unique case of black sugar workers' quarters 
-
being flooded in Natal, and it appears not to have fully convinced 
41 NAD, CSO 1447, 1895/6156, Relative to Nuisance Emanating from the 
Tongaat Sugarmill, 1895. 
42 Warner Report in Government Gazette 1.8.1905. 
See_also Goble Report in Government Gazette 18.7.1905, which 
attracted harsh criticism from the Indian Opinion 5.8.1905, p.506. 
In the light of these facts it was nothing short of flagrant 
negligence on the part of employers which had given cause for an 
Inspector of Native Labour to report in 1919 that barracks were still 
generally to be found "on the banks of bifurcating streams and in 
some places on a steep slope in close proximity of a stream. These 
barracks are constantly subject to innundation of storm water the bad 
effects of which are too well known to need reference" (TAD, GNLB 
308, Inspector of Native Labourers to Director of Native Labour, 
12.11.1919). ' 
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employers to refrain from providing housing in low-lying areas that were 
susceptible to flooding. 
All these factors - the quality and the situation of housing, and the 
quality and quantity of rations - which were quite within the control of 
sugarmillers, were compounded· to make endemic ill-health and periodic 
epidemics the lot of their black workers. The 1902 measles epidemic in 
the Mount Edgecombe district, which claimed the lives of hundreds of 
infants;43 the malaria epidemics, particularly those which ravaged 
coastal Natal in 1905, 44 the nutrition-related diseases - these were 
either attributable to or severely aggravated by the work and housing 
environment created by the sugarocracy. And if black sugarmill workers, 
particularly those who were serving indentures, ·sought redress, their 
complaints usually fell on deaf ears. 
In the years around the turn of this century the Annual Reports of the 
Protector of Immigrants almost invariably referred to complaints by 
Indian workers as "frivolous and unfounded", yet they al ways carried 
contradictory testimony of widespread assault, high death rates, 
numerous suicides, and insanitary housing as commonplace conditions in 
the sugar yillages. 45 An official inquiry in 1900 into the murder of 
two Reynolds Bros. employees was reported by the Protector of Immigrants 
to have found "general ill-treatment" on that compmy's estates, 46 and 
there is every reason to believe that the company was not unique in this 
respect. 
4 3 Protector of !Dlnignmts, Report for 1 m. 
44 Protector of Immigrants, Report for 1~ and Report for 1906. 
There was another severe malaria epidemic in the early 1930s (Report 
on Investi.@.tion into Malaria in the Union of South Africa, 1930-31 ) . 
45 See for example Protector of Immignmts, Report for 1896, Report for 
1 fff7, and Report :for 1 m. 
46 Protector of· Illllligrants, Report for 1~. 
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So long· as the majority of its workforce was constricted by indentures, 
I 
the sugarocracy appears to have found little cause for practicing 
systematic paternalism on its properties. It took official inquiries in 
1906 to improve conditions on two of Natal's largest sugar properties 
(in one case leading to a reduction of the death rate, amongst Indian 
workers and their families, from 39t; to 14~) and the Protector found it 
appropriate to recommend in this regard that Reynolds Bros. and Natal 
Estates should, as Tongaat had started doing, appoint a medical officer 
to visit Indian workers' quarters daily.47 What scant evidence there 
is of overt sugarocratic concern for the welfare of indentured workers 
suggests that it was inspired by little more than a recognition that 
these workers were human. The sugarocracy approached Indian workers in 
what was esentially a suppressive and punitive manner. Their approach 
was based on expectations of unquestioning worker submissiveness, and on 
( 
the assumption that workers' expectations were fully met by wages, 
quarters, and rations. 
Prelude to Suga.rocratic Welfarism: 1914-late 1930s 
After the indenture system had been abolished, little was placed on 
record about sugarmill workers' housing. It was only when the 
sugarocracy ca.me to address its problem of finding a substitute for the 
, 
system that information was again recorded which showed no positive 
changes to have been effected in the interim. One upshot of the 
sugarocracy's lobbying to have the Union Government respond to its 
demand for a stable supply of African labour, after the abolition of the 
indenture system, was the Department of Native Affairs' investigation. 
into the conditions 'facing labour in the sugar industry. The ~earing 
47 Protector of Imn:ignmts, Report for 1~ and Report for 1~. 
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indictment of the sugarocracy that ensued from the investigation was not 
accompmied by action that would bring them to book for their employment 
practices, and sugarocrats reacted without the same sense of urgency 
conveyed by the officials. 
The investigation started early in 1919 with a Departmental Inspector 
, 
visiting the south coast sugar estates and other industrial plants, and 
later that year the Director of Native Labour, Pritchard, also did a 
tour of inspection. The findings made in this first round of 
I 
inspections gave unprecedented insights into what had been taking place 
on sugar company property. For this reason alone the inspection and 
their immediate repercussions warrant special attention; but more so 
because the Departmental inspectorate appointed early in 1920, as a 
consequence of the inspection, was withdrawn in 1928, whereafter 
detailed information was again not recorded. 
An amendment in 1915 to the Natal Public Heal th Act of 1901 had laid 
down methods of sanitation using water- and pail-closets, it had made 
specifications for workers' housing which included a restriction on the 
building of back-to-back rows of quarters, and it also drew attention to 
the existence of special regulations pertaining to employers of more 
than 50 workers who, like any other employer of more than 10, were 
required to submit all building plans for official approval.48 When 
the reports of 1919 are portrayed against the background of this 
statute, the housing~ituation for black sugarmill workers is seen to 
have been totally untenable. 
Excerpts from the report on north doast sugar properties follow which 
48 Government Gazette 16. 6. 1915. 
related to sugarmill workers: 
Natal Estates ... Three blocks of back to back buildings 
about 6 ft. high earth and brick floors, no fire places, 
bunks or ventilation. Remarkable to sey that in one of 
the rooms there was a growing ant heap. Cooking done in 
wood & iron lean to erected by the natives and a perfect 
disgrace. No latrines, bunks or washing facilities, 
water carried from dam and Mill, about 'J)O yards awey. 
Complaints were also made of being troubled by jigger 
fleas and other vermin ••• 
Central Factory ... One six roomed wood and iron 
structure 10 x 9 flat roof, earth floors, windows at 
back. No fire places, bunks, latrines or washing 
facilities. Cooking done in one of rooms. Water 
carried from river. Two built brick rooms. Same 
remarks as above except that cooking is done in lean to 
wood and iron structure, entirely unsuited. Three rooms 
wood and iron structure, floor much below door level, no 
windows, bunks, fire places, latrines or washing 
facilities ••• 
Tinley Manor ... One row hollow .block buildings 9 x 10 
room, windows at back, fire places and brick floors. 
One row reed-grass walls thatched grass roof building, 
earth floors, no bunks, fire places, ventilation, 
latrines or washing facilities. Cooking done in open 
and in rooms ••• 
Darnall ... About 30 to 35 acres of land is set aside 
for natives to erect their own buildings or huts and 
with the exception of a few wood and iron structures 
which are exclusively used for togt labourers the whole 
of this land is pitted with huts of all descriptions and 
the natives are left to themselves to work out their own 
salvation. A state of affairs which should not be 
allowed to continue under any circumstances. No 
latrines or washing facilities provided... . 
Amatikulu ... Wood and iron four roomed building 25 x 
25, brick and cement floors, windows at back and front. 
No fire places. Cooking done in old dilapidated wood 
and iron covering, earth floors. No bunks or washing 
facilities. Latrines trench system reed-grass screening 
wooden frame for natives to squat on ••• 
ZSM ••• With the exception of three wood and iron 
buildings earth floors, no bunks, fire places or washing 
facilities. Windows at back and sides. The remainder 
of the huts consist of wattle and daub reed-grass 
thatched roof, no bunks, fire places, and a few with 
windows at back. These barracks are situated between 
two drains, one carrying a nice flow of water and the 
other is full of stagnant water and throws out a most 
obnoxious odour and certainly not conducive to the 
native. No latrines provided. Cooking done i~9wood and iron structure, fire place and earth floors ••• 
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These descriptions adequately convey the order of things in African 
49 TAD, GNLB 308, Dundee Native Affairs Dept. Inspector to Director of 
Native Labour, 4.12.1919. 
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sugarmill workers' compounds as they were found to be in 1919. The 
reports provided the basis upon which the government officials mounted 
their attack on employers, and al though by 1921 many new barracks had 
been built in response to this pressure, Pritchard could still record at 
the end of that year that 
in the case of large employers who have in times of 
prosperity· been warned to set their house in order and 
have neglected_ to do so, we cannot allow the continued 
housing of_ natives under conditions such as those 
described.50 
Hulett's in particular attracted approbrium from the relevant officials. 
Company housing at Felixton had first caught the attention of the Health 
Department even before the sugar mill there became operative. During 
1910 the Natal Board of Health had appointed a committee, under the 
chairmanship of Tongaat's E.Saunders, to consider the desirability of 
certain wood and iron cottages intended for occupation by whites in the 
embryonic village. The question was resolved in conjunction with 
J.L.Hulett and his son Albert.51 Then in 1917 the Health Department had 
confronted Hulett's over the quality of housing for Felixton's African 
workers.52 It was obvious by 1921 that the company had consistently 
evaded the Department's directives on this latter question. As the 
local Native Affairs inspector assessed the situation at Felixton in 
1921' 
more than ordinary pressure should be brought to bear on 
Huletts as the present native quarters are a disgrace to 
any employer of native labour and should be c~demned by 
the Health Department without further notice. 
He remarked further that 
50 TAD, GNLB 253, 357/16/53, Pritchard to Park Ross, 13.12.1921. 
51 NAD, DPH 81/1911, Report of E.Saunders to Natal Board of Health, 
4.10.1910; and NAD, DPH 81/1911, J.L.Hulett to Board of Health, 
10.1o.191 o. 
52 TAD, GNLB 253, Park Ross to Director of Native Labour, 2.12.1921. 
53 TAD, GNLB 308, Northern Coastal Area Inspector to Director of Native 
Labour, 26.8.1921. 
The native compound at this.mill is not fit to house 
human beings and is a very ramshackle affair and in 
near~;,every respect is not what our regulations ask 
for •. 
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The Durban-based Assistant Health Officer, Park Ross, took up the issue, 
and when he conveyed his views on the matter to the Director of Native 
labour, he showed that the Heal th Department had its own difficulties 
with Hulett's: 
You will see that after everyth~ng is arranged Messrs. 
Huletts are not prepared to go on with anything, and [at 
Felixton] they are housing Natives in a species of 
piggery. 
I have pressed them similarly at Tinley Manor, and have 
come to some sort of arrangement as to what is to be 
done, but so far I have failed to get any definite 
statement in writing. 
At Tinley Manor new grass shanties were being erected in 
which to house Natives in absolute disregard of all 
regulations. 
At Felixton n~ves, you will see, are housed in an 
insanitary way. . 
The major thrust of the action taken by the Department of Native 
Affairs, following its investigation, was directed against conditions 
under which African workers were housed, although their wages, health, 
and rations were also dealt with. Regarding housing, it was clear that 
African sugarmill workers were in many instances being accommodated in 
structures which had formerly been Indian workers' "lines", · but ju'.st as 
~ften under conditions which were similar to, if not worse than, those 
that existed before such "lines" had been erected. 
Just as in cases where housing had originally been in an illegal state 
and then left to decay, the nutrition of sugarmill workers had been poor 
in the indentures period and was now as bad as or worse than this. The 
conditions under which the preparation of food was carried out were 
54 TAD, GNLB 253, Northern Coastal- Area Inspector to Assistant Health 
Officer, 22. 11 • 1 921 • ' 
55 TAD, GNLB 253, Park Ross to Director of Native Labour, 2.12.1921. 
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hardly conducive to healthy nutritional habits, not that the food 
rations were themselves nutritionally adequate. What the reports of the 
early 1920s showed was that each African worker was generally provided 
with 3 lbs. of mealie meal per d8\)T, with some sugarmillers providing a 
half pound more than the norm, or even giving unrestricted amounts; in 
every case 3 lbs. of mealie meal was the minimum ration, and in some 
cases the only ration. Where meat was given to African workers, it w~ 
usually 1 lb. per week; St.Lucia provided 1 lb. a fortnight and Felixton 
2 lb. a week, while Darnall provided 1 /- per week for the purchase of 
meat. Some sUgarmillers allowed, in addition to the basic fare, access 
to sugar and treacle, and in the unusual case of Amatikulu, African 
workers were giyen a pound of mealies and a quarter pound of beans every 
Sunday. In so~e instances beans were regularly supplied but then 
usually only to workers from the Transkei. In at least one case, that 
of Cha.ka's Kraal, the provision of food was used as a form of extra-. 
economic compllsion. That sugarmill's African workers would receive one 
and a quarter pounds of beans and a shilling for meat weekly, in 
addition to their normal ration of three and a half pounds of mealie 
meal per day, on condition that they had not ta.ken any time off during 
the week.56 
Sugarocratic neglect of the welfare of black sugarmill workers was the 
order of the day. Instead of reacting positively when confronted by 
official injunctions, the m~terial responses of sugarmillers, and their 
stated intentions regarding improvements, left government officials with 
a.clear impression that they were recalcitrant reformers, who were 
capitalising on inadequate regulations, and who were regularly in need 
56 TAD, GNLB 308, Dundee Native Affairs Dept. Inspector to Director of 
Native Labour, 4.12.1919. 
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of inspectors' visits "to keep the employers up to the mark11.57 No 
\ 
amount of official pressure or evidence of discomfort or disaster seemed 
able to shake sugarmillers from their disposition towards black workers. 
Thus, when in 1925 the government proposed the scrapping of hospitals 
built under regulations J?ade for the care of indentured Indians, and the 
formation of a hospital board and dressing s~ations, the "sugar men" 
were divided in their response to this attempt to rectify what was seen 
to be a "distinctly unsatisfactory'' state of affairs.58 
No less satisfactory was the sugarmillers' reluctance to improve black 
workers' rations. Park Ross waged a long battle against employers in 
the sugar industry over the question of workers' diets. He argued that 
there were severe vitamin deficiencies, and that immediate attention 
needed to be given to effect dietary changes if scurvy was to be 
countered. Addressing himself to the SASA membership in 1927, Park Ross 
expressed the wish that his views be known ''by shareholders in some of 
your concerns whose interest therein is dividends, while my interest is 
that of the heal th of the employee. Believe me these issues are the 
same".59 
When later in 1927 amendments to the 1911 Native Recruitment Act were 
proposed concerning rations, Natal's Chief Native Commissioner wrote to 
the Secretary for Native Affairs: 
As you are aware the Sugar Planters are opposed to the 
amendment ••• and as the law now stands the Department 
cannot do more thag
0
it is doing at present in the W8¥ of 
gentle persuasion. · 
57 TAD, GNLB 308, 107 /19/97, Central Coastal Area Native Affairs Dept. 
Inspector to Director of Native Labour, 23.8.1921. 
58 Department of Public Health, Report for 1925. See also TAD, GNLB 
308, Director of Native Labour to Secretary.for Public Health, 
17 .6.1921. / 
59 TAD, GNLB 308, Park Ross to SASA Secretary, 26.3.1927. 
60 TAD, GNLB 308, Chief Native Commissioner (Natal) to Secretary for 
Native Affairs, 11.4.1927. 
308 
The sugarmillers' rejoinder to governmental censure on housing and 
heal th matters was invariably stated in terms relating to the strictures 
imposed by a depressed sugar market. This did not detract from the 
appalling state of affairs which had prevailed unchecked for so long, in 
and out of times of employers' prosperity, nor did it reflect the wa;t in 
which sugarmillers were handling the statute's which had a bearing on 
their employment practices. But more importantly, attempts by 
sugarmillers to justify their practices with respect to black sugarmill 
workers were starkly contradicted by their actions vis-a-vis white 
employees. 
Inhabitants of the sugar villages had before World War I been left very 
much to themselves outside the work situation. Within the- context of 
strict segregation social life was informal and unstructured. Apart 
from activities that might have been engaged in by religious groups, 
recreation was devoid of institutionalised organisation. Then during the 
prosperous period (for sugarmillers) between the end of World War I and 
the international sugar crisis in 1925, sugarmillers began to show an 
interest in the recreation and general welfare o~ white employees. 
Al though this interest may have reflected paternalism, .its implicit 
purpose was to cultivate a sense of community amongst white sugarmill 
personnel. 
Community-building involved the sugarocracy in a wide range of 
investments covering all aspects of life in the sugar village. There 
were endeavours made to solidify the white employees' community by 
involving them in an economic sense with their companies, such as when 
in 1919 thirty three whites were granted "employees' shares", in Tonga.at 
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Sugar Co .• 61 (Both Tongaat and Natal Estates also established 
Employees' Trading Companies, the former owning a shop and a service 
station, and the latter a hotel at Mount Edgecombe in addition to its 
shop.)62 Religious practice was· encouraged through the provision of a 
site or by financing the construction of a church.63 By erecting 
recreation halls in the sugar villages the suparocracy established a 
balance between the sacred and the profane amenities available for the 
use of white employees. 
The opening of a new recreation hall invariably called for the presence 
of some sugarocratic or managerial figurehead, but it is unlikely that 
any such occasion was more auspicious than when Smuts, who was on a tour 
I. 
of Zululand opened the ZSM hall in 1922;64 all the more so because the 
blood had hardly dried since Smuts' troops had crushed the 1922 white 
mine workers' strike, and now on behalf of one of his several close 
acq_uaintances in the sugarocracy he was performing the honours at the 
opening of a hall for white sugarmill workers. These halls provided a 
venue for social activities as well as being the nucleus for employees' 
recreational and sport clubs, such· as that initiated in Mount Edgecombe 
in 1924, with the comp:my (Natal Estates) contributing £1 for each pound 
collected by members. 65 
Besides· being used as a club house, the village recreation hall was 
where sugar millers hosted parties for their white employees. White 
adults could generally expect their employers to provide an annual end-
of-season party, which in some cases was attended by the sugarocratic 
hosts. There were other occasions where comJl3.rlies provided parties, such 
61 Condenser 5:5(1967), p.3. 
62 SASJ 16:1 (1932), p.59. 
63 See for exam:LJle SASJ 4:5(1920), p.461, and 17:2(1933), p.72. 
64 SASJ 6:9(1922), p.659. 
65 South African Sugar Year Book and General Directory (1930), p.70. 
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as when in 1928 W.A.Campbell left for Britain at the beginning of 6 
mon~hs leave, and Natal Estates threw a party for 200 guests.66 It was 
not only the adults who enjoyed the sugarmillers' hospitality. By the 
early 1930s annual "Christmas trees" - parties for the children of white 
sugarmill personnel - were traditionally given and sometimes attended by 
members- of suga.rocratic families.67 
. 
Another event which was to become a traditional item on white sugarmill 
employees' calendars was the inter-sugarmill sports tournament. In 1935 
an annual inter-sugarmill bowling tournament was inaugurated, -with teams 
competing for the silver W.E.R.Eiwards trophy. The popularity of bowls 
was to spread to all the sugar villages, and bowling greens were 
provided by employers_ who might also, as C.G.Smith did in 1935 at 
Chaka's Kraal, have officiated at their opening.68 
The sugarocracy's community-building exercise was clearly predicated 
upon an acceptance of the group to which it was directed, as a permanent 
and stable community worthy of and responsive to encouragement in the 
extra-work sphere. There would appear to be nothing different between 
such an exercise and sugarocratic paternalism towards black workers; 
there was however a difference, and this 1B\Y in ideological subtleties. 
Whereas both had the objective of promoting stability, community-
building involved primarily the strengthening of bonds within a _ 
designated racial group, while paternalism towards black workers was 
more specifically related to the search for legitimacy; the former was 
66 SASJ 12:11 (1928), p.658. 
67 The tradition of sugarocrats personally hosting Christmas parties was 
maintained by members of the Crookes family until well after World 
War II in the C.G.Smith sugar villages; in the case of Doornkop this 
was done in the general manager's house. See SASJ 15: 1 ( 1931), p.12; 
SASJ 40: 1 ( 1956), p.61 ; and SASJ 40: 1 ( 1956), p.61. 
68 SASJ 20:9(1936), p.535. 
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based on the assumption that employee allegiance already existed, the 
latter on the assumption of the need to nurture allegiance. 
Sugarocratic Paternalism and Reformism in 
Social Control Methods: late 1930&-1962 
Enveloped in a threatening aura of employer rule, sugar villages were 
not in the pre-1930s period characterised by benevolent paternalism. It 
has been shown that the sugarocracy's employment practices. in the sphere 
of housing were certainly until the 1930s far from salutary. 
Then during the 1940s a measure of change began to be effected in the 
material conditions for the residents of the sugar villages. This 
"enlightenment" was manifested in two ways, of which improved workers' 
housing constituted one. The other aspect was of an ideological nature. 
It involved efforts to cultivate, in the minds of their employees, an 
image of company benevolence and philanthropy which deserved to be 
reciprocated by deferential allegiance to, and strong identification 
- ' 
with, comp:llly objectives. Extensive schemes were undertaken to improve 
or replace housing for black and for white employees.69 New houses were 
constructed for white employees, and where electricity and water-borne 
sanitation were not yet laid on these were provided. Brick cottages 
were erected for Indian personnel at Tongaat and elsewhere, and African 
workers' compounds were refurbished or replaced. These housing schemes 
featured in reviews of comp:lllies' expenditures throughout the 1940s and 
early 1950s, as did the establishment in Tongaat of a company-sp0nsored 
\ 
69 The government's inspections between 1935 and 1938 which were 
conducted with the aim of re-housing all industrially-employed "non--
Europeans" by the end of 1941 mey have been a consideration, although 
this was nowhere suggested in sugar industry documents. See Annual 
Reports, Department of Public Health, 1931 and 1935; the latter made 
reference to sugar estates. On new housing in the early 1940s see 
South African ~ Year :Book ( 1941-42) , pp. 154-155. 
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Employees' Welfare Association, and the issue by the same company of 
50000 shares to be sold to "permanent staff" of 10 years or more 
standing, so that each would have a shareholding equal to the amount of 
their annual sala:ry.70 
The strides taken by the sugarocracy during'the 1940s and 1950s to 
ameliorate living conditions and strengthen employees' allegiance were 
in step with the development of paternalistic ideals and prevailing high 
profits, and they did not in any sense eliminate the discrepancies which 
racial housing policies involved. Thus when the sug;a.rmill at Pongola 
neared completion early in 1954, its new village embodied both the post-
war spirit of employer welfarism and the principles of racial housing 
policy.71 
Some of the principles which were embodied in sugarocratic endeavours to 
provide improved housing were not flaunted before workers. Referring in 
1955 to company expenditure on housing for black wor.kers, E.Saunders 
informed shareholders that the old barracks for Indian sugarmill workers 
at Tongaat 
which apart from being outdated and in a bad state of 
repair, were situated on valuable land adjacent to the 
mill which wi~l no d~t be required in time for normal 
factory expansion ••• ; 
and his v.ice-chairman, · Polkinghorne, added that 
though it is practically impossible to {§3llge the effect 
of improved living conditions in terms of money, I have 
no doubt that recent housing improvements carried out by 
your compmy have already served to stB:.bilise that class 
70 More than ~f the shares were subscribed to in the first year of the 
scheme's operation. See company reports contained in SASJ 31:8(1947), 
and 32:9(1948). 
71 SASJ 38:4(1954), pp.227-233. 
72 Reported in SASJ 39:9(1955). 
of labour for whom they were provided which s~uld lead 
to a general improvement in labour efficiency. 
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Presumably the jubilation of the ostensible beneficiaries of the housing 
scheme in question was not allowed to be clouded by such talk of control 
and profits that is the elixir of the shareholder. 
If improved material conditions were appreciated and if sugarocratic 
paternalism was favourably received, then the workers' own consciousness 
might be the source of loyalty and industry that compilsion was formerly 
intended to bring about. In this, sugarocrats were not merely heeding 
the injunctions of officials, over the preceding decades, to give 
attention to improved employment conditions. There was also the 
"Tongaat philosophy" which had to be ackowledged as a powerful force for 
change in Tongaat and, ultimately, .in other sugar villages. 
Frequently extolled in the pages of The Condenser, the Tongaat 
philosophy was most fully articulated by Watson in his book Tongaati, an 
excerpt from which follows: 
73 Ibid. 
Remember first that Tongaat is constituted as one 
community, a unity of people, a holistic synthesis of 
vastly varying human beings. The object is to maintain 
that unity; to clothe it eventually - all of it, each 
component of it - with the garments of perfection. 
That, said and done, is what Tongaat has declared to be 
its aim: a perfect sugar undertaking in an ideal multi-
racial community; not a sugar enterprise associated with 
a group of separate comm uni ties ••• [Tongaat] is a 
trictyledonous unity of 7450 souls (or thereabouts) the 
majority of whom are talcing part in the evolvement of 
a prototype for community life in which, while each 
group will develop its own social pattern and live 
largely, but not necessarily exclusively, within the 
domain of its own social activities, mutual interests, 
goodwill, and confidence will surmount racial 
prejudices ••• 
••• there is nothing repugnant about the idea of the 
sorting of individuals into groups or classes or clubs 
by aggregation ••• Aggregation into such communities and 
· for such reasons has been a sociological process 
~hereve7 tl\j4e has been a culture of any kind since time 
1rmnemor1al. -
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Although professing antipathy for apartheid, the proponents of the 
Tongaat philosophy contradictorily advanced the notion of "aggregation", 
which implied the ideological and material imposition of racial 
segregation by the company. Euphemism and "sociological" rhetoric in 
Watson's work could not obscure the parallels between apartheid and 
aggregation. 
Though explicitly presented as a notion unique to Tonga.at, aggregation 
merely represented a grandiose justification of the segregationist 
practices which were uniformly evident in all the sugar villages. This 
uniformity was most.clearly demonstrated in the treatment of those 
~migr~ Mauritian sugarmill workers and their descendants who were 
regarded as "creoles" or "coloureds". 
In order to furnish an exposition of the position of these ~igr.~ 
Mauritian artisans some contextual and historical material must be 
adduced. In his study of ''Durban coloureds", Dickie-Clark found in the 
political behaviour of his subjects an "attempt to remain apolitical" 
and an "inability to support any decided, clear-cut political 
orientation11.75 This political ambivalence he attributed to social and 
political marginality: they aspired to the political status of the white 
electorate, with whom they had cultural affinity; and they found no· 
cause to identify with Indians, Africans or others classified as 
"coloured".76 That the people he was studying were largely of Mauritian 
descent is instructive, although this factor does not of itself explain 
74 R.G.T.Watson, Tongaati: An African Experiaent. London: Hutchinson, 
1960, p.228. 
75 H.F.Dickie-Clark, The Marginal Situation: A Sociological Study of a 
Coloured Group. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966, p.123. 
76 Ibid. 
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the position of Mauritian sugarmill artisans in the face of decades of 
ostracism and discrimination. 
According to van den Berghe in his study of Tongaat, "fear of 
discrimination from the Europeans" had led "coloured" Mauritian 
sugar mill personnel in that town to "keep themselves apart". He also 
sought to show that "their status is ambiguous and their position is 
marginal.11.77 So the a.ay..:.to-dey life of these Mauritian artisans, while 
it mey ,have borne a strong resemblance to that of white work colleagues, 
was nevertheless distinguished by barriers of consciousness, legal 
statute, and company politics. In this sense these artisans were 
certainly "marginal", but their position in the sugarmill's occupational 
hierarchy was far from marginal. Indeed, as has been shown, they were 
indispensible in that context particularly in the sphere of sugar-
boiling. 
What must be understood is that marginalisation was not simply an 
attitudinal stance taken by "coloured" Mauritian sugarmill artisans. 
Their marginality reflected a systematic process of segregation. Before 
this process began in earnest in 1950, Mauritian artisans had, as has 
been shown in Chapter 5, gained for themselves a reputation as dedicated 
workers occupying significant positions in the sugarmill. As case in 
point was that of a worker who spent over thirty years in Hulett's 
Tinley Manor sugarmill before retiring in 1931; he was 
a most experienced mill man in almost every department 
. of sugar manufacture. He was a first class sugar 
boiler, juice preparer and mill,gverseer. He was also 
compound manager for some years. 
77 P.L.van den Berghe, Caneville: The Social Structure of a South 
African Tovn. Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1964, pp.155-
156. 
78 From an un-dated newspaper obituary given to me by the son of the 
deceased (Interviewed, Mount Edgecombe, 2.7.1982). 
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Even if social ostracism was experienced by workers who were regarded as 
"creoles", this did not necessarily imply that their status in the 
' . 
sugarmill was in any wey affected by their skin-colour: before World War 
II, it was recalled, 
The chief engineer was the workman; he worked beside 
you. The second engineer was the chief electrician, and 
he worked. The boss will come up and hold the ladder 
while you climb up there ••• Y011. had a problem you'd go to 
the office and see the boss;r~ 
And, as a.retired artisan explained, they were indeed dedicated to the 
sugarmill and its performance: 
that was our job. That was our bread and butter, so if 
they had to send for us anytime of the night there's a 
breakdown, we had to go because now we think in our 
minds that this factory is my factory ••• Right up to now, 
if they had to send me (well I'm pensioned off) they had 
to send for me, the door ring;3 and sey "you are required 
at the factory urgently'', we're going. I'm not going to 
say "oaoh, going to the factory". No! I'm thinking 
it's my bread and butter, I've got to go. I've got to 
keep that factory going. Today, what they've got, 
they've given me a 'phone, which we never had before. 
Each chap that they think is liable to be called 
out ••• and they 'phone him up. That's today ••• In those 
days the police b~ used to come and knock at the door 
and we used to go. 
Furthermore, in the words of this former welder, they were not ~ntirely 
apathetic: 
We were in the AEtJ [Am'algamated Engineering Union] ••• we 
weren't in the sugar industry union. So the artisans 
[exclusive of pan-boilers] were in the AEU ••. It was .very 
active. We had a shop steward .•• but the sugarmill, they 
weren't very pleased about that ••• because .•• they like to 
keep the workmen down ••• Before we Joined the union, we 
us.ed to work on a Sunday ••• [ for j two bob or a day 
off ••• When we joined the union the union had to make the 
sugarmill pay the blokes; if they work S~~ay 8 hours, 
they got to be paid 8 hours at double time. 
79 Interview with former pan-boiler of Mauritian descent, Tongaat, 
28.6.1982. 




Numerous instances of family succession in particular sugarmills, 
frequently in the very same line of work, meant that a close-knit 
network evolved amongst the Mauritian sugarmill artisanate. In the pre-
World War II years this closeness was manifested for example when 
members of three Mauritian families related by marriage travelled 
annually from various suga.rmills and 
they used to spend the whole week between Christmas and 
New Year [together]. All the young men used to go 
hunting ••• for a whole week it was like a clan ••• Don't 
talk about crayfish, mussels ••• and these big paraffin 
tins with hams; six or seven hams being cooked ••• they 
used to make grog ••• overproof cane s~ri t with the 
raisins inside and tea, in a large cask. 
Before World War II there was no uniformity amongst sugar villages 
regarding the location of Mauritian artisans: 
Before that we [at Mount :Edgecombe] lived by the mill, 
this wey and tgat way ••• we used to live all round, all 
over the place. ~ 
And in the late 1940s a Mauritian fitter at Tongaat lived with his 
family in a house which stood in the very mill yard. Elsewhere 
Mauritian artisans were residentially concentrated on grounds of 
occupation rather than country of origin. But after the passage in 1950 
o:f the Population Registration Act, "the Mauritian village" became a 
general and conspicuous element of the sugarmilling village at large, 
for "The population register drove us apart" and "The compmies put us 
apart".84 From another perspective, 
We never felt any discrimination, not by the company. 
They were open to everybody ••• alright, they put the 
whites one side and the Mauritians the other si~5' but 
when it came to a mixed function we were invited. 
Individual perceptual differences aside, Mauritian artisans now faced a 
82 Interview with former pan-boiler of Mauritian descent, op cit. 
83 Interview with former artisan of Mauritian descent, op cit. 
84 Interview with wife of artisan, both of Mauritian descent, Gledhow, 
29.6.1982. 
85 Interview with former artisan of Mauritian descent, op cit. 
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common separation from their work colleagues. 
Complementing residential segregation were the conditions which 
generally led to the exclusion of Mauritian artisans and their families 
from schools and recreational facilities restricted to whites. 
Sometimes.Mauritian children classified white were refused entry to 
white schools on grounds of their dark skin pigmentation - a Mauritian 
fitter resigned from a Natal sugar company in the early 1950s after his 
child was thus treated86 - and many children were as a result educated 
at private, Roman Catholic schools; in Swaziland; and in at least one 
case in Mo9ambique; rather than submit to the dictates of the state 
schooling system. 
Moreover, the inhabitants of "the Mauritian village" frequently 
experienced other forms of social ostracism. Not only were most 
.regarded as "coloureds" in a racist milieu, but they were widely treated 
by whites as inferior. One interviewee spoke of the wey in which, at 
Chaka's Kraal "White Mauritians resented us", and how the Mauritian 
donor of the Roman Catholic church building in that village drew a 
distinction between "Mauritians and Mauritians"; ''because he thought he 
owned the church", he thus attempted to segrega,te the congregation. The 
incident may have been exceptional, but far more exceptional wa.S its 
very recognition by the informant, a woman of Mauritian descent married 
to a Mauritian sugarmill artisan. Male informants, by their responses, 
appeared to de-emphasise discriminatl_on against them to the extent of 
intimating that they accepted it and withdrew from situations where 
racism might be overtly manifested. 
The environment into which they retreated was one characterised by 
Sb Interview with former Mauritius-born artisan, Tongaat, 25.6.1982. 
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intimate family life, observance of the tenets of Roman Catholicism, and 
stoical resignation; an environment characterised by intermarriage and 
' 
close ties amongst settler families. As more marriages took place 
outside the expatriate Mauritian community, "the Mauritian village" 
remained the context for a tightly-woven, if rapidly diminishing 
community. 
The marginalisation of "creole" Mauritian sugarmill workers was sealed 
by their own reluctance to seek common cause with Indian and African 
sugarmill workers who were also oppressed by the racist practices of 
their employers. As van den Berghe saw it, they 
have internalized the White colour prejudices, seek 
acceptance into the White group, and reject the Indians 
and Africans all the more vigorously in .an attempt to 
validate their own claims to White status.ts"f . 
Denied unqualified acceptance by whites, these Mauritian artisans fell 
into the position which they were assigned to by ruling class racism as 
much as by their own ideology. 
That the sugarocracy had pressed "creole", or "coloured" Mauritian 
sugarmill workers into the mould cast by the apartheid state gave the 
lie to any claims that aggregation was anything but a segregationist 
policy implicitly rooted in racist ideology. It was in the improvement 
of housing that the Tongaat philosophy and the general sugarocratic 
attitude in the post-World War II years represented a departure from' 
past thinking on the question of employee welfare, but deliberate 
segregation persisted. 
What the Tongaat philosophy stood for was an intellectually constructed 
paternalism, a thought out and systematic programme for the amelioration 
ITT van den Berghe, Caneville., p.195. 
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of employment conditions with a view to securing stable social relations 
and raised productivity. It was a sophisticated form of paternalism 
the inherent limits of which lay in its ideological mainspring, as van 
den Berghe's dissection thereof has demonstrated. 
In Tongaat at the very end of the sugarocractic era, van den Berghe 
found the 
power syst'e·m is one of autocratic paternalism 
complicated by a three-way segregation and 
discrimination on grounds of colour. All racial groups, 
including the super-ordinate White group, Flf'e subjected 
to this policy of centralized paternalism. 
Four mechanisms, according to the author, maintained this system of 
power. Firstly, the "bread and circuses" device was implemented by 
, 
providing good medical care, rations, housing, and tightly organised 
recreation. Secondly, the "family affair" technique was resorted to "to 
isolate the community from outside influences, and to prevent the 
.organization of collective opposition". Thirdly, co-optation was used 
in an attempt to defuse opposition or potential opposition.. Fourthly, 
potential opposition was controlled by company involvement in trade 
union activities, in sports associations, and in the local Indian 
Taxp:wers' Association.89 Following an examination of these and other 
practices by Tongaat's owners and managers, van den Berghe reached the 
conclusion that· because black workers did not subscribe to Pa.ternalism, 
that ideology remained only in the minds of the employers. This gave 
rise to "a one-sided relationship that calls for the development of an 
elaborate mythology''.90 The mythology he wrote of took the form of 
not only consciously devised rationalizations of the 
ruling class to make the masses accept White domination. 
They are also self-deceiving defence mechanisms of the 
88 Ibid., p.120. 
89 Ibid., pp.87-93. 
90 Ibid., p. 250. 
dominant group which allow that grQf P to rule and to 
discriminate with a clear conscience.~ 
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By ·reducing the Tongaat philosophy to its mythological origins van den 
Berghe achieved a great deal. However his main conclusions were made 
within a "race relations" framework, which misses or avoids the point to 
be made here, namely that sugarocratic paternalism was ultimately a 
facade for class embattlement. Although sugarocratic paternalism was 
indeed a tooI of racial domination, that domination served (and was 
intended to serve) another purpose beyond the ambit of "race relations", 
namely that of stable social (class) relations. If racial domination 
had been the ultimate objective, there would have been no rationale for 
paternalism towards lblack workers to have emerged in the sug;ar villages 
when or as systematically as it did; there was certainly no question of 
sugarmillers having at the time been faced with a "race relations" 
crisis. 
Fr~m the time that the Tongaat philosophy was conceived, Tongaa.t began 
taking on its now characteristic architectural style, with every new 
building given a Cape-Dutch exterior along lines proposed by the artist 
Gwelo Goodman. No other sugar village was given such a homogenous, if 
contrived, identity, nor did all reflect the paternalistic heights 
reached there, but Tongaat provided an example which was in most other 
respects emulated elsewhere. 
Tongaat was poised to take the lead in extending community-building to 
black workers in the early 1960s, when a wind-fall on the world sugar 
market was to justify a large capital outlay on new housing, inter 
91 Ibid., p.251. 
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alia.92 Whether in Tongaat or in any other sugar village, sugarmill 
workers were c0nstantly going to be reminded of the benevolence of the 
"father"-employer. New housing schemes would be named after 
sugarocratic personages, as would be sports grounds, and if other names 
were to be given to such amenities they would generally reflect the 
sugarocracy' s concern with entrenching what it saw to be the cultural 
plurality of its employees. 
Summary 
Although never deviating from a racially tiered system of privilege and 
recognition, over time the sugarocracy changed its attitude towards the 
social c_ondi tions of existence in the sugar villages in various ways. · 
Sugarocratic racism had in the pre-World War II period been manifested 
as a rapacious approach to the housing and nutrition of black workers. 
Subsequently racism was cast in the mould of cultural pluralism, meaning 
that segregation and racial differentiation were rationalised on the 
grounds of cultural (and thus occupational) peculiarities. The change 
of attitude from disdain to overt interest in social control that was 
seen to have come about in the latter period, was reflected in the 
conscious development of suga.rocratic paternalism. 
Paternalism now embodied a more benevolent approach to housing and 
living conditions in general, but the implicit programme of community-
building was extended beyond the white cell of the sugar village to 
first the Indian, and then the African cells, in a clearly divisive 
fashion. Thus just as any changes that took place within the racial 
di vision of sugarmill labour left that system intact, so too was the 
92 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Sugar Industry of the 
· Repiblic of South Africa, 1970, p.11. 
' 
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cell-like structure of the sugar village preserved. What had changed 
was the style of sugarocratic control over village life, such that 
ideology had been brought to the fore as an instrument of policy and 
rationalisation, and, more importantly, as a means of promoting 
) 
sugarocratic legitimacy and stable social relations. 
CHAPIER EIGHT 
WORKERS I RESPONSES 
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The terrain of sugarmill workers' experiences has been shaped by 
dialectical forces. While the sugarocratic impress has been immense, 
the workers' methods of coping with working conditions have reverberated 
on the sugarmill owners. Up to this point, little mention has been made 
of the responses of sugarmill employees to their working conditions, or 
of their responses to the range of controls which have been associated 
with sugarocratic rule. The history of sugarocratic domination has so 
far been implicitly rather than explicitly presented as a history of 
constant struggle to contain the resistance .of sugarmill workers. It 
has been shown how, as an important dimension of the culture of the 
sugarmill, coercion, legal statutes, ideological sophistry, and material 
sanctions have been arrayed against the sugarocrats' employees. This 
leaves open the question of the degree to which sugarocrats' self-
arrogated prerogatives of class rule were met with workers' 
acquiescence, and how sugarmill workers have contested sugarocratic 
domination. It therefore remains to be demonstrated in what sense the 
history of .sugarocratic domination and the history of workers' responses 
have been causally related elements of the history of class struggle in 
the sphere of sugar production. 
Two forms of workers' responses have historically interested employers 
in the sugar industry (as much as in any other). Workers' 
submissiveness in the face of personal or structural controls has 
interested employers as an ideal, while organised workers' resistance 
has elicited employers' interest in repression. However, these two 
forms of workers' responses have not necessarily been mutually 
exclusive. Moreover, accommodation and org:mised resistance have not 
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been the only responses made by sugarmill workers, but it is these, and 
principally the latter, which have most directly influenced employers' 
practices and the course followed by the labour process itself. 
Notwithstanding limits on readily available primary material, it is 
possible to discern quite distinct themes and continuities in the 
history of workers' responses to the sugarmilling labour process in 
Natal. A conceptual framework for the analysis of these responses is 
advanced in the first part of this chapter. The following four sections 
are devoted to a chronological examination of sugarmill workers' 
responses to the conditions and controls under which they have laboured 
in the Natal sugar industry. 
Accommodation and Resistance 
The world's cane sugarmill workers have historically laboured under 
quite distinct conditions: they have generally worked in rural areas 
rather than in the midst of urban communities, and their places of work 
have been located in the leE7st industrialised parts of the globe. As 
the following references indicate, sugarmill workers - whether slaves, 
indentured or completely proletarianised - have reacted to their 
condition with a complex, and frequently spontaneous, combination of 
accommodation and resistance. 
Genovese, regarding plantation slaves, considered that their resistance 
was tempered by paternalism in such a wey that 
their action tended to become defensive and to aim at 
protecting the individuals against aggression and abuse; 
it could not readily pass into an effective weapon for 
liberation ••• 
[But] the slaves found an opportunity to translate 
paternalism into a doctrine different from that 
understood by their masters and to forge it into a 
weapon of resistance to assertions that slavery was a 
natural condition for blacks, that blacks were racially 
inferior, and that black slaves had no rights or 
legitimate claims of their own. 
Thus, the slaves, by accepting a paternalistic ethos and 
legitimizing class rule, developed their most power:ut 
defense against the dehumanization implicit in slavery. 
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An important point is contained in this passage. There was the limit to 
paternalism in the slave plantations; there also was the resistance to 
dehumanisation, the creative and dynamic response to oppression. 
Although their defences might have taken on the appearance of 
quiescence, slaves did show themselves to be capable and willing to 
I 
confront their masters in open revolt. This capacity was still being 
demonstrated by slaves in the sugar-producing British West Indies during 
' the firs~ half of the nineteenth century, "on the very eve of freedom".2 
The response of enslaved sllg3.rmill workers had been deeply embedded in 
slave culture in a sense which Braithwaite captured well in his 
conception of "the slaves' cultural double-competence11.3 Their ability 
to survive depended largely on each slave's competence to confront 
oppression~in her or his own consciousness, 
to be both marginal and participatory at the same time; 
to conceive of oneself as part of society and, still, at 
the same time, not a part of it. 
The double-competence of the slaves in Jamaica and the 
rest of the Caribbean permitted them to live in the 
spirit/secular continuum ••• It also allowed them to live 
in a spiritual/ poli tica1
4 
continuum, which radicalised 
them into constant revolt. -
Faced by quite a different form of obligation to their masters, 
indentured workers articulated their responses to class rule and 
E.D.Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll~ New York: Pantheon Books, 1972, 
pp.5 and 7. 
2 M.Craton, "Proto-Peasant Revolts? The Late Slave Rebellions in the 
British West Indies 1816-1832", Past and Present 85(1979), pp.99-125. 
3 E.K.Brai thwai te, "Commentary Three". In Roots and Branches: Current 




oppression without reference to paternalism. Nonetheless, as Walter 
Rodney pointed out with regard to indentured workers in Guyana, 
Moments of struggle and moments of compromise appeared 
within the same historical conjuncture, but ultimately, 
resistance rather than accommodation asserted itself as 
the principal aspect of this contradiction.5 
Regarding proletarian sugarmill workers, Mintz has observed, with 
reference to Puerto Rico, that 
Often the predominant rural population is landless, 
wage-earning, store-buying, and corporately em ployed - a 
proletariat, in short, but a rural proletariat. Study 
of rural proletarian communities suggests that their 
inhabitants m8iY have a sturdy awareness Of their Class 
membership, but this is not to S8iY that this awareness 
is ~qually shared or that it leads to a prgdictable 
homogeneity in political (or other) attitudes. 
Proletarian sugarmill workers have indeed demonstrated an ability to 
resist exploitation, but their special condition would seem to.have 
placed limits on their resistance such that they have sometimes, and 
quite conspicuously, appeared as comparative late..:..comers in regional 
working class movements.7 This speaks more of constrained working class 
organisation than accommodation, for proletarian sugar workers have 
always had defensive, albeit often individual, rejoinders to 
exploitation and oppression. 
5 W.Rodney, A History of the Guyanese Working People, 1881~1905. 
London: Heinemann, 1981, p.151. 
6 S.W.Mintz, "The Rural Proletariat and the Problem of the Rural 
Proletarian Consciousness", Journal of Peasant Studies 1:3(1974), pp. 
291-325. 
7 This has for example been observed in the case of Cuba by F.Grobart, 
"The Cuban Working Class Movement from 1925 to 1933", Science and 
Society 39:1(1975), pp.73-103; and in the case of Java by J.Ingleson, 
"Worker Consciousness and Labour Unions in Colonial Java", Pacific 
Affairs 54:3(1981 ), pp.485-501. For discussions on sugarmill workers' 
struggles against employers and the state see K.W.J.Post, "The 
Politics of Protest in Jamaica, 1938: Some Problems of Analysis and 
Conceptualization", Social and Economic Studies 18:4(1969), pp.374-
390; and the chapter on the so-called Huk Rebellion in the 
Philippines in·J.Walton, Reluctant Rebels: Comparative Studies of 
Revolution and Underdevelopment. New York: Columbia University Press, 
1984. 
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On the question of unorganised, or rather "informal", responses by 
proletarian workers it is instructive to ref er to van Onselen' s 
injunction regarding the development of worker consciousness: 
\ 
In settler-dominated economies with repressive labour 
legislation, it is, in the first instance, to the less 
dramatic underlying worker responses that we have to 
turn in looking for this consciousness.8 
That is to say, workers' self-awareness as exploited workers does not 
have organisation as a pre-requisite nor "formal" industrial action as a 
necessary consequence. 
Until the 1930s it could generally be said that worker consciousness in 
the sugarmill workers of the Caribbean countries and Mauritius (and 
Natal) was widely expressed in the "less dramatic" responses spoken of 
by van Onselen and, as Mintz had recorded in Puerto Rico, without 
leading to "a predictable homogeneity in political attitudes". A new 
phase in the history of these sugarmill workers' resistance was ushered. 
in by the strikes which swept through the sugar colonies during the 
1930s. Although the workers in question IDS¥ still not have had a sound 
organisational base, their collective resistance announced a new-found 
awareness, a consolidated awareness of their class and its capacities. 
Put another wey, worker consciousness in the sugarmill workers of the 
old plantation colonies in the Caribbean and the Mascarenes was now 
showing signs of developing into a collective awareness of class as an 
economic category and as a social condition. 
Yet although sug:trmill workers in the forementioned regions had adopted 
a more assertive stance, conflict could not have been an endemic feature 
to the extent of excluding accommodation. This accommodation was an 
8 C.van Onselen, "Worker Consciousness in Black Miners: Southern 
Rhodesia, 1900-1920". In Studies in the History of African-Mine 
Labour in Colonial Zimbabwe, by I.R.Phimister and C.van Onselen. 
Gwelo: Mambo Press, 1978, p.19. 
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imponderable element in the sugarmiller/worker relationship. It may 
have been manifested as "moments of compromise" or as quiescence; it mey 
have reflected pragmatism or it mey have reflected internalised 
deference. The largely passive act of accommodation did not of itself 
suggest its underlying rationale; rather, it was trends of control and 
resistance which offered an indication of that rationale. On the one 
historical extreme,· in -an ideal typical sense, bondage and paternalism 
were accompanied by ostensible quiescence; on the other, proletarian 
freedom and managerialism were accompanied by negotiated compromise; but 
throughout, the acco~modative act generally concealed the tensions which 
fuelled the resistance/ accommodation dialectic. 
If it is a complex matter to provide an empirically-based explanation of 
acquiescence, it is hardly any easier to trace the history of workers' 
responses in general when there is but scant primary material to be 
adduced. Such is the difficulty of explaining sugarmill workers' 
responses in Natal. What follows is an attempt to portray some of-the 
more important themes in workers' responses to the sugarmilling labour 
process in Natal, particularly the development of worker consciousness 
as expressed through forms of resistance ranging from "undramatic" and 
individual acts to collective actions undertaken spontaneously or in an 
organised manner. 
Two observations must be made before proceeding. It has to be noted 
that throughout (and for some time beyond) the indentures period, black 
sugar workers were not confined exclusively to any particular branch of 
work: they were deployed in the sugarmill and the fields on a fairly 
flexible basis, and during the off-crop there was a tendency for 
employers to concentrate them in field work. The second point to be 
made is that ascribed ethnicity or ethnic identity had a material basis. 
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White and black workers in the sugar industry faced quite different 
, 
conditions (and not uncommonly responded differently), and black workers 
. sometimes struggled independently as "Africans" or as "Indians" (and 
then according to whether they were indentured or "free"). 
Responding to the Indian Indenture System in Natal: 1860-1914 
For the greater part of the Natal sugar industry's existence the 
majority of sugarmill.workers were indentured or of subservient status 
within the ambit of Masters and Servants statutes. Since 1850 all 
African workers in Natal had effect~vely been "servants". Al though 
there were some similarities between the legal status of these Africans 
and that of indentured Indians, there were also significant differences. 
Thus, for example, indentured Indian workers were legally protected from 
flogging but, by contrast to "servants", they were not allowed to sue 
for wages. Between 1859 and 1872 free Indians had almost equal status 
to "servants"; from 1872 they were by statute technically differentiated 
from African workers; and from 1888 they were liable to register as 
"servants", although still statutorily differentiated from African 
workers.9 Not surprisingly, under the divisive and suppressive legal 
and· social climate in general, Natal's sugarmill workers generally coped 
with the rigours imposed by the sugarmilling labour process through 
disparate and often spontaneous actions. The most constrictive work 
environment and the greatest preponderance of individualised and 
spontaneous responses by sugarmill workers were to be seen during the 
operation of the Indian_ indenture system. 
The most extreme response by Indian workers during the indentures period 
9 See F.Ginwala, "Class, Consciousness and Control - Indian South 
Africans 1860-1946". PhD thesis, Oxford University, 1974, pp.44-53. 
331 
was suicide. Instances of suicides reported by the Protector of 
Immigrants were not classified according to place of work, and so all 
may not have occurred among sugar workers. Nevertheless the statistics 
may be assumed to have reflected the status quo on sugar properties as 
much as on the northern Natal coal mines or elsewhere. The number of 
suicides committed by Indian workers in Natal grew steadily throughout 
the indentures period. With the mounting preponderance of free Indians 
in Nat8:1, the suicide rate amongst this category grew phenomenally,' but 
it never approached the rate of suicides among indentured workers. These 
rates (for indentured and free Indians respectively) during the early 
years of this century have been compared with the suicide rate in India, 
and are reflected in Table 13.10 
TABLE 13: SUICIDE RATES COMPARED: INDIA AND NATAL 
SUICIDE RATES PER MILLION 
NATAL NATAL 
INDIA (Indentured Indians) (Free Indians) 
1904 33,5 469 89 
1905 40,D 582 249 
1906 39,0 661 213 
Source: B Pachai, "The History of the 'Indian 
Opinion' 1903-1914," Archives Year Book 
for South African History 24 (1963). 
What was most tragic. about suicides was that their impression on the 
conditions of torment was inconsequential. Some of those conditions 
10 Although these rates showed a decline after 1906, Tinker's classic 
work on indentures as "a new form of slavery" contained the 
calculation that the suicide rate amongst all Indians in Natal was 
ten times higher in the closing years of the indentures period than 
India's maximum (H.Tinker, A New System of Slavery. London: Oxford 
University Press, 197 4, p.201 ). According to H.S.L.Polak, The 
Indians of South Africa: Helots within the Empire and how they are 
treated. Madras: G.A.Nateson, 1909(?), p.25, the suicide rate for 
indentured Indians in Natal was never less than 14 times the rate 
for India. See also B.Pachai, "The History of the Indian Opinion 
1903-1914", Archives Year Book for South African .'History 24 ( 1963). 
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were not even always linked by contemporary observers to the indenture 
system or its experiential and demographic connotations; they were more 
often than not regarded as the outcome of personal. and domestic traumas. 
Amongst those who did link the ill-treatment of indentured workers with 
suicide and desertion was Gandhi.11 The comments of the Protector of 
Immigrants reflected the uncritical alternative view. In his Report for 
1903 the Protector cited an instance where he visited an estate on the 
grounds that a recent suicide by an indentured worker appeared to have 
resulted from ill-treatment; his finding being that "he really committed 
suicide because the work on a SUgar Estate was not congenial to him11.12 
While an official. such as the Protector of Immigrants could associate 
suicide with personal. trauma, he did not perceive that such a distressed 
state on the part of the victim might have been explicable in terms of 
the indenture system. Thus in his Report for 1904 he claimed that 
"There have been 30 convictions against employers, managers, etc., for 
assaulting their indentured Indians, but affairs of this kind do not 
necessarily prove ill-treatment11.13 And on the following page of the 
same document, where he noted the large influx of indentured workers 
from Madras, he expressed the concern that many of them were 
not suited for agricultural purposes, thereby causing 
endless trouble with the employer, while many are young 
and il~-4developed. The tendency to suicide is very marked. 
While there can be little doubt that suicide had some significance 
within the culture of the sugarmill during the indentures period, it did 
not reflect worker consciousness as such. Nor did suicide contest 
employers' domination. The same might be said of alcohol and drug 
11 M.Gandhi, The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. Delhi: Government of 
India, 1959-, Vol.II, pp.20-24. 
12 Protector of Immignmts, Report :for 1 !J)3. 
13 Ibid., Report for 1904. 
14 Ibid. 
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abuse, both of which have elsewhere been regarded as forms of resistance 
to the sugarmilling labour process.15 But that is not to say that there 
were not other "less dramatic" respons!3S which did indeed reflect the 
development of worker consciousness during the indentures period, and 
which were treated by employers as resistance. 
During its early years the indenture system itself had circumscribed the 
cause for resistance, the possibilities for different forms of 
resistance, and the repercussions for resistance. Once the first 
indentures had expired new possibilities presented themselves, of which 
the most obvious was to leave the sugar estates and then either to stay 
in Natal or return to India. Many free Indians in Natal remained in the 
sugar industry and earned improved wages, while those in India testified 
to the plight of their compatriots in Nata1.16 Except for the 
individual satisfaction which might have been gained by leaving an 
employer or by having him pay one a wage far in excess of that received 
during the period of indenture, the indenture system was not made any 
more acceptable. If anything, the comparative disadvantage of being 
indentured may nave have been felt on a mounting scale. 
In the last decade of the indenture system's operation, the sentences 
passed on Indian workers in Natal for "absence without leave", absence 
from roll-call or disobedience, insolence, "leaving work in a bcxly'', and 
"neglecting'' to work two hours on Sundays, ran into the thousands, with 
15 See R.Cohen, "Resistance and Hidden Forms of Consciousness amongst 
African Workers", Review of African Political Economy 19 ( 1900), pp.f?-
22; K.Saunders, "'Troublesome Servants': The Strategies of Resistance 
Employed by Melanesian Indentured Labourers on Plantations in 
Colonial Queensland", Journal of Pacific History 14:3-4(1979), 
pp.168-183; R.Takaki, Pau Hana: Plantation Life and Labor in Hawaii. 
Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1984, pp.132-134; and M.Tayal, 
"Indian Indentured labour in Natal, 1890-1911", Indian Economic and 
Social History Review 14: 4( 1977), pp.519-54 7. 
16 See L.M.Thompson, "Indian Immigration into Natal 1860-1872", Archives 
Year Book for South African History 2( 1952), p.66. 
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the great majority of these sentences being passed for the first two 
charges.17 When in November 1913,Indian sugar workers gave their 
support to the campaign initiated by Gandhi as passive resistance, their 
actions bore testimony to a capacity also for concerted resistance of a 
far greater magnitude than "leaving work in a body''. 
When they joined the 1913 strike, the Indian sugar workers were in the 
first instance making a collective statement about their political 
rights.18 The strike severely affected sugar com:p3.llies, particularly in 
the Mount Edgecombe, Verulam, and Tongaat districts, but the wo~kers who 
became involved initially made it quite clear that their actions were 
directed not against employers but against the government.19 Thus 
although production was disrupted by the temporary stoppage of cane-
cutting, Indian sugarmill workers at Mount Edgecombe worked until all 
already harvested cane had been crushed,20 and at Tongaat Indian workers 
assisted in extinguishing a cane fire during the strike.21 Employers on 
17 See particularly Annual Reports, Protector of Immigr-ants, 1902 to 
191 o. 
The penalties on indentured Indian workers for ''unlawful absence from 
work" had been laid out in BLC, Sessional.. Papers, 2, 1885. 
18 See Ginwala, "Indian South Africans". 
J.D.Beall and M.D.North Coombes, "The 1913 Disturbances in Natal: The 
Social and Economic Background to 'Passive Resistance"', unpublished 
mimeo., have concluded that "for the strikers [Gandhi] appeared as a 
late-comer, · a negotiator and only dubiously, as a friend". 
Although statistics showing the extent of the strike are not easy to 
come by, towards the very end of the strike the situation amongst 
Indians along the sugar belt was as follows: 
Working On Strike 
North Coast 11060 302 





(TAD, GG 898, Governor General to Secretary of State, 11.12.1913.) 
19 Ginwala, "Indian South Africans", p.218. 
20 Ibid. 
21 R.G.T.Watson, Tongaati: An African Experiaent. London: Hutchinson, 
1960, p. 136. 
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the other hand did not make any concessions under the circumstances, and 
they collaborated with the state in trying to put down the strike. 
Military force was used to cordon off estates; many workers were wounded 
\ 
by bullets at Mount Edgecombe; and rations were withheld.22 
The striking sugar workers appear to have surpassed Gandhi's 
expectations. Much to Gandhi's distress, he had had to explain to 
Marshall Campbell that 
after my arrest the workers [Gandhi's co-workers] found 
it impossible to control the men and the movement became 
not only spontaneous, but it assumed gigantic 
proportions ••• I must freely admit that I would have 
certainly endeavoured to call out your2~en also; but •• .-yours would have been the last estate. 
In his reply, Campbell chastised Gandhi for the consequences of the 
strike in Victoria County: indentured workers, wrote Campbell~ "were 
only induced to come out by grave threats of personal violence made by 
persons whom I believe to be your agents, two of whom were arrested and 
fined11.24 Gandhi was obviously disturbed by Campbell's attack, and he 
admonished the striking workers as follows: 
Victoria County has not been as free from violence as 
the Newcastle district was. You retaliated. I do not 
care whether it was under provocation or not, but you 
retaliated, and have used sticks and stones, and you 
have burnt sugarcane. That is not passive 
resistance ••• If ... I was an indentured Indian working for 
the Hon. Mr. Marshall Campbell, Mr. Saunders, or other 
employer, and if I found my treatment not just, I would 
not go to the Protector - I would go to my master and 
ask for justice; and if he would not grant it, I would 
say that I would remain there without food or drink 
until it was granted. I am quite sure that the stoniest 
heart will be melted by passive resistance.25 
While rapping the workers over the knuckles, Gandhi publicly lauded 
Campbell for his support in the Senate for the repeal of the £3 
22 GinwaJ.a, "Indian South Africans", pp.220-222. 
23 Gandhi, Collected Works. Vol.XII, pp.298-299. 
24 Ibid., p.313. 
25 Ibid., pp.468-4 70. 
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"licence" payable by free Indians.26 Gandhi had obviously, 
underestimated the convictions 'of Indian sugar workers regarding 
resistance and the W8¥ in which they would find in the political strike 
an opportunity to express themselves also as discontented workers. 
While the north coast may well have been the scene of more intense 
action during the strike, the south coast was only to a degree less 
affected. The south coast was not spared from violence either. On 25th 
November a detachment of 13 policemen went to the sugarmiller 
Hawksworth's Beneva Estate bn the south coast, where 250 Indian workers 
had joined the strike. An exerpt from the police report described the 
W8¥ in which passive resistance was handled by owners and troops before 
erupting into violence: 
I spoke· to the Indians through a European Interpreter 
and asked them if they were willing to go to work, they 
said they were not, Mr Hawksworth then said he wanted 
them arrested I again spoke to them and said they would 
have to come to Umzinto with me and see the Magistrate, 
they agreed to this and some made a move as if to start 
on the road to Umzinto, just then Indian Nakka Kondiah 
N? 67749 shouted to them not to go, I again spoke to 
them and they said they wanted to bring their women and 
children in to avoid trouble I agreed to this they all 
collected on a piece of vacant ground situate between 
the Offices and the Compound and Samuel an Indian who 
spoke in English said "we will not go into Umzinto as 
the Police will beat us". Sergeant Davidson replied and 
said "The Police will not beat you and you can take 
plenty of time and walk quietly along the road". 
The women at this time moved away towards the rooms and 
an Indian Sheik Peir shouted something in his own 
language and sat down on the ground and struck the 
ground with his open hand a few times, jumped up and 
threw himself flat on his back and lay there, most of 
the other men followed his example but some at the back 
of the crowd did not do so, until some of the men who 
were already lying down jumped up and sp:>ke to them in a 
threatening manner and they then sat down. 
Indian Sheik Peir then sµ:ike in Kaffir and drew his hand 
across his throat, I order the Police to loose their 
horses quietly towards them but not to harm them in any 
26 Gandhi was to repeat his praise of Camrbell as see Ibid., p.433. 
way as we moved to~ards them I heard someone shout "A 
horse is killed" •.• 
337 
The ensuing confrontation left two strikers dead and another ten 
suffering bullet wounds. 
The 1913 strike was an event which employers could look upon as a 
disruption, but mor~ than that as a time after r which Indian workers 
would avoid field work on an ever-increasing scale. From that time the 
number of Indian sugar workers began shrinking more rapidly than it had 
been doing,28 and those Indian workers remaining in the industry tended 
to.become concentrated in sugarmill work or overseer positions in the 
cane fields . 
. First Manifestations of Industrial Action: 1914-late 1930s 
The first major strike involving sugar workers after 1913 did indeed 
constitute industrial action. This strike occurred during 1918 at the 
northern-most sugarmill in Natal, St. Lucia Sugar Co.'s Umfolozi 
sugarmill. (See Table 14.) Although far from Durban, and not dependent 
on Indian workers, the Umf olozi sugarmill was not an unlikely site for a 
strike as sugar workers in northern Zululand have always been the lowest 
paid. According to the official evidence, all 260 African workers at 
the Umfolozi sugarmill went out at 7 a.m. on 25th September 1918, 
demanding that their monthly wages be increased from £2 to £3. When, 
Z7 TAD, GG 898, Rourke to Trew, no date~ The Beneva incident was also 
reported in the Report of the Indian »iquiry Commission of 1914. 
28 In the early 1900s approximately g:yj, of all sugarmill workers were 
Indians, the figure for 1903 having been 89,9% of the total of 
7449(Statistical Year Book for 1903). Just over a decade after the 
strike, in 1926, Indians constituted 45,9% of all 7711 sugarmill 
workers and Africans 46,3% (Board of Trade and Industries, Report N? 
66, Report on the Sugar Industry, 1926). By 1935 Indians constituted 
34, 9% of all ,9145 sugarmill workers and Africans 52,8%; while 3908 
Indians were employed by millers-cum-planters as . field workers (SASJ 






































STRIKES/"DISPUTES INVOLVINC WORK STOPPAGES" 1918-1954 . 
NO OF WORKERS INVOLVED 
SUGARMILL/' 




Zululand 3 days 
lnanda 1 day 51 
New Guelderland 1 day 96 
lllovo 2 days 31 
5 strikes 
. ' 
Glendale: Settlement of dispute by arbitration 
Illovo 3 days 65 
-
Illovo 2 days 60 
. 
Refinery 28 hours 847 
-
' 
Umfolo zi 2~ hours 22 
Department of Labour, Annual Reports; Natal Mercury; 
H G Ringrose, Trade Unions in Natal. Cape Town: Oxford 
University Press, 1951; South African Sugar Journal. 
. 
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about an hour later, the demand was reportedly raised to £4, the manager 
warned the striking workers that he was calling in the police. The 
magistrate at Empangeni was sent a telegram, and a sergeant with four 
constables were dispatched to Umfolozi. The narrative is ta.ken up by 
the sergeant, in his report to his commanding officer in Eshowe: 
Shortly a:fter [the telegram was sent to the magistrate] 
the Natives ••• thought better of it and returned to work. 
There were no untoward incidents, nor damage to property 
threatened, it being simply a case of passive resistance 
as far as it went. No previous trouble has been 
experienced, nor were arry grievances put forward. 
I arrived at the Mill at 5 p.m. just as the Natives were 
ceasing work for the day, and had everyone of them 
gathered together and addressed them. I thoroughly 
explained to them the provisions of the Masters and 
Servants Act ••• 
I think that these Natives must have been stirred up by 
some agitators either from the Rand or Durban, but up to 
the present I cannot trace any of them. There have been 
none at the Mill to the knowledge of the Compound 
Manager or any of the Mill officials, but still there 
may be some working amongst the Natives. 
I do not think that there will be any further trouble, 
at any rate, for the present, I have left a couple of 
good N.C.s [Native Constables] there to watch
2
9vents and 
make guarded enquiries for the next few deys. 
The following week the sergeant reported to the magistrate, tenaciously 
pursuing his hypothesis that the workers had not struck of their own 
volition: 
the 2 Native Constables alluded to ••• have returned to 
day and report that the Natives are working well and 
that there has been no further trouble. 
The o.c. sent me a detective (Native) who has been sent 
to the Mill to endeavour to trace the cause and origin 
of the late strike, as we are anxious to ascertain if 
possible, whether there are any Native -agi tato~ from 
the Rand or Durban at the bottom of this trouble. 
The Umfolozi strike was ill-fated, and within a month over 100 of the 
frustrated workers whose demands had not been met deserted the 
sugarmill. 31 
29 NAD, CNC 1918/33, Rumbelow to CCC Eshowe, no date. 
30 NAD, CNC 1918/33, Rum below to Empangeni Magistrate, 2.10.1918. 
31 NAD, CNC 1918/33, Emµuigeni Magistrate to Chief Native Commissioner, 
24. 10.191-8. 
' 340 
Towards the end of 1919, over a year after the Umfolozi strike, Felixton 
sugarmill's crane drivers and those in charge of the cane carrier struck 
for higher wages and against certain conditions of work.32 There were 
signs that a modicum of organisation had underpinned this strike, which 
may have reflected the growing threat to white semi-skilled workers' job 
I 
tenure as em players seized opportunities to replace them with ·Indian 
workers. It is significant in this context that employers were eager to 
curb organisation amongst white workers, and that Tongaat's owners had 
been given cause to praise all but 6 white employees who resigned from 
their union rather than from the comp:my when the union demanded certain 
wage minima that were to be paid at an hourly rate.33 There was nothing 
remarkable about the relatively acquiescent behaviour of white sugarmill 
workers. As the SASJ's editor was to observe, "the true proletariat of 
South Africa are black ·and coloured men, and the real aristocrats seem 
to be the artisans11.34 The artisanate of the sugarmill was small, and 
even if the aristocracy of sugarmill labour was inclusive of semi-
skilled white workers it did not exceed 10% of the total workforce. 
This small stratum occupied the most privileged positions in the 
sugarmill's occu~tional hierarchy. 
\ 
As some white sugarmill workers were resigning from their union, black 
sugarmill workers were doing just the opposite. From the mid-1920s 
responses by.black sugarmill workers acquired a new dynamic inasmuch as 
they were, in certain localised instances, guided by strong 
organisational influences. While at a structural level the 1924 
Industrial Conciliation Act had given organised Indian but not African · 
32 In its limited coverage of the strike the SASJ reported that a sugar 
workers' union was in operation on the coast (SASJ 3: 12 ( 1919), 
p.895). 
33 Condenser 5: 5( 1967), p.3. 
34 SASJ 15:6(1931), pp.359-361. 
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workers the possibility of gaining union recognition, both sectors of 
the black working class in Natal reacted positively, albeit regionally 
and unevenly, to organisational appeals. Endeavours to rally the 
collective sympathies of black workers in Natal were made by the 
Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union of Africa (ICU) and, since 
1930, its break-away faction the ICU yase Natal, on the one hand, and by 
the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) on the other hand. 
Although the ICU had gained considerable support amongst Africans since 
the time of its establishment in Natal in 1924 (many of those supporters 
in Durban having also joined the CPSA when it opened a branch in the 
city in 1929), from 1930 the break-away ICU yase Natal had rapidly lost 
ground in Natal, largely to the advantage of the CPSA~35 The 
sugarocrats were surely keen observers of the changing fortunes of both 
the IC1! and· the CPSA in Natal, and from close quarters at that. It was 
in J.L.Hulett's house that Clements Kadalie obtained official permission 
to hold the first ICU meeting in Durban in 1924;36 and A.W.G.Champion, 
as the secretary of the ICU in Natal, clashed with L.C.Grice (see 
Chapter 1, "The Sugarocracy's Consorts"), as employers' representative, 
before securing the appointment of a Wages Board on behalf of Durban's 
African workers in 1925.37 
Both Helen Bradford and Shula Marks have discussed the issues 
surrounding William Campbell's connivance in mounting an indirect attack 
on the ICU in 1927 through the agency of his acquaintances Solomon, the 
paramount Royal Zulu, and John Dube. After Dube had spoken at 
Camrbell's invitation, and in Solomon's presence, to a thousand workers 
35 E.Roux, Time Longer than Rope: The Black Man's Struggle for Freedom 
in South Africa. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964, · pp.222 
and 245-246. 
36 C.Kadalie, My Life and the ICU. London: Frank Cass, 1970, p.64. 
37 The Truth about the ICU. Durban: African Workers' Club, 1927, p.22. 
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at Mount Edgecombe,38 he augmented his verbal condemnation of Champion 
and the ICU' in his newspaper Ilanga, lase Natal.39 
While it is clear that Champion had a following amongst workers along 
the SU@ll" belt,40 it is equally apparent that sugarmillers (and growers) 
did not take kindly to the ICU's presence.41 But if employers in the 
sugar industry had been anxious enough about the ICU's advances to have 
deemed obstructive tactics necessary,42 then the ascendancy of the CPSA 
as a political umbrella organisation must have been a particularly 
bitter pill for them to swallow. 
Since 1935, but especially after the 1937 strike at the Durban Falkirk 
Iron Company's foundry, the organisation of black industrial workers in 
Natal was spearheaded by members of the CPSA.43 This did not augur well 
38 H.Bradford, "The Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union of Africa 
in the South African Countryside, 1924-1930". PhD thesis, University 
of the Witwatersrand, 1985, p.148. 
39 Jlanga lase llatal, 12.8.1927. I am grateful to Shula Marks for first 
having alerted me to the existence of this particular comment by 
Dube. 
40 As early as 1925 the ICU had convened a meeting "at Zululand" 
(Forman, BC 581, B1.5, Notice of ICU Executive Committee, 
c.6. 10. 1925); and by 1929 there was certainly an ICU branch in 
Stanger (Forman, BC 581, B5.35, A.W.G.Cham.pion to R.A.Mdima, 
23. 7. 1929) • The sugar belt was however not an ICU stronghold and 
"at no stage obtained a sufficient grip ••• to organize protest over 
existing conditions" (H.Bradford, "The Industrial and Commercial 
Workers' Union in the Natal Countryside: Class Struggle on the Land". 
Hons. dissertation, University of Cape Town, 1900, p.50). 
41 Bradford, "Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union in the South 
African Countryside". p.198. 
42 Ibid., pp.148 and 372. Incidentally, despite the relatively milder 
position of the ICU yase Natal, the Natal break-away faction of the 
ICU (as suggested by Roux, Time Longer than Rope. pp.245-246), the -
ICU yase Natal, like the South African Native National Congress, was 
unlikely to have been looked upon kindly by sugarmillers, even if 
Albert Luthuli had been admitted as the first African representative 
on the sugar industry's Central Board (A.Luthuli, Let My Peop1e Go. 
London: Collins, 1962, pp.65-70), and the Campbells were on amicable 
terms with John Dube (see Chapter 2). See also S.Marks, Reluctant 
Rebellion: The 1906-8 Disturbances in llatal. Oxford: Claredon Press, 
1970, pp.54 and 358-365. 
43 Roux, Time Longer than Rope. pp.250-252 and 330-331. 
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for the sugarmillers. Towards the end of the 1930s, in 1937, the NSIEU 
was constituted and registered as a union of Indian SU€f3rmill workers, 
with a "parallel" but officially unrecognised African section. Inspired 
by tireless organisers, including some of the first Indian members of 
the CPSA, such as H.A.Naidoo and G.Ponnen, 44 the NSIEU represented an 
"infiltration" of the sugar industry by "outsiders", and communists at 
that. 
The birth of the NSIEU, at the very time that labour-saving entered into 
I . 
the sugarmillers' thinking, was a significant event. However its sphere 
I 
of influence over sugarmill workers was limited on two uounts: the NSIEU 
did not have a large base of members in the sugarmills, and it did not 
represent the only device by means of which SU€f3rmill workers sought to 
eliminate the pangs of the general economic climate and related 
pressures upon them at the point of production. 
le.bour-saving meant different things to different people in the sugar 
industry. When two of Doornkop sugarmill's African workers had stood 
trial in mid-1937 for malicious injury to property (by. putting fire to 
com pmy cane), the court found inter alia 
Dissatisfaction among employees ••• as a result of 
alteration of conditions of employment. 
Ill feeling on part of malcontents against those 
employees who had.accepted the new terms. 
Rumour current amonst employees that those refusing the 
new terms would be dismissed. 
On 20/5/37 twenty five acres of cane on the estates were 
burnt. · 
As a result of the fire the Mill started ~rushing 
immediately and, as all employees were needed for the 
extra work,,
5
thus entailed, none of the malcontents were 
dismissed.<t 
One of the accused was acquitted, the other convicted. The latter 
44 K.Luckhardt and B.Wall, Organize ••• or Starve! The History o:f the 
South African Congress of Trade Unions. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 
1980, p. 78. 
45 NAD, Lower Tugela Magisterial Archives, Criminal Case 1431 of 1937. 
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worker, an induna iri the sugarmill, had refused to accept the 
lengthening of the working month by the company. His ingenious act of 
resistance was representative of the spontaneous responses which were to 
persist in the sugarmills despite the existence of the NSIEU. 
Some two years after the convinction of the Doornkop induna, 9 of 
Felixton sugarmill's African workers, including 3 from Mo98lJlbiquB, were 
charged and convicted for inciting 76 of their African colleagues to 
withhold their labour. The charges arose out of the refusal by an 
I 
entire shift of African workers to work one night early in June 1939 
unless their wages of £2. per month were· increased. Despite appeals from 
the manager and the compound manager, in the presence of a contingent of 
police, the workers stood fast and the sugarmill had to be closed down 
for the night. 46 As in the case of the Doornkop "malcontents", 
Felixton's African workers were the losers in their attempt to contest 
the status quo in the sugarmill. Though the list of such defeats was to 
grow, it was in these sorts of action by workers at specific sugarmills 
that the limited reach of the NSIEU continued to be shown up. 
An important factor which accounted for the NSIEU's limited 
organisational strength was that from the outset its work was hampered 
by employers. Union meetings were prohibited on comp:my property, and 
clandestine meetings were ·constantly under threat of disruption by armed 
intimidators.47 Consequently, during the early years of the NSIEU's 
existence, its officials travelled long distances to remain-in touch 
with ~orkers while obviating the victi~isation that was expected if 
46 NAD, _Lower Umfolozi Magisterial Archives, Criminal Case 568 of 1939. 
47 Luckhardt and Wall, Organize or Starve. p.78. 
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local stewards were appointed.48 The Union's Secretary, H.A.Naidoo, 
nevertheless appears to have been extraordinarily optimistic about its 
potential. 
With claims to a following of a mere 25 sugarmill and refinery workers, 
Naidoo's contribution to the 1938 South African Trades and Labour 
Council (SATLC) Conference nevertheless revolved almost entirely on the 
' 
position of field workers. Three resolutions came of this concern: the 
conference delegates called on the SATLC's Durban Local Committee to 
investigate the position of field workers; a call was made for a Wage 
Board inquiry into field work; and a motion was adopted to tackle the 
"unorganised position of the rural districts11.49 When M.Diamond 
represented the NSIEU at the 1939 SATLC Conference, his main concern was 
the way in which the Factories Act was being violated by sugarmillers 
who expected a 12-hour working day of their employees without providing 
lunch breaks o~ rest rooms.50 The issues which·they injected into the 
SATLC's meetings may have given the impression that the NSIEU's 
organisers occupied themselves solely with "global" questions, but, as 
they were to demonstrate when they lockSd horns with the sugarocracy in 
1941, this was not the case. 
Confrontin:g the Suga.rocracy: late 1930s-1962 
Undaunted by structural difficulties and employers' attempts to stifle 
.organisation, the NSIEU went ahead to achieve its first victory in 
1941 as a result of its successful bid to have the Department of Labour 
conduct an investigation into the conditions facing sugarmill workers. 
48 H.G.Ringrose, Trade Unions in Natal. Cape Town: Oxford University 
Press, 1951, p.73. 
49 TUCSA, AH 646, Da 1.8, Minutes of 8th Annual SATLC Conference, 1938. 
50 TUCSA, AH 646, Da 1.9, Minutes of 9th Annual SATI.C Conference, 1939. 
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The outcome of the investigation was in itself an important achievement, 
. as was shown in Chapter 4, but more imi:ortantly, it led to significant 
wage increases and other material benefits for black workers. The 
NSIEU's achievements in 1941 demonstrated quite vividly ,to the employers 
that concerted and organised worker action had indeed come to the Natal 
sugar industry. 
With war-time inflation steadily eroding the value of their wages, black 
' 
sugarmill workers began early in 1941 to express discontent with their 
material condition. The 1941 dispute began on 23rd January of that 
year, when the NSIEU and the SATLC jointly requested, through Natal's 
Divisional Inspector of Labour, that a meeting be convened at which 
workers' representatives and sugarmillers might discuss wages and other 
conditions in the industry. Employers declined.51 As the NSIEU had so 
far acted constitutionally at every stage, the government appointed a 
Conciliation Board on 3rd June. By the end of July the Conciliation 
Board, having not settled the dispute, adopted a resolution that neither 
further negotiation nor arbitration would lead to a settlement.52 
On Wednesda;y 20th August the NSIEU held an organisational meeting at 
Clairwood which was attended by about 250 African workers and 35 Indian 
workers.53 Natal's Inspector of Labour met ~i th the ten sugarmillers 
concerned on Friday 22nd August, when the employers agreed to settle 
subject to any wage determination being made effective from no earlier a 
date than 1st September. On the following evening the NSIEU held a 
general meeting attended by some 250 African workers and 150 Indian 
workers, most bf them from Hulsar. The next day an executive meeting 
51 TAD, ARB 583, NSIEU Secretary to SUgarmillers, 7.3.1941. 
52 TAD, ARB 583, Conciliation Board to Minister of Labour, 22.7.1941. 
53 TAD, ARB 583, Deputy Commissioner to Commissioner of Police, 
30.8.1941. . 
~347 
was held at which the NSIEU turned down the sugarmillers' proposai.54 
/Apart from the meetings held that week-end, there was a strike of 150 
African workers at the Renishaw sugarmill.55 The NSIEU persuaded the 
striking workers to resume work and await the outcome of a strike ballot 
to be~held at a general meeting of sugarmill and refinery workers 
planned for the 30th August at Temple Hall, in Sirdar Road, Clairwood. 
The strike ballot meeting was to be held in the event of a failure by 
em.ployers to act, before that date, to settle the workers' grievances. 
The demands that workers had made were for a 10/- per month increase, 
for improved quarters and rations, and for the recognition of the NSIEU 
by em players. 
On Mondey 25th August employers made the offer of 10/- per month to male 
adults and 5/- to women and youths employed at Hulsar, in Durban, and a 
5/- per month increase to all sugarmill (i.e. rural) workers. At an 
NSIEU meeting that night the urban/rural differential embodied in this 
offer was rejected, and the demand for a 10/- increase all round was 
repeated •. 
On Tuesday 25th August a meeting of 600 sugarmill workers at Mount( 
Edgecombe showed them to be unanimously agreed on the need for strike 
action. At one of the Hulett's sugarmills, Darnall, workers had been 
offered general increases,. but the NSIEU and that sugarmill's workers 
stood opposed to the differentiation of workers in this way. These 
latter workers also refused· to negotiate directly with Hulett' s, 
demanding that recognition be given to the NSIEU.56 
54 TAD, ARB 583, Natal Divisional Inspector to Secretary for Labour, 
26.8.1941. 
55 Natal Mercury Zl.8.1941. 
56 Ibid. 
------------------- --- --- -
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On Thursday 28th August employers' and workers' representatives met to 
discuss the workers' grievances, their demand for an increased and 
uniform rate of P8iY" for the entire industry, and a revision of hoilrs of 
work. It was agreed to hold another meeting at which the Conciliation 
Board would be re-assembled. 
On Friday 29th August the Conciliation Board met. The Board had not 
been officially disbanded since its appointment in June, and it was 
still empowered to arbitrate in the ongoing dispute. This meeting was 
also adjourned until the following day, with the stalemate between 
employers and workers unbroken. 
On SaturdB¥ 30th August the dispute entered an even more critical stage. 
The meeting that dey of the Conciliation Board closed with a decision to 
await the arrival in Durban of I.Walker, the Department of Labour's 
Secretary, to mediate in the dispute. The Natal Mercury had reported 
"signs of truculence" amongst Esperanza's workers, the position at 
Renishaw was no less tense, and the NSIEU was hard put to restrain 
workers from striking.57 Thus when more than 400 workers met as pl~ed 
in Clairwood to decide on a course .of action, NSIEU officials had to go 
to great lengths to convince them that because the issue was now sub 
judice, strike action would be illegal and therefore inadvisable.58 
' 
On Tuesdey 2nd Septembe·r the Natal Mercury contained an editorial on the 
dispute which was broadly sympathetic with the workers. The articJ,.e 
also intimated that Walker might.exercise the powers conferred upon him 
as Controller of Manpower, under the war-time Emergency Regulations, to 
end the dispute. Inflamed by the thought of this possibility, the NSIEU 
57 Natal Mercury 1 • 9. 1941 • 
58.Ibid. 
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reacted immediately. With the prospect of official high-handedness 
threatening the striking workers' cause, the NSIEU's Secretary wrote to 
the Minister of Labour, warning that 
Thousands of workers involved in the present dipute, 
living under conditions that can only be described as a 
scandal and disgrace to any civilised country, certainly 
will not tolerate any arbitrarily imposed terms of 
settlement when they have fully conformed with every 
legal reql,lirement in terms of the Industrial Council 
(sic) Act.?~ . · 
The NSIEU had reportedly voiced strong opposition to the creation of the 
post of Controller of Manpower, and it was not now going to stand for 
I 
the collective bargaining process to be short-circuited.60 
The NSIEU's misgivings were obviously assuaged, because on Wednesday 
10th September employers' and workers' representatives agreed to allow 
Walker to mediate and to to leave it to him to settle the dispute. His 
settlement would be binding until the first Wage Determination. Had the 
I 
settlement failed sugarmill workers would undoubtedly have gone out on 
strike regardless of anything the NSIEU might have suggested. They knew 
that they would have had the backing of the Non-European United Front, 
which a week before Walker's arrival had already begun preparing a 
memorandum calling on all black workers in Natal to come out in active 
support for the suga.rmill workers in the event of such a failure.61 As 
it happened, the workers found Walker's settlement of 10/- to all adult 
male workers and 5/- to women and youths, without urban/rural 
differentiation, to be acceptable. 
With the 1941 victory notched up, the NSIEU's status as a sugarmill 
workers' union was confirmed. The Union's officials could not be 
59 Quoted in Daily News 2.9.1941. 
60 Data.I Mercury 3. 9. 1 94 1 . 
61 Natal Mercury 5.9.1941. 
------ --- ----------------~ 
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complacent in their victory for, as Naidoo made clear during the 1942 
SATLC Conference, sugarmillers had not let up in their campaign to 
obstruct organisation. Naidoo spoke of the various implications of the 
employers' camplign; of how attempts were made to ''break" the Union by 
"an off-loading of labour on to the fields", of widespread dismissals, 
and of discrimination against workers who were "interested in the 
Union".62 These revelations were voiced in support of the motion passed 
at the Conference 
That the Government be requested to amend its industrial 
laws for the purpose of including such agricultural 
workers as are engaged i~ the sugar industry and in 
agricultural co-operations.b3 
Not surprisingly, this call came to nothing, but the fundamental matter 
in question did not escape the attention of the sugarmillers. The SASJ 
conveyed it to them in a parabolic editorial: 
Let us take an instance of the ill effects of differeing 
wage scales within the industry as a whole. In a 
lodging on a sugar estate are two brothers. One is a 
worker in the fields, the other an unskilled worker in a 
mill. There is a disparity between the wages received 
by each. The agricultural labourer, who is beyond the 
pale of wage legislation, receives only one-half of the 
wages received by his brother in the factory. There 
comes discussion, explanation, argument; and in the end, 
smarting from apparent injustice under which the one is 
paternally cared for by the Government, the other 
foments insurrection and, with the vigour of a fanatig 
breeds among his like a strike and civil disobedience. 4 
The SASJ's editor was to be proved not far off the mark with his 
premonition about the field worker,65 but his message was not heeded by 
the sug:i.rmillers. As Naidoo opined during 1943, employers were unlikely 
62 TUCSA, AH 646, Da 1.12, Report of 12th Annual SATLC Conference, 1942. 
63 Ibid. 
64 SASJ 26:9(1942), p.431. 
65 When the Natal Sugar Field Workers' Union was launched in the mid-
1940s its first concerns were to struggle to have field workers 
recognised under the Industrial Conciliation Act, and for improved 
wages (TUCSA, AH 646, Dd 7.3, Memorandum from NSFWU to Prime Minister 
Smuts, no date; TUCSA, AH 646, Dd 17.?7, NSFWU Constitution, no date; 
and Ambag 2:3(1946), pp.11-12, 2:6(1946), p.15, and 2:10(1946), 
p.22). 
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to alter the prevailing conditions except possibly under the pressure of 
a strike.66 As Naidoo was to witness at Glendale over the following 
months, some employers would go to great lengths to preserve the status 
quo, and even the threat of a strike was not a certain means of bringing 
about reform. 
Of the local disputes that took place in the aftermath of the 1941 
victory, that between the NSIEU and Glendale Sugar Estate was 
particularly significant. The 1941 award had only applied to workers 
employed in the 9 sugarmills and refinery whose various owners were 
represented on the relevant Conciliation Board. This had left workers 
at the remaining 13 sugarmills unaffected by the award. Such 
differentiation reflected the regional pattern of the NSIEU's membership 
at the time: the Union was registered in the contiguous magisterial 
' districts of Durban, Pinetown, Umzinto, Inanda, and Lower Tugela, and 
the 6 smallest and most peripheral sugarmills within those districts had 
no workers who were NSIEU members. Sugarmills embraced by the terms of 
the award each had more than 100 workers enrolled as NSIEIJ members, and 
only one of the 13 unaffected sugarmills, namely Melville, had some of 
its workers organised by the Union. (See Table 15.) Glendale was one of 
the ~mills falling within a district where the Union was registered, 
but which at the time had no workers in the NSIEU. Although Glendale, 
under the ownership of the Paruk family, stood outside the sphere of 
actual sugarocratic control, its protracted dispute with the NSIEU, 
between mid-1943 and early 1945, inv_?lved issues and personnel that were 
subsequently to emerge within the sugarocraey's sugarmills. 
The Glendale dispute had its origins in July 1943, as the sugarmill was 
66 TUCSA, AH 646, Da 1.13, Report of the 13th Annual SATLC Conference, 
1943. 
.I 
TABLE 15: MEMBERSHIP Of THE NATAL SUGAR INDUSTRY 
EMPLOYEES' UNION, 1941 
RACIAL DIVISION Of LABOUR 
NS I EU 
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SUGARMILLS WHITE. "MAURITIAN" AFRICAN INDIAN MEMBERSHIP 
(Indians and 
Africans) 
Chaka's Kraal 30 11 430 136 114 
' 
Gledhow 33 - 168 149 129 
Renishaw 24 - 175 150 166 , 
Illovo 36 9 165 185 303 
Esperanza 51 .,. 5 279 177 117 
Sezela 74 - 393 318 276 
Mt Edgecombe 166 - 550 742 526 
Hulsar 139 - 590 302 271 
Tonga at 75 - 300 255 243 
Darnall 328 - 900 215 196 
Glendale 6 - 45 43 ·-
Melville 27 - 257 106 88 
Doornkop 13 ' 241 54 - -
New Guelderland 16 6 181 74 -
Central factory 33 - 160 140 -
Ptospecton 6 - 20 56 -
" Umzinkulu 12 - 153 87 -
Shire's - - 45 - -
felixton 54 - 500 63 -
Amatikulu 54 - 450 105 -
Entumeni 8 - 208 57 -
Z S M 73 - 510 115 -
Umfolozi 99 - 725 28 -
1 357 31 7 545 3 557 2 429 
Source: TAD, ARB 583, LL 1052/260, Divisional Inspector to 
Secretary for Labour, 22.9.1941. 
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about to begin its annual crushing season. 67 A meeting had been 
scheduled for that month, at which NSIEU officials were to have started 
organising and recruiting Glendale workers. Inclement weather prevented 
the meeting from being held. The NSIEU learnt that 10 workers who had 
congregated in the hope of attending the meeting were soon thereafter 
withdrawn from the sugarmill by its management, and put to work in the 
company's cane fields. Nevertheless, by the end of August the majority 
of Glendale's workers, who were eligible for membership, had joined the 
NSIEU. During the next two months, September and October, four more 
sugarmill workers, including two shop stewards, were re-allocated to 
tasks outside the sugarmill. Then during December, at the end of the 
crushing season, 18 sugarmill workers were not made the conventional 
offer of off-crop work in the sugarmill or as field labourers, and they 
and their families were instructed to vacate the company's living 
quarters. The NSIEU intervened and believed it had succeeded in having 
the management give these people a reprieve until alternative 
accommodation had been found. To the Union's surprise, these workers 
were subsequently arrested and jailed for trespassing. The NSIEtJ. again 
intervened to secure their release, and the Union arranged accommodation 
for them until the beginning of the 1944 crushing season, when they were 
to apply to resume work at Glendale. However, before the new season 
started in June 1944 they were informed that the suga.rmill had its full 
complement of workers, and that they were unwanted. 
The NSIEU was to discover that even after the season had begun more 
workers were being recruited, including some from Nyasaland and 
Moy:unbique, and that with the inception of three shifts, the sugarmill's 
labour needs were higher than they had ever been. Furthermore, workers 
67 The story of the Glendale dispute has been reconstructed from 
correspondence contained in TAD, ARB 598, LC 1052/416, 1944; and TAD, 
ARB 1573, 1183/12-31, 1944. 
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who were employed had reported to the NSIEU that sirdars and the factory 
manager had threatened to dismiss any who joined the union or had 
I 
contact with its secretary. The situation was exacerbated by claims to 
the effect that the factory manager had publicly boasted of having 
destroyed the NSIEU at Glendale. Workers then held a meeting where 
demands were formulated for submission to the management. 
On 26th July the NSIEU demanded Glendale to recognise the Union and a 
local union committee of 4 members, and to re-instate the 18 workers who 
had been dismissed at the end of the previous season. Al though 
management acknowledged recognition of the NSIEU "as .it is entitled to 
by law", Glendale refused to submit to the demands. When, as a 
consequence of this refusal, Shanley, who had succeeded Naidoo as the 
NSIEU's Secretary in 1943, co?tacted one of Glendale's directors in 
Durban, Suleman Paruk, it was intimated that the company would stand 
fast, fully prepared to cope with a strike of two months duration if it 
had to. Shanley responded with the warning that the NSIEU could sustain 
a strike until the end of the season, whereupon Paruk suggested 
resorting to a ministerially-appointed Conciliation Board. Before 
calling for the constitution of such a Board, a final attempt was made 
to resolve the issue internally. This attempt met with failure because 
the factory manager, J .B.Grant, who was entrusted by the Glendale 
directorate to act on behalf of the comP311Y, regarded the affair as non-
negotiable. A meeting of workers on 31st July resolved to apply for a 
Conciliation Board, and in the event of the Minister of Labour's failure 
to comply with the request, to go out on strike. 
Because the sugar industry fell under the provisions of War Measure N?3 
of 1942, the Minister of Labour recommended the appointment of an 
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arbitrator to settle the Glendale dispute. There was a lengthy del8¥ in 
the making of this appointment, one of the prospective arbitrators 
having died and others having been otherwise committed. Meanwhile, it 
was reported by Shanley, in a letter written to the Minister of Labour 
early in September 1944, that Grant was "commencing to adopt a cold 
at ti tu de once again", that four more workers had been dismissed, and 
that the company was "visciously anti-union and ruthless. They will 
stop at nothing". During November Shanley communicated to the Minister 
the NSIEU's views on the urgent need for the appointment of an 
arbitrator, and referred again to continuing dismissals, to the 
management's not having "wasted any time in intimidating and terrorising 
the employees at Glendale", and to the resultant fear amongst workers to 
deal with NSIEU officials except at a point that was 2 miles from 
comrany premises. 
An arbitrator's award was finally made in mid-March 1945, which 
compelled Glendale to recognise and c~operate with an NSIEU shop 
steward and a local complaints committee; and complaints procedures were 
set out. The award was to be effective for one year. 
The Glendale dispute essentially revolved around the questions of union 
recognition and worker representation. The role played by owners and 
management during the dispute was no different in its objectives and 
methods from that played by other sugarmillers in Natal under 
circumstances where workers were trying to organise or where they 
collectively sought union recognition. Small sugarmillers and 
suga.rocrats alike were intent on deflecting the new-found organisational 
energies of black workers. 
The registration of the Industrial Council for the Sugar Manufacturing 
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.and Refining Industry in MB¥ 1947 did not ameliorate the circumstances 
within which the NSIEU operated. Consensus was far from being reached 
on wage rates when the first Industrial. Council "agreement" was adopted 
in mid-1947, and there followed negotiations between the NSIEU and the 
Department of Labour in the absence of the employers (who refused to 
meet with the Union officials).68 Not only were they shunned by 
employers, but the NSIEU's officials sensed mounting organisational 
difficulties as Indian semi-skilled workers were systematically being 
replaced by Africans. Because Africans, who already outnumbered the 
\ 
3COJ Indians 2:1 in the SU§3.I'mills, were housed in compounds they were 
relatively inaccessible to NSIEU organisers.69 
No more than a few days had passed since the NSIEU's officials had 
lamented the fact that the compound represented an obstacle to 
organisation when, on the 2nd November 1947, 500 African sugarmill 
workers at Darnall went on strike to demonstrate their objections to 
compound discipline and to demand the dismissal of the compound manager 
and a number of company policemen. These workers, about half 'of whom 
came from Mo~bique, were reported by the Daily News to have returned 
to work after 1 5 hours following an address by the police captain who 
had travelled from Durban with 30 other policemen to deal with the 
strike.70 Shanley offered a corrective to the newspaper report, stating 
that the brutality of the police and the consequent hospitalisation of 
some workers had been neglected.71 
Darnall's workers were evidently quite competent to organise and act 
68 TUCSA, AH 646, Da 4.4, Minutes of SATLC Durban and District Local 
Executive Committee Meetings, June 1947 and August 1947. 
69 Ibid., October 1947. 
70 Daily Bevs 3.11.1947. 
71 TUCSA, AH 646, Da 4.4, Minutes of SATLC Durban and District Local 
Executive Committee Meeting, November 1947. 
., 
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collectively around a specific grievance, but it was clear that they did 
not. command sufficient resources to be able to defy police (or 
employers') instructions and sustain a strike until their demands were 
met. Nor did the NSIEU offer an effective means of pressing African 
sugarmill workers' demands. The Union's officials saw themselves as 
being hamstrung by structural conditions. As the SATLC, relaying a 
report frcm Shanley, portrayed those conditions in September 1948: 
Under present circumstances we have to go to the 
Employers for permission to hold meetings because there 
are no facilities for holding meetings elsewhere than on 
the Estates. 
The Industrial Council ••• is functioning very well and it 
was not proposed to do anything to upset the Employers 
by holding meetings on private property without 
permission. 
Naturally the Employers do not want us to go against 
Government policy and consequently there is a lot of 
confusion on the question of the status of the African 
workers. · 
The Employers take up the stand that until the 
Government gives definite expression to its policy 
towards ~e African workers they are not going to do 
anything. 
A decade earlier they had been bold and optimistic organisers, but since 
the formation of the Industrial Council, the NSIFlJ's officials seemed to 
have become cautious if not somewhat diffident. 
Given its highly centralised organisational structure - a handful of 
Durban-based officials acting as policy-makers, organisers, and 
negotiators - the NSIEU had dti.ring and since its 1941 struggle found it 
difficult to contain workers' militancy in those su,garmills where it had 
members. By now virtually deferring to employers so as not to 
jeopardise its position within the Industrial Council, the NSIEU was 
effectively (but probably quite unintentionally) announcing to African 
sugarmill workers in particular that it could promise them little 
besides what it said in the Council which was in their interests. Yet 
72 Ibid., September 1948. 
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within the Industrial Council, the NSIEU's own voice was stifled as a 
result of its officials' inability to penetrate the barriers erected by 
the sugarmillers. 
Despite its problems, the NSIEU had made considerable headwey during its 
first decade, and by 1948 it could boast a membership of 27 42 Indian 
workers and an additional 1520 workers in its African section.73 But 
when the time came in mid-1949 to negotiate a new Industrial Council 
agreement, the representatives of these more than 4000 sugarmill workers 
felt obliged to withdraw from the Council. Early in the negotiations a 
dead-lock was reached between the employers on the one hand, and the 
NSIEU and the AEU on the other, over the definition of job categories in 
mechanical work (viz. those applying to artisans, handymen, and 
assistants or "hands"). The position deteriorated when the NSIEU 
withdrew from the Council; its decision to do so having been occasioned 
by the em players' denial of recognition to the Union and its appointed 
shop stewards, and their refusal to make provision in the agreement for 
the collection of union subscriptions by stop order. 74 Under these, 
circumstances it is not surprising that the new agreement represented 
significant gains for white sugarmill workers (such as having an end put 
to the employers' practices of lowering shift engineers' wages during 
the off-crop and charging rental for company houses, and being assured 
· that "the status of 'artisan' will not be interfered with").75 The 
Industrial Council agreement had thus reinforced the material 
connotations of the racial division of sugarmill labour. 
Material differentiation within the context of the racial division of 
73 Ringrose, Trade Unions., pp.107-11 O. 
74 TUCSA, AH 646, Da 4.4, Minutes of SATLC Durban and District Local 
Executive Committee Meetings, July 1949 and September 1949. 
75 Ibid., September 1949. 
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sugarmill labour accounted for the fact that virtually every strike by 
sugarmill workers was an ethnically exclusive affair. It would be 
facile to put this down to the racial division of sugarmill labour 
alone; and equally simplistic to attribute it entirely to ethnic 
identity. The bloody 1949 clash in Durban between Indians and Zulus 
might be used to argue that ethnic identity cannot be altogether· 
discounted as a vital aspect of workers' responses along ethnic lines at 
that time. To the degree that ethnic identity did exist amongst 
sugarmill workers, it was underpinned by the +egal (and thus material) 
differentials between Indians and Africans - different rights to 
property, different rights as workers, spatial segregation, and the 
social division of labour according to "racial" criteria. It is perhaps 
not surprising then that although by the late 1940s the NSIEU had 
organised almost one-third of all sugarmill workers in Natal, its 
success had not resulted in the elimination of "ethnic responses" to the 
sugarmilling labour process. And certainly the schism between black and 
white sugarmill workers remained as deep as ever. 
That the consequences of the "ethnicity" factor in industrial sugar 
workers' responses could themselves reinforce divisions amongst black 
sugar compuiy employees was made apparent at the Hulsar refinery during 
December 1952. On the 16th December, the. 300 African refinery workers 
on the first shift downed' tools. They demanded that their wages be 
raised above the levels set by the Wage Determination a decade past, and 
they requested overalls and other benefits. Hulsar was given ""24 hours 
to accede to these demands. When the Daily Bevs appeared that af'ternoon 
it reported that t:D Indian workers on the first shift had been warned to 
join the strike "or be killed".76 After the striking African workers 
76 Daily Devs 16.12.1952. 
\ 
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returned to their compound, where the second shift also remained that 
afternoon, 'the refinery's centrifugals and driers were kept in operation 
by white artisans and Indian workers.77 
On the following morning the striking workers, now numbering 800 and 
including a very small number of Indians, met on the Hulsar sports field 
with directors of the company and officials from the Departments of 
Labour and Native Affairs. After informing them of their instant 
dismissal, the Hulsar director Sulin refused to speak to the workers' 
representative declaring that the "indaba was over".78 With 40 armed 
police standing by the workers were told that they were expected by the 
employers to collect their pay· and, after spending the night in the 
compound, to either re-enlist with or leave Hulsar the next morning. 
Although they initially refused to take their pay, they did so the next 
morning and by the afternoon half of the workers had been reinstated.79 
During the Hulsar strike, but behind the scenes, the NSIEU's Shanley 
communicated with the Secretary of the Industrial Council first by 
telephone and then in writing. The Union's central purpose was to 
dissociate itself from the strike and to seek physical and financial 
security for Indian workers employed by Hulsar. More than that, the 
NSIEU wished 
to state that naturally their sympathies are with the 
strikers in their endeavour to obtain by direct means, 
that which [the] Union has been trying_ to obtain by 
peaceful negotiations through yo~[sic.J Council over 
the period of the past FOUR years. · 
Shanley continued to make the telling point that the blame for the 
77 Ibid. 17.12.1952. 
78 Ibid. 18. 12. 1952 • 
79 Ibid. 19 and 20.12.1952. 
00 TUCSA, AH 646, DC 8.96, E.Shanley to Industrial Council for the Sugar 
Manufacturing Industry Secretary, 18.12~ 1952. 
strike lay 
squarely on the shoulders of the Employers' Association, 
as this organisation has repeatedly refused to pass on 
to its lowly paid Employees, a share of the benefits 
which have accrued to the Industry from t~~ Sugar Price 
Increases and the improvements in methods. 
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The Hulsar workers, as the only urban industrial sugar workers, and in 
terms of the Industrial Council agreements, received higher wages than 
their counterparts in the sugarmills. That the striking Hulsar workers 
were summarily dismissed pointed to the disjuncture between the ideology 
and rhetoric of sugarocratic paternalism on the one hand and workers' 
actual material circumstances on the other. This was a time when the 
employers' welfarism was gathering momentum, yet improved housing in a 
number of the sugar villages was not accomplllied, in this case, by the 
provision of overalls or, more significantly, by a more conciliatory 
approach to protesting workers. It was a time when, as Shanley had 
written, returns to capital in sugar were expanding, and uninterrupted -
production took priority over conciliation. 
Once the Hulsar strike had been crushed it would be some two decades 
before the sugarocracy and its corporate heirs would again face serious 
rebellion. However that is not to sa:y that all. sugarmill workers had 
somehow been pacified, nor is it to say that all sugarmillers-
sugarocrats and others alike - went uncontested in their every action 
towards employees. 
An AEU organiser found on one of his routine visits to the sugarmills a 
few months after the Hulsar strike that white artisans were generally 
\ 
content with their conditions. There were complaints of excessive 




happy", 82 and Felixton's AEU shop steward conveyed the impression that 
"members at this Mill seem to be just one big happy family''.83 Like all 
happy families however, sugar villagers had their tribulations. The 
"double grip" which the employer had over them as boss and landlord 
could be tightened to an intolerable degree. Then, as happened at 
Umfolozi late in 1954, workers retaliated in an attempt to release the 
employers' grip. Twenty one white sugarmill workers retaliated by 
downing tools when one of their colleagues was dismissed from Umfolozi 
in connection with an alleged misdemeanour in the social ambit of 
village life. This victim of social control was dismissed for something 
unrelated to his work, but his fellow workers found it necessary to use 
the strike as the only means available to them in trying to redress the 
issue. The striking workers then felt the might of the employers' grip 
themselves when they were prosecuted and sentenced to a .£10 fine or 2 
weeks' "compulsory labour" (half suspended for one year) for their two 
and a half hour "illegal strike".84 
As the end of the sugu-ocratic era approached a period of relative calm 
set in. There is no evidence of worker militancy between 1954 and 1962 
(and for some time thereafter), even when Tongaat reduced by one-fifth 
its sugarmill's workforce in the face of the 1960 distribution crisis.85 
The reasons for this apparent lull in collective action are difficult to 
establish, but some discussion is warranted. What is clear is that 
organised labour was going through a period of flux and uncertainty. 
The NSIEU appears to have withdrawn from the SATLC in 1948. Al thoug."1. 
Shanley, the Union's secretary, had been a member of the CPSA (before 
82 AEU Monthly Journal and Report 293(April 1954), p.CJ7. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Interview with A.Britz, AEU District Secretary, Durban, 12.9.1985; 
Ibid. 301(December 1954) and 305(April 1955). 
85 Tongaat Shareholders' Annual General Meeting, reported in SASJ 
44:4 ( 1960). 
/ 
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joining the South African Congress of Democrats), when the SATLC's 
members re-aligned themselves between 1954 and 1955 the NSIEU, as a 
"parallel union", followed the course set by the South African Trade 
Union Council (SATUC) as opposed to that taken by the South African 
Congress of Trade Unions (SACTlJ). The SATUC (soon to be named the Trade 
Union Council of South Africa (TlJCSA)) represented the more conservative 
faction to emerge from the SATI.C, and it also embraced the AEU which had 
organised sugar mill artisans. The position adopted by the AEU led to 
the formal severance of its ties with its parent, the British AEU. The 
alignment of the NSIEU and the AEU with TUCSA indicated a commitment on 
their respective parts to "bread-and-butter" negotiations strictly 
within the ambit of the Industrial Council. 
What is unclear is why large-scale spontaneous resistance should have 
diminished, on the one hand, and why SACTU never organised within the 
sugar industry on the other hand. The memories of the workers' defeat 
at Hulsar and harsh repression of political and union activism by the 
state during the 1950s and early '60s could not have been the sole 
reasons. It may well be that the NSIEU's older organ1sers could shed 
some light on the issue, but the door of the Union's offices is 
unfortunately closed to all researchers as a matter of principle. 
Contesting Institutionalised Captial/Labour Relations: 
the Post-1962 Period 
Professional corporate managers continued to have few problematic 
capital/labour issues to contend with in the early years of the post-
sugarocratic period. The sugar companies' coffers were filled to 
overflowing by the high revenue of the early 1960s' boom, and welfarism 
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and material improvements were the order of the day.86 
'.rensions within the capital/labour relationship appeared to be contained 
by the Industrial Council framework. It was in that framework that 
white sugarmill workers struggled to no avail to introduce closed-shop 
agreements, ff7 and within which they inti~ated that they would move in 
favour of job reservation if Indians were given artisan training by the 
sugar companies.SB The motives underlying this struggle also led the 
AEU to dis-affiliate itself in 1966 when TUCSA decided to adopt a non-
racial approach to organisation and strategy. As serious as the 
exclusivist tendencies of white sugarmill workers were (at a time when 
managers were trying to undo the more constrictive aspects of the 
sugarocratic legacy), 89 they were to fall into the shadow cast by black 
sugarmill workers' militancy which manifested itself in the mid-1970s. 
During 1973 Durban and its immediate hinterland experienced widespread 
strikes. Although the first of these strikes occurred in the Coronation 
brick and tile plant, a Tongaat subsidiary, the sugar comp:mies were not 
otherwise touched by the 1973 strikes. Thus sugarmill workers were not 
involved in the militancy which is now generally regarded as a watershed 
in South Africa's post-World War II labour history. However a series of 
strikes by black sugarmill workers during 1974 attested to the fact that 
they too had entered a new phase of resistance. 
86 In the early to mid-1960s sugar companies were experiencing high 
earnings (Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the ~ Industry 
of the Republic of South Africa, 1970), and their newly appointed 
personnel managers embarked on projects to bring sugarmill workers' 
conditions up to those which prevailed on the gold mines (Interview 
with T.Vogel, SASA Personnel Consultant, Durban, 11.9.1985). 
ITT P.L.van den Berghe, Caneville: The Social Structure of a South 
African Tovn. Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1964, p.97. 
ffi Financial Mail (Special Supplement) 19.2.1965, p.29. 
89 Interview with Vogel, op cit. 
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In mid-October 1974 about eJ:JJ African workers at the Felixton sugarmill 
went on strike. Felixton' s compound manager, P.Boyd, had organised a 
raid on the compound in search of privately-brewed liquor. Incensed by 
this attempt at social control, the African workers downed tools and on 
the night of the 15th October they demonstrated their disapproval by 
running through the sugarmill waving cane stalks. The following day saw 
them quietly seated in the compound, with armed police standing by, 
while the works committee and Department of Labour officials discussed 
their demand for Boyd's dismissal. The strike ended and work was 
resumed, after 24 hours, following Hulett's promise that the workers' 
grievances would be investigated by the company.~ 
Less than a fortnight after the Felixton strike, over fiXJ black workers 
struck at the nearby Empangeni sugarmill. After off-duty workers had 
-
"rampaged" through the sugarmill, they and their striking colleagues 
spent the night dancing on the sports field. Without having made 
specific demands, the striking workers refused the next morning to 
negotiate with the management through the works committee; they wanted 
to speak directly to the general manager and the factory manager. After 
two days the strike ended with the management having accepted a letter 
from the workers in which they laid out their grievances, but not 
without tear gas and dogs having also been used by .the police to 
disperse congregated workers and to route them from their compound.91 
A few weeks later, on the morning of 14th November, over 500 African and 
Indian workers struck for higher wages at the Darnall sugarmill. This 
was the third of Hulett's five sugarmills to experience a strike within 
a month and the rapid appearance of police was quite predictable. The 
90 Daily News 16.10.197 4 and 18.10.197 4. Natal Mercury 16.10.197 4; 
1 7.1O.197 4; and 1 9. 10. 197 4. 
91 Daily News 25.10.1974 and 26.10.1974. Natal Mercury 26.10.1974. 
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Daily Bevs reported that the workers were in an "ugly mood", 92 and an 
unprecedented step was taken when white women and school students in the 
village were sent to the whites' recreation hall and kept there under 
police guard: whether it was Hulett's managers or the police who 
originally proposed it, it was either a reflection of some deep-seated· 
fear with racist overtones, or it was a signal to the striking workers 
that the sugarmill had been declared a veritable battlefield. White 
personnel kept the sugarmill in operat~on until mid-night, ~ packets 
were prepared, and buse~ were placed on stand-by to indicate to the 
striking workers that they faced immediate dismissal. The management 
promised to investigate grievances expressed at the time that the wage· 
demands were made, and to report back to the workers in a fortnight. 
This undertaking was accompanied by an ultimatum that· workers should · 
return to work or face dismissal. The strike was called off.93 
It became quite clear two days later, when about 200 African and Indian 
workers struck for higher wages at the Melville sugarmill, that-the 
emergent pattern of managerial responses had not deterred workers from 
ponfronting their employers outside the Industrial Council. In this case 
clashes took place between armed police and strikers who had allegedly 
stoned passing cars on the nearby main road. The strike was broken when 
workers were threatened with immediate dismissai.94 
The reaction of the sugar companies to the strikes of October and 
November 1974 was not simply a displey o:I intransigence. The Felixton 
strike had arisen out of a specific grievance and Hulett's, although 
defending the compound manager, was prepared to treat it as a delicate 
92 Daily 1f evs 1 5. 11 • 197 4. 
93 Daily News 15.11.1974. Natal Mercury 15.11.1974 and 16.11.1974. 
94 Daily If evs 18. 11. 197 4. Iatal Mercury 18.11.197 4. 
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and negotiable affair. However the three subsequent strikes had all the 
appearances of having been manifestations of what Shanley of the NSIEU 
had feared would follow the Hulsar strike some two decades previously; 
namely, the spreading of "the 'Strike Idea111.95 Certainly the sugar 
companies did not treat the latter three strikes as legitimate or 
justifiable: the employers could ill-afford stoppages at a time when 
export earnings were extremely high, and in terms of the most recent 
Industrial Council agreement wages were due to be increased less than 
six months later. The workers, for their part, had shown how rapidly 
and effectively they were able to mobilise collectively around an issue 
which may have seemed to employers to be ill-defined if not 
indefensible. 
In retrospect, the events of late 1974 were the prelude to a revised 
approach to capital/labour relations by the sugar companies. The 
transformation took shape after the approval by Parliament of certain of 
the recommendations made by .the Wiehahn Commission in 1979. Three 
issues in particular characterised the transformation. Firstly, as an 
extension of their recommendations to the Wiehahn Commission (and in an 
attempt to contain spontaneous outbursts by sugarmill workers), 
employers were quick off the mark to sponsor the first trade union for 
African sugar mill workers. The NUSMRE was launched in 1980 with an 
employers' subvention, and under the leadership of forme.r works 
committee functionaries. With its membership of over 4000 in 198), as 
opposed to the NSlEl.J's membership of some 200, the NUSMRE stood for the 
overwhelming majority of sugarmill workers.96 Although it was created 
as a "sweetheart union", its officials will deny that the employers' 
95 See Note 8) above. . 
96 S.Miller, Trade Unions in South Africa, 1970-1980. Cape Town: SALDRU, 
1982, p.190. 
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subvention has had any bearing on the NUSMRE's work.97 
The second aspect of the post-1979 transformation in capital/labour 
relations in the sugar industry was the appearance of the Sweet, Food 
and Allied Workers' Union (SFAWU). As a member of the Federation of 
South African Trade Unions (FOSATU), which waa formed in 1979, the SFAWU 
embraced the central FOSATU principles of being non-racial, of 
establishing strong factory floor organisation around factory floor 
union committees, of the subservience of union officials to workers' 
control, and of union non-alignment to political and other parties.98 
Being outspokenly critical of parallel unions and espousing 
organisational democracy,93 the SFAWU was fundamentally at odds with 
most of the other unions active in the SUgJ3.I" industry. Apart from these 
differences, the SFAWU did not belong the sugar industry's Industrial 
Council. Its first successful penetration into the sugarmills was made 
at Dalton, whose workers were previously unorganised yet readily 
accessible to FOSATU organisers who had already established a foothold 
in southern Natal.100 
Thirdly, employers had to come to terms with the failure of their own 
attempts (detailed in Chapter 6) at repulsing such an intrusion aa that 
made by the SFAWU. This demanded a shift in their approach to labour 
relations. This shift involved, inter alia, a change in the employers' 
discourse. On the one hand they acknowledged the dawning of a new "post 
sugarocratic" era in capital/labour relations: 
a veritable revolution has been taking place in the 
relationships between management and the workforce, 
particularly with regard to black workers. 
97 Interview with F.Khumalo and B.Dlamuka, NUSMRE officials, Durban, 
3.1.1983. 
98 See Isisebenzi (July, 1979). 
99 See Posatu Worker lfevs (February, 1900). 
1 OOinterview with J.Naidoo, SFAWU official, Durban, 10.9.1985. 
The delicate nature of these negotiations and the time 
involved is something that was totally unheard of a few 
years ago and a very far cry fr3m the paternalistic 
management style we once enjoyed.1 1 
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On the other hand they announced their commitment to a new institutional 
framework: 
Managements in the Sugar Industry have accepted that 
freedom of association is a right and not a privilege to 
be denied or def erred; that unions are an integral part 
of the free enterprise system; and that while there will 
always be the inherent conflict of interests between 
employers and unions, this conf6~ct can be contained, 
regulated and institutionalised. 
While it is clear that a shift has indeed taken place in the employers' 
discourse, it is equally apparent that this did not mean that a more 
accommodating position has been adopted vis-a-vis organised black 
sugarmill workers. What the new terms of the employers' discourse 
reflects is a strategy of control by institutionalised incorporation. 
The manifestation of the post-1979 transformation in capital/labour 
relations may be fruitfully discussed against the background of its 
three essential aspects as outlined above. Although the immediate 
consequence of the Wiehahn reforms was the launching of the NUSMRE, it 
was only during 1981 that the new scenario was clearly seen to be 
unfolding. 
When late in March 1981 the owners of Union Co-op.'s Dalton sugarmill 
provided a 17% wage increase but simultaneously withdrew free food 
rations, workers there reacted with a work-stoppage. This was met with 
an immediate reprisal by the owners. Workers were evicted from their 
quarters by the police and arrested for trespassing, and others 
reportedly gave themselves up for arrest. · The SFAWU then took up the 
101 South African Sugar Year Book (1983-84), pp.69-71. 
102Ibid., p. 31 • 
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workers' ·cause by challenging the employers' actions in court. The 
court's judgement went against the SFAWU and the employers were 
effectively given legal sanction to evict migrant workers at their 
discretion.103 The SFAWU had demonstrated to sugarmillers that the 
putting down of a strike did not mean that the workers' militancy had 
been neutralised, and if the Union had been defeated in this instance, 
it was not going to retreat from the sugar industry with a bloodied 
nose. 
A few months after the Dal ton strike, in early October 1981 and with 
10000 workers in various other industries already on strike, 2000 
Hulett's workers at Darnall, Amatikulu, Mount Edgecombe, and Felixton 
sugarmills downed tools in protest against the state's announced plans 
to revise the conditions governing pension funds. The week-long strike 
by sugarmill workers had the NUSMRE officials seemingly caught up in 
action which they had neither anticipated nor carefully planned. 
Hulett's nevertheless moved quickly to a compromise, as the value of the 
cane stockpile created by the strike rose to R 1,5 million.104 Although 
the pension strike was short-lived, the issue in question was to remain 
largely unresolved over the following years. What was for sugarmillers 
particularly significant about the pension dispute in 1981 was that "for 
the first time, strikes by factory workers had an adverse influence on 
milling time efficiency''.105 
The SFAWU was more successful than it had been in the Dalton case when, 
after negotiating for 7 months with C.G.Smith, it entered into an 
agreement with the comµm.y in February 1982 through which it would in 
103Daily News 8. 10. 1981 ; Fosatu Worker News (April, 1982). 
104Daily l'fews 5. 10. 1981 , 6. 10.1981. 7. 10.1981 and 8.10.1981. 
105South African 81®ll" Year Book ( 1981-82) , pp. 54-56. 
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future be allowed to negotiate on behalf of Noodsberg sugarmill's 
workers. During the negotiations leading up to the agreement, C.G.Smith 
had pressed the SFAWU to apply for Industrial Council membership and had 
claimed that the company would apply to have the Industrial Council 
cover Noodsberg (which, as a relatively new sugarmill like Dal ton, 
remained outside the scope of the Industrial Council since neither the 
workers nor the owners had made application to join it).106 By holding 
out against C.G.Smi th and securing the extra-Industrial Council 
agreement, the SFAWU had achieved something that was unprecedented in 
the sugar industry. 
Having achieved its status as representative for the majority of 
Noodsberg's black workers, the SFAWU went on to usurp the position of 
the NUSMRE at the southern-most sugarmill in Natal, C.G.Smith's 
Umzinkulu factory. At Umzinkulu ·the SFAWU had found the NUSMRE to have 
worked through C.G.Smith to maintain its weak grass-roots contact with 
workers (by, for example, giving notice of increased subscriptions on 
compll'lY letterheads). There was little resistance to SFAWU's organisers 
when they moved into Umzinkulu, and members were readily recrui tea..107 
The agreement between the SFAWU and C.G.Smi th was enhanced during the 
following year, 1983, when a committee was established to handle all 
negotiations at any C.G.Smith sugarmill where the SFAWU had organised 
the majority of workers. This committee, consisting of 6 stewards per 
sugarmill(Noodsberg and Umzinkulu), 3 SFAWU officials, and company 
representatives, immediately negotiated a 13% increase for the lowest 
paid workers and 7 ,5% for the highest paid, and food rations of R50 and 
R45 for Noodsberg's and Umzinkulu's workers respectively.100 Since the 
106Ibid. 
107Interview with J.Naidoo, SFAWU official, Durban, 10.9.1985. 
108Posatu Worker Iews (April, 1983). 
' . 
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Industrial Council had recently provided for a 7,5% increase across the 
board and incorporated the food ration into this· increase, the SFAWU 
could justifiably claim to have shown negotiating prowess. 
While the SFAWU was gaining ground in the C.G.Smi th sugarmills where the 
NUSMRE had had least success in organising workers, the latter union was 
spreading its influence elsewhere. During 1982 the NUSMRE ma.de what is 
arguably its most outstanding contribution to the cause of sugar 
workers, by securing a court ruling that workers in cane trans-shipment 
zones be declared industrial workers (see Chapter 6, p.277). The year 
1982 also saw the NUSMRE "in the midst of conflict", 109 when workers at 
6 sugarmills (Hulett's Felixton, Amatikulu, Mount Edgecombe, and Darnall 
sugarmills, -and Umfolozi and Entumeni) went on strike in 
October /November to contest the offer of a food allowance made by the 
respective sugar companies. The striking workers were ·dismissed and 
then selectively re-hired.110 Whether the NUSMRE had lost control over 
these workers or had been unable to control the strike to the advantage 
of the workers, it nevertheless appeared not to have lost its conviction 
that it had good cause for expanding its membership in other plants 
outside the sugar industry. During the latter half of 1982 and through 
1983 the NUSMRE spread into transport, paper, milling, and other 
industries, in an attempt to recruit members. Re-named the National 
Sugar and Refining and Allied Industries Employees' Union, it pressed 
ahead with its recruitment drive under allegations by R>SATU of using 
subterfuge in the process.111 
109R.& L.Lambert, "State Reform and Working Class Resistance, 1982". In 
South African Review 1, edited by South African Research Service. 
Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1983, p.247. 
11 ODaily Bevs 2.11. 1982. 
111 Fosa.tu Worker News (November, 1982 and September, 1983) • 
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While the NUSMRE was making forays outside the sugar industry, members 
of its original constituency within some SU€f3.l"mills were abandoning the 
·union in favour of the SFAWU. By early 1984 hundreds of NUSMRE members 
at the Pongola and Umfolozi SU€f3.l"mills had reportedly resigned to join 
the SFAWU. 112 These gains by the SFAWU were again achieved at 
regionally peripheral sugftrmills where the NUSMRE had only made limited 
inroads. The NUSMRE's strongholds were the suga.rmills owned by Hulett's 
(which had brought the Union into being), while its following in other 
sugarmills, especially those situated furthest from its Durban 
headquarters, was weak. 
Sugarmillers, and Hulett's in particular, could initially look upon the 
position adopted by the NUSMRE with some degree of self-satisfaction. 
However while the advance of the SFAWU mey in its early stages have 
caused them some disquiet, its officials have gained the employers' 
respect as astute and "professional" negotiators.113 The employers' 
frequent, but cautious, references to inter-union rivalry in sugar 
industry publications mirrored their opinions on the respective unions 
involved. In mid-1983 the chairman of the South African Sugar Millers' 
Association (SASMA) looked back on the 1982 
strikes over the feeding allowance issue [in which the 
NUSMRE was involved]. Some firm action was taken by the 
employers but these incidents also served to demonstrate 
that there are no winners in such a situation - only 
losers, and further damage was sustained to the good 
industrial relations climate we are trying to foster and 
encourage ••• 
Recessions are never a fertile time for union pressure 
on remuneration and we should acknowledge the 
responsible approach taken to the wage negotiations some 
112Posata Worker News (January /February, 1984) • 
Because of the marginal majority commanded by SFAWU at Pongola, the 
sugarmill now has two agreements in operation with uneven 
consequences for the workers; one is an Industrial Council agreement 
and the other is between the SFAWU and C.G.Smith (Interview with 
E.Tough, Industrial Council Secretary, Durban, 9.9.1985). 
113Interview with T.Vogel, SASA Personnel Consul tent, Durban, 11.9.1985. 
months ago [the NUSMRE and SFAWU had been involved in 
separate negotiations] which took cognisanff
4
of the very 
difficult situation faced by the Industry. 
A year later the vice-chairman of SASMA noted 
an intensification of the rivalry between [the NUSMRE 
and the SFAWU]. The latter gained majority 
representation at a third mill and there is an active 
recruiting effort taking place at others. The [NUSMRE], 
on the other hand, commands effective black worker 
leadership in the Industry with representation at 13 
mills... 1 
In case there is a perception that either union could be 
prejudiced by being first to settle the wage issue [as 
the NUSMRE had done] and thereby perhaps afford the 
other the opportunp;y of achieving a better deal, this 
must be disabused. 1 ? 
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A more even-handed perspective on the rivalry was offered by SASA's 
Persormel Consultant, T.·vogel, when he declared that 
The labour movement owes much to the establishment and 
development of representative Liaison Committees on the 
pa.rt of millers' managements and the mercurial charisma 
of home grown black employee leaders like Selby Nsibande 
of NASASAIEU and others in the [SFAWU]. · 
It is also becoming apparent that black union rivalry 
may still lead to internecine warfare based on ill 
feelings, jealousies, ideological differences and 
competition for membership in the same Sugar Industry. 
The grip of the recession and the waning fortunes of the 
industry are hopefully indicators to the union 
organisers and members that a more professional and 
institutional route is needed if the mobilisation of the 
black labo1ff 6in the Sugar Industry is to be successfully 
continued. 
The plea for unions to adopt a "professional" approach to capital/labour 
relations was repeated when the managing director of the Tongaat-Hulett 
Group - the heartland of the NUSMRE constituency - expressed anxiety 
over the probability that 
once the period of inter-union rivalry and competition 
for members is over ••• Trade Unions are likely to be 
under considerable pressure from their members to use 
the collective bargaining process to make demands on 
114South African SUgar Year Book (1982-83), pp.45-46. 
115SASJ 68:6( 1984), pp.213-217. 
116South African Sugar Year Book (1983-84), p.31. 
central Gone.rnment and Regional and Municipal 
authorities. ., 
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Warning of the employers' inability to entertain such demands being 
made, he was concerned to ensure "that we carry out our industrial 
relations policies in a W8N which is professional and effective" .118 
The sugarmillers' sensi ti vi ty to the the issue of "politicised" 
capital/labour relations must be quite acute given that all organised 
black suga.rmill workers are now either linked to Inkatha, to which the 
NUSMRE became affiliated in 1984, 119 or to FOSATU, of which both the 
SFAWU and (since 1983) the NSIEU are affiliates. Suga.rmillers face in 
Inkatha an avowedly "cultural movement" with which, at least at the 
leadership level, they appear to be on conciliatory terms. On the other 
hand they face in FOSATU an avowedly proletarian federation, which they 
have accorded due respect as a "professional" organisation representing 
workers' interests. 
That the recent history of organised responses by black sugarmill 
workers has revolved around the NUSMRE and the SFAWU begs the question: 
what has become of the NSIEU? The NSIEU embarked on its mission as the 
first union to organise black suga.rmill workers in the late 1930s under 
conditions which had prevented its officials from erecting strong 
sugarmill-based representation had they so intended to do. The NSIEU 
was nurtured and it grew within the context of suga.rocratic domination. 
Its organisational structure has been maintained since its founding, 
centralised around its Durban-based secretary. The present incumbent, 
117South African Sugar Year Book (1983-84), pp.69-71. 
118Ibid. 
119The principal reason for making this alliance is claimed to be the 
NUSMRE desire to share a platform with Inkatha to voice their mutual 
opposition to economic sanctions against, or disinvestment from, 
South Africa (Interview with B.Dlamuka, NUSMRE official, Durban, 
9. 9.1985). . . 
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R.Pillay, has been the NSIEU's chief official for over a quarter of a 
century, and he has been witness to his constituency's shrinkage during 
the past five years- to the advantage of first the NUSMRE and then the 
SFAWU. Had the NSIEU responded to the post-1979 transformation by 
adapting its organisational structure it m03 well have been in a 
position today to command a majority in some sugarmills. Instead, it 
represents a thinly-spread membership in the Industrial Council.120 Its 
most notable public action since the appearance of its two rivals has 
been its affiliation to FOSATU. It is likely that the respective 
affiliations of all three black sugarmill workers' unions will draw 
their members into the very sort of political. struggle which employers 
are so keen to obviate. 
Summary 
The Natal sugarocracy has had to contend with various forms of workers' 
accommodative and resistant responses to the sugarmilling labour 
process. During the indentures period these responses typically took 
the form of individual and spontaneous resistance. These were responses 
to a system as much as to its immediate effects, and sugarocrats 
retaliated by urging greater state control over its functioning so as to 
tighten up the system. When, after the expiry of the Indian indenture 
system, worker organisation first made its appearance in the sugar 
industry, sugarocrats were faced with a situation to which they 
responded by trying to sow disorganisation. Thus was the history o~ 
sugarmill workers' responses influenced by modes of sugarocratic 
control. 
120It is interesting in this context that the NSIEU's Secretary walked 
out of the Industrial Council after failing to have a closed shop 
agreement concluded "a few years ago" - had he been successful the 
NSIEU's membership would have swollen (Interview with E.Tough, 
Industrial Council Secretary, Durban, 9.9.1985). 
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Collective responses to the sugarmilling labour process in Natal have 
historically been in keeping with the global picture. On the one hand, 
collective resistance has been consolidated, but not fully homogenised, 
with the development of black suga.rmill workers' unions. On the other 
hand, certain layers of the workforce, the collectively more 
accommodating white workers with the most privileged positions in the 
occupational hierarchy, remained aloof of black workers and their 
concerns. Such divided responses have given emi;tiasis to the dialectical 





When at the turn of the twentieth century, the small group of 
sugarmillers emerged in Natal who were to maintain dynastic control over 
sugarmilling for the riext six decades, it is unlikely that they could 
have foreseen the scope of their historical importance. They could not 
realistically have anticipated their own success in the light of 
colonial Natal's past. The only points of reference they might be said 
' to have had as they embarked on their dynastic journey were located in 
\ -
their ancestor al "Home". These were the ruling ideas of Victorian 
Britain; above all, the ideologies .of imi:erialism and capitalism. Their 
ambitions would have been rooted in them, and the~r every success would 
have fortified their allegiance to those ideologies. 
As Natal's sugarocracy made its ascent, its respective empires expanded • . 
Simultaneously, the ascendant sugarocracy was gradually being atomised, 
with control over sugarmilling becoming increasingly concentrated in 
fewer hands. In its ascent the sugarocracy was faced by innumerable 
difficulties, not least of which was that of maintaining a stable, 
predictable, and tractable workforce. This workforce was, for its part, 
riven by a range of attributes, some of which, such as race, were 
socially ascribed, others, such as skills, achieved within the 
constraints of a racial division of labour, and all underlined by 
ideology. In its pursuit of capital under stable conditions, the 
sugarocracy could, :Qarticularly in i,ts formative years, prey on some of 
these differences from its position of dominance over working people. 
This study has turned on the imperatives, the methods, and the 
consequences of that domination. 
S~rocratic domination of the South African sugarmilling labour process 
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manifested itself in various forms through four fairly distinct periods. 
The first of these, beginning in 1905 with the advent of fully 
centralised industrial sugarmilling and ending in 1914 with the 
termination of the indentures period and the coincident outbreak of 
World War I, was a relatively brief period during which the sugarocracy 
consolidated its _position as a group of bourgeois millers-cum-planters. 
The second period, lasting until the late 1930s, spanned the years 
during which the sugarocracy turned to organisational means for 
struggling against local and global impediments to surplus value 
realisation. Thereafter, in the period until 1962, the sugarocracy 
embarked on an expansionary and highly competetive journey at the end of 
which its size had been compressed quite considerably. Although the 1962 
clash has been viewed as the end of the sugarocratic era per se, most 
remaining members of the sugarocracy were only to completely abdicate 
control when the sugar industry was overwhelmed by Angl~American and 
Bar low Rand at the turn of the 1980s. Because the sugarocracy as a bloc 
(which could reproduce itself as such) was no more, the two decades 
since 1962 have been referred to as the post-sugarocratic period. As 
the following synopses show, each of these periods was as distinctive 
for its connotations for the sugarocracy as it was for its connotations 
for sugarmill employees. 
1905 - 1914 
The Natal sugar industry entered the twentieth century after having 
survived the local and global obstacles to capital accumulation in sugar 
which had imposed themselves during the late nineteenth century. With 
the signing of the 1903 Customs Convention the industry had also gained 
some security against competition from Mauritius and other overseas 
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producers. Inside the sugarmills (which had already incorporated vacuum 
pans), the capacity and efficiency of extraction was being improved by 
the installation of new milling plant. But the hallmark of this first 
period was the SUgfll"ocracy's labour-coercive practices. 
Sugarocratic domination showed few signs of having moved beyond those 
forms which had prevailed in nineteenth century plantations. Whether 
constrained by indentures or by pass laws, unskilled black workers could 
expect an uncompromising dominance. Skilled personnel, particularly , 
those with sugar-making skills, faced a more benign form of domination. 
Given not only their special skills, but also the wey in which many were 
attracted from abroad, these latter employees were placed in a 
relationship of pragmatic, if not in every case interdependent, accord 
with the sugarocracy. In this respect Mauritius exerted a significant 
influence. on the nuances of SllgfU"ocratic rule: Mauritius was a source of 
technical and manage.rial employees (as well as field overseers), and it 
provided a model for the organisation of sugarmill labour with which 
some early sugarocrats were personally familiar. 
Although worker consciousness surfaced in various acts of resistance, 
these did not stimulate distinctive counter strategies from the 
employers' side. The methods used to control labour in the SllgfU"mills 
and the sugar villages remained unchanged during the entire indentures 
period. Sugarmill workers continued to be ex~sed to an uncompromising 
patriarch8;lism which had sugarocrats expecting complete subservience and 
refusing to take cognisance of workers' demands, however these were 
articulated. 
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1914 - late 1930s 
The curtailment of Indian immigration in 1911 and the consequent expiry 
of indentures in 1914 forced the sugarocracy to turn its collective 
attention to the recruitment of proletarian (and migrant partly-
proletarianised) labour. Although this imperative came at a time when 
the pressures on Africans to seek incomes outside the decreasingly 
productive Reserves were mounting, the sugarocracy had no 
institutionalised basis from which it might compete with other employers 
(especially the mining companies) for African labour. The sugarocracy 
was unsuccessful in its endeavour to have the Union Government provide 
it with the measure of support which it had enjoyed during the colonial 
period, and which the mining companies now had. The problem of 
procuring cheap unskilled labour was an industry-wide (albeit possibly 
somewhat exaggerated) issue which did not have any obvious ramifications 
for sugarmilling as such. Indeed, despite their declared inability to 
offer potential workers conditions which were as good as mine workers' 
conditions, sugarocrats housed African workers on their properties under 
conditions which even fell short of the scant statutes they had had to 
observe with respect to indentured Indian workers. They appeared 
uninterested in trying to attract labour, and hoped rather to have that 
labour foist on them. 
Of course the inter-war period was_ a generally difficult one for sugar ' 
capital in Natal, notwithstanding high world prices for sugar in 1920 
and the cessation of the Mo9ambique Convention in 1923. In 1925 the 
world's sugar producers were given a foretaste of what was to come 
during the Great Depression. The production of a large sugar crop in 
South Africa that year coincided with global overproduction to set 
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prices tumbling, and five years later world sugar prices again went into 
a steep decline. 
The sugarocracy had come to those straits at a ,time of global 
depression, and it was hard put under the circumstances to seek 
protection both by trying to secure imp:3rial preference and by rallying 
cane growers to its cause. As regards the actions taken by the 
sugarocracy in response to the strictures of the market, it is worth 
recalling that 
Surplus value has to be produced but also realized in 
the market. What this implies is that the realization 
of surplus value (i.e. firidi~ markets, selling in those 
markets and making a profit) may be more crucial than 
the production of surplus value for certfin firms, 
certain industries or during certain periods. 
The realisation crisis of the inter-war period led to the 
institutionalisation of collective responses, with the sugarocracy 
throwing its weight behind the BEPO, FCI, and SASA. 
To compound the realisation problem, the production of surplus value was 
simultaneously held in jeopardy by workers who were themselves suffering 
the depression. The late 1930s saw sugarmill workers acting for the 
first time in a manner which had the sugarocracy take notice. This and 
legislation in favour of industrial workers marked the turning point 
within the sugarmills from labour-using and dehumanising forms of 
exploitation, to labour-saving and exploitation tempere4 by conscious 
sugarocratic paternalism. 
Late 1930s - 1962 
The inflationary war years saw sugarmill labour pressing its demands for 
C.R.Li ttler and G.Salaman, "Bravermania and Beyond: Recent Theories 
of the Labour Process", Sociology 16:2(1982), pp.251-269. 
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better wages, while sugarocrats faced a relative shrinkage of export 
earnings and difficulties with technical improvements. Then. the 
sugarocracy entered the post-war period on the crest of a wave. After 
the removal in 1947 of the quotas which had been set in 1936 there was a 
massive increase in sugar production. Then with the signing of the 
Commonwealth Sugar Agreement in 1951 having spurred the sugarocracy on 
to intensify production and expand investments in sugar, it was poised 
to become party to the 1953 International Sugar Agreement from a 
position of strength and optimism. The doubling of the world sugar 
price late in the 1950s contributed to make this a particularly 
significant decade for the sugarocracy. 
In the midst of the prosperity of the immediate post-war years, 
sugarocratic paternalism could be consciously displayed in a more 
benevolent form than previously. The earlier reforms in Tongaat . 
undoubtedly stimulated the new-found interest in community~building and 
employees' welfare. Although the conditions for consciously benevolent 
paternalism were enhanced by the sugar villages' status as re la ti vely 
isolated and "com,plete" communi ties,2 it did not follow that workers 
would respond positively to community-building and its underlying 
rationale. While the nature of the sugar village might historically have 
presented an impediment to formally organised workers' resistance, it 
had not prevented the development of worker consciousness.3 Of this the 
sugarocrats were quite aware, and ideology came to be used with some 
alacrity in their quest for stable social relations. 
2 The term "complete community" was used in a similar context by 
R.Takaki, Pau Hana: Plantation Life and Labor in Hawaii. Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 1984, p.99. 
3 On the limits of work-place isolation as a factor in constraining 
workers' resistance see E.Shorter and C.Tilly, Strikes in France 
1830-1968. London: Cambridge University Press, 1974, pp.287-291. 
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As sugarmill workers contemplated the new sugarocratic countenance, 
their employers were locked in battle for supremacy in the sugar 
industry and (from the early 1960s) diversifying out of sugar. The 
growth of the ascendant companies was attended by the growth of 
professional management, and the distance between workers and the 
suga.rocracy was stretched correspondingly. Thus sugarmill workers saw 
the conscious sugarocratic paternalism of the post-War period being 
rapidly transformed into a bureaucratically administered welfare system. 
Al though the structures of sugarmill ownership and control were 
undergoing change, workers' reponses were formulated with respect to the 
labour process as they experienced it, and not in terms of the 
configuration of the compmy directorate. And ·while paternalism mey have 
brought with it certain material improvements, workers generally showed 
that they had not been taken in by its implicit ideological content. 
Since 1962 
It is difficult to speak of the existence of a sugarocracy as such a:fter 
1962. Although the 1962 clash within the sugarocracy ended with 
sugarocratic contende1rs as 1\rictors, it also marked the beginning of 
mining (and allied industrial and finance) capital's more deliberate 
penetration of the sugarocracy's strongholds. For almost two decades 
after 1962 individual sugarocratic families remained in effective 
control of the largest sugs.r compmies' operations, but the sugarocracy 
was gradually being denied the possibility of reproducing itself. 
This transitional stage in the history of sugar capital coincided with 
the emergence of monopoly capitalism in South Africa. The linking of 
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the fortunes of the sugar industry with the progress of the leading 
\ 
monopolistic powers in South A.frica was also associated with 
developments in sugar technology and structural control. Automation 
proceeded apace, most significantly in the boiling house, and the corps 
, 
of skilled sugarmill workers shrank appreciably. The shrinkage in the 
number of positions assigned to skilled workers in the sugarmill was 
counterposed by the expansion of the managerial stratum and the raising 
of educational and training levels for workers designated as semi-
skilled. These changes were attended by modifications in the employers' 
industrial relations discourse and practices, which involved a de-
racialisation of the division of non-managerial labour and an attempt to 
inculcate petit bourgeois aspirations amongst black workers. 
Black sugarmill workers exerted a dynamic and purposeful influence on 
their employers' ideological and community-building cam~igns by drawing 
them into increasingly more calculated practices. The waxing wave of 
collective, if not always organised, resistance, particularly since 
1974, met with hard-line repression by employers, and it had them 
showing mounting concern for both institutionalised capital/labour 
relations and ~mproved extra-work facilities for workers. 
Whatever reformist measures might have meant in material terms, 
sugarmill workers were not complacent recipients of company welfare. 
\ 
Possibly the strongest single piece of evidence in support of this view 
was that provided by sugarmill workers when the fading sugarocratic 
voice was heard from the platform of support for a "yes" vote in the 
November 1983 constitutional referendum: it was responded to with great 
resonance by 25()'.) black workers at the Amatikulu, Darnall, Felixton, and 
Umfolozi sugarmills who held a protest strike on the day their bosses 
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and the rest of the white electorate cast their votes. 
* * * 
When Freyre referred to the bagaceira and Genovese to "the world" 
created by slave-holders, they were reflecting on cultural milieux 
associated with plantation sugarmilling, inter alia, in particular 
regions. An endeavour has been made in this thesis to penetrate the 
cultural milieu of the South African sugarmill, and to explain the 
nature of the local sugarocracy's impress on the terrain of sugarmill 
workers' experience. While it has offered an explanation of the 
sugarocratic impress as one facet of the culture of the sugarmill, the 
thesis provides an implicit agenda for research into the actual 
experience of work and social life in the sugar villages. 
The conclusions of this thesis facilitate entry into the culture of .the 
sugarmill for researchers in the future by sparing them having to embark 
on their task with nothing but the sugarocracy's historiography to 
inform them: important though it may be for understanding the 
intricacies of sugarocratic existence and domination, the version of 
sugarmilling history told by sugarocratic biographers and ideologues m~ 
be accepted as belonging to the realm of bourgeois ideology. 
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APPENDIX 1 : SOUTH AFRICAN SUGAR COMPANIE3' D~TORATES, 1940 - 1960 . 
* British 
** Mauritian 















































































































1940 1950 1960 
CG Smith GV Crookes(chair/MD) GV Crookes(chair/MD) 
GJ Crookes(chair/MD)JJ Crookes JJ Crookes 
L Reynolds VJS Crookes VJS Crookes 
AW Dickens AW Dickens H Brunskill 
GV Crookes NL Davey E Camden Smith 
TB Job* TB Job* S Morris* 
SW TB\}Tlor* FS Morris* RH Waring 
SH Hey(sec) SH Hey(sec) 
E Camden Smith(GM) 






















































































Zululand ~ llillers end Plant.era 
1940 1950 1960 
WB Calder(chair/MD) WB Calder(chair/MD) GM Hulett(chair) 
AS Goble JSP Ma.ckness S Smith 
CT Roper JB Calder RL Hulett 
GH Morris LC Grice RSL Hulett 
JB Calder H Armstrong B Freakes 
LC Grice LP Addison JN Hulett 
1S Robinson 







Smith & Berend(secs) N Paton(sec) 
C Jelley(GM) 
H Annstrong(GM) 




























Acquired by Tongaat in 1945 for 
1400(X) of Tongaa.t's one pound shares. 
Gledhow-Cbaka' s Kraal ~ CcJnpma' 
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1940 1950 1960 
CG Smith( chair) AW Dickens( chair) FSV Gillatt(chair/MD) 
GJ Crookes JJ Crookes JJ Crookes 
JJ Crookes FSV Gillatt ·Js Calder 
AW Dickens JS Calder GV Crookes 
D Calder WB Coverdale SH Hey 
FSV Gillatt GV Crookes- FNN Crookes 




SH Hey(sec) FR Jones(sec) 
Central Factory 
Acquired by Tongaat in 1946 for 
2eJ:XX:JJ of Tongaat's one pound shares. 
















Umfolozi Co-operative ~ Planters 
1940 1950 1960 
G Heaton Nicholls GJ Ba.denhorst EEH Bowles 
JA Erlandson AJ Bonella JS Bertram 
SWOL Johnson HC Proksch HSJ Adlam 
CVS Hitchins GG Roberts DE Dooley 
HC Hitchins PH van Rooyen AC Liesenberg 
JK Johnson CK Johnson HA Meintjes 





JH Shire(owner) JA Shire(owner) 
Doornkop 81J€IU" EBtatee 
1940 1950 1960 
N Rosenberg(MD) P Murrey(Durban dir) HC Peyne 














llev Guelderland Sugar Pactory 
1940 
Estate G Stewart 
Glendale ~ :FiJtate 
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APPENDIX 2: CORPORATE OWNERSHIP OF SUGARMIL!.S IN SOUTIOON AFRICA 
The Mauritian sugar industry had already acquired considerable global 
prominence and a relatively sophisticated production and research 
infrastructure by the time that the South African sugar industry 
germinated along colonial Natal's coast. Mauritius supplied much of the 
expertise and some of the mechanical plant upon which Natal's sugar 
industry depended in its formative years, and the Natal industry was 
permeated by immigrant Mauritian personnel. Partially upon the 
expertise accumulated in Mauritius and Natal, and financed mainly by 
metropolitan British and Portuguese capital, sugarmilling subsequently 
took root at the turn of the twentieth century in the very area of 
Mo~bique which had earlier yielded multitudes of slaves to Mauritian 
sugarmillers, inter alia. Since the turn of the twentieth century sugar 
production has intensified in these three regions, viz. Mauritius, 
Natal, and Mo90Jllbique, and expanded into other regions on the southern 
African sub-continent. There follow brief notes on patterns of 
ownership and control of today's sugarmills in the former British 
colonies of southern Africa and the Mascarenas, excluding South Africa. 
Mauritius 
Mauritius, the progenitor of sugar production in the wider southern 
African context, had as early as !776 three sugarmills in operation; one 
powered by animals, one by wind, and another by water. Although the 
number of sugarmills on the island found its peak in 1863, the 
centralisation of production really began to accelerate after 1870, when 
European sugar beet processing placed the Mauritian industry in 
jeopardy. Accomp:mying centralisation since 1880 was the separation of 
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estates from sugarmills. Thus whereas in 1870 there were 218 sugarmills 
on mostly individually-owned estates, by 1909 the ratio of suga.rmills to 
estates was approximately 1 : 2.1 
Mauritian suga.rmillers became closely linked with certain branches of 
the British bourgeoisie after 1810, when France was ousted from its 
position of colonial rule over the island. British capital came to 
feature within some of the larger Mauritian sugar companies, and by the 
1830s British merchants were ranked amongst the major exporters of 
I 
Mauritian sugars. Mauritian sugarmillers used these avenues as well as 
certain British Members of Parliament, appointed as their Iondon agents, 
to wield poli tica.l influence in Bri tain.2 The significance of these 
liaisons became starkly apparent in the 1960s, as Mauritius stood poised 
before independence and the group of sugar mill owners "used all its 
considerable influence in London through Tate & Lyle and the 
Conservative Party to delay universal suffrage as long as possible".3 
After independence in 1968 Tate & Lyle remained an important ally of 
Mauritian sugarmillers, and its ownership of Britain's sugar refineries 
vested the corporation with a mantle of power which Mauritian 
sugarmillers valued, so long as agreements such as the 1975 APC-EEC 
Convention of Lom~ were in the offing.4 
1 R.Lamusse, "The Economic Development of the Mauritius S~r 
Industry", Revue Agricole et Sucriere 'de L'ile Mau.rice 43:1 (1964), 
pp.22-38. 
2 See M.D.North Coombes, "Labour Problems· in the Sugar Industry of Ile 
de France or Mauritius 1790-1842". Master's dissertation, University 
of Cape Town, 1978. 
3 J .Houbert, "Reunion I: French Decolonisation in the Mascareignes", 
Journal of Commonvealth and Comparative Politics 18:2(1900), pp.145-
171. See also R.Seegobin and L.Collen, "Mauritius: Class Forces and 
Political Power", Review of African Political Economy 8(1977), 
pp.10~118. 
4 See the terms of the Convention in Africa Year Book and Who's Who 
1m. London: Africa Journal, 1978. Tate & Lyle commented at some 
length on the Convention in their 1979 Annual Report, and it has been 
discussed in A.G.Kemp, editor, Africa and the EEC in the Aftermath o:f 
Lom~ and UBCTAD IV. Aberdeen: Aberdeen University African Studies 
Group, 1977. 
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By 1980 known corporate holdings in the Mauritian sugar industry were 
Tate & Lyle's two-thirds share of The Mauritius Molasses Company; 
Lonrho's interests in Benares Sugar Company, through FAW Investments 
which is registered in the Isle of Man; and Lonrho's controlling 
interest of Mon Tresor & Mon Desert, which had three of Mauritius' 21 
sugarmills in 1900.5 Lonrho's entry into the Mauritian sugar industry 
had been made in 1967, when the corporation acquired the Anglo-Ceylon & 
General Estates Compmy which had operated in Mauritius since the dawn 
of the century.6 
Zimbabwe 
Sugarcane was first milled in colonial Southern Rhodesia in 1936 by 
Triangle Sugar Estate, using a second-hand sugarmill from Natal. 
Triangle was taken over from the Southern Rhodesian.government in 1954 
by a syndicate of Natal SUgfl.rocrats, who in 1957 relinquished control to 
Hulett's. Sugar refining was also first done in the territory in 1936, 
when Rhodesian Sugar Refineries opened its Bulawayo refinery. This 
latter company, which subsequently opened a refinery in Salisbury, in 
1951, and another in Ndola, Northern Rhodesia, in 1960, had been 
established by the younger brother of the founder of Mo98JD.bique's Sena 
Sugar Estates. 
The second comp:my to mill sugar in Southern Rhodesia was Hippo Valley 
Estates. Four years after the company was formed in 1956, with a strong 
contingent of immigrant Mauritian planters within the directorate, a 
5 Who Owns Vbom, United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland. 2 Vols. 
London: Dun & Bradstreet, 1980. 
6 S.Cronj~ et al Lonrho: Portrait of a Multinational. Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1976; A.Macmillan, editor, Mauritius Illustrated. London: 
Collingridge, 1914, p.370; and N.Ramachandran, Foreign Plantation 
Investment in Ceylon, 1889-1958. Ceylon: Central Bank, 1963. 
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used suga.rmill was bought in Mauritius and put into operation in 1962. 
In 1965 a second sugarmill was erected by Hippo Valley Estates at 
Chiredzi. 
All raw sugar produced in the country is marketed by Sugar 
Sales(Private)Ltd, formed in 1963 by Triangle, Hippo Valley Estates, and 
Chirundu Sugar Estates; the last shareholder being a comp:my formed in 
1953 under the same board of directors as that of Rhodesia Sugar 
Refineries. 
Although Triangle and Hippo Valley Estates were initially indigenous 
companies, they were rapidly absorbed by foreign concerns. While the 
former was embraced by Hulett's when the favourable international sugar 
agreements and markets of the 1950s encouraged expansion, the latter 
comp:my fell prey to two foreign contenders, Anglo-American and Tate & 
Lyle. Tate &Lyle also secured a majority shareholding in Rhodesia 
Sugar Refineries and a controlling share of Sugar Marketing(now Sugar 
Distributors), which markets packaged sugar within the country. Through 
its ownership of Chirundu Sugar Estates, Tate & Lyle also entered the 
tripartite directorship of Suga! Sales. See Figure A for details of 
sugarmill ownership in Zimbabwe. 7 
Swaziland 
Sugarmilling began in Swaziland in 1958 when Ubombo Ranches put into 
operation its recently acquired second-hand sugarmill from Natal. 
7 Figure A is based on the following sources: D.G.Clarke, Foreign 
Companies and International Investment in Zimbe.bve. London: Catholic 
Institute for International Relations, 1980; Finance Week, 13-19 
March, 1980, pp.323-324; South African Sugar Year :Book (1979); and 
the followine compmy reports: Anglo American Corporation (1980), and 
Tate&Lyle (1979). 
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Ubombo Ranches, initially a ranching company, had become a subsidiary of 
the Usutu River Sugar Compa.ny_after the latter company was floated in 
1958.. During 1959 the Usutu River Sugar Company was converted into the 
Swaziland Sugar Milling CompmJr. 
Another sugarmilling com piey made its appearance in Swaziland in 1958 
when a joint venture between Hulett's and the Colonial(subsequently the 
Commonweal th) Development Corporation saw the formation of Mhlume 
(Swaziland) Sugar Company. At the opening of the Mhlume sugarmill, 
\ 
which crushed its first crop in 1960, the British High Commissioner in 
Swaziland found it appropriate to include in his address three verses of 
doggerel in tribute to Guy Hulett, and an admission that he could 
think of no better example of the happy application of 
the common-sense British principle of mixing many 
elements of European and African virtue, p~lic and 
private, in a happy, creative and savoury brew. 
The High Commissioner would have viewed the brew in a different light 
some twenty years later, when the chairman of Lonrho Sugar Corporation, 
the parent company of which had acquired control of Swaziland Sugar 
Milling CompmJT in 1968, commented that 
The season at Ubombo was marred by an illegal labour 
strike organised by a minority of agitators. It was 
however rapidly stopped with the help of government, and 
work has resumed with greatly improvad labour relations 
which have been excellent ever since.~ 
Ubombo had also experienced a strike in 1963, 10 before Lonrho had taken 
over the company. Close collaboration between sugar companies and the 
colonial and post-1 968 Swaziland state in putting down the strikes was 
one facet of the intimate and cordial relationship between sugarmillers 
and the government. Then there was the association established through 
ff SASJ 44:5(1960), pp.369-371. 
9 Lonrho Sugar Corporation, Annual Report (1900). 
10 M.Fransman, ''Labour, Capital and the State in Swaziland, 1962-1 <J77", 
South African Labour JBulletin 7:6(1982), ppe5&89. 
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the Swaziland government's take-over of the Hulett share in the Mhlume 
sugarmill and, more recently, its large contribution towards the Simunye 
sugarmill which was opened during 1980. The new sugarmill is managed by 
Tate & Lyle Technical Services, the parent compmy of which is a minor 
shareholder in the venture. It is notewortey that the fields from which . 
Simunye is supplied are mechanically harvested. See Figure B for 
details of sugarmill ownership in Swaziland.11 
Zambia 
As has already been mentioned, the commissioning of a refinery predated 
the local milling of sugar in Northern Rhodesia. Tate & Lyle retained a 
controlling interest in the Ndola refinery when in 1964 it was 
transferred from the books of Rhodesia Sugar Refineries to those of the 
newly formed Ndola Sugar Company. The latter company was renamed in 
1966 as the Zambia Sugar Company, and in the same year a subsidiary, 
Nakambala Estate, was formed to .grow sugarcane. Since 1968 this 
sugarcane has been crushed in the Nakambala sugarmill, which had been 
relocated from Chirundu, whence it had gone from New Guelderland in 
Natal. 
The collaboration between the Zambian government and British sugar 
capital, represented by.Tate & Lyle, is necessarily intensive. Although 
the Zambian state acquired almost complete ownership of the local sugar 
company through its Industrial Development Corporation(INDEC0),12 Tate & 
Lyle retained a small share and responsibility for management. See 
11 Figure B is based on the following sources: SASJ 64:9(1900), -pp.367-
371; and the following company reports: C.G.Smi th Sugar( 1980), 
Crookes Bros.(1979), Lonrho Sugar Corporation(1979), and Tate & 
Lyle( 1979). 
12 See Cronj~, Lonrho., and L.Turner, Mu1tinational Companies and the 
Third World. London: Allen Lane, 1973. 
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Figure C for details of sugarmill ownership in Zambia.13 
Malawi 
If Tate & Lyle can be said to hold the reins of the Zambian sugar 
industry without being a major shareholder therein, then Lonrho's 
dominion over the sugar industry of Malawi is unquestionable. Not only 
is Lonrho the most prominent sharehoider in the two comp:ulies producing 
sugar in the country, but it also holds management contracts for both 
sugarmills concerned. And the penetration of Lonrho into the country's 
economy came out of a particularly intimate tie which the company 
established with the Malawian government. 
The Sugar Corporation of Malawi was formed in 1965 after Lonrho had 
collaborated for a year with the state to prepare seed-cane and to 
resettle large numbers of people occupying the land which WJ:U3 selected 
for the sugar venture. Production in the SUCOMA sugarmill, which was 
built by a South African company, began in 1967. A more recently formed 
compmy, Dwangwa Sugar Corporation, has constructed a second sugarmill 
in the country which also operates under Lonrho management. 
These sugarmilling projects are the most recent investments by Lonrho in 
the industry on the sub-continent, and they also reflect a consolidation 
of the Lonrho machinations in sugar company shares. As has been 
mentioned, in 1967 Lonrho bought a company owning three sugarmills in 
Mauritius. This was effected by a Lonrho controlled compmy, Swaziland 
Sugar Milling Company, which in 1972 gave over control of the Mauritian 
interests to Lonrho in exchange for its shares in SUCOMA. In· 1977 the 
13 Figure C is based on the following sources: South African ~ Year 
Book ( 1979 ); and Tate & Lyle ( 1979). 
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picture cleared when Swaziland Sugar Milling Company was renamed Lonrho 
SUgar Corporation. This subsidiary of Lonrho's now controls sugarmills 
in South Africa, Mauritius, Swaziland, and Malawi, and has a Mauritian 
as its chairman and joint managing director. See Figure D for details 
· of sugarmill ownership in Malawi.14 
Summary 
The majority of southern Africa's sugarmills are controlled, if not 
owned, by South Africa- or England-based multinational corporations. 
Evidence points to a readiness on the part of some of the corporations 
to engpge in sugarmilling projects as minority shareholders, in order to 
.derive the benefits of plant supply contracts; management contracts; 
refining and distribution contracts; and research and development(R & D) 
opportunities. Tate & Lyle is the most prominent corporation in this 
respect, being not only the owner of the Mirrlees Watson Comapany which 
manufactures sugarmill components, but having also a strong R & D 
function in the industry, as well as owning the British refineries. The 
investment of foreign capital in the sugar industries of southern Africa 
is integrally associated with transfers of plant, technology, and 
personnel, and while redundant sugarmills from Mauritius and Natal have 
been relocated in new sugar-producing regions, Mauritius and, to a 
lesser extent, South Africa have been important sources of sugarmilling 
experts for all the SU€fll"-producing countries in southern Africa. This 
accentuates the pattern of foreign domination over sugarmilling in most 
southern African countries. 
14 Figure D is based on the following sources: South African 8u€lll" Year 
Book (1979); and Lonrho Sugar Corporation(1979). 
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FIGURE A: OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OF SUGAR MILLS IN ZIMBABWE, 1980 
COMPANIES MILLS 
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FIGURE B: OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OF SUGAR MILLS IN SWAZILAND, 1980 
COMPANIES 
LONRHO Ltd 
64% beneficial interest l 99% equity interest 
LONRHO SUGAR CORPORATION Ltd 60%) UBOMBO RANCHES Ltd 
TATE & LYLE ~ ROYAL SWAZILAND SUGAR CORPORATION 
?0;0 . . . Ltd 
gg~~~~~~~~~H i~• f'o (!~t~e:p~~!~bi:c~~;c~!n~~~~!~~) 
CORPORATION ~ . 
SWAZILAND GOVERNMENT 
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TOTAL NUMBER OF SUGAR MILLS: 3 
Other MNC Interests in the Sugar Industry: 
C G SMITH 14% CROOKES BROS Ltd 100%:. CROOKES PLANTATIONS Ltd 
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FIGURE C: OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL or SUGAR MILLS IN ZAMBIA, 1980 
COMPANIES MILLS 
NAKAMBALA ESTATE Ltd Nakambala 
T 10,78~6 
TATE & LYLE Ltd -------~: ZAMBIA SUGAR Co Ltd 
INDECO Ltd 
(Tate & Lyle Technical 
Services Ltd responsible 
for management) 
TOTAL NUMBER OF SUGAR MILLS: 1 
Other MNC Interests in the Sugar Industry: 
ZAMBIA SUGAR Co Ltd 100%_ Ndola Refinery 
(Tate & Lyle Technical Services Ltd 
responsible for management) 
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FIGURE D: OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OF SUGAR MILLS IN MALAWI, 1980 
COMPANIES MILLS 
LONRHO Ltd 1 991 equity interest ADMARK PRESS 
64% beneficial interest "\·5% INDUSTRIES /z4,5~~ 
51% LONRHO SUGAR CORPORATION Ltd - SUGAR· 





31 • 87~~ - DWANGWA , SUGAR CORPORATION Dwangwa 
(Lonrho Ltd responsible 
for management) 
-
TOTAL NUMBER OF SUGAR MILLS: 2 
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